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Abstract  
 
This thesis is about broadsheet coverage of the European Parliament (EP). More 
precisely, it studies the amount and content of news referring to the EP as well 
as the professional attitudes of their producers. The main purpose of the thesis is 
to explain variation in the press coverage. Thereby it combines political 
communication research with the European integration literature discussing the 
legitimacy of the EP. It argues that cross-country and inter-temporal variation 
cannot be explained by factors internal to news production alone. Instead, 
national parliamentary traditions impact profoundly on the way EU parliamentary 
affairs are reported. 
The thesis employs a mixed-methods research design. It conducts a quantitative 
content analysis of 18 broadsheets published in six European countries – Ireland, 
the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria – over three 
time periods: one is a routine period of two years; the remaining two datasets 
are oriented at key issues and events over time. In total, 3956 newspaper 
articles are analysed. In addition, 18 in-depth interviews with the respective 
Brussels correspondents and a director at the EP Directorate-General for 
Communication complement the findings. 
While the EP receives regular coverage, the thesis finds that news are selected 
and presented according to the interest of the audience. Hence the domestic 
angle prevails in the news coverage and the EP’s own prominence and potential 
to generate conflict attract media attention more often when major issues are at 
stake. However, domestic relevance is not the only explanatory factor. While 
newsmakers also respond to varying levels of public support for EU membership, 
the thesis identifies national parliamentary traditions as a strong external driver 
of EP news coverage. Here, procedural characteristics and public expectations 
shape the amount and content of EP news as well as newsmakers’ attitudes – 
and more significantly so with the rising powers of the Parliament. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction: 
The European Parliament and the press 
 
This thesis studies the amount, volume and content of news referring to EU 
parliamentary affairs as well as the approaches of their producers. The main purpose 
of the thesis is to explain variation in the news coverage of the quality press. Thereby 
it aims to link political communication research to the literature on European 
integration discussing the legitimacy of the European Parliament (EP). It argues that 
cross-country and inter-temporal variation cannot be explained by factors internal to 
the news production process alone. Instead, national parliamentary traditions impact 
profoundly on the way EU parliamentary affairs are reported alongside public 
opinion towards the EU.  
To develop this argument, the thesis conducts a quantitative content analysis of 
newspaper articles published in the quality press of six countries, namely Ireland, the 
United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria. In each country, 
three broadsheets have been chosen – one leaning to the political left, one to the 
political right, and a business-oriented or financial newspaper. A total of 3956 
newspaper articles are analysed across three time periods. One is a two-year-long 
routine period between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007. The remaining 
periods are orientated at key events and issues. The investiture procedure of the 
European Commission in the years 1999, 2004 and 2009/10 and the study of the 
SWIFT case, later SWIFT agreement, between 1 June 2006 and 30 November 2010 
serve to examine changes over time. 30 articles from three US newspapers are added 
to the latter dataset for comparison. Using a mixed-methods approach, the findings 
are complemented by 18 in-depth interviews with their respective correspondents in 
Brussels and with one director at the EP Directorate-General for Communication.  
This chapter presents the research puzzle followed by the research agenda before it 
elaborates the argument of the thesis. The last section provides an outline of the 
thesis.  
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1.1 The research puzzle 
On 7 July 2011 BBC News Magazine published an online article explaining the new 
EU law that simplifies and clarifies information on food packaging for European 
consumers (Winterman 2011). On the day before, the EP approved the draft 
legislation in its second reading under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP).
1
 
The legislative outcome was preceded by lengthy negotiations between the members 
of the Parliament and the Council who were themselves lobbied by both consumer 
groups and the food industry. In the end, the Parliament was able to steer through a 
compromise which entails ‘more information, choice and quality’ for European 
consumers (European Parliament 2011). However, the EP’s role was not mentioned 
at all in the BBC news article. The newsmaker here stressed the actual outcome 
rather than the preceding political battles leading to the compromise. While this is 
just one example – and although British dailies did not report anything from the EP 
on that day, other newspapers across Europe picked it up – the question of why the 
EP’s role was not granted greater consideration in this case remains unanswered.  
Being a parliament one of the EP’s core functions is to generate publicity – which is 
according to Rush (1976: 28) ‘one of Parliament’s most important weapons’ when 
speaking of the House of Commons. Not only does the EP regularly meet in plenary 
sessions to debate European legislation, it also openly scrutinises the European 
Commission in its day-to-day business as well by means of the elective function – 
the Parliament has the right to vote the Commission both in and out of office. 
Further, the EP holds comprehensive legislative powers having gained the status of a 
‘co-equal’ legislator alongside the Council (e.g. Tsebelis and Garrett 2000; Corbett, 
Jacobs et al. 2003; Kreppel 2003; Maurer 2003). Publicity is not only owed to 
institutional provisions, but also inherent to its special representative role in the EU 
political system as the only directly elected institution. Liebert (2007: 262) points out 
that the EP ‘fosters publicity and transparency in a range of activity spheres of the 
Union that otherwise would go completely unnoticed by the public’.  
Despite the European Parliament’s relevant role in the EU political system, shooting 
a messenger upfront for not reporting about it is not supportive in understanding the 
EP’s legitimacy in public. As Statham (2006: 7) argues, the lack of visibility of 
                                               
1 Title: Provision of food information to consumers (repeal. Directives 90/496/EEC and 
2000/13/EC), COD/2008/0028 
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European affairs is not necessarily due to a poor media performance but ‘could, and 
arguably is more likely to, result from inadequacies in the performances of the 
political system […]’.   
In fact, the Parliament’s expanded powers are only one side of the coin. The other 
side is that the problem of the EU democratic deficit persists (see Follesdal and Hix 
2006). Earlier proposals predicted an increase in democratic legitimacy of the EU 
once the Parliament would have been strengthened (e.g. Williams 1991; Lodge 1994) 
as has been the case with the Treaty revisions in the last few years. But the latter is 
still accused of being the European project’s ‘big failure’ (The Economist 2009b) in 
that it is unable to link to European citizens (see also The Economist 2009a). 
National parliaments may be closer, or even better at representing their citizens from 
a populist point of view. Nevertheless, the expansion of scrutiny rights of national 
parliaments by the Lisbon Treaty may lead to greater de jure legitimacy of EU 
politics; in practice however their direct influence in EU policy making is likely to 
have little or no effect (see, for instance, Raunio 2010).  
European elections exemplify the peculiar relationship between EU citizens and their 
representatives. Research regularly supports the phenomenon of second-order 
elections which are not a contest about Europe, its candidates and parties but are 
dominated by domestic politics as low voter turnout and the success of national 
opposition and smaller parties suggest (e.g. Marsh 1998; Hix and Marsh 2007; Hix 
and Marsh 2011; Hobolt and Wittrock 2011). At the same time public awareness 
levels of how the European Union operates are not very high. Eurobarometer figures 
repeatedly highlight the lack of public knowledge about and understanding of the EU 
and its Parliament
2
, despite presenting relatively high public trust levels towards the 
latter.
3
 Given the lack of awareness public opinion research is unable to answer 
                                               
2 The average figures for the number of EU citizens who ‘feel they understand the way the 
European Union works’ were 41% in 2005 (European Commission 2005b) and only slightly 
higher with 47% in 2010 (European Commission 2010b). According to a Special Eurobarometer 
published in 2008, the average for the self-perceived knowledge of the EP’s role in the EU was 
ranked by EU citizens at 3.7 on a scale between 1 (‘I know nothing’) and 10 (‘I know a great 
deal’) (European Commission 2008c).  
3 In 2005, 51% of European citizens expressed that they ‘tend to trust’ the EP (European 
Commission 2005b). Five years later, this figure is slightly lower with 48% (European 
Commission 2010b). Throughout the years, these trust levels have been higher than for the 
European Commission or the European Council.  
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questions about citizens’ evaluations of the day-to-day parliamentary business in the 
European Union.
4
 
Yet, information gathered via mass surveys is not the only source of public opinion 
for the evaluation of perceptions about the European Parliament. In fact, one of the 
mass media’s functions is to transmit news and information, impressions and 
interpretations from the European Union, its institutions and EU policy-making to 
European citizens (cf. Gerhards 2000; Baisnée 2004; Statham 2006). And indeed, EU 
citizens rely on both broadcast and print media as a source of information about 
European affairs.
5
 By providing information and news from Brussels journalists are 
able to raise public awareness of EU politics (cf. de Vreese and Boomgaarden 
2006a). Peters (2005) suggests further that public discourse enables citizens to 
participate in the emerging European democracy. Hence if successful, media 
coverage has a legitimising function and thereby contributes to reducing the 
democratic deficit (see, for instance, Meyer 1999; de Vreese, Banducci et al. 2006; 
Bijsmans and Altides 2007). That is also why Trenz (2008: 303) claims that 
‘[European] integration studies need to understand how media act as selective 
amplifiers of political information about the EU and how selected outputs are turned 
into news that shape the political reality of Europe’. 
Thus, in order to comprehend the relationship between the European Parliament and 
EU citizens a study of the media becomes inevitable:  
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 One exception is the publication of a Special Eurobarometer survey on the European 
Parliament in March 2008, with fieldwork conducted between September and November 2007 
(European Commission 2008c). It tested knowledge and assessed self-perceived awareness of 
European citizens about the EP as well their opinions and expectations towards the latter. The 
thesis will elaborate on this in the conclusions.  
5 In spring 2005 Eurobarometer reported that 70% would use television as a source of 
information about EU affairs, followed by 43% who also relied on daily newspapers. An 
additional 22% sought the internet for EU news among other sources (European Commission 
2005a). Five years later (European Commission 2010b) these figures look only slightly 
different: 81% used television, 49% daily newspapers, and 26% the internet to keep themselves 
informed. 
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‘Modern politics are largely mediated politics, experienced by the 
great majority of citizens at one remove, through their print and 
broadcast media of choice. Any study of democracy in 
contemporary conditions is therefore also a study of how the media 
report and interpret political events and issues; of how they 
facilitate the efforts of politicians to persuade their electorates of 
the correctness of policies and programmes; of how they 
themselves (i.e., editorial staff, management and proprietors) 
influence the political process and shape public opinion.’  
(McNair 2000: 1) 
In fact, European institutions have become increasingly aware of the media’s role of 
conveying news and information from the EU to European citizens. The sixth EU 
parliamentary term (2004-2009) witnessed an implementation sequence of new 
communication strategies by the European institutions. The European Commission 
came up, among other things, with Plan D
6
 in 2005 handled by a new Commissioner 
for Communication and Institutional Relations, Margot Wallström, and issued a 
White Paper on Communication
7
 one year later. The European Parliament itself 
modernised its website in September 2005 with the aim to facilitate access to both 
citizens and journalists (European Parliament 2005) followed by the introduction of 
EuroParlTV, an online television channel covering parliamentary debates, in 2008.
8
  
However, the media might be able to shape public opinion, but does not have 
exclusive control over it. Citizens form parts of their opinion on the ground of other 
impacts through their socialisation, such as the attitudes of their peers and long-
established cultural pre-conceptions. This feeds back to the media as well (cf. Norris 
2000). Thus, as ‘‘organizer’ of public opinion’ (Negrine 1996: 110) newsmakers are 
also able to hold European representatives accountable by acting as a democratic 
watchdog on behalf of EU citizens (cf. Meyer 2002). In other words, correspondents 
in Brussels are able to ‘put at test the legitimacy of the EU’ (Trenz 2008: 294). 
Hence, both integrative roles of the media – that of a messenger and of a 
                                               
6 European Commission (2005c): Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions. The Commission’s Contribution to the Period of Reflection and Beyond: Plan-D for 
Democracy, Dialogue and Debate, COM (2005) 494 final. Brussels, 13 October 2005. 
7 European Commission (2006c): White Paper on a European Communication Policy, COM 
(2006) 35 final. Brussels, 1 February 2006. 
8 For an overview of the communications activities by the European institutions see Bijsmans 
(2011: 73-82).  
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commentator (Statham 2006) – in the relationship between represented and 
representatives deserve particular scholarly attention in order to understand the 
perceived legitimacy of the European Parliament.  
 
1.2 The research agenda 
While media studies in the European context have grown considerably in numbers 
over the last few years, the European Parliament or its members have seldom been 
the subject of political communication research (but see Sonntag 1983; Morgan 
1999; Baisnée 2003; Anderson and McLeod 2004). Most of the literature that refers 
to the EP rather deals with the phenomenon of European elections (e.g. Blumler 
1983; Blumler, Gurevitch et al. 1986; Leroy and Siune 1994; de Vreese, Banducci et 
al. 2006; Schuck, Xezonakis et al. 2011). Generally, communication research in the 
EU context can be distinguished by three purposes: one research stream studies the 
salience of EU affairs in the media, another one seeks to detect media effects, while a 
third one investigates drivers of media coverage as in the present study.  
Studies related to the first stream compare media salience of European affairs across 
countries, various types of media (especially public and commercial broadcast as 
well as quality and tabloid print media) and over time. One concern here is to detect 
whether any form of Europeanisation of media coverage, content, tone or news angle 
has taken place across Europe. Thus far, researchers have observed that media 
coverage has risen over the years with the EU and European elections having become 
more visible in the news (e.g. Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart et al. 2010; Schuck, 
Xezonakis et al. 2011) although cross-country variation still prevails (e.g. de Vreese 
2001a; de Vreese, Banducci et al. 2006). Not many studies, however, investigate 
media coverage during routine periods, i.e. during times not characterised by 
significant events at the EU level (but see Norris 2000; Peter, Semetko et al. 2003; 
Peter and de Vreese 2004; Brüggemann and Kleinen von Königslöw 2007). 
Nevertheless, the results constantly highlight that European affairs are generally not 
prominent in the news. Instead, they are said to be only marginally visible in the 
national media (e.g. de Vreese 2003; Peter, Semetko et al. 2003; Peter and de Vreese 
2004; de Vreese, Lauf et al. 2007) and peak around key events (e.g. Norris 2000; de 
Vreese 2001a; Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart et al. 2010). However, some find that 
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once they are reported, they are granted greater consideration than other political 
news (as far as evening television programmes are concerned), which Peter et al. 
(2003) call the phenomenon of ‘invisible importance’.  
Overall the findings imply that similar assumptions can be made with respect to 
media coverage of European parliamentary affairs. Little coverage can be expected 
here unless major decisions are at stake. Yet, we cannot be certain since little 
research has been pursued to examine the EP’s visibility in the press. Sonntag (1983) 
investigates the media coverage of the first Parliament across four countries (France, 
Italy, West Germany and the UK) and across media outlets (radio, television, and the 
press). He has found that between 1979 and 1981 highly salient events such as the 
first elections to the EP and the latter’s rejection of the draft budget trigger news 
coverage. However, Sonntag has provided a rather negative outlook for the future by 
having predicted a downward trend in media coverage. Even though the EP has 
gained more powers in the meantime by the Maastricht Treaty, Morgan (1999) draws 
similar conclusions from a study examining media coverage of the European 
Parliament in Britain during the year 1996. He contrasts the results with separate 
findings from media coverage in Belgium and Ireland. In all three countries the 
European Parliament reportedly receives only minor attention. Further, Koopmans 
(2007) for the period of 1990 to 2002 also finds that legislative and party actors at 
both national and EU level are generally granted less consideration in the print media 
than core state actors. 
Criteria for the Europeanisation of news content are defined at the very least by 
corresponding media coverage in that ‘a European public sphere should reflect 
national media reporting on the same topic using common sources’ (de Vreese, 
Banducci et al. 2006: 479, following Risse and van de Steeg 2003). Peter et al. 
(2003) in this respect find convergence of the thematic structure by an analysis of 
television news in five EU countries. They identify three themes which have been 
covered to a similar extent and even presented in a similar light. Yet, other research 
discovers that during European elections a domestic angle prevails (e.g. Kevin 2003: 
71ff; de Vreese, Banducci et al. 2006). Results also differ in terms of tone – here all 
varieties have been confirmed: an election study across 25 countries of television and 
print media finds the tone mostly neutral (de Vreese, Banducci et al. 2006); 
correspondents’ evaluations of European affairs have been identified as pro-
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European with newsmakers following ‘business as usual’ (Statham 2006); while the 
opposite has been verified for a five country sample and television news during a 
routine period which tended to be negative (Peter et al. 2003). When returning to 
Morgan (1999) who investigates the media coverage of the EP, his results show that 
in the UK news was predominantly negative in its tone while in Ireland and Belgium 
the press coverage was reportedly mostly neutral and focussed on MEPs. Overall, the 
findings imply that variation in media coverage of EU parliamentary affairs is 
unlikely to be one-dimensional but diverges in several aspects, most notably across 
type of media, country, and by time period.  
Considering this variation in media content, research has eventually concluded that 
the requirements for a single European public sphere are not (yet) met (see Machill, 
Beiler et al. 2006). These are, among others, a shared language and a common media 
system enhancing pan-European debate (see, for instance, Kielmansegg 1996; 
Gerhards 2000). However, many argue that due to the dominance of national 
perspectives in the media we at best find a Europeanisation of co-existing or 
interacting national public spheres whose extent varies according to issue salience, 
reference points, journalistic interpretation and timing (cf. Bijsmans 2011). One can 
distinguish here between three types of Europeanisation (Koopmas 2007: 185ff): 
supranational Europeanisation, whereby European-level actors have an increased role 
in the media; vertical Europeanisation by means of European issues becoming 
relevant for the national context; and, horizontal Europeanisation, indicated by 
references to other European countries and political events (see also Koopmans and 
Erbe 2004).  
Little is known about how the European Parliament contributes to the development 
of a European public sphere, yet Liebert (2007: 260) argues that the shortcomings in 
the EP’s role of a ‘strong public’ lie in its representational function ‘since the liberal 
democratic link with constituencies reduces the EP’s potential for more deliberate 
forms of the European communicative space’. Hence following Liebert, it can be 
expected that vertical Europeanisation of media coverage is a more likely finding 
than a pan-European convergence of EP press coverage. 
Another research stream tries to relate EU news coverage to turnout in EP elections 
in terms of visibility (Norris 2000; Schönbach and Lauf 2002; Banducci and 
Semetko 2003; Banducci and Semetko 2004) while others go further and investigate 
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impacts of news content on feelings of identity (e.g. Bruter 2009), support for EU 
integration (e.g. Banducci, Karp et al. 2002; Vliegenthart, Schuck et al. 2008) and 
levels of Euroscepticism (e.g. Norris 2000). Research, furthermore, finds that the 
intensity of campaigns, of which media coverage is a part, in the run up to EU 
referendums is linked to the degree of change in citizens’ attitudes (Hobolt 2005).  
EU media coverage is also found to contribute to changes in public opinion about EU 
enlargement (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006b). In this kind of research news 
content is taken as the explanatory variable for political behaviour. This means that if 
the present research was to find an absence of media coverage about the EP, we 
would conclude that EU citizens would remain largely unaware of their 
representative body. Further, in the EU communications literature ‘a lack of news 
regarding the EU and the EP are thought to contribute to a lack of legitimacy […]’ 
(de Vreese, Banducci et al. 2006: 478). However, without denying the media’s role 
in shaping public opinion, any research of media effects would exceed the scope of 
this thesis which focuses on explaining variation in media coverage of EU 
parliamentary affairs.  
This leads us to a third research stream which attempts to explain differences in 
media coverage of European affairs. This study area is still somewhat narrow 
compared to the previous streams (Peter and de Vreese 2004: 4). Quantitative studies 
identify key events and salient issues as drivers of EU news coverage in broadcast 
media (Peter and de Vreese 2004) and newspapers (Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart et al. 
2010). Boomgaarden et al. (2010) even find that week-long meetings of the EP in 
Strasbourg and Brussels lead to more attention by the press. It can thus be expected 
that EU parliamentary affairs are actually newsworthy and covered by the press. 
Nevertheless, while the positive effect of parliamentary activities on their own press 
coverage would be a reasonable finding, it may not be a sufficient condition for 
explaining variation in EP media coverage. Quantitative research further finds that 
explanatory factors related to the financial structure of broadcasting companies – EU 
news is more prominent in public than in private broadcasting – and public opinion 
matter to the extent that higher levels of public satisfaction with democracy at the 
national level generate more prominent television news in five EU countries (Peter 
and de Vreese 2004). Others (Brüggemann and Kleinen von Königslöw 2007) reveal 
by regression analysis that the size of the country where news are distributed as well 
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as the interest of the editor in European affairs impacts on the extent to which 
newspaper coverage and content have Europeanised over 20 years’ time.  
As regards media coverage of the European Parliament, the exploratory study of 
Morgan (1999) suggests that factors related to historic developments, the electoral 
systems and benefiting positions in the EU alongside public support for EU 
membership would have an impact. Further, Morgan (1999) assumes that in the UK 
the latent dissent over the EU is responsible for the negative tone in the news, 
whereas in Ireland and Belgium citizens would be happy with EU membership and 
thus not be interested further. Hence mostly neutral stances towards the EP are 
expressed by newsmakers (ibid.: 91). This would mean that the European Parliament 
is equated with the EU as a whole, and its activities do not make a difference to the 
media. Remarkably, British MEPs have been interviewed revealing that in their eyes 
the general hostility towards EU institutions and attitudes of editors and publishers 
would contribute to these distortions. At this point though, the views and experiences 
of correspondents in Brussels and Strasbourg would have provided further 
explanations for the differences in media coverage.  
That is where Baisnée’s study (2003) ties in. He explores the relations of the Brussels 
press corps to the European Parliament, although he does not rely on interviews 
either. He argues that the changing numbers of correspondents registered with the EP 
would have to do with an absence of interest of the EU press corps in the institution. 
According to Baisnée some of this can be explained by the country specific 
journalistic culture. But the character of the institution itself would also make it 
difficult for the journalists to report. Anderson and McLeod (2004) evaluate the 
European Parliament communications strategy in this respect, concluding that both 
the European Parliament press directorates and the regional parliamentary offices 
would not provide sufficient support for journalists to cover EU parliamentary affairs 
satisfactorily. Moreover, MEPs are said to be even skilled and interested to a much 
lesser extent to cooperate with the media. Hence, Anderson and McLeod (2004) 
nickname the EP the ‘great non-communicator’. These findings are in line with what 
has been concluded for the EU in more general terms: a lack of access (Kevin 2003: 
122f) and of co-ordinated communications policies by the institutions (Gavin 2001) – 
especially by the European Commission amounting to a general communication 
deficit (Meyer 1999). 
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Interview or survey research (sometimes in combination with quantitative analysis) 
in general not only stresses the relationship of newsmakers to European institutions 
and actors as an explanation for varying press coverage (see Gleissner and de Vreese 
2005: 227f), but find the organisation inside the newsroom including logistics and 
news routines as indispensable for explaining the correspondents’ approach to EU 
news (e.g. de Vreese 2001b; de Vreese 2003). Interviews also reveal that the editor’s 
interest is a decisive factor for the amount of EU news published in European dailies 
(e.g. Morgan 1995; Gleissner and de Vreese 2005). Others further investigate 
working conditions (e.g. Lecheler 2008), or the professional role understanding of 
correspondents (e.g. Gerhards 1993; Siapera 2004; Statham 2006). 
Notwithstanding these relevant studies in the field, several questions remain 
unanswered: Under what particular conditions does the European Parliament receive 
media coverage? What precisely is reported about the EP, its members and their 
activities? In what way? And lastly, what explains the variation in media coverage 
across countries, media outlets and over time, if there is any?
9
 These require 
systematic investigation.  
To sum up previous contributions in EU communication research, there are several 
things to be learnt for the study of EP press coverage. Firstly, there is reason to 
believe that media representations vary across member states. Thus, a systematic 
cross-country analysis allowing us to infer generalisations is inevitable. Secondly, 
variation was also found across various types of media outlets which research on EU 
parliamentary affairs should bear in mind. Thirdly, research thus far has primarily 
analysed EU media coverage over rather short time periods. Hence, news about the 
EP should be studied over a longer period of time and include both routine periods 
and key events. Fourthly, the drivers of this variation have to be investigated 
thoroughly. Previous research cited above has identified effects either internal or 
external to news production. A study of EP press coverage should draw them 
together. That means, alongside factors linked to the working conditions, editorial 
constraints and routines of newsmakers, public opinion which is a temporal factor, 
features of the domestic political system as well as media system characteristics have 
to be tested with respect to news content and coverage. Lastly, in order to 
                                               
9 The last question, which cannot be addressed in this thesis, would ask: What effect has media 
coverage of EU parliamentary affairs on public opinion (towards the EP, and the EU)?  
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comprehend the whole picture it is advisable to apply a mixed-methods research 
design. Quantitative analysis should be complemented by interviews with EP news 
producers, i.e. the correspondents in Brussels, in order to investigate their stances 
towards EU parliamentary activities as well as their reflections of their role and 
profession. 
 
1.3 The argument 
Seeing that the literature has largely ignored the media coverage of the European 
Parliament and its members, the thesis therefore proposes the following research 
question:  
What explains variation over time and across country in the press 
coverage of the European Parliament? 
In answering the research question the thesis distinguishes between three dimensions. 
The first one is the study of the extent of news coverage; the second one concerns the 
presentation of news content in terms of formal characteristics (but not by means of 
tone). Both these dimensions respond to the media’s role of a messenger by 
transmitting news, impressions and information from the European Parliament to 
their audiences across Europe. The third dimension investigates the newsmakers’ 
evaluations of the European Parliament. By that, the thesis also considers the media’s 
role of a commentator on EU parliamentary affairs.  
To this end, the thesis employs a mixed-methods approach. The quantitative analysis 
considers a total of 3956 newspaper articles published in the quality press of six 
European countries plus 30 articles from US broadsheets. The study stretches over a 
routine period and two time periods examining key events and issues. The findings 
are complemented by 18 in-depth interviews with the respective correspondents in 
Brussels as well as one director at the EP Directorate-General for Communication. 
On the whole, the thesis identifies three main factors responsible for the variation in 
news coverage which affect all three dimensions of coverage, content and 
newsmakers’ evaluations of EU parliamentary affairs: news values as impacts 
stemming from within the news production process, and public support for EU 
membership as well as the national parliamentary tradition as external factors. The 
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thesis finds that EP news is selected and presented according to the interest of the 
audience. Hence the domestic angle prevails in the news coverage and the EP’s own 
prominence and potential to generate conflict attract media attention more often 
when major issues are at stake. However, domestic relevance is not the only 
explanatory factor. While newsmakers also respond to varying levels of public 
support for EU membership, the thesis identifies the national parliamentary tradition 
as a strong driver of EP news coverage. Here, respective procedural characteristics 
and public expectations shape the coverage and content of EP news as well as 
newsmakers’ attitudes – and more significantly so with the rising powers of the 
Parliament.  
News values represent an established notion of communication research maintaining 
that news is selected according to the interest of the audience. For political news 
stories, standard criteria comprise importance and conflict among others. For EU 
news a central news value is domestic relevance, which is characterised as having an 
impact for the domestic audience. The thesis argues that these standard criteria also 
become applicable for the news coverage of EU parliamentary affairs, albeit to a 
varying extent. News from the EP is primarily selected on the issue rather than on the 
importance of the institution, the prominence of its members or their ability to 
generate political conflict. Hence, the central news selection criterion is that the 
issues with which Europe’s legislators are concerned, be they political or policy-
related, have to be relevant for the domestic audience newsmakers are writing for.  
Altering some contentions of the Europeanisation debate in that the domestic 
orientation of news hinders the development of a European public sphere, the thesis 
argues that this news value is responsible for the regular coverage of EU 
parliamentary affairs which follows the legislative cycle of the European Parliament. 
In addition, the thesis finds that EP news coverage rises in publication numbers 
during the run-up to general elections at the national level which serves as an 
indicator for EU parliamentary politics being relevant for their ability to permeate 
domestic politics. The domestic perspective in news content furthermore provides a 
mediated form of linkage between European representatives and their constituents by 
widely featuring prominent nationally elected MEPs.    
The importance of the EP and its potential to stimulate political conflict, however, 
are decisive selection criteria at a pan-European level when the EP is actually able to 
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use its institutional powers. The SWIFT case witnesses a ‘Lisbon effect’ in news 
coverage in that the use of its new veto power on international agreements caused a 
significant rise in attention paid to the EP by the quality press. The example of the 
investiture procedure shows, however, that press coverage of the EP does not rise 
exponentially but reaches a satisfaction level once MEPs have demonstrated their 
powers already as in the case of 2004. Yet, following the increased parliamentary 
powers of the Lisbon Treaty the coverage of EU parliamentary affairs is expected to 
remain at a high level. The thesis argues that these are positive conditions for public 
awareness levels of the European representative body. 
The thesis argues that two further, external effects drive the press coverage of EU 
parliamentary affairs. The thesis contends that the latter generate a specific type of 
political news – regardless of the issue they refer to a parliamentary institution and 
its actors, their attitudes, behaviour and decisions. Considering that the EU political 
system is very complex featuring lengthy decision-making processes influenced by a 
multitude of political actors, the European Parliament’s precise role therein is 
difficult to identify for European citizens.  
This has two implications for the press coverage of European parliamentary affairs. 
The first one is that this lack of public knowledge contributes to an undifferentiated 
view onto European politics. The thesis therefore argues that the EP’s press coverage 
is probably dependent on public stances towards the EU in general. In particular, the 
thesis shows that higher levels of public support for EU membership are linked to 
greater attention to EU parliamentary affairs by the quality press. While Eurosceptic 
stances are less visible in the professional assessments of parliamentary politics by 
correspondents in Brussels, news content reflects negative stances towards EU 
integration by featuring respective Eurosceptic MEPs in countries where the public is 
less supportive of the European project.  
The second implication is that newsmakers have to find an approach to reporting EU 
parliamentary politics which is comprehensible for their readers. The thesis argues 
that due to the public unawareness of the EP journalists use the domestic 
parliamentary tradition as a reference point. The thesis shows that the press reflects 
characteristics of procedures inherent to the national parliamentary tradition in the 
presentation of news content about EU parliamentary affairs. In particular, such 
reflections become apparent in the representations of individual MEPs and of the 
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hearings preceding the conformation of the Barroso II Commission. As regards the 
MEPs, news content reproduces cross-country differences by varying patterns of 
references to constituency focus, individual party membership as well as to the 
legislative and political role of individual EU representatives. 
By taking the national parliamentary tradition as a standard, the findings provide 
room for the assumption that the European Parliament is perceived by the press as a 
rival to its national counterparts. Not only is the extent of news coverage of EU 
parliamentary affairs affected negatively by higher levels of public trust in the 
national parliament, but newsmakers’ evaluations illustrate that the European 
Parliament is being criticised for not being like the respective national counterpart. 
The thesis argues that this is because the European Parliament has grown out of the 
parliamentary tradition commonly found at the national level and developed into an 
institution which is quite distinct in many respects, most notably concerning its 
elective function and its autonomous position in the EU political system providing it 
with considerable veto powers. Newsmakers experience difficulties in presenting the 
EP in a manner that is perceptible for their readers. Rather than representing it for 
that it is, they still draw comparisons to the national legislature which casts a 
damning light onto the European Parliament.    
In consideration of these findings the thesis contributes to understanding the 
European Parliament’s democratic legitimacy in public. In the end, it all comes down 
to the notion of one correspondent: the European Parliament is regarded as ‘a serious 
joke’ by Brussels correspondents in that it is relevant at the European level for it to 
receive press coverage, but it is not yet trusted to be as serious as national 
parliaments from a national point of view and hence not represented by its unique 
role in the EU political system. 
 
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical framework of the thesis in order to answer 
questions about the drivers of EP news coverage. Thereby it builds on previous 
research regarding the production process of EU news. The chapter argues that news 
about EU parliamentary affairs generate political news stories which fall into two 
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categories. On the one hand, they belong to the category of EU news and thus a 
European dimension has to be considered when trying to explain the factors 
responsible for EP news coverage. It will be argued that news is selected on the 
newsworthiness of the issues involved. Thus, EP news coverage is driven by the need 
of a story to be relevant for a domestic audience. Other news values, particularly the 
importance of the EP and its ability to generate political conflict, are weighed against 
this criterion and are more likely to become applicable when major issues are at 
stake. Nevertheless, EU parliamentary affairs are a specific type of political news – 
regardless of the issue they refer to a parliamentary institution and its actors, their 
attitudes, behaviour and decisions. Given the complexity of the EU political system 
which makes it difficult to identify the European Parliament’s role therein resulting 
in an undifferentiated view onto European politics, it is expected that, without 
neglecting an effect of media coverage onto public opinion, public stances towards 
EU integration in general impact on news coverage and content of parliamentary 
affairs as well as the newsmakers’ evaluations thereof – alongside levels of party 
political contestation of the EU issue. In addition, it is argued that the national 
parliamentary tradition has an influence. Put differently, due to the public 
unawareness of the EP the coverage is aimed at the readers’ familiarity with and 
appreciation of the domestic parliamentary culture. Firstly, the latter’s trust in the 
national parliament determines the amount of coverage the European equivalent 
receives. The more people appreciate Parliament in general, the more likely they 
want to hear from the EP. Secondly, their understanding of how Parliament works at 
the domestic level shapes news content. It is likely that the press reflects 
characteristics in procedural terms of the national parliamentary tradition in the 
presentation of news about EU parliamentary affairs in order to make news better 
comprehensible. Thirdly, although the thesis does not investigate the tone of news it 
is expected that correspondents compare the European Parliament to the national 
equivalent when evaluating the former’s role given the familiarity and expectations 
of their readers. The impact of the national parliamentary culture is arguably the 
strongest determiner of EP news coverage affecting coverage, content and 
evaluations by the press.  
Chapter 3 presents the research design and methodological approach of the thesis. It 
argues that while broadsheets do by no means represent the general media landscape 
in a country, they provide political comment and analysis of European matters for 
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which they employ correspondents in Brussels. At the same time, cross-media 
variation is largely being controlled for in order to answer the research question. 
Further the investigation comprises six EU member states, namely Ireland, the 
United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria. In each country 
three broadsheets have been chosen for analysis. Despite being a rather small sample, 
the cases are comparable on the key explanatory factors while controlling for effects 
related to the different media systems. Not only is the research able to detect the 
domestic relevance in the EP coverage, but also to determine external effects on the 
news production process. In all these countries the domestic political cycles are 
independent from each other. However, most importantly we find variation both in 
terms of public support levels towards EU membership and in characteristics of 
parliamentary tradition which cross-cut each other. The selection of time periods 
seeks to fill in some gaps in EU communication research which predominantly 
focuses on key events or issues. The first period serves as a routine period between 1 
October 2005 and 30 September 2007 which was not severely interrupted by external 
events such as defeated referenda on the EU constitution. Yet, some far-reaching 
legislative decisions have been taken and during the period the EP was faced with 
many internal changes. The remaining two periods target crucial parliamentary and 
legislative decisions by the EP and consider possible before/after effects in the press 
coverage. Here, the investiture vote of Prodi, Barroso I and II serve as a measure of 
parliamentary scrutiny and media representations thereof. The case surrounding the 
SWIFT issue investigates the Lisbon-effect of parliamentary power and its impact on 
news coverage from the EP. The methodological approach of the study is mixed: The 
thesis first and foremost relies on a large-N quantitative analysis of broadsheet 
articles about EU parliamentary affairs; and secondly on expert interviews conducted 
with correspondents in Brussels. While it accounts for both the media’s roles of a 
messenger and commentator, this combination also responds to the need in political 
science, and political communication in particular, to give full account to both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. At the same time, the method serves to even 
out methodological weaknesses of either approach allowing for a sufficient amount 
of external and internal validity as well as reliability of the results.  
Chapters 4 to 6 represent the empirical part of the thesis. The first empirical chapter 
investigates the drivers causing variation in the extent of EP news coverage during 
the first period chosen for investigation. It introduces the Tobit regression model 
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which is also used in the remainder of the empirical analysis. As regards the EU 
dimension of news stories, the chapter argues that news selection criteria applied to 
the salience of the issues involved matter for the press coverage. Here, the need to be 
relevant for a domestic audience represents a crucial driver which also becomes 
apparent in the fact that more news from the EP is being produced in the run up to 
general elections in the national context. The importance and potential for 
controversy of EU parliamentary activities have an impact as well, although these are 
subject to further circumstances related to the legislative process at the EU level. The 
chapter finds that the precise coverage of parliamentary affairs at the EU level is 
dependent on whether the EP is sitting in plenary session or not. Thereby the press 
coverage follows the ‘normal’ parliamentary cycle of the EP distributing more news 
during the winter months than during the summer break. The chapter furthermore 
argues that public opinion is indeed linked to EP news coverage. At times and in 
countries where citizens are more in favour of EU membership, the European 
Parliament receives more press coverage – a finding which underlines the EP’s 
dependence on public evaluations of the EU political system as a whole. Contrary to 
the initial assumptions however, trust in the national parliament has a negative effect 
on the attention the European press pays to the European equivalent which provides 
room for the assumption that the European Parliament is judged against its 
counterparts in the national context proposing some form of rivalry going on 
between the institutions in the public sphere. While this rivalry is being exemplified 
by the German and British cases, this phenomenon requires further investigation. 
Chapter 5 studies characteristics and drivers of news content about EU parliamentary 
affairs. Thereby it concentrates on MEPs because their presentation provides a 
comparable and significant measure of news content across newspapers. The chapter 
essentially argues that, while MEP prominence matters to some extent, the way 
newsmakers in Brussels approach Europe’s legislators and present them in the news 
is influenced by features and procedures of the respective national parliamentary 
tradition in terms of electoral competition and resulting behaviour of political actors. 
This is not only apparent in the domestic focus of news content – a finding which 
does not hold for the French quality press though – but also identified by the varying 
patterns in references to constituency focus, individual party membership as well as 
to the legislative and political role of individual representatives in Strasbourg. In 
short, Europe’s representatives are conceived of as deputies for their domestic 
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colleagues. The wider conclusions of these findings underline the potential of the EP 
to be perceived as a rival to national parliaments. European legislators and their roles 
are not presented as unique or supranational, but as similar to those of national 
parliamentarians. This lends support to the assumption that MEPs and MPs as well 
their performances are directly compared, which provides implications for the 
analysis of newsmakers’ evaluations of the EP in the next chapter. One exception is 
the French press which not only stresses European legislators more often than their 
counterparts in the remaining countries, but also reflect only few similarities to the 
role understanding of French MPs. A possible explanation can be related to the 
relative weakness of the French Parliament whose relevance is undermined by 
Presidential politics. French broadsheets might compensate this weakness by 
stressing the unique, supranational character of the European Parliament and its 
members. Here, a potential rivalry between the parliamentary institutions at the 
European and national level might go in favour of the former in that it is regarded as 
a somewhat better parliament as regards its functions of executive scrutiny and 
decision-making power. 
Chapter 6 examines the coverage of key events: namely the SWIFT case and the 
investiture of the European Commission. The aim here is to explain variation over 
time as well as to examine newsmakers’ evaluations of the EP’s role during these 
events. By focussing on two most-likely cases, the research is able to hold events at 
the European level constant in order to test the main research hypotheses. The 
chapter argues that news coverage follows the growing importance of the European 
Parliament for EU politics over time. Broadsheet coverage rises significantly once 
the European Parliament is able to make use of its powers exemplified by the EP’s 
threat to veto the incoming Barroso I Commission in October 2004 and the actual 
rejection of the SWIFT agreement in February 2010. However, given that news 
media respond to the news value of surprise, the chapter finds that press coverage 
after such climaxes is not an ever-increasing phenomenon. Instead, the press appears 
to become used to the Parliament’s new powers by being more aware of the ongoings 
with the press coverage ‘normalising‘ at a relatively high level. This has positive 
implications for levels of public awareness of the European Parliament and its 
members. However, news content and newsmakers’ evaluations do not treat the EP 
as a ‘normal’ parliament. Instead, the EP is being criticised for not yet being as 
competent as its national counterparts in terms of efficiency and scrutiny of the 
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executive. Results from both the quantitative and qualitative analysis provide reason 
to believe that this is due to the precise fact that the EP does in reality not resemble 
parliamentary traditions at the national level, but, if anything, comes closer to the US 
American Congress. That is also why that the press have difficulties in presenting 
EU parliamentary affairs in a manner that is understandable for their readers. This 
argument integrates the findings of the previous two chapters: The EP is indeed 
perceived as an extension of the national parliamentary tradition in procedural terms, 
but since it grew institutionally stronger it is seen as a rival to its national 
equivalents, especially in countries where the latter are generally considered quite 
influential legislatures in the domestic context. 
Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter. It draws together the main findings of the thesis 
and discusses the precise contributions to the existing literature, both empirically and 
theoretically. The chapter also highlights the limitations of the study but at the same 
time points at avenues for future research in the field of EU political communication 
in general, and EP coverage in particular. Lastly, the thesis provides an outlook for 
the Parliament’s legitimacy in the public eye and possible implications for European 
democracy.   
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Chapter 2  
News coverage of EU parliamentary affairs:  
A framework for analysis 
 
The present chapter discusses the factors which are likely to impact on the news 
coverage of EU parliamentary affairs. Media studies generally differentiate between 
external and internal factors that determine news production. Accordingly, internal 
impacts stem from within media organisations and the professional understanding of 
journalists. These mainly comprise organisational governance, work routines, which 
include the application of news values, as well as personal principles and beliefs (see, 
for instance, Esser 1998; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; de Vreese 2001b; de Vreese 
2003; Donsbach and Patterson 2004). Comparative research identifies external 
effects, on the other hand, as being outside of news organisations and individual 
news makers. These range from media ownership to media system dynamics, politics 
and even to broader cultural settings (see, for instance, Semetko, Blumler et al. 1991; 
Bennett 1996; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Hallin and Mancini 2004; Schudson 
2005). This chapter picks up on this distinction but develops the impact of external 
factors further by arguing that the domestic parliamentary tradition is expected to be 
a central driver of EP news coverage. 
In doing so, the chapter suggests that news about EU parliamentary affairs generate 
political news stories which fall into two categories. To begin with, they belong to 
the category of EU news and thus a European dimension has to be considered first 
when trying to explain the factors responsible for EP news coverage. This entails that 
news referring to EU parliamentary affairs is not necessarily selected because the 
European Parliament and its members are deemed newsworthy by newsmakers, but 
because of the issues involved, be they political or policy-related. It will be argued 
that these issues are first and foremost likely to be selected, presented and discussed 
in light of their relevance for the domestic audience – a phenomenon which holds for 
EU news in general and thus can also be expected to be pertinent for EU 
parliamentary affairs. Other news values, particularly the importance of the EP and 
its members and their ability to generate conflict, which normally apply to political 
news, are likely to be weighed against this criterion, unless major pan-European 
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issues are at stake. Further, the concurrence of EU news with national events has to 
be considered. When highly salient events are at stake at the domestic level, EU 
parliamentary affairs are likely to receive less attention. 
Nevertheless, EU parliamentary affairs are a specific type of political news – 
regardless of the issue they refer to a parliamentary institution and its actors, their 
attitudes, behaviour and decisions. Therefore, the chapter argues that news values, 
and especially domestic relevance, are not the sole explanatory factors for variation 
in EP press coverage and proposes two external effects. Given the complexity of the 
EU political system which makes it difficult to identify the European Parliament’s 
role therein resulting in an undifferentiated view onto European politics, it is 
expected that, as part of the reciprocal relationship between the media and public 
opinion, public stances towards EU integration in general impact on news coverage 
and content of EU parliamentary affairs as well as the newsmakers’ evaluations 
thereof. The latter are expected to respond to a Eurosceptic mood with less coverage, 
reactive news content and rather negative attitudes towards the EP, while the interest 
of somewhat more Europhile readers is likely to lead to the opposite effect. The 
chapter also introduces an alternative hypothesis of political contestation of the EU 
issue, whereby greater party polarization is likely to lead to more coverage.   
In addition, and most importantly, it is argued that the understanding of the national 
parliamentary tradition impacts on the news coverage of EU parliamentary affairs. 
Put differently, the coverage is aimed at the readers’ familiarity with and 
appreciation of the domestic parliamentary culture, which can be characterised as an 
external effect. Firstly, the latter’s trust in the national parliament is expected to 
determine the amount of coverage the European equivalent receives. The more 
people appreciate Parliament in general, the more likely they want to hear from the 
EP. Secondly, their understanding of how Parliament works at the domestic level is 
likely to shape news content. It is likely that the press reflects procedures of the 
national parliamentary tradition in the presentation of news about EU parliamentary 
affairs in order to make them better comprehensible. Thirdly, although the thesis 
does not investigate the tone of news it is expected that correspondents compare the 
European Parliament to the national equivalent when evaluating the former’s role 
given the familiarity and expectations of their readers.  
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These drivers related both to the newsworthiness of the issue involved and the 
relevance of Parliament in general are expected to be central. As such they 
complement each other since the news coverage of EU parliamentary affairs 
combines both aspects of EU news in general and the precise coverage of Parliament.  
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: It firstly discusses why one would 
expect media coverage of EU parliamentary affairs given that two elementary 
conditions are met – namely those of access to information granted by Parliament on 
the supply side and staff employment in Brussels by media outlets on the demand 
side of news (2.1). Given that the interests of newsmakers to report EU parliamentary 
affairs remain unanswered the chapter then proceeds to discuss the news coverage of 
EU parliamentary affairs under the umbrella of EU news which are determined by 
issue relevance and detects crucial news values (2.2). News selection criteria are also 
weighed against external effects. Here the impact of national events on EP news 
coverage is also briefly elaborated. Eventually, the chapter discusses external effects 
on news coverage under the aspect of parliamentary news items (2.3). Here, the 
impacts of public opinion towards the EU in general are briefly elaborated before the 
section presents the main argument about the impact of the national parliamentary 
culture on the news coverage of EU parliamentary affairs. The conclusions (2.3) 
summarise the argumentation and discuss possible contributions of this thesis to 
existing research on EU news coverage and to the democratic deficit debate.  
 
2.1 Why one would expect media coverage of the European Parliament 
When attempting to explain media coverage of EU parliamentary affairs, we need to 
differentiate the term media coverage further – that is between the amount and 
content of coverage, as well as newsmakers’ evaluations.10 The first category refers 
to the visibility of the EP in the news and can be measured in terms of extent and 
volume of news items dealing with their activities. Although the thesis is not 
interested in investigating any effects of media coverage, the extent to which EU 
parliamentary affairs are covered tells us how relevant these are in the public eye. If 
there was no coverage at all, we would conclude that the EP is not a newsworthy 
                                               
10 Note that the thesis does neither pursue a discourse analysis nor investigates the tone of 
news.  
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institution which has supposedly a negative impact on public awareness levels. Thus, 
questions about the drivers of news coverage also provide insight into the relevance 
of EU parliamentary affairs. Secondly, characteristics of news content provide us 
with clues about how the EP, its members and the decisions they take are represented 
in the news in order to make assumptions about the determinants of such media 
content. Further, a content analysis provides an understanding of the context in terms 
of political and policy-related issues in which EU parliamentary affairs are discussed.  
Thirdly, while the thesis does not evaluate the tone towards the EP and its members 
in the news, the interest not only lies in the media’s role as a messenger of EP news. 
The role of a commentator can be examined through interviews with correspondents 
which provide another measure of assessment and allow us to extend the argument to 
the reporters’ evaluations of EU parliamentary affairs. 
Media coverage conditions content. And while media coverage itself is dependent on 
numerous factors, there are, besides normative motives related to parliamentary 
democracy, practical conditions which already indicate the likelihood for the 
European Parliament and its members to receive media attention. Put differently, one 
could argue that media coverage of EU parliamentary affairs is a self-evident finding 
given the public nature of the legislative body and the size of the EU press corps. 
The European Parliament, like other parliamentary institutions, is a public house. 
Plenary sessions as well as committee meetings ‘normally’ take place in public (Rule 
103 of the European Parliament Rules of Procedure of the 7
th
 parliamentary term). 
Furthermore, according to Rule 104.1 of the same document: 
‘Any citizen of the Union and any natural or legal person residing 
or having its registered office in a Member State has a right of 
access to Parliament documents in accordance with Article 15 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, subject to 
the principles, conditions and limits laid down in Regulation (EC) 
No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
pursuant to the specific provisions contained in these Rules of 
Procedure.’ 
These terms of accessibility and transparency are a positive condition for EP news 
coverage. However, there are nevertheless obstacles for the EP to become noticed in 
public. The media is a fast moving business and therefore proactive strategies of 
political institutions and actors are beneficial for newsmakers and consequently for 
media coverage. Anderson and McLeod (2004) discover obstacles for media 
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reporting in the Parliament’s own instruments of public relations during the 5th 
Parliament. MEPs, as well as the EP press directorates and the regional offices would 
not provide sufficient support for the journalists to cover the European Parliament, 
their members and the affected decisions adequately. Furthermore, for EU 
correspondents the support of officials as well as the terminology of press releases 
provided becomes a crucial element when gathering information to be transmitted as 
news to their audience (cf. Gavin, 2001). Gleissner and De Vreese (2005: 227) allege 
that correspondents find press releases distributed by EU institutions rather boring 
and very complicated. This might also be linked to the rather long and complex 
decision-making processes at the EU-level competing with the actuality and 
ephemerality of news relevant for the audience (see de Vreese 2003: 63-64).  
Others, however, argue that European political actors are increasingly responding to 
demands of the mass media by distributing press releases and organising conferences 
(cf. Bijsmans and Altides 2007). Further, the communications approach of the EU 
would have changed from being informative to a strategy of promoting EU policies 
and decisions (Caliendo and Napolitano 2008). Despite previous criticism by 
Anderson and McLeod (2004) it can therefore be expected that also the European 
Parliament and its members have improved their communications strategy in order to 
guide the media’s attention. Parliaments in general increasingly rely on own public 
relations nowadays (Marschall 1999), especially in the breed of new media 
developments (such as online news and social media devices). The European 
Parliament responded to changes in the media market by, among other things, 
launching a new, user-friendly website in September 2005 in order to communicate 
more effectively to European citizens and provide better access to information for 
journalists (European Parliament 2005). Three years later, the Parliament’s own web 
television channel was created providing citizens and the press with ‘democracy on 
demand’ (European Parliament 2008). These developments represent positive 
conditions for media coverage of EU parliamentary affairs. 
Alongside the supply side of information, the signs are also rather positive on the 
demand side: The Brussels press corps is nowadays reportedly the largest one in the 
world, with even more foreign journalists accredited to the EU institutions than in 
Washington (Baisnée 2004). They can be characterised as ‘pack journalism’ 
(Schudson 2003) whereby a single source, here the EU, brings them together. In 
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2010, 935 journalists were registered in the common system of accreditation by the 
European Parliament, the Commission and the Council.
11
 Yet, this number does not 
provide any clues about which media employ how many correspondents in Brussels 
for what purpose. Another crucial problem concerning adequate press coverage of 
the European Parliament is that it does not reside in one place only, but is involved in 
the EU decision-making process by gathering in two different cities. The plenary 
sessions take place in Strasbourg for one week once a month. However, the EP’s 
permanent seat is in Brussels alongside the other key European political institutions. 
Here, MEPs have their main offices and follow their daily legislative business in 
party and committee meetings. EU correspondents, if not travelling on an ad-hoc 
basis from their home office (Baisnée 2003), are normally stationed in Brussels and 
commute to Strasbourg when necessary – and supposedly whenever possible since 
many other political actors and institutions generate news such as decisions in the 
Council of Ministers, statements by the EU Commission or even meetings of the 
NATO who also resides in Brussels. Alongside this competitive environment in 
Brussels, in recent years problems have arisen in the outgrowth of the economic 
crisis. The print media is especially affected facing a switch of readers to online 
publications which advertisement revenues cannot compensate (The Economist 
2010). This is not very supportive for EP news coverage. A then Brussels-based 
correspondent writes in 2009: ‘As media organisations pare costs, the inevitable 
result will be less coverage of EU affairs’ (Smyth 2009).   
Despite being a positive condition for media coverage of EU parliamentary affairs, 
access to information is not able to provide sufficient explanations for when and why 
the EP and its members would receive media coverage or not. And although the 
media employs correspondents in Brussels to cover European affairs, we are unable 
to detect the precise interest of newsmakers to report EU parliamentary affairs. The 
very fact that European Parliament engages communication strategies in an 
environment of high concentration of EU institutions and political actors also calling 
for media attention allows us to derive that the European Parliament is not 
newsworthy per se. In other words, it does not receive media coverage just because it 
is the European Parliament as a representative and powerful institution of the 
European Union. Instead, the press corps supposedly trades information from and 
                                               
11 The number of registrations reached its peak at about 1,000 in 2007. These figures were 
obtained informally from the EP Directorate-General for Communication.  
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about the EP and its members against other news in the pool of European affairs. In 
fact, Gavin (2001: 305) claims that the EP’s ‘clear lack of power and the complexity 
of its political arrangements and processes almost make it inevitable that journalists 
will find it less attractive as a source of copy’. The fundamental question therefore is: 
which factors are decisive for EP press coverage? 
 
2.2 The issue-dependence of EU news coverage 
European parliamentary affairs predominantly generate political stories. They 
represent hard (‘factual’) news as opposed to soft news which aims at entertaining 
the audience. Yet, by falling into the wider category of EU news, for newsmakers 
‘there is an added dimension of developing an interest in European issues’ (Kevin, 
2003: 132). Journalists who produce EU news stories are themselves part of a wider 
news production process – and that is subject to the underlying economic logic 
whereby the media operates (McManus 1994): as regards the print media, the 
purpose is to attract the readers’ attention and to suit their interest so that they 
(continue to) purchase a particular newspaper. Although some researchers doubt that 
journalists write to supply news for their readers only (cf. Shoemaker and Reese 
1996: 116f), others claim that reporters in general, and foreign and EU 
correspondents in particular, mainly respond to what the readers want (cf. Street 
2001; Hannerz 2004). ‘If they do not cater well for that audience their very survival 
is at stake’ (Negrine 1996: 101). This rationality ensures profits for the newspaper 
cooperation both from the selling price and the advertisement revenues. At the same 
time, the income of the individual journalist is secured as well. ‘That emphasis on 
giving readers what they want to read, as opposed to what lofty notions of civic 
responsibility suggest they ought to read, is part of a global trend’ (The Economist 
2010) – especially in times of economic crisis which deeply affects the print market. 
In this cost-effective scheme based on exchange of information, public attention and 
profit (see Fengler and Russ-Mohl 2008) editors act as gatekeepers making sure that 
the EU coverage suits their consumers’ taste and normally having the final say over 
the most important news of the day (eg. Gavin 2001: 303). Morgan exemplifies for 
many British EU correspondents that ‘reporters write and rewrite to suit changing 
London demands’ (1995: 324).  
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In the following, the relevance of news selection criteria as part of newsmakers’ 
routines will be discussed. These apply to characteristics of news stories (2.2.1), and 
are weighed against the salience of other news (2.2.2).  
 
2.2.1 The applicability of news values 
In order to receive information about the interest of the whole readership, journalists 
and especially editors draw upon reader surveys and media consumption studies, or 
compare what other media report by scanning their products and considering the 
letters to the editor (cf. Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Street 2001). A reliable and 
established measure, however, is the application of news values which ‘constitute an 
audience-oriented routine’ of newsmakers and thereby lie within the news production 
process (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 111; see also Galtung and Ruge 1965). These 
are predictable selection criteria when journalists decide to cover a story or not, as 
well as to what extent. If an event or a piece of information possesses characteristics 
worth reporting, the likelihood for it to receive news coverage is affected positively.  
Shoemaker and Reese (1996: 111) compile the following most applicable news 
values (from Stephens 1980): prominence/importance, human interest, conflict/ 
controversy, the unusual, timeliness and proximity. These criteria are used because 
the reader only has limited time to inform herself, and thus is interested in the most 
relevant content.
12
 The application of news values is inherently linked to the qualities 
a story, an event or a statement possesses in the eyes of news producers (De Vreese, 
2003: 59) and translated into newsworthiness. That being said, it would be expected 
that EU correspondents in Brussels more or less evaluate the political on-goings in a 
similar way. In fact, ‘pack journalism’ is also characterised by the circumstance that 
the reporters on location ‘adopt the same viewpoint’ (Schudson 2003: 139). This 
implies that cross-media, let alone cross-country variation is not a likely finding in 
the media coverage of the European Parliament. Scholars of EU news production 
                                               
12 The application of news values is, however, also linked to the type of media and the market. 
Tabloids, for instance, generally prefer scandalous and emotional stories. Although in systems 
where the print media relies less on reader subscriptions but instead on direct sells, 
broadsheets are supposedly more aggressive in light of competition which is the case for the UK 
print market (see Esser 1999). Moreover, public service broadcasting is known to follow 
principles of education and balance in their programmes more strictly compared to commercial 
TV and radio stations. 
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would dispute that assumption however, as most correspondents generate bulletins 
for national media that employ them given the absence of a unitary European media 
system.  
For journalists and correspondents reporting about foreign affairs, and European 
politics in particular, one principle becomes especially important when deciding what 
news are newsworthy: European news stories have to be relevant for a domestic 
audience (cf. Peter et al. 2003: 310). This phenomenon is not new and has been 
identified for international news in general where the media is dominated by the 
nation or state (Hafez 2007: 37-38). If an event is too far away both in terms of 
geography and scope, i.e. when the audience is unlikely to be affected directly, then 
it is considered not worth reporting – unless other news values have a great impact 
such as the unusual. Thus, this news value of domestic relevance is the equivalent of 
proximity which is understood as ‘local angles in national stories’ (Shoemaker and 
Reese 1996: 111).  
Gleissner and de Vreese (2005: 228) go as far as to argue that editors would be 
generally less interested in EU affairs. The reason for that supposedly lies in the fact 
that ‘Europe’ is far away, and although the EU institutions, and the European 
Parliament in particular, take decisions which impact on European citizens, this is 
often not straightforwardly traceable in the complex and lengthy process of EU 
decision-making. Citizens are supposedly more aware of the heads of governments 
acting at the European stage. Here, chancellors, prime ministers and presidents are 
much more prominent in the news (see Koopmans 2007), which probably has to do 
with the fact that their ‘faces’ are already familiar from national politics. Kevin 
(2003: 125) furthermore underlines that ‘the integration process is viewed in the 
media as intergovernmental rather than ‘European’’ exemplified with European 
election campaigns.  
This intergovernmental media perspective suggests that EU parliamentary affairs are 
deemed newsworthy according to the degree of national interests in a particular 
policy issue or legislative decision. Domestic relevance as such is not linked to 
European parliamentary affairs per se, but to the issue, with which the EP and its 
members are concerned. In other words, sheer importance of the latter is not decisive 
enough. Although it seems likely that news stories referring to the EP and its 
members are selected on their prominence and importance because ‘actions of the 
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powerful are newsworthy’ (Shoemaker and Reese 1996: 111). And not only is the EP 
the only directly legitimised body at the EU level because it is elected by all 
European citizens. But also, over the past few years, alongside many treaty revisions 
and the development of informal institutional rules, the Parliament has become a 
strong player within the EU institutional layout. Yet, ‘‘Europe’ and the ‘EU’ are 
generally considered news stories on the basis of ‘newsworthiness’, rather than being 
issues that are considered a necessary part of the daily news agenda’ (Kevin, 2003: 
127). Instead, the issue, be it political or policy-related, serves as a crucial determiner 
of news selection. The directive to liberalize port services (Port Package II)
13
, for 
instance, supposedly did not receive much media coverage in Austria in 2006 – a 
country which has neither a sea coast nor a maritime harbour, despite European dock 
workers’ boisterous protests in front of the EP in Strasbourg – the latter eventually 
rejected the legislation in January 2006. Consequently, with respect to the European 
Parliament’s news coverage it is more likely that the press reports about issues which 
are relevant for the domestic context. The following hypothesis derives: 
Hypothesis H1-A:  
Domestic relevance is likely to be the central news selection 
criterion for news referring to EU parliamentary affairs.  
The importance of the EP and its members as well as their ability 
to generate conflict are likely to be weighed against the domestic 
relevance, unless major pan-European issues are at stake, which 
render these news values applicable on their own.  
The centrality of the domestic relevance relativizes the remaining news values. 
Timeliness is an underlying criterion for most news and the unusual is always 
interesting for the curious human nature. Human interest, on the other hand, which 
according to Shoemaker and Reese (1996: 111) entails references to ‘celebrities, 
political gossip and human drama’, is rarely decisive for political, hard news. Other 
news values, especially importance and conflict, have supposedly more weight when 
EU parliamentary affairs imply consequences for (parts of) the domestic audience. 
Importance, for instance, becomes more applicable when the EP takes a decision 
which has a domestic impact. An example here is the services directive
14
 which was 
initially highly opposed by the French and German governments fearing ‘social 
dumping’ would diminish labour protection and workers’ rights. The political groups 
                                               
13
 Directive of the EU Commission on market access to port services (Port Package II, COM 
(2004) 0654) 
14 Directive on services in the internal market (Directive 2006/123/EC) 
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in the EP having had the power to do so under the co-decision procedure finally 
agreed to pass a watered-down version of the directive in trade off additional 
measures to control member states’ compliance with the law (Hix and Høyland 2011: 
213). Thus, the news selection criterion of importance is reinforced by the domestic 
relevance of a news story, unless rare but highly salient European issues are at stake 
such as the ratification of an international agreement.  
The services directive is furthermore an example for the news value of conflict being 
also weighed against that of domestic relevance. In fact, disputes and arguments 
between actors represent a crucial news selection criterion for political stories, as it 
would be boring and a waste of time for the audience to report about politics when 
everyone agrees with another and understands each other (see Shoemaker and Reese 
1996: 111). Yet, one difficulty with the European Parliament, despite increasing 
intra-institutional party politics (Hix, Noury et al. 2007), is that due to the absence of 
a common work language, parliamentary debates appear to be rather technical and 
seem to serve voting procedures only lacking heated discussions and lively enga-
gement by the members of the European Parliament (Shephard and Scully 2002). 
This diminishes the potential for political controversy to be a crucial factor for 
newsmakers to decide whether to report from the EP or not (see Baisnée 2003: 98-
99). Occasional muscle flexing vis-à-vis the Commission as in the case of Santer’s 
resignation in 1999 and Barroso’s cabinet reshuffle in 2004 and 2009 however, has 
made the news value of conflict at an institutional level fairly applicable for several 
times in the past. The prospect for conflict has supposedly also increased with the 
extension of parliament’s legislative rights, allowing for clashes between the EU 
institutions over policy decisions. However, political conflict is seldom a pan-
European phenomenon. Given the nature of the EU political system in which the 27 
member states still seek to preserve their national sovereignty, we more commonly 
find disputes between the European and the domestic level. Again, coverage of these 
controversies is issue-related and thus expected to vary across member states 
according to domestic relevance.  
Nevertheless, if understood in Galtung and Ruge’s term of negativity (1965) conflict 
can also be associated with stories that involve bad news. Franklin (1996), for 
instance, argues for the British case that the press is seemingly less interested in 
Parliament and its actors. Due to increased specialisation and privatisation (and 
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modernisation if one takes the rising role of the internet into account after 2000) in 
the media market resulting in fiercer competition, journalists would nowadays prefer 
news values such as scandal or personal misconduct of MPs. Mere informational and 
educational aspects of parliamentary news are seemingly not sufficient anymore. 
Thus, news stories of parliamentary politics and decision-making are only worth it, 
when they are sensational enough to sell the story (Oberreuter 2002). The recurring 
scandals about MEPs expenses and the accusation of wasting tax payers’ money on 
the maintenance of the Strasbourg assembly here serve as examples for negative 
news worth reporting from the EP.  
Given that the thesis’ interest not only lies in determining factors that impact on 
news coverage of EU parliamentary affairs, we also have to enquire the effects on 
news content. As far as news selection criteria selection criteria are concerned, the 
answer to this specific part of the research question is relatively straight-forward. As 
Galtung and Ruge (1965: 71) put it: ‘Once a news item has been selected what makes 
it newsworthy according to the factors will be accentuated (distortion).’ Hence, the 
second part of the first hypothesis expects the following:  
Hypothesis H1-B: The key news selection criteria, which are 
decisive for the selection of news, most notably domestic 
relevance as well as importance and conflict, are also likely to 
shape the presentation of news referring to EU parliamentary 
affairs. 
Research on how European affairs are presented in the media detects specific frames 
in the news, which de Vreese (2003: 27) defines as ‘an emphasis in salience of some 
aspects of a topic’. Such research usually aims at understanding the effect of media 
content on their recipients (see, for instance, Scheufele 1999; Scheufele and 
Tewksbury 2007). However, media effects on attitudes or behaviour are not subject 
of the research in this thesis. Rather, the focus lies on how we can explain variation 
in news content about the EP. Nevertheless, previous findings of this research stream 
are supportive for the argumentation of the influence on news values on media 
content about the EP and its members. 
De Vreese (2003: 116) argues that EU news stories are ‘framed heavily in terms of 
conflict’ in the television coverage of EU politics in the Netherlands, Britain, and 
Denmark. Having identified the accompanying news selection criterion above, we 
can assume that especially the conflict frame can be found in the news content 
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referring to the EP. As discussed above, conflict in European parliamentary politics 
can take the form of institutional clashes between the EP, the Commission, the 
Council or other institutions; or battles can be fought on the grounds of ideological 
differences between political actors. News content might further be enriched by 
negativity: Legislators which are directly involved in any scandals, or those who 
have something controversial to say, such as Eurosceptic representatives, supposedly 
receive more attention than backbenchers. But again controversial situations of 
domestic relevance in terms of conflict between the EU and the individual member 
state level are most likely to be presented in the media given the intergovernmental 
perspective of the latter (Kevin, 2003: 125).  
Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) also identify conflict to be among the most common 
news frames applied in newspapers and television programmes surrounding the 
Amsterdam summit in the Netherlands in 1997, especially in the rather serious news 
outlets. Being a single case study, however, any impact of the relevance for the 
domestic audience cannot be measured. D’Haenens (2005) tests the same news 
frames as her colleagues in a comparative study of quality newspapers from six EU 
member states and one newspaper from the US. Although she only relies on one 
broadsheet in each country, she finds significant variation in framing across the 
countries under her investigation. This implies that domestication matters as well, 
which Kevin (2003: 132) identifies as the ‘national hook’ of an EU story. ‘To 
domesticate something means to transport it across a border, from an outside to an 
inside; from the outside of a nation state - into the nation state’ (Slaatta 2006: 12).  
The criterion of domestic relevance might thus also impact on the personification of 
news content. Personification helps selling stories as the audience has a ‘face’ in 
mind to (re-)identify actors, related actions and policy decisions (see Luhmann 1996: 
66ff). Hence, it can be expected that some MEPs who were rather prominent in the 
national context beforehand, such as Guy Verhofstadt – former Prime Minister of 
Belgium and a new member of the 7
th
 European Parliament – are more attractive for 
the Brussels press corps than other MEPs in order to link EU parliamentary affairs to 
the domestic political context.  
The third objective of the thesis is to study newsmakers’ evaluations in their role as a 
commentator (see Statham 2006). Given the centrality of news selection criteria, the 
next hypothesis follows naturally from what has been argued thus far: 
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Hypothesis H1-C: Newsmakers are likely to evaluate the 
European Parliament in terms of newsworthiness.  
An alternative assumption to the domestic relevance arises from the Europeanisation 
debate. Although common findings do not support the existence of a European public 
sphere, some media research observes rising media interest over time (e.g. 
Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart et al. 2010, Schuck, Xezonakis et al. 2011), and the 
convergence of themes reported across countries (e.g. Peter et al. 2003). Trenz 
(2004), for instance, argues that a mediated European public sphere in terms of 
political communication would have emerged by quantitatively and qualitatively 
comparing newspaper articles from six EU member states of the year 2000. He 
particularly brings to light the Europeanisation of national qualitative press regarding 
political news exploring a plurality of European issues with journalists autonomously 
determining their articles. Some EU policies have obtained high levels of 
convergence among the different newspapers such as economic issues or institutional 
reform for which similar news frames have been applied. Hence, he ascertains that 
the independent press is well able to enhance common communication across the EU 
and that Europe is becoming ‘a taken for-granted reality’ (ibid.: 310). Thus, it can 
equally be expected that some news content about the EP might have adopted a 
European focus as opposed to a national angle giving preference to European actors. 
Similarly, correspondents are equally likely to provide commentary from a European 
perspective (see also Statham 2006). These assumptions relate to the news value of 
importance by which the EP can be described as a relevant political actor at EU level 
and might especially be true for highly salient European events and decisions as 
argued above. Nevertheless, Trenz admits that variation still prevails: ‘For obvious 
reasons, national newspapers pick those issues that seem most relevant for them from 
the national perspective’ (ibid.: 306). Again, the domestic perspective is expected to 
dominate in the news, and any other news values relevant for selection of EU 
parliamentary affairs as news are likely to be weighed against it.  
In sum, as regards the work routines of journalists which are internal to news 
production, it has been argued that the interest by newsmakers in European affairs, of 
which news from the EP is a part, is driven by the relevance of news stories for the 
domestic context. Therefore, the relevance for the domestic audience is supposedly 
the strongest news selection criterion decisive for the news coverage of EU 
parliamentary affairs. Even though importance and conflict can be applicable too, 
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their weight for selection and in the presentation of news depends on domestic 
relevance. The attention the EP receives and the way the press discusses its activities 
is determined by national interests and therewith news coverage is predominantly 
expected to depend on issues rather than on the importance of the institution and its 
members per se, unless the latter generate personal, scandalous or prominent stories 
on their own. Newsmakers’ evaluations should reflect these assumptions 
accordingly.  
 
2.2.2 Concurring with national politics for visibility in the press 
News values are not only linked to a certain story but have to be weighed in relation 
to other stories. As we have seen, the domestic context plays a significant role in 
news production. While the newsworthiness of the European Parliament increases if 
news producers consider a story relevant enough for the domestic audience, the 
external impact of national politics is expected to have the opposite effect on EP 
news coverage. National news has a more direct impact on the national audience in 
this case than news from far away in Brussels. The former demands space and 
attention which at the same time reduces the chances of the European Parliament and 
its members to receive media coverage (see also Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart et al. 
2010: 510). In fact, correspondents believe that their readership is less interested in 
EU politics than in politics in general (Statham 2006: 18). 
The phenomenon of EU elections’ second-order nature underlines this assumption of 
EU parliamentary affairs being less important than national politics (see, for instance, 
Hix and Marsh 2007, 2011). At the same time, scholars attest the media a poor 
informative function surrounding EU polling days evoking a ‘second-rate coverage’ 
(de Vreese, Lauf, et al. 2007) compared to the attention national and other events 
receive. Thus, the following can be hypothesised: 
Hypothesis H2: Highly salient national political events, such as 
election campaigns, are likely to lead to lower news coverage of 
EU parliamentary affairs. 
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The concurrence with national politics is supposedly less visible in the actual content 
of EP news since following this hypothesis the distortion towards less coverage 
implies that content is not a likely finding.
15
  
Thus far, the chapter has discussed media-specific effects both internal and external 
to news production process which impact on the selection, presentation and 
evaluation of news referring to EU parliamentary affairs. Other effects directly 
linked to news production result from the competition in the media market, 
ownership regulations, or the political affiliation of a news outlet (see Shoemaker 
and Reese, 1996; Schudson, 2005) or are related to characteristics of the (domestic) 
journalistic culture (see Esser 1998; Baisnée 2003; Mancini 2005). Hallin and 
Mancini (2004) furthermore classify media systems according to the degree of state 
intervention in regulating the media, the degree of media partisanship, the historical 
development of media markets and the extent of journalistic profession within 
countries. The type of media system is as an external factor an important control 
variable which has to be considered in the research design. The next section, 
however, proposes specific hypotheses for the precise press coverage of 
parliamentary affairs at the European level. 
 
2.3 Explaining press coverage of parliamentary affairs at the EU level 
The chapter thus far has argued that while access to information and staff resources 
are an important condition of news coverage, the press coverage of EU parliamentary 
affairs is determined by news values. As such they generate political stories 
comparable to those in the national context. Nevertheless, a European dimension is 
added to the news coverage. Hence, domestic relevance is expected to be the main 
news selection criterion. Newsmakers select and frame European news that 
comprises EU parliamentary affairs according to domestic relevance of the issue 
involved rather than on the newsworthiness of the European Parliament and its 
members per se. However, political news stories contain more than just references to 
issues. Although it was argued above that importance of the EP is not the central 
                                               
15 Even if we were to find news content, a discourse analysis might be the best tool to describe 
media content in relation to national events. But the thesis only looks at characteristics of news 
content. Thus, no further hypothesis will be presented here. Newsmakers’ evaluations are 
furthermore captured by the previous hypothesis H1-C.  
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news value, political news and particularly news about EU affairs still tells the reader 
about political actors and institutions, as well as their attitudes, behaviour and 
decisions. Baisnée (2003: 79) claims that the EP ‘is penalised by its esoteric 
functions and its not very newsworthy activities as well as by the anonymity of many 
of its members’. For the news coverage of EU parliamentary affairs, therefore, the 
questions here are: what determines the extent to which the audience wants to hear 
about Parliament and European legislators within EU news; and in what manner are 
EU parliamentary affairs presented and evaluated so that readers are able to make 
sense of news content? Gleissner and de Vreese (2005: 229) argue that ‘since most 
national political systems differ from the EU system, it is problematic for the 
journalist to cover issues adequately’. Here, the precise aspect of the domestic focus 
can be taken further and it will be argued that there are other external factors specific 
to the domestic political context that drive EP news coverage.  
This section argues that the most significant effect on both news coverage and 
presentation of news content as well as on the professional attitudes of its producers 
derives from the national parliamentary culture. This impact will be discussed in 
detail in section 2.3.2. Beforehand, the effects of public opinion towards the EU 
(2.3.1) expected to bias EP press coverage will be discussed briefly to underline the 
main argument. 
 
2.3.1 Public opinion towards the EU as a driver of EP news coverage 
The European dimension of news stories about EU parliamentary affairs identified 
above allows us to also discuss the readers’ interest in political news beyond the 
context of the nation state. The European Parliament is the only directly elected 
democratic institution at the EU level and therefore also subject to public opinion. 
EU citizens in general trust the EP more than any other EU political institution as 
Eurobarometer surveys regularly point out.
16
 Seeking to explain the variation in the 
public trust levels towards the European Parliament in the EU-15, Gabel (2003) 
actually finds that the strongest predictor in an analysis of Eurobarometer data would 
                                               
16 According to the Autumn Eurobarometer in 2005 51% trusted the EP, compared to 46% for 
the European Commission, and 40% for the Council (European Commission 2005b). Five years 
later, trust levels were reported as 48%, 44% and 40%, respectively. Furthermore, according to 
this latter survey, 43% of European citizens trusted the ECB (European Commission 2010b). 
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be public support for EU membership. This suggests that the approval of the 
European Parliament primarily increases with the rising levels of support for the 
political union alongside other weaker impacts. Although Gabel only investigates the 
trust in the institution and not the actual awareness and perceptions of the European 
Parliament, it can be derived that support for EU membership and appreciation of the 
European Parliament are in fact interlinked. This makes sense given the absence of 
comprehensive public knowledge about the European Union.
17
 At this stage, support 
for the EU can be equated with general interest in EU affairs since the greater the 
public acceptance of the supranational political system, of which the European 
Parliament is a key part, the supposedly more welcomed are EU news. That is also 
why it is proposed here: 
Hypothesis H3-A: News coverage of EU parliamentary affairs is 
likely to be more comprehensive in countries and at times, 
when/where the public is more supportive of EU membership.  
Although this assumption about the explanatory power of public opinion towards the 
EU is not a novel one in the general area of EU news coverage (cf. de Vreese 2001a: 
287), the relationship between the public opinion towards the EU and the media is of 
reciprocal nature. Previous studies have shown that EU news coverage can also have 
an effect on public opinion and political behaviour: Vliegenthart et al. (2008), for 
instance, show by time-series analysis that the way EU news are framed has an 
impact on aggregate levels of public opinion, where positive frames lead to higher 
levels of public support for the EU and negative frames to the opposite effect. 
Similarly, exposure to EU media coverage coupled with high visibility and a positive 
tone is also found to contribute to more positive public evaluations of EU 
enlargement (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006b). Visibility of the EP elections in 
the news is furthermore found to impact on the turnout at the polls (see, for instance, 
Banducci and Semetko 2003; 2004). 
Other studies, however, allow us to derive that the media also respond to the interest 
of the audience in European affairs. Norris (2000), for instance, seeks to find a con-
nection between the messages communicated by the media and the abstention from 
voting in European Parliament elections. Drawing on Eurobarometer data as well as 
on content analyses of newspaper articles and television programmes during the mid-
                                               
17 See footnote 2 in chapter 1. 
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1990s in the EU-15 member states, she affirms her hypothesis that the use of media 
is positively related with knowledge and trust in EU integration as well as with 
participation in EU elections. However, she herself is not convinced that the former 
has any causally significant impact on the electorate as the media was only 
reinforcing the existing divides between the ones who are politically interested and 
the ones who are generally less likely to participate. Thus, she concludes that media 
content and voter participation would be caught in a ‘virtuous circle’ because of a 
two-way relationship whereby media and party campaigns activate the active who 
consume the media, participate in politics and thus provide again reason for the 
former to report and discuss politics. Consequently, a similar circular relationship 
can be assumed regarding the relationship between news coverage of the European 
Parliament and public interest in European affairs. Indeed, the research here is not 
interested in the effects of media coverage of EU parliamentary affairs on public 
opinion or awareness levels. But we can assume that the press adapt their style of 
reporting of EU news, of which the EP, its members and their activities are a part, to 
the audience’s openness to hear from the EU. In short, the attention EU 
parliamentary affairs receive within EU news is likely to depend on the public 
support levels towards EU membership.  
However, some argue that the impact of public opinion is not necessarily clear cut: 
Morgan (1999: 91) explains low news coverage during 1996 in the UK, Ireland and 
Belgium with different assumptions: Citizens of the latter two countries would 
support EU membership and thus not be interested further, while the British are not 
interested because they are rather hostile towards the EU. Anderson and Weymouth 
(1999) in fact attest British correspondents in Brussels a lack of interest in EU 
politics per se due to the media management in London, possibly resulting from the 
fact that the public in the UK is rather hostile towards EU integration (e.g. Gavin 
2001: 303). 
Peter and de Vreese (2004), on the contrary, anticipate an effect of public support for 
EU membership opposite to H3-A: ‘we expect that less support of the EU leads to 
more emphasis on contentious and controversial, in other words, negative aspects of 
the EU and, consequently, to more coverage’ (ibid.: 8). Even though they do not find 
a significant impact of this factor in a study testing the variable of support for EU 
membership in a multivariate regression model on the amount of EU coverage in 
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television news, their assumptions point at an alternative hypothesis which must not 
be ignored in the subsequent analysis. This specifically concerns the political 
contestation of the EU in the domestic context. Schuck et al. (2011) argue that the 
news coverage of the 2009 EU election is higher in countries where the EU as an 
issue itself is subject to greater party political contestation – measured by the extent 
of polarization. In particular, they find a curvilinear relationship whereby low levels 
of party political contestation have a negative effect on the visibility of EU elections 
in the media, assuming that mainstream parties try to keep the issue off the agenda. A 
positive effect, on the contrary, is found when party polarization over European 
integration is considerably high, such as when anti-European parties take part in the 
election campaigns. Thus, we can expect that higher levels of political contestation 
of the EU in a country are likely to lead to more news coverage of EU parliamentary 
affairs. This assumption cuts across the previous hypothesis as public opinion and 
elite views of EU integration do not necessarily correlate. This has to be tested in the 
analysis to come.  
In fact, the media itself, being considered part of the (domestic) elite, might have 
different stances towards the European Union in general than the mass public. And 
thus, one would expect that the media reports from the European Parliament 
irrespective of the public mood towards EU membership or levels of political 
contestation by evaluating the newsworthiness of EU parliamentary affairs solely on 
the grounds of news values. In fact, domestic and European elites are generally said 
to be somewhat more open towards European integration than the mass public. This 
was revealed by a survey published by Spence (1997) and conducted by EOS Gallup 
Europe in 1996 relying on data of 3700 respondents of the political, administrative, 
socio-economic, media and cultural elites in the then-fifteen member states. Hooghe 
and Marks (2006) go further and directly compare elite and public opinion. Their 
findings show that both the net support for EU membership and the net support for 
the statement that one’s own country is benefiting from the EU membership is 
significantly higher for elites than for the mass public.
18
 Nevertheless, among the 
members of the elite, journalists are said to be most sceptical according to Spence 
                                               
18 Yet, Hooghe (2003) claims that the divisions in opinion by elites and the public towards 
European integration have to be examined with caution. She is convinced that away from the 
surface, one has to look more thoroughly at particular EU policies. Here, she declares, opinions 
are, for instance, similar regarding EU decisions associated with high spending: both elites and 
mass public would be less in favour of that. 
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(1997). This implies that the media’s opinion is closer to that of the public and thus a 
sign that the newsmakers indeed respond to the public mood in their EU coverage 
and therewith coverage of EU parliamentary affairs.  
Diez Medrano (2003), who examines the framings of both regional elites and citizens 
towards European integration in Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom, states in 
this respect that ‘even if it were true that members of the elite always initiate the 
framing of a particular problem in a particular way, the frames they use would 
necessarily reflect cultural themes they by and large share with the rest of the 
population’ (ibid.: 257). Thus, being part of a domestic political and social culture, 
one may assume that EU-correspondents address a notably Europhile or Eurosceptic 
readership in a particular way. Provided they report from the EP in the first instance, 
correspondents who respond to a Eurosceptic audience are expected to more often 
frame news content of EU parliamentary affairs in terms of the news value negativity 
identified above than their colleagues writing for a Europhile readership. Thus, the 
following hypothesis derives: 
Hypothesis H3-B: In countries where the public is less supportive 
of European integration Eurosceptic actors are likely to be 
featured more often in the news than in countries where citizens 
are rather pro-European. 
Furthermore, journalists act as ‘‘organizer’ of public opinion’ (Negrine 1996: 110). 
That means newsmakers are not only messengers of news, but also act as 
commentators. Hence, newsmakers’ attitudes towards the EP may also express the 
variation in public support for EU membership. In line with the former two 
propositions, it can thus be hypothesised: 
Hypothesis H3-C: In countries where the public is less supportive 
of European integration, correspondents are likely to evaluate the 
activities of the European Parliament and its members more 
negatively than in countries where citizens are reasonably in 
favour of European integration. 
It remains to be seen however, if also levels of political contestation are reflected in 
news content and newsmakers’ evaluations. Again and following the brief discussion 
above, the alternative hypotheses would expect that greater party contestation of the 
EU issue is likely to have a similar effect on news content and newsmakers’ stances 
towards the EP as hypothesised in H3-B and H3-C, respectively. However, these 
effects are difficult to measure and thus not subject to testing in this thesis.  
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In sum, and without neglecting the reverse effect of media coverage onto public 
opinion, it has been argued here that for the news reporting of European Parliament 
affairs it matters whether the public in one country is rather supportive of EU 
integration or rather against it. Low levels of public support for EU membership are 
supposedly linked with lower coverage, responsive news content and negative 
stances of correspondents towards EU parliamentary affairs, whereas the opposite is 
expected to be true in countries where citizens are highly supportive of EU politics. 
The alternative hypothesis expects higher levels of political contestation of the EU to 
have a positive impact on news coverage, and a similar effect on news content and 
newsmakers’ evaluations. These hypotheses address the European dimension of 
news dealing with parliamentary affairs at the EU level. News coverage of the EP is 
constrained by public support for the EU if we assume that the EP is understood as a 
part of the EU political system – as a European institution. Yet, the EP is at same 
time a Parliament, albeit a very specific type thereof. Therefore, further hypotheses 
apply that address the characteristics of parliamentary democracy at the European 
level. 
 
2.3.2 The impact of the national parliamentary tradition  
Public opinion towards the EU and the European Parliament cannot per se be linked 
to an understanding of supranational affairs. Even if issues are selected and framed in 
terms of domestic relevance, given the complex institutional layout at the EU level 
which differs from that of the domestic political system, it is allegedly very difficult 
for citizens to comprehend the political processes. This would explain why 
knowledge of EU politics is not very high among EU citizens according to self-
evaluations gathered by Eurobarometer surveys.
19
 Gelleny and Anderson (2000) 
show that with respect to the public assessment of the performance of the EU 
Commission President only half of the respondents were able to formulate an opinion 
– the ones that had at least some knowledge about the European executive. Anderson 
(1998), in contrast, claims that when evaluating their support for EU membership, 
citizens would use proxies that they derive from their stances towards characteristics 
                                               
19
 The average figures for the number of EU citizens who ‘feel they understand the way the 
European Union works’ were 41% in 2005 (European Commission 2005b) and 47% in 2010 
(European Commission 2010b). 
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of the domestic political system. This is precisely because they would largely be 
unaware and uninformed about European politics and institutions. In his regard, 
satisfaction with democracy at the domestic level would have the most powerful 
effects on attitudes towards the EU, followed by support for establishment parties 
especially in countries where anti-establishment parties are prominent. McLaren 
(2007) takes up these arguments in a study about the conditions for Euroscepticism 
in the EU-15, despite acknowledging the fact that the overall knowledge about the 
EU had grown over the last ten years. As a by-result, and in line with her previous 
colleague, she is able to confirm that trust and distrust, respectively, in national 
institutions, also drive the views on European institutions such as the European 
Parliament, the Commission or the Council. 
In the absence of comprehensive knowledge about how the EU, and especially the 
European Parliament, works, one may assume that citizens also use proxies in order 
to make sense of the European legislative body. And these proxies are likely to 
derive from the national parliamentary tradition. National parliamentary tradition is 
understood here as comprising two essential elements relevant for the analysis of the 
press coverage of EU parliamentary affairs. Thereby, it approximates to the approach 
of Patzelt (2003: 83ff), who conceptualises Parliament as a system which by its 
various functions is embedded in a particular environment that includes other 
political, legal and societal actors. The first element which becomes relevant for the 
present analysis refers to the way in which the national parliamentary system works 
in procedural terms. These procedures include parliamentary functions in broader 
terms, but more specifically parliamentary elections, working modes of Parliament, 
political party organisation and legislative behaviour of individual members of 
Parliament. The second element important for this thesis involves the public 
experience with Parliament, which includes public trust towards the institution, 
knowledge and political awareness as well as citizens’ expectations towards 
Parliament and its members. Both the procedures and the public experience are 
interlinked and determine each other reciprocally – public expectations, for instance, 
can affect legislative behaviour and vice versa the latter can shape attitudes of 
citizens towards their representatives. In this relationship, as initially outlined, the 
media plays an important role since according to McNair (2000: 1) ‘modern politics 
are largely mediated politics’.  
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The media, as argued in thesis, becomes crucial for the relationship between the 
European Parliament and its citizens as well. However, with the EU being only 
marginally visible in the national news (e.g. de Vreese 2003; Peter, Semetko et al. 
2003; Peter and de Vreese 2004; de Vreese, Lauf et al. 2007), the direct influence of 
parliamentary procedures at the EU level onto public opinion is supposedly weaker – 
although this remains to be tested in empirical research. The national audience, 
nevertheless, can be expected to largely remain the same as would be for the press 
reportage of the national parliament. It follows that the public experience with the 
national parliament serves as an explanatory factor for the broadsheet coverage of the 
EP. This rests on the assumption that the press respond to a readership which is more 
familiar with the way the national parliament works.  
Hence, following the application of proxies by the public to evaluate the EU and its 
institutions (see Anderson 1998; McLaren 2007), a similar effect can be expected 
with respect to the relationship between public trust levels towards the national 
parliament and news coverage of the European equivalent. Peter and de Vreese 
(2004), for instance, find that greater levels of public satisfaction with domestic 
democracy contribute to a greater relevance of EU news in television in terms of 
prominence. It can be argued in a similar vein as before that trust in the national 
representative body has a positive impact on the extent to which media consumers 
are interested to hear or read about parliamentary affairs at the EU level. And 
newsmakers respond to the varying levels of interest. Thus, it can be hypothesised 
here that trust in the national parliamentary institution has a positive effect on the 
amount of news coverage of the EP.  
Hypothesis H4-A: The higher the public trust in the national 
representative body, the higher and more comprehensive the 
news coverage of EU parliamentary affairs.  
As regards the content of news, when journalists report about EU parliamentary 
affairs they too have to consider that their audience might only have little knowledge. 
Statham (2006) finds from surveys with EU correspondents that those working for 
national newspapers as opposed to transnational ones believe their readers lag behind 
in the understanding of how the European Union works. Low levels of awareness of 
European politics can be addressed, as argued above, by delivering a news story 
through a domestic frame. However, the domestic angle was related to issue 
relevance for the national audience rather than making sense of specific EU 
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parliamentary characteristics and developments. Here, the concept of domestic 
relevance as dominant news value can be taken further to explain the presentation 
and discussion of news content.  
Gleissner and de Vreese (2005) argue that correspondents would experience 
difficulties in presenting news stories given the unique political system of the EU. 
That is why ‘often they see themselves simply forced to approach a topic from the 
basics’ (ibid.:  229). These ‘basics’ are supposedly derived from the national context 
with which EU citizens are more familiar. Similarly, Schmidt (2006) argues that 
national conceptions of democracy and political institutions would still prevail in the 
heads of citizens despite on-going Europeanisation processes. The national parlia-
mentary culture has evolved over a longer time than that of the EU. Hence EU 
correspondents are expected to respond to the knowledge and expectations of their 
audience in their news coverage of the European Parliament, its members and their 
actions. Put differently, news about the EP is presented in a manner which is 
comprehensible for the national audience:   
Hypothesis H4-B: News content about EU parliamentary affairs is 
likely to reflect characteristics of procedures from the national 
parliamentary tradition. 
It can furthermore be anticipated that because national parliamentary traditions differ 
from each other across Europe, also the perceptions towards and respective media 
representations of the European Parliament vary due to familiarity with the 
respective domestic political system. As Diez Medrano (2003: 6) points out, ‘because 
national states remain a key socialization agency and the bounded space within 
which individuals spend most of their lives, worldviews and thus framing processes 
differ across nations.’ Significant and comparable characteristics of the national 
parliamentary culture across countries comprise the way national legislators are 
elected, which impacts on the latters’ representative behaviour; the importance of 
political parties; decision-making processes and legislative organisation. The media 
representations of respective features of European parliamentary politics therefore 
should vary according to the national context.  
The experience with parliamentary practice at the national level also shapes 
particular expectations towards parliamentary democracy in general since 
‘institutions do not just constrain options; they establish the very criteria by which 
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people discover their preferences’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 11). Goetze and 
Rittberger (2010: 51), in line with the sociological institutionalism, propose that the 
EP derives its legitimacy (in cognitive terms) from experiences with parliamentarism 
at the national level since ‘a high degree of legitimacy of existing practices and 
procedures makes it increasingly difficult to conceive of alternative modes of 
democratically legitimizing the EU ‘off the beaten track’.’ The EP is therefore not 
distinct from its national equivalents but follows their footsteps. In fact, Farrell and 
Scully (2007: 198) conclude from the analysis of Eurobarometer surveys and the role 
understanding of MEPs themselves that ‘there is strong evidence, albeit fragmentary 
in nature, of a public desire for representatives with whom they can identify and see 
as linking the structures of the EU and themselves to their communities’. Given the 
public unawareness of parliamentary democracy at the European level, this ‘public 
desire’ can supposedly be explained by expectations towards representation at the 
national level with which citizens are more familiar. It can therefore be assumed that 
people have similar expectations towards the European Parliament as to their 
national representative body which impacts on the press coverage of EU 
parliamentary affairs. These are supposedly reflected in the way correspondents 
assess parliamentary democracy at the EU level. The following hypothesis derives: 
Hypothesis H4-C: Correspondents are likely to compare the EP to 
the respective national parliament when evaluating the former’s 
powers and competences. 
Hence, it is anticipated that to the same extent to which news coverage depends on 
the interest in national parliamentary affairs and news content resembles 
characteristics of the domestic parliamentary culture, public expectations towards the 
role of national parliaments and legislative behaviour spread to the EU level. Should 
this hypothesis hold, two scenarios are likely to evolve: seeing that the European 
Parliament has comprehensive powers it can be either be held in high regard as a 
substitute to parliamentary democracy in the domestic context; or considered less 
capable of fulfilling parliamentary functions when taking national parliaments as a 
standard.  
Parliaments in Europe have a long-standing history. The revolutions starting in the 
18th century across Europe witnessed the desire for the representation of citizens’ 
interests by a common body that is opposed to the powerful head of state – the King 
or Queen. However, the role of parliaments across Europe has changed over time. 
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The conception of independent parliamentarians that would act at their own 
discretion in the interest of the whole people (Mill 1865; Burke 1942) soon gave way 
to the necessity of party organisations within Parliament (Bagehot 1936[1867]). 
Especially since the introduction of mass suffrage at the beginning of the last century 
and the resulting change in party government, single legislators have to stick together 
with their party colleagues to some extent to assure stable and efficient government. 
This may not be a threat to the representative function of Parliament though, as the 
individual legislator is still obliged to act in its own conscience. Parties, on the other 
hand, anyway aim to follow the interest of the citizens not least because they want to 
become re-elected.  
But conversely to the notion of effective government, citizens across Europe by 
appealing to the representative functions of Parliament still prefer their delegates to 
act on their behalf only. Electorates generally dislike party alliances and parlia-
mentarians with strong ties to private businesses which, in their eyes, constrain the 
parliamentarians to represent constituents' interests. Many think that Parliament as a 
whole should oppose the government, ignoring the predominant forms of 
parliamentary government in Europe nowadays, whereby the majority in Parliament 
is intertwined with the government (see Strøm 2000). Patzelt (1996), for instance, 
demonstrates for the German case, that when asked about the functions of the Bun-
destag, people hold the control of the government as most important duty. Many 
believe it is important for parliamentarians to introduce the views and demands of the 
people, while most would like that decisions follow the majority of the public 
opinion. Moreover, not many believe that it is important to maintain a stable 
government majority. It appears that the German people have a distinct view of the 
Bundestag as counterpart of the government that must defend the interests of the 
citizens. That seems to relate back to the beginnings of parliamentarism and is a clear 
misunderstanding of the German parliamentary system. Regretting the miscom-
prehension of the German parliamentary system, Patzelt (1996) is convinced that the 
media share a great burden of the lack of knowledge and the misperceptions about 
the Bundestag.  
However, in the public eye the European Parliament might benefit from this kind of 
public desire for representation given that it is independent of the executive. The 
European Commission does not emanate from the EP after European elections are 
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being held. Instead, the 27 governments propose candidates which then have to be 
approved by Parliament. While the EP cannot be dissolved by the Commission, the 
electoral independence of the legislature facilitates the censure of the executive. The 
EP demonstrated in 1999 that it is not afraid to vote the Commission out of office by 
threatening to table a censure motion which eventually led to Santer’s resignation. 
This kind of relationship between the executive and the legislature at the European 
level is closer to the initial concepts of parliamentary democracy elaborated above – 
although party politics have become increasingly important (see Hix, Noury et al. 
2007).  
But one scenario could be that the press value the EP’s independence of the 
executive in their assessment of its powers and competences when comparing it to 
national parliaments. This could become even more likely considering that national 
parliaments are said to have lost competences amid advancing European integration. 
Despite concessions by supranational institutions and the EU treaties, of which 
Lisbon significantly acknowledges the role of national parliaments within the EU
20
, 
some scholars argue that national parliaments in the EU have lost (see Goetz and 
Meyer-Sahling 2008) and are still losing parliamentary powers due to the on-going 
Europeanisation processes. ‘Constitutionally, policy-making powers previously held 
by the national legislatures have been transferred upwards to the European level’ 
(Raunio 2009: 327). Further, the ‘early-warning mechanism’ which provides national 
parliaments with a direct veto instrument regarding EU legislative initiatives that do 
not comply with the subsidiarity principle is a ‘relatively harmless procedure, 
established primarily to inject legitimacy to EU governance’ (Raunio 2010: 11). 
Hence, given the EP’s ability to step in where national parliaments do not have 
competences (any more), citizens and therewith their public voice might express 
gratitude to the EP for representing their interests.  
The other scenario could be that journalists hold the respective national parliament in 
higher regard than the EP. Some attest the EP an underdeveloped linkage function, 
whereby citizens are able to identify with their elected MEPs and the latter being 
                                               
20 Article 12(b) TEU, for instance, states that ‘national Parliaments contribute actively to the 
good functioning of the Union’ by, among other things, being informed by the EU institutions, 
respecting the principle of subsidiarity and co-ordinating with other parliaments, including the 
EP. The subsidiarity principle is specified in a protocol of the Treaty (‘Protocol (no 2) on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality’) stating that national 
parliaments generally have the right to object any legislation that, in their eyes, does not 
conform to the principle. 
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responsive in their legislative behaviour to the electorate, and see the weakness of 
any electoral and resulting representational link between MEPs and EU citizens as 
the Parliament’s ‘big failure’ (The Economist 2009b). The phenomenon of EP 
elections being ranked second-order after national ones exemplifies this weakness 
(cf. Reif and Schmitt 1980; Marsh 1998; Hix and Marsh 2007). National parliaments 
are still somewhat closer to European citizens both in geographical and 
representational terms.  
Moreover, national parliaments are at a disadvantage compared to their European 
counterpart given their limited powers of direct influence on EU politics.
21
 The latter 
is however able to affect EU policy-making directly. Hence, when comparing the EP 
to its national counterparts, newsmakers might evaluate the former in rather negative 
terms. This might be especially true for countries where the national parliament is 
considered a supreme institution such as in the UK; or even in Germany where the 
Constitutional Court has underlined with its so-called ‘Lisbon judgement’22 in June 
2009 that the Bundestag must not be undermined in European affairs.  
 
2.4 Conclusions 
The chapter has shown that some explanations for variation in the news coverage of 
EU parliamentary affairs exceed the assumptions of previous research. The chapter 
has contended that, although there are positive conditions in terms of access to 
information provided by the EP and numbers of staff deployed in Brussels to cover 
EU affairs, the interest of newsmakers in reporting EU parliamentary affairs is 
determined by the audience and is dependent on several factors, both internal and 
external to the EU news production process. Distinguishing EU parliamentary affairs 
                                               
21 However, some argue that politics and policy-making in the EU have a reverse effect on 
parliaments within their domestic context: their scrutinising power towards the executive 
would have been expanded by means of new monitoring and information gathering mechanisms 
including revised parliamentary standing orders, established European affairs committees, 
extraordinary debates on European Union matters, co-operation with other parliaments, their 
committees and their parties, or parliamentary delegations in Brussels (see, for instance Raunio 
and Hix, 2000; Maurer and Wessels, 2001; Auel andBenz 2005; O’Brennan and Raunio 2007; 
Tans et al. 2007; Barrett 2008).  
22 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30/6/2009, Paragraph No. (1 - 421), 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html; for an interpretation 
of the judgement see Kiiver (2010) 
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by issue relevance and parliamentary stories helps to disentangle the net of possible 
explanatory factors.  
The chapter has argued that news about EU parliamentary affairs fall into the 
category of political news stories which follow principles of actuality and factuality. 
What makes these stories particularly newsworthy is the importance of the subject 
and the actors involved, controversy and (political) consequences for the audience. 
However, they have an added European dimension which distinguishes them from 
common domestic political news stories. These have to be relevant for the domestic 
audience in order to receive coverage. At the same time, newsmakers are likely to 
present the issues at stake through a domestic lens. That being said, stories about EU 
parliamentary affairs are anticipated to be only relevant if the issues involved have an 
impact for the domestic audience. The European Parliament is unlikely to be 
newsworthy per se unless major issues are at stake. However, the European 
dimension of EU news further requires that external factors related to the domestic 
context are taken into account. Here, the salience of national events supposedly 
biases EP coverage. Newsmakers’ evaluations will tell whether the EP is assessed in 
terms of newsworthiness.   
News values represent classic drivers of EU news coverage and have been addressed 
in previous studies (see, for instance, Semetko and Valkenburg 2000; de Vreese 
2003; Kevin 2003; d’Haenens 2005) – even the biasing effect of national events was 
discussed elsewhere (see Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart et al. 2010). The interesting 
question here is that if we find that common news values apply for the selection and 
presentation of news from the EP, what does it mean for European democracy? The 
domestic focus is unlikely to overcome given the need to make news attractive for a 
domestic audience. And if this news value was found to be responsible for regular 
coverage from the EP positive conclusions could be drawn for the levels of public 
awareness of the EU representative body. But a worrying finding would be if there 
was no convergence across different countries. If the EP was not worth reporting 
when highly salient, pan-European issues are at stake, which can be characterised by 
importance and conflict, then the European Parliament would not be understood for 
its political role in the European political system. Similarly, if the research found that 
national elections constrain the press coverage from the EP this would be an 
indicator for the EP not (yet) being relevant enough in the public eye. In this case, 
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EU parliamentary politics are unlikely to contribute to political discourse at the 
national level and further erode the democratic deficit by not drawing any linkage to 
European politics.  
The second dimension of EU parliamentary affairs is that they generate a specific 
type of political news – that is parliamentary politics. However, considering that the 
EU political system is very complex featuring lengthy decision-making processes 
influenced by a multitude of political actors, the European Parliament’s precise role 
therein is not facilitating to identify for European citizens. Hence, this lack of public 
knowledge supposedly contributes to an undifferentiated view onto European 
politics. This chapter has contended that higher public support levels towards the EU 
are expected to lead to more comprehensive coverage, fewer references to 
Eurosceptic actors and more positive evaluations of EU parliamentary affairs by EU 
correspondents. While the chapter does not dispute the reciprocal effect of news 
coverage onto public opinion, the impact of public opinion onto news coverage is not 
an entirely novel assumption (see, for instance, Anderson and Weymouth 1999; 
Morgan 1999; de Vreese 2001a; Gavin 2001; Diez Medrano 2003; Peter and de 
Vreese 2004), but, if rendered valid, has further implications for the democratic 
deficit. On the one hand, variation in public opinion is a healthy part of European 
democracy as it allows for public discourse. But if the press coverage of the EP was 
found to be entirely dependent on public evaluations of the EU as a whole, then the 
EP is unlikely to be publicly identified as an independent institution and political 
actor which represents all European citizens, even those more prone to 
Euroscepticism.  
The chapter has also introduced an alternative hypothesis about political contestation 
of the EU issue, whereby greater party polarization is likely to lead to more 
coverage. Yet, the novel contention of this chapter is that due to the complexity of 
the EU decision-making process the strongest impact on EP news coverage is 
expected to derive from the national parliamentary tradition. Given the public 
unawareness of European political processes it is argued that proxies from the 
national parliamentary tradition are being employed by newsmakers for the news 
coverage of EU parliamentary affairs. The national tradition of parliamentary 
democracy is expected to drive the interest of the readership in reading news about 
the EP, the precise understanding of EU parliamentary activities, and the respective 
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evaluations by newsmakers. In short, news values, and especially the requirement of 
domestic relevance which apply to EU news in general, are not sufficient explanatory 
variables for variation in the press coverage of the European Parliament, its members 
and their actions. These particular news stories, as regards coverage and the 
presentation and discussion of news content, are also determined by the 
parliamentary tradition of the nation state with which citizens are familiar.  
This familiarity is helpful for understanding the EP for what it is – a Parliament. 
However, if these assumptions are rendered true, then the EP would not be 
understood in public for its unique supranational character which unites the European 
people within one representative body. Further, if it is being criticised for being not 
like – in the worst case not as good enough as – the respective national parliament, 
then the EP would not necessarily have an added value to European democracy in the 
public eye. In fact, the media’s role in this case would be rather that of a dis-
connector between the European Parliament and its represented.  
Nevertheless, the research in this thesis adds to the existing literature in 
communication research by arguing that the national parliamentary tradition is a 
central driver for the press coverage of EU parliamentary affairs. In doing so, the 
hypotheses presented here go beyond previously identified factors by arguing that 
features and procedures of the domestic political system matter. Yet, several other 
possible influences have not been addressed any further here, since their impact is 
expected not to be as crucial as that of the factors presented in this chapter, albeit 
relevant. These especially concern differences in journalistic cultures and variation of 
media systems across countries, as well the political affiliation of a newspaper and 
the number of staff they employ in Brussels. These factors are being controlled for in 
the analysis to come and given further consideration in the next chapter which 
presents the research design and methodological approach of the thesis.   
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Chapter 3  
Tackling the research question: 
A mixed-methods approach to the broadsheet coverage of the EP 
 
The previous chapter has argued that variation in the news coverage of EU 
parliamentary affairs can be explained by factors both internal and external to the 
news production process. On the internal side it has been contended that EU news 
stories are selected on the issue itself whereby news values, most notably the 
requirement of domestic relevance, are responsible for both the selection and 
presentation of EU news referring to Parliament and its members. While the 
coverage of the latter is also affected by events occurring in the national context, two 
further external effects impact on the precise coverage of parliamentary affairs at the 
EU level. Here, the previous chapter has argued that given the public unawareness of 
EU politics, and Parliament in particular, the public salience of the national 
parliamentary culture determines the coverage alongside public opinion towards the 
EU in general.  
In order to test these hypotheses, this chapter proposes a mixed methodological 
approach. The thesis first and foremost relies on a large-N quantitative analysis of 
newspaper articles referring to EU parliamentary affairs and secondly on expert 
interviews conducted with correspondents in Brussels. This combination responds to 
the need in political science, and political communication in particular, to give full 
account to both quantitative and qualitative approaches. At the same time, the 
method serves to even out methodological weaknesses of either approach. While the 
quantitative analysis provides insight to the broader picture and enables the research 
to specifically test external effects, the qualitative study addresses cross-media and 
cross-country variation more closely and particularly answers questions related to the 
media’s role of a commentator. Thus, a sufficient amount of external and internal 
validity as well as reliability of the results is ensured.  
The present chapter argues that broadsheets provide an appropriate media to 
investigate the parliamentary coverage precisely because they provide political 
comment and analysis of European matters for which they have correspondents 
employed in Brussels. This relates to the essential condition of the newsmakers’ 
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implicit interest in EU parliamentary affairs elaborated in the previous chapter. At 
the same time, cross-media variation is largely being controlled for in order to 
answer the research question. Further the investigation comprises six EU member 
states, namely Ireland, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Germany and 
Austria. In each country three broadsheets have been chosen for analysis. Despite 
being a rather small sample, the cases are comparable on the key explanatory factors 
while controlling for effects related to the different media systems. Not only is the 
research able to detect the news value of domestic relevance in the EP coverage, but 
with this selection it is also able to determine the external effects on the news 
production process. In all these countries the domestic political cycles are 
independent from each other. However, most importantly we find variation both in 
terms of public support levels towards EU membership and in characteristics of 
parliamentary tradition which by cross-cutting each other enables the research to 
determine which of the external factors have a stronger impact, or whether they 
complement one another.  
The research relies on three time periods. The first one serves as a routine period 
between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007 which was not severely interrupted 
by external events such as defeated referenda on the EU constitution. Yet, some far-
reaching legislative decisions have been taken and during the period the EP was 
faced with many internal changes. The remaining two periods target key events and 
their development over time. Here, the investiture vote of Prodi, Barroso I and II 
serve as a measure of parliamentary scrutiny and media representations thereof. The 
case surrounding the SWIFT agreement investigates the Lisbon-effect of parlia-
mentary power and its impact on news coverage of the EP. The combination of 
different time periods serves to control for unexpected effects and to produce robust 
findings which at the same time allows the research to infer generalisations of the 
results, provided the research hypotheses presented above hold.  
The chapter sets out by justifying the case selection (3.1). It proposes the use of 
broadsheets to allow for a systematic examination of news coverage about the EP 
(3.1.1). Section 3.1.2 substantiates the country selection and explains in what way 
these are appropriate to test the explanatory factors external to news making. After 
that, the chapter presents the data (3.2) comprising both newspaper articles (3.2.1) as 
well as interviews (3.2.2) and explains why these have been chosen as well as how 
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the data will be analysed and interpreted in the empirical chapters to come. The 
chapter eventually summarises the main implications and discusses the strengths and 
weaknesses of the research design (3.3).  
 
3.1 Case selection 
According to Geddes (2003: 95) ‘the theory or hypothesis being tested determines 
the appropriate unit of analysis and the universe of potential observations’. Thus, in 
order to test the hypotheses presented above, the case selection has to allow for a 
sufficient amount of variation both regarding internal and external effects. That 
means the research has to account for balance across media outlets in order to make 
assumptions about the applicability of news values with respect to the coverage of 
EU parliamentary affairs. At the same, and in order to detect the external effects 
including the salience of the national parliamentary culture, public opinion towards 
the EU and the concurrence with highly salient national events, a sufficient amount 
of cross-country variation is required. The following two subsections first address the 
question of media selection before the country selection is being justified.  
 
3.1.1 The choice of national broadsheets 
EU citizens are predominantly exposed to domestic media which, on the other hand, 
also mainly responds to the domestic audience not accounting for other viewers, 
readers, or listeners across Europe.23 The selection of news items from the national 
                                               
23
 The media as such is still mainly organised domestically in the EU. There is no pre-existing 
European media system although there are some transnational types of co-operation in both the 
television sector and press divisions. In this regard, the German newspaper die tageszeitung ser-
ves as an example of newspaper collaboration as it publishes the French monthly paper Le 
Monde Diplomatique as a supplement; and there is, for instance, ARTE as joint television channel 
of French and German public broadcasters. But these forms of co-operation do not account for 
any overall ‘European’ view. Concerning this matter, a few newspapers have been established 
such as the European Voice in 1995, or the European Daily in 2010. However, these sheets have 
small circulation numbers, attract special target groups of higher education and income, and 
circulate mostly only in the European capitals. Apart from that, a few European-wide channels 
have been set up since the beginning of the 1980s. But, the only two channels that have survived 
thus far are Eurosport and Euronews both having only marginal shares in national audience 
attentions. Some scholars investigate the phenomenon of European-wide television channels 
and conclude that citizens are not very interested in such projects (Sepstrup, 1990). The 
audience is said to prefer domestic programmes in their own language and of relevance 
regarding national culture.  
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media therefore becomes inevitable for a study of the news coverage of EU 
parliamentary affairs. However, one also has to account for the various media outlets 
which target different groups. Media studies in the EU context have revealed 
differences in the coverage of EU affairs across a range of media. Peter and de 
Vreese (2004), for instance, find that public broadcasting channels cover EU topics 
more prominently than private television programmes. Kevin (2003) also discovers 
that ‘Europe’ is not a prime-time topic on television by comparing press and televi-
sion coverage in eight countries. Moreover, public broadcasting companies cover 
Europe and the EU more often and more comprehensively than the commercial ones. 
But still, according to Kevin, the quality newspapers report most often about the EU 
(see also Trenz 2004).  
An examination of national newspapers therefore becomes plausible, since a 
sufficient supply of news referring to the European Parliament can be expected here. 
Further, it has been argued above that such news mainly belong to the category of 
political news stories. And, ‘newspapers generally have more political news than 
does television news, because they have far fewer constraints in terms of space and 
production costs’ (de Vreese, Banducci et al., 2006: 483). At the same time, EU 
citizens substantially rely on daily newspapers as a source of information about EU 
affairs – and still more so than on the internet in general. According to 
Eurobarometer surveys published over the last few years, only television is more 
attractive for them in this respect.
24
 Although the thesis will not investigate any 
effects of media coverage about the EP, newspapers are a valuable source to 
answering the research question.    
Within the range of newspapers available in the European member states, due to their 
role of providing political analysis and enhancing political debate broadsheets 
represent an adequate sample for the investigation of the EP press coverage.
25
 
Obviously tabloids report about EU affairs as well, but their journalists are less likely 
                                               
24 In spring 2005 Eurobarometer reported that 70% would use television as a source of 
information about EU affairs, followed by 43% who also relied on daily newspapers and only an 
additional 22% searched on the internet for EU news among other sources (European 
Commission 2005a). Five years later (European Commission 2010b) these figures look only 
slightly different: 81% relied on television, 49% daily newspapers, and 26% the internet to keep 
themselves informed on EU political affairs. 
25 Trenz (2004: 312) even argues that European broadsheets bear the potential to establish a 
unified European media system: ‘It is a self-regulating and largely autonomous system that is 
specialized in observing and selecting European political communication and that applies 
similar standards and selection procedures to build political news from it.’ 
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to be found in the EU capitals, which has been identified in the previous chapter as 
an important condition for press coverage of EU parliamentary affairs. Even though 
the total number of staff in Brussels per news outlet is expected to vary across quality 
newspapers, only the largest yellow press companies receive their information first-
hand from their own correspondents registered with the EU institutions. The others, 
and this also holds for regional and local newspapers, simply incorporate the facts 
and reports spread by the common newswires and press agencies into their news 
coverage. Trenz (2004) however, claims that quality newspapers address distinct 
target groups rather than the general public and do not necessarily take the same 
‘national’ perspective. This is plausible. But elite journalists nevertheless act as 
opinion leaders in their national context and are able to shape other media content as 
well as influence political actors and public opinion directly (cf. Trenz 2004; 
d’Haenens 2005; Bijmans and Altides 2007). This in turn allows for some 
generalisation of the results. 
At the same time, cross-media fluctuation is largely being controlled for. ‘The 
privileged newspapers in each national context should be expected to produce more 
or less the same quantity and quality of news, and the same (but nationally different) 
elite perspective.’ (Slaatta 2006: 13). Thus, a sample of broadsheets serves us to 
assess the weight of news selection criteria for EU news stories, and for EU parlia-
mentary affairs in particular. The previous chapter has argued that domestic 
relevance is likely to be the dominant news selection criterion (Hypothesis H1-A) 
which responds to the ‘nationally different elite perspective’. At the same though, 
importance and conflict are likely to become applicable as well since the notion of 
‘the same quantity and quality of news’ implies that correspondents working for 
broadsheets apply similar news values at a pan-European level when evaluating the 
newsworthiness of EU political stories. This assumption can also be linked to the 
‘universal experience’ Statham (2006: 35) claims journalists in Brussels to have 
when following their work of reporting about EU affairs.  
However, some variation within the national media landscape can be expected since 
they have different audiences. Hence, in order to control for (at least) some variation 
within member states, three major broadsheets have been chosen per country – two 
political ones, one to the centre-left and one to the centre-right of the political 
spectrum, as well as one sheet known as financial or business newspaper. All 
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selected quality papers are distributed at the respective national level
26
, and represent 
some of the most commonly studied broadsheets in the field of EU political 
communication research (see, for instance, Trenz 2004; de Vreese, Banducci et al. 
2006; Statham 2006; Bijsmans and Altides 2007; de Wilde 2011). A detailed data 
overview will be provided further below.  
 
3.1.2 Country selection 
In order to determine whether we find cross-country variation in the news coverage 
of EU parliamentary affairs explained by the external factors proposed in the 
previous chapter – comprising the public salience of the national parliamentary 
culture (Hypothesis H4), the concurrence with national events (H2) and public 
opinion towards EU membership (H3), the cases need to be selected carefully.  
The comparative method serves as suitable approach to the research question by 
selecting only a small number of cases. Ragin (1987: 16) in fact suggests that 
applications of this method ‘produce explanations that account for every instance of 
a certain phenomenon’. However, the accompanying problems are those of too many 
independent variables that are able to explain differences in the press coverage about 
the EP – as well as possible over-representation of deviant cases (Lijphart 1971: 685-
6). In order to circumvent these problems Lijphart (1971) suggests, among other 
things, to focus on ‘comparable’ cases which share important characteristics, and to 
only consider ‘key’ variables. With these requirements in mind, six countries, 
namely Ireland, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria, 
have been selected. EU member states from the North, the South, or the East are not 
considered precisely because they would bias the comparability of the countries by 
adding more explanatory variables. In fact, the selected countries share a long- to 
medium-term membership of the European Union. Among them are three founding 
members; the UK and Ireland joined in 1973; and only Austria is the youngest EU 
member since 1995. Experience with EU membership also entails (some degree of) 
familiarity with EU politics and policy-making by the respective citizenry. Public 
awareness of the European Parliament in all these member states should thus be 
                                               
26 The German print market is characterised by a strong regional orientation of newspapers. 
However, the dailies included in this sample are commonly read at a nation-wide level.   
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reasonably high as opposed to countries which joined the EU in or after 2004. All 
selected countries represent established democracies, unlike the newer or some of the 
Mediterranean member states.  
The case selection reveals sufficient variation with regards to the key explanatory 
variables which respond to the hypotheses referring to external effects on news 
production. As regards Hypothesis H2, we find indeed six independent national 
political cycles among the chosen member states which depend on general elections, 
government behaviour and constitutional arrangements. That is to say, general 
(parliamentary or presidential) elections in these countries do not occur 
simultaneously but are subject to the domestic context. Nevertheless, the previous 
chapter identified public opinion towards the EU and the public salience of the 
national parliamentary culture as the most significant external drivers on the precise 
news coverage of parliamentary affairs at the EU level. In fact, the countries have 
been selected carefully on these two hypotheses, H3 and H4 respectively, in order to 
determine any or either effect.  
Figure 3.1 provides the distribution of public support levels across country. A close 
look reveals that, taken as pairs, Ireland and the Netherlands, Germany and France, 
the United Kingdom and Austria score similarly on the public attitudes towards the 
membership of the EU (high, medium, and low respectively).  
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Figure 3.1: Support for EU membership, 2004-2010 
 
Legend: % ‘EU membership is a good thing’; Source: Eurobarometer 
To begin with the first pair, in the United Kingdom and in Austria citizens and some 
government elites (the Conservatives in Britain and the FPÖ in Austria) are both 
highly sceptical towards the EU compared to the other countries. Yet, public support 
in the latter country has recently increased slightly. Ireland and the Netherlands both 
demonstrate some of the highest support rates among all EU member states for EU 
membership over time. And this is despite defeated referenda over the EU 
Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty, respectively in each country. Franklin et al. 
(1995) in fact suggest that referenda on European issues are mainly a popularity 
contest for the respective domestic government rather than assessment tools for the 
EU.
27
 The citizens of France and Germany generally express medium-level support 
for the EU ranging around the average support for EU member states by 15, 25 and 
27 countries respectively with German rates being slightly higher. But the figures for 
France are still comparable, despite having rejected the EU Constitution in 2005 in a 
referendum. Nonetheless, both member states are highly influential founding 
members of the EU with the elites being strongly in favour of the EU (with some 
                                               
27 More recent research (Hobolt and Brouard 2010), however, shows that attitudes towards the 
EU Constitution are multi-dimensional and voters would, among other things, also express their 
concerns over aspects of European integration in referenda. Nevertheless, support for European 
membership, as shown in Figure 3.1. has not been severely affected over time, allowing us to 
categorise the six countries into three pairs according to support levels.   
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
M
ar
-0
4
A
u
g-
0
4
Ja
n
-0
5
Ju
n
-0
5
N
o
v-
0
5
A
p
r-
0
6
Se
p
-0
6
Fe
b
-0
7
Ju
l-
0
7
D
e
c-
0
7
M
ay
-0
8
O
ct
-0
8
M
ar
-0
9
A
u
g-
0
9
Ja
n
-1
0
Ju
n
-1
0
N
o
v-
1
0
Ireland
Netherlands
France
Germany
Austria
UK
EU-15/25/27
 72 
exceptions in France) and hold close friendship with one another at the political 
level.  
As regards the remaining key explanatory variable, within these three pairs the 
parliamentary traditions differ considerably from each other, all of them being 
special in their own way. Although, and importantly, the research will not structure 
the empirical findings in terms of paired comparisons, occasional paired contrasts are 
still useful to underline the argumentation of the thesis.  
Figure 3.2 provides an overview of public trust levels towards the national 
parliament. It shows that the figures vary across country – trust levels are 
considerably higher in the Netherlands and in Austria; but these figures also fluctuate 
significantly over time in most countries.  
Figure 3.2: Trust in the national parliament, 2004-2010 
 
Legend: % ‘tend to trust’; Source: Eurobarometer 
The comparable features of the national parliamentary culture within the three pairs 
detected above become particularly important for the analysis of the press coverage 
of EU parliamentary affairs. These include the diverse characteristics of the electoral 
system and the party system which lead to distinct legislative behaviour of MEPs and 
political parties; variation in decision-making structures; as well as differing levels of 
scrutinising activity towards the executive. While a detailed operationalization of the 
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explanatory variables will take place in the subsequent empirical chapters, the key 
features can be briefly contrasted within the pairs.
28
  
 
3.1.2.1 French and German particularities in parliamentary traditions 
In terms of parliamentary traditions both cases of France and Germany could not be 
more distinct from each other: France is a true semi-presidential system with a strong 
double executive which undermines the French Parliament. This becomes especially 
apparent in times when the directly elected President and the Prime Minister are from 
the same political party, although the Assemblée Nationale elects and controls the 
latter formerly. Further, the French Parliament is handicapped by constitution which 
restricts the legislative powers of both houses. Its committee system is also quite 
underdeveloped and the standing orders in general are rather limited (see Frears 
1990; Bell 2004). It is therefore relatively weak in comparison to the German 
Parliament. Although the Bundestag faces a strong second chamber due to the 
complex federal system, it has been referred to as an exclusive example for a policy-
making or so-called working parliament with strong influences, even in European 
matters (cf. Norton 1996; Maurer 2002) , manifested in the German Basic Law. That 
said, most of the parliamentary work takes place in the committees rather than in the 
plenary. 
Both political systems also differ in their electoral rules which has representational 
consequences. The German electoral system for the Bundestag is regionally split and 
termed Mixed-Member-Proportional system (MMP). While half of the members are 
elected directly by plurality mode, the other half enters the Bundestag via the list-
system of their party rendering close voter links less necessary. Needless to say, 
political parties play an important role in the selection and promotion of individual 
candidates (see Saalfeld 2002). General elections in France follow the plurality mode 
and thus allow for some direct campaigns of individual candidates. French delegates 
are furthermore allowed to hold a second mandate which is usually a major local or 
regional office. The importance of the ‘cumul de mandats’ has grown in recent years 
(Costa and Kerrouche 2009: 340f). As a consequence, French legislators are publicly 
                                               
28 Note that while in all countries the parliament is bi-cameral, the focus of this thesis lies on the 
second chamber, i.e. the one that directly holds the government to account, as it is comparable 
to the EP.  
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regarded as valuable intermediaries between citizens and the political government 
(Frears 1990; Rizzuto 1997). Furthermore, the party system in France is defined by 
two blocs while the German party system is rather characterized as moderate with 
two small parties (the Greens and the FDP) being accepted as possible coalition 
partners in government at the federal level. In sum, the different features should 
become apparent in the news coverage about the EP of the respective national 
newspapers despite the fact that public support levels towards the EU are similarly 
high.  
 
3.1.2.2 Parliamentary cultures of Austria and the UK 
In the unitary state of the UK, the British House of Commons is often being referred 
to as the ideal type of parliamentary government (see Strøm 2000) by which a single 
party majority resulting from the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system holds 
the government accountable. Given the geographical fragmentation of political 
parties on the ballots however, single party governments become less likely in the 
future and increasingly give way to coalition governments (cf. Hix, Johnston et al. 
2010). The electoral system with its single-member constituencies also allows for a 
strong link between the represented and the representatives (Norton 2002a). The 
opposition of the resulting predominant two-party system is weak which is not least 
due to the absence of comprehensive parliamentary rights. As in the other countries, 
the lower chamber in Britain faces a second chamber, the House of Lords.  
By contrast, in the much smaller and federal state of Austria the lower chamber, the 
Nationalrat, is a ‘light version’ of the German Bundestag. It also faces a second 
chamber which is composed of regional representatives. Its committee system is 
much better developed than that of the House of Commons which favours many ad 
hoc committees over established ones (see Mattson and Strøm 1995). And, although 
there has been a two-party system as well for many years
29
, one may speak of a two-
and-a-half party system now. The smaller coalition partners FPÖ and BZÖ have been 
seriously involved in the government after 1999 seeking to break the traditional 
Proporz system in which party-related interests of all (respected) sectors participate 
                                               
29 In Austria, three socio-political Lager (blocs) have been dominant until recently. However, 
until 2000 the socialists and the conservatives have excluded the nationalistic Lager from 
government. 
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evenly in political decision making. Still, the electoral system is proportional. That is 
why coalition governments, especially Grand coalitions due to restricted options, and 
extensive negotiations have always been necessary as no party has received an 
absolute majority yet. Similar to the German system, parties play a significant role in 
the selection of individual candidates, even though the electoral system allows for 
some preferential voting at the local and regional level (Müller 2008). But according 
to Müller and Scheucher (1994: 178ff), only about a third of voters make use of their 
electoral right to choose individual candidates. The nature of constituency service is 
thus different from the British political system. 
To contrast the cases even further, Austria is by constitution a semi-presidential 
democracy with its Head of State being directly elected by the people (see Duverger 
1980: 167). In reality though, the president rather fulfils representative tasks than 
influencing Austrian politics – a role comparable to that of the British Queen.  
 
3.1.2.3 Differences between the Irish and Dutch parliaments 
Although public support levels for EU membership are similarly high in both Ireland 
and the Netherlands, the two countries differ in their parliamentary culture. 
Certainly, none of these parliaments are ideal types in any sense although the Dáil 
Éireann was largely influenced by the Westminster model. But both systems have 
some interesting features which are expected to shape the media view onto the 
European Parliament and its members in particular. The most striking one of the Irish 
parliamentary culture is the candidate-centred STV electoral system which is also 
used for the European Parliament elections. It forces the Irish members of the Dáil 
(TDs) to act highly responsively towards their constituents since the candidates not 
only compete with members of other parties but also with their own party colleagues 
(cf. O’Halpin 2002). Dutch voters can also express their candidate preferences on 
national ballots, but de facto everyone just votes for parties in general. Moreover, in 
the Netherlands the electoral system, being proportional, defines the electoral district 
size as the whole country. It results that the members of the Tweede Kamer do not 
have close contacts to the voters as there is no distinct geographical constituency to 
be accountable to (cf. Gladdish 1990; Andeweg 1997). That is especially why these 
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two parliamentary traditions are interesting to contrast in terms of their electoral 
systems controlling for EU support.  
However, the other consequence of the Dutch electoral system is the multi-party 
system as there is literally no threshold to enter the Tweede Kamer.
30
 This results in 
a seat share by a large number of parties in Parliament (currently ten) and 
consequently leads to multi-party coalition governments. In Ireland, one finds 
coalition governments as well with Fianna Fáil being the largest party almost always 
forming a coalition with one or two smaller parties. Similarly to the Austrian 
Constitution, the Irish system is also semi-presidential (see Duverger 1980: 167), but 
weakly performed in reality, while the Netherlands draw on their constitutional 
monarchy. In general, the Dutch Tweede Kamer, being considered a policy-making 
chamber, is somewhat better equipped in terms of its committee system (see Mattson 
and Strøm 1995). The Dáil, on the other hand, given its assimilation to the House of 
Commons is comparatively a rather weak law-making chamber (see Murphy 2006).   
 
Given the cross-cutting variation in the two explanatory factors of parliamentary 
tradition and public opinion towards the EU, the country selection increases the 
internal validity of the research precisely because we are able to determine which of 
the two external effects matter for the news coverage of EU parliamentary affairs – 
the national parliamentary culture, public support for EU membership or both. At the 
same time it provides for an insightful comparison across countries and allows for 
the generalization of the findings.  
Taken together, the country selection also allows us to control for other, media-
specific impacts. In fact, across the countries we find differences in the 
characteristics of the media system and journalistic culture. Hallin and Mancini 
(2004) classify media systems according to the degree of state intervention in 
regulating the media, the degree of media partisanship, the historical development of 
media markets and the extent of journalistic profession with countries. They propose 
three different ideal types of media systems. The liberal one found in the Anglo-
Saxon countries including the UK, Ireland, the US and Canada is characterised by an 
autonomous press. ‘Commercial newspapers dominate, political parallelism is low, 
                                               
30 The threshold is as low as 0.067 percent of the overall vote.  
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and internal pluralism predominates – with the exception of the highly partisan 
British press’ (ibid.: 75). In the Mediterranean or polarised-pluralised model of a 
media system, which also includes France, ‘the state plays a larger role as an owner, 
regulator, and funder of media’ and ‘the press is marked by a strong focus on 
political life’ (ibid.: 73). The democratic-corporatist model, dominating in Austria, 
Germany and the Netherlands, can be found somewhat in between the two other 
types with moderate levels of political parallelism, and a moderate degree of state 
intervention. In the absence of a unitary European media system, the characterisation 
of national media systems play an important role with regards to expected variation 
in the news coverage of the EP. The country selection allows us to control for that in 
the analysis to come. 
Furthermore, one has to control for country-specific journalistic cultures. Although 
EU correspondents are said to have socialised with the particular Brussels beat by 
‘going native’ with the European Union elites (Morgan 1995) and thereby share a 
‘universal experience’ with respect to their work in the European capital (Statham 
2006: 35), one can assume that differences in understanding of journalistic 
professions still persist. Esser (1998) compares the work experience of British and 
German journalists (in their home office) and finds that while in the UK a division of 
labour is common in the newsrooms, the journalistic autonomy is much higher in 
Germany. That would lead to personal biases in the German press offices, and 
organisational biases in the British counterparts in news content. Other scholars 
suggest a broad distinction between a Continental, rather opinionated model – 
journalists of this culture interpret news and provide comment; and the Anglo-
American type of journalism which is relatively fact-oriented and neutral (see 
Köcher 1986; Donsbach and Patterson 2004; Mancini 2005).  
In sum, by considering six countries and 18 newspapers, we can expect sufficient 
variation as regards both internal effects of news production with respect to news 
values and external effects related to the national parliamentary tradition, public 
opinion towards the EU and the occurrence of highly salient domestic events. The 
case selection furthermore allows us to control for the country-specific differences in 
media systems and journalistic cultures.  
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3.2 Methodology and data  
Small-N comparisons are often criticised for their limited ability to generalise 
explanations for occurring phenomena. According to Lijphart (1971: 684) the most 
appropriate method to establish ‘reliable general laws’ is the statistical approach. 
However, critics of Lijphart´s suggestion argue that an increase of the number of 
cases would lead to a decrease of comparable, similar cases but at the same time 
increase the number of causal explanations (see, for instance, Przeworski 1987: 44; 
Ragin 1987: 50; Collier 1991: 14-16). The present research project tackles this 
problem by increasing the number of observations within cases and over time (see 
Mair 1996). The content analysis therefore comprises a large-N of newspaper articles 
selected from the overall 18 newspapers (plus one substitute) that have been 
collected for various time periods between 2004 and 2010. These news items will be 
analysed quantitatively. In addition to the extensive and periodical content analysis, 
the research aims at methodological triangulation (see Denzin 1989) of the results by 
combining the statistical method with qualitatively conducted interviews with the 
respective correspondents in Brussels. This approach responds to scholarly claims 
about a greater need in political science for a combination of methods, as Tarrow 
points out: 
‘Whenever possible, we should use qualitative data to interpret 
quantitative findings, to get inside the processes underlying 
decision outcomes, and to investigate the reasons for the tipping 
points in historical time-series. We should also try to use different 
kinds of evidence together and in sequence and look for ways of 
triangulating different measures on the same research problem.’ 
(Tarrow 1995: 474) 
Especially in the field of European political communication research there is 
according to Statham (2006: 3) ‘relatively little in the way of ‘joined up’ approaches, 
addressing both contents and news production processes, systematically and cross-
nationally, at a general level’ (but see de Vreese 2001b, de Vreese 2003, Gleissner 
and de Vreese 2005, Statham 2006). The empirical contribution of the present 
research design is therefore expected to be welcomed by this school. However, rather 
than following the model of a ‘nested analysis’ (Lieberman 2005) whereby cross-unit 
and case (small-N) studies determine each other, the mixed-methods approach here 
seeks to explain the same phenomenon of EP news coverage simultaneously 
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investigating the very same cases. Therewith the qualitative approach serves best to 
answer questions about the internal factors of news production which are expected to 
have an effect on the press coverage of the EP. Furthermore, interviews can also 
provide insight into the newsmakers’ evaluations of the EP and its members, while 
complementing the interpretation of the statistic results. The quantitative analysis 
provides the dependent variables of broadsheet coverage and allows for testing 
external effect of news making. This methodology serves to increase the external 
validity as well as the reliability of the key research findings given the rather small 
number of cases, i.e. countries, included in this study. Both methodological 
approaches have their limits, which cannot be fully evened out by their simultaneous 
applications. Nevertheless, the analysis aims at producing robust and consistent 
findings. The following sub-sections provide a detailed overview of the data by 
explaining the use of newspaper articles and the selection of interviews for the 
analysis.  
 
3.2.1 Quantitative content analysis of newspaper articles 
The method of quantitative content analysis selected for this thesis has several 
implications. In the following, the time periods of investigation will be justified. 
Then the actual article selection will be briefly elaborated before particularities of 
some newspapers will be presented. Lastly, the coding scheme will be explained in 
more detail.  
 
3.2.1.1 Time periods selected 
Media content analyses in the context of EU news have thus far predominantly 
focussed on the analysis of key events, such as EU elections, referenda, or European 
summits accompanied by rather short time-scales, which is understandable given 
different research interests and limited resources (see Statham 2006: 3). The present 
research project seeks to fill part of this gap with regards to the news coverage of the 
EP and its members. In fact, the newspaper article collection consists of three 
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datasets, including both pure news and commentaries.
31
 The first and core one 
contains 2155 newspaper items published between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 
2007. The second dataset comprises 1320 articles which have been published during 
the days surrounding the formal investiture procedure of the European Commission 
by Parliament (both the President and the cabinet). These specifically affect the days 
between the nomination or presentation of the candidate(s) until one week after the 
vote for the Prodi Commission (24/03/1999-12/05/1999 & 21/07/1999-22/09/1999), 
Barroso I (30/06/2004-29/07/2004 & 12/08/2004-25/11/2004) and Barroso II 
(19/06/2009-23/09/2009 & 27/11/2009-16/02/2010). The hearings for the Barroso II 
Commission have been investigated in more detail. The number of articles for this 
particular sub-dataset comprises 167 news items in total. The third and last dataset 
represents a longitudinal study including all articles published on the SWIFT case 
and involving the European Parliament directly (N=286) between 1 June 2006 and 
30 November 2010.  
The main dataset, which will be subject to chapters 4 and 5, refers to a routine period 
which was largely unaffected by political or economic crises. It covers two 
legislative annual cycles of the sixth Parliament and thus allows for a comprehensive 
analysis with a reasonably large N. Despite being considered a routine period, during 
its sixth legislative term the European Parliament encountered many external and 
internal challenges. When the new and returning MEPs took office on 20 July 2004 
the deliberation on the European Constitution was one of the main concerns among 
the actors, institutions and citizens across Europe resulting in its defeat with the 
negative referenda in France and the Netherlands in spring 2005. The solution 
finding phase then had actually involved MEPs until the end of 2009 (in the seventh 
legislative term) when the revised constitutional agreement, the Lisbon Treaty, came 
into force. Related to this debate was the question of the institutional siege of the 
European Parliament, with many MEPs preferring the abandonment of Strasbourg in 
favour of Brussels, as well as a revised distribution of parliamentary seats among the 
member states. Legislatively the European Parliament took some far-reaching 
                                               
31 In total, 83.85% of the articles selected were news items. Please refer to Appendix A3.1 for 
further details. Since the thesis is not interested in how EU parliamentary affairs are being 
evaluated in the news, but investigates the amount of coverage and volume measuring visibility 
as well as characteristics of news content, the remainder of the thesis will not draw any 
distinction between the types of newspaper articles. Furthermore, the incorporation of the so-
called zero observations (see further below, page 84) would not allow for such a distinction.  
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decisions concerning REACH
32
, the services directive
33
, and the Port Package II
34
 
involving consequences for the Single Market; issued reports and resolutions in the 
fields of security regarding the data exchange with the United States and passenger 
regulations at European airports
35
, on car emissions in the field of environmental 
policy
36
, as well as with respect to liberalisation plans for postal services
37
 and train 
transport
38
; and enquired the affairs around Equitable Life
39
 and CIA-related actions 
in Europe
40
 enacting special committees affecting consumer, citizen and human 
rights. Furthermore, on the political side, MEPs were faced with the threat of the UK 
Tories to leave the biggest European parliamentary party, the EPP, as well as the 
actual foundation of the group ‘Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty’ comprising anti-
EU and extreme rightist parties in the European Parliament. While these events and 
developments provide the press with a lot of substance for news stories about EU 
parliamentary affairs, whether these proceedings translate into news coverage from 
and about the EP remains to be seen and will be investigated in Chapter 4, the first 
empirical chapter. 
Although the newspaper articles of this sample refer to one parliamentary term only, 
there was a major turnover of parliamentary and political posts within the EP at the 
beginning of 2007. The reshuffle concerned the office of the EP President, the party 
leader of the EPP-ED as well as many committee chairs.  Furthermore, the chosen 
period starts just after the European Parliament launched its new website in 
September 2005 whose purpose was among others to provide better access to 
information for journalists as laid out in the previous chapter.  
The remaining data are case studies and serve to investigate developments over time 
and also consider possible before/after effects in the press coverage of the EP and its 
                                               
32 Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (Regulation (EC) No 
1907/2006) 
33 Directive on services in the internal market (Directive 2006/123/EC) 
34 Directive of the EU Commission on market access to port services (Port Package II, COM 
(2004) 0654) 
35 E.g. ‘Resolution on SWIFT, the PNR agreement and the transatlantic dialogue on these issues’ 
(RSP/2007/2503) 
36 ‘CARS 21: A Competitive Automotive Regulatory Framework’ (2007/2120(INI)) 
37 ‘Application of the Postal Directive’ (Directive 97/67/EC as amended by Directive 
2002/39/EC) (2005/2086(INI)) 
38 ‘Railway transport: implementation of the first railway package’ (2006/2213(INI)) 
39 In May 2007 the MEP Dianna Wallis issued a report on the crisis of the Equitable Life 
Assurance Society (2006/2199(INI)) following a 15-month enquiry. The society was accused of 
mismanagement leading to disadvantages for policyholders. 
40 ‘Alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of 
prisoners. Interim report‘ (2006/2027(INI)) 
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members by selecting appropriate articles. All told, the data provides a ‘reasonably 
representative’ sample of the material for content analysis. ‘‘Reasonably 
representative’ here is taken to mean a sample which is not skewed or biased by the 
personal preferences or hunches of the researcher, by the desire to ‘prove’ a 
particular preconceived point, or by insufficient knowledge of the media and their 
social context’ (Hansen et al. 1998a: 102-103). Table 3.1 provides an overview of the 
data.  
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Table 3.1: Data overview 
Newspaper Country Affiliation 
average 
circulation b 
No of 
correspondents 
Correspondents 
interviewed Dataset I 
Total by 
Country Dataset II 
Total by 
Country 
Dataset 
III 
Total by 
Country Total N 
Irish Times IE centre-left 116000 1 1 230 
385 
99 
147 
9 
11 
 
Irish Independent centre-right 163000 1/0
 c
 0 138 – 
e
 – 
e
  
Irish Examiner centre-right 57217 1 1 – 
e
 42 2  
Sunday Business Post business/financial 53000 0 0 17 6
 f
 0 546 
The Guardian GB centre-left 382000 2/1
c
 1 53 
204 
39 
169 
5 
17 
 
The Times centre-right 654000 1.5
d
 1 47 45 1  
Financial Times business/financial 140000 4 1 104 85 11 390 
Le Monde FR centre-left 317000 4/3/2
c
 1 158 
336 
89 
221 
19 
49 
 
Le Figaro centre-right  328000 2/1.5
cd
 1 50 61 7  
Les Echos business/financial 140000 1 0 128 71 23 609 
De Volkskrant NL centre-left 287000 2 0 107 
320 
73 
231 
4 
26 
 
Trouw centre-right
 a
 105000 2 1 99 72 10  
NRC Handelsblad business/financial 241000 2 1 114 86 12 579 
Süddeutsche Zeitung DE centre-left 433000 3/2
c
 1 191 
641 
111 
400 
38 
137 
 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung centre-right 363000 4 4 301 160 42  
Handelsblatt business/financial 144000 3 1 149 129 57 1156 
Der Standard AT centre-left 100000 1 0 118 
269 
60 
152 
22 
46 
 
Salzburger Nachrichten centre-right
 a
 84000 1 1 96 75 20  
WirtschaftsBlatt business/financial 38000 1 1 55 17 4 472 
US broadsheets US n/a n/a n/a n/a – 
e
 0 – 
e
 0 30 30 30 
Total of articles collected 
  
 
 
17  2155 
 
1320 
 
316 3791 
Non-EP articles       –  –   165 3956 
Zero observations added       8692  –  – 8692 
Total N            12648 
Legend: a some would also categorise Trouw as centrist; b Source: World Association of Newspapers (2007) and newspapers’ own information for advertisers; figures are indicative for 
the year 2006; c The number of correspondents changed over the time of the investigation; d 0.5 means that the permanent staff is supported by a freelancer on location; e not considered 
in the particular selection; f no data available for 1999 
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In addition, the first and third dataset have been complemented by a certain amount 
of zero observations. As regards the first data set, for every day (excluding domestic 
bank holidays and Sundays) a newspaper has not published anything on the 
European Parliament that would comply with the selection criteria described below, 
the date has been entered and article length has been coded as 0. By creating artificial 
articles, this method enables the researcher to examine the total variation of EP press 
coverage by accounting for days and periods when no news (according to the 
selection criteria) from or about the institution, its members or their actions was 
produced. Similarly, the third dataset has been amended by 165 articles which only 
refer to SWIFT but not the EP. Problems which arise due to the bias by zero 
observations will be tackled in each particular analysis in the respective empirical 
chapters. The SWIFT case also considers publications in US broadsheets to contrast 
the results given that the US authorities were considerably involved in the 
negotiations of the international agreement. Here, for the entire period 12 newspaper 
articles were selected from the International Herald Tribune, and each six for the 
New York Times and The Washington Post. Chapter 6 will elaborate more on the use 
of the precise data.  
 
3.2.1.2 Newspaper article selection 
The actual selection of newspaper articles has been restricted to certain criteria. The 
most important one is the self-proclaimed ‘1+2’ rule.41 It prescribes that an article 
has to clearly mention the European Parliament or any equivalent (e.g. current 
MEP(s), committee(s), report(s), etc.) in the title, the highlight section or the first 
paragraph, plus twice independently in the text, i.e. not in the same sentence. If the 
first paragraph is short, then the second paragraph also counts towards the ‘1’ part of 
the rule, unless the title/highlight is long. In case where the newspaper article only 
consists of a single paragraph, the title and/or the first three sentences should include 
a reference to the EP as well as the remainder of the text in two instances. These 
selection criteria premise that the EP, its members and their activities receive a 
minimum amount of attention. There are, for instance, many more articles on the 
selection of individual commissioner candidates regarding dataset II. But here, the 
                                               
41 Note that the idea for this rule has been instigated by the selection criteria applied by Jasson 
(2009). 
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EP does not receive sufficient attention. Some articles do not mention it at all, or 
only make a brief reference such as ‘the candidate will appear before a European 
Parliament committee next week’.  
The search for most articles, including the ones from the US broadsheets, was 
conducted via Nexis UK, an online newspaper database. Some newspapers are not 
represented in that database, or have missing volumes, and have been accessed via 
their own online archives. This affects the Sunday Business Post, The Irish Examiner 
and Irish Independent, as well as the German and Austrian newspapers. A detailed 
list of the keywords used can be found in the appendix.
42
 The minimum word count 
required for the selection is 100 excluding the title and any subtitles. Further, articles 
had to be written by the respective newspaper’s own correspondents, journalists or 
editors, which means that all articles distributed by newswires or contributed by 
experts and other outsiders, have been excluded. The same holds for any articles 
published in supplements, summaries, outlooks of the week, and interviews with 
either MEPs or any other person. One exception is that the third dataset on SWIFT 
also contains interviews with various people, and commentaries of third persons to 
increase N.
43
 The ‘1+2’ rule does not apply here either for the same reason. It is 
important to mention these selection criteria since they imply that ‘there is more out 
there’. Everything presented in this research does not necessarily stand for the whole 
coverage of the European Parliament by a particular newspaper. It could be possible, 
that there are more, other, or more distinct articles about the European Parliament, 
MEPs and European parties respectively than actually included in this particular 
analysis. They have not been selected, because they do not comply with the initial 
selection criteria. Thus, the results to follow have to be interpreted with a pinch of 
caution.  
In order to ensure that unitizing complies with reliability requirements (see 
Krippendorff 2004: 251ff), two independent coders were recruited to sample 
newspaper articles consistent with the selection criteria. Coders were recruited 
according to language skills and are recent postgraduates of communication science. 
They were given detailed instructions and had to select relevant articles from the 
downloaded raw material for the period between 1 October and 31 December 2006 
                                               
42 Please see appendix A3.2.  
43 The respective chapter will elaborate further. 
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as well as for a pre-selection of dataset II (the hearings for the Barroso II 
Commission) and the entire period of dataset III. The reliability scores for 
Krippendorff’s α are reported in the appendix and overall range from .65 to 1 (see 
Appendix 3.3).
44
  
 
3.2.1.3 Newspaper particularities 
There are a few implications which have to be accounted for when interpreting the 
data: firstly, the profile of the Irish Independent is somewhat mixed in a sense that 
the newspaper provides news which is both informative and fact-oriented and articles 
which much rather fall into the category of tabloids. That is why this newspaper has 
been substituted by the Irish Examiner for datasets II and III. Secondly, the here 
investigated Irish business-focussed newspaper, the Sunday Business Post, is as the 
name suggests a Sunday newspaper, and thus provides much fewer articles in total 
than the other sheets in this study. In the case of SWIFT it in fact did not produce any 
articles at all. However, this might also have something to do with the fact that this 
broadsheet has no correspondent registered with the EU institutions. However, most 
calculations of the descriptive and explanatory analyses in the empirical chapters will 
be based on proportions. In other cases, the possibility of a bias will be discussed. 
Thus, the underrepresentation of the Irish business press does not threaten the 
analysis.  
Thirdly, for the very same media, as well as for the Irish Examiner and the Austrian 
business-focussed broadsheet, the WirtschaftsBlatt, only articles which were 
published online were available for data collection. At this point, the researcher has 
to trust that the content of both the paper and online version does not differ 
enormously, relying on the findings of Neuberger et al. (1998) that the news items 
published online mainly duplicate the news of the respective print version.
45
 
Fourthly, the NRC Handelsblad is an evening newspaper. In the analysis to come this 
is being accounted for by tying independent variables to the respective publication 
dates. Lastly, the British business-focussed newspaper is, being the Financial Times, 
a European newspaper and focuses less on pure British politics, although for the 
                                               
44 The calculations are based on the instructions of Hayes (2005). 
45 Further, d’Haenens et al. (2004) even argue from a recipient perspective that readers of 
online and print versions of newspaper articles would not consume news in a different way. 
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analysis here only the London editions have been included (as opposed to the USA, 
Asia and European editions). Some other newspapers, especially the German ones 
also have daily editions at the regional level, which have been discarded. Given the 
variation in newspaper content, the standard errors of the multivariate analysis to 
come are clustered according to newspaper. 
Further, it is important to note that there is variation in numbers at first sight – across 
country, newspaper and over time, which provides the ground for thorough empirical 
investigation. Looking at Table 3.1 and especially the main dataset I, the German 
newspapers issue by far the most articles on EU affairs involving the European 
Parliament with 642 articles published in the two year period. The Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung tops this amount with a figure of 301 articles to which only the 
Irish Times comes closest with 230. However, this finding cannot be linked to a 
greater interest of German broadsheets in EU parliamentary affairs per se. In fact, 
previous research has also found that these newspapers, and especially the FAZ, 
publish by far more political stories on EU affairs than others (Kevin 2003: 56; 
Bijsmans 2011: 131). This of course correlates with the total number of 
correspondents these newspapers employ in Brussels as shown in Table 3.1.  
The Irish, French and Dutch newspapers follow the German ones with a total range 
of 320 to 385 news items. Solely the broadsheets published in Britain and Austria 
provide less than 300 articles for that particular period, with The Times publishing 
the least on the EP (47 articles) of the European dailies. Not only does this first 
overview alter the allegations of Slaatta (2006) who, as cited above, claims that elite 
newspapers would not differ much in coverage and content. But, more specifically, it 
also suggests that the variable of public opinion towards EU membership might have 
an impact here, as the UK and Austria bear the lowest support levels. A systematic 
relationship has yet to be verified in the empirical chapters to come. This pattern 
furthermore looks different for the remaining datasets, which will be investigated in 
detail in the respective chapters. The cross-country and cross-newspaper bivariate 
correlations between the numbers of publications of the three datasets are statistically 
significant and producing at least r = 0.625 which underlines the reliability of the 
newspaper article collection across datasets.
46
 At the same time, the high correlations 
provide reason to believe that the various newspapers during periods of key events 
                                               
46 See appendix A3.4 
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raise their coverage proportionally to their day-to-day coverage. It can therefore be 
assumed that the Germans always publish more than the British, regardless of the 
occasion. This phenomenon will be subject to further investigation in chapter 6.  
 
3.2.1.4 Coding scheme 
Given that ‘content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and 
quantitative description of the manifest content of communication’ (Berelson 1952: 
18) the essential purpose of the statistical analysis is to count frequencies by 
classifying content in numerical terms. The research is as such replicable. All 
newspaper articles have been coded by hand and captured systematically in a 
statistical database (SPSS). The unit of analysis is defined by the individual news 
item. The coding categories have been specified according to the research interests 
and orientate themselves at the common standards applied in quantitative content 
analyses (see Hansen 1998a: 106 et seq.). A coding pilot has been applied, and some 
of the categories and their measurement have been adjusted throughout the course of 
coding.  
All coding was conducted by the author. However, in order to test intercoder 
reliability (see Krippendorff 2004), 10% of dataset I and each 20% of the remaining 
datasets were randomly selected from each newspaper sample and coded by three 
additional, independent coders. These were recruited according to language skills 
and knowledge of European politics: One coder is a former postgraduate, one a 
former PhD student and the other one a current PhD student of European affairs. 
Coders were provided with a detailed codebook
47
 and instructed accordingly. 
Krippendorff’s α was calculated for all relevant variables producing satisfactory 
scores (see Appendix A3.5).
48
 Individual values for Krippendorff’s α will be 
provided in the respective analyses of the empirical chapters.  
The main coding categories comprise formal characteristics of the article, such as 
length, words spent on reporting specifically about the EP within the articles, date of 
publication, author name, article type, location, and page number; the themes of the 
articles both in structural (e.g. constituency matters, EP debates or institutional 
                                               
47 The codebook is available from the author upon request. 
48 The calculations are based on the instructions of Hayes (2005).  
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disputes) and topical (e.g. the services directive or REACH) terms; variables that 
respond to the linkage function of Parliament, such as the number and names of 
MEPs cited, their party affiliation, legislative office and constituency origin provided 
in the articles; and more specific factors regarding dataset II and III, such as 
comparisons drawn to the US Congress and focus of the article (in terms of persons 
and topics). A detailed coding scheme can be found in the appendix.
49
 
Other commonly applied categories in media research address the tone in a given 
news story or editorial comment. These may target the opinions of actors cited, or the 
stances of the writer towards a person, an institution or an issue (see Hansen 1998a: 
114 et seq.). This would have provided further interesting insights into the press 
coverage of the EP. But due to lack of resources such value dimensions have not 
been considered.
50
 At the same time, it can be expected that the variation in tone is 
not significantly large as most articles (83.85%) represent pure news items which 
are, unlike commentaries, hardly evaluative.
51
 
The internal validity of the statistical analysis is rather limited due to the restricted 
ability to causally infer within the data (see Neuman, Just et al. 1992). While 
qualitative analysis in form of in-depth interview evaluation can iron out this 
weakness to some extent, as will be explained in the next subsection, explanatory 
variables gathered from secondary sources will be applied in order to derive causal 
explanations for the variation in the press coverage about the EP. These factors are 
oriented at key features of the data, namely publication dates, country and 
newspaper. They describe newspaper characteristics, news values, public opinion, 
political contestation over the EU, specifics of national parliamentary traditions and 
dates related to the domestic political cycle among other, controlling variables. They 
will be operationalized in the corresponding chapters of investigation.  
 
                                               
49 See appendix A3.6 
50 Yet, regarding the smaller two datasets II and III the research investigates the newsmakers’ 
evaluations of the Parliament’s role towards the European Commission and during the 
negotiations of the SWIFT agreement. 
51 See appendix A3.1. Krippendorff’s, however, ranges from 0.23 to 1for the type of article (see 
Appendix A3.5). 
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3.2.2 Qualitative approach: interviews with correspondents 
The content analysis is of quantitative nature and thus limited to quantifiable 
explanatory variables. In order to enrich the results with newsmakers’ evaluations 
and explanations especially relevant for testing the hypotheses about the internal 
factors of news production, interviews with the respective EU press correspondents 
have been conducted in June 2010 – after the content analysis of the main dataset 
was completed. The reason for this methodological choice is two-fold: Firstly, Table 
3.2 shows that most news items (51.4%) considered in the analysis have actually 
been written in one or more of the EU capitals, namely Brussels, Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg.
52
 Only a small amount of articles for which the location was provided 
(8.1%) has been distributed by staff stationed in domestic cities, or elsewhere abroad 
from the home office.
53
    
Table 3.2: Location of the articles  
 
Frequency Valid Percent Cum. Percent 
EU capital(s) 1341 51.4 51.4 
Domestic capital or city 159 6.1 57.5 
Other city 53 2.0 59.5 
No location provided 1055 40.5 100.0 
Total 2608 100.0 
 
Note: N comprises N=2155 of dataset I, N=167 of dataset II and N=286 of dataset III 
Secondly, it is plausible to interrogate only the newsmakers responsible for the 
precise content examined in the broadsheets of this study rather than journalists who 
work for different media. Put differently, this methodological approach increases the 
internal validity of the study. Yet, it renders the sample non-random and rather small. 
Some of the correspondents who contributed to newspaper articles published prior to 
the interviews in Brussels have been succeeded by colleagues. Nevertheless, the 
latter follow the editorial line of the same print media, especially since most of them 
have been working elsewhere for the same broadsheet beforehand (see Table 3.3).  
A few relevant studies have incorporated interviews with correspondents in Brussels 
aiming at several discoveries. Some focus on the constraints the journalists on 
location receive during the news production process (e.g. de Vreese, 2003; Kevin, 
2003; Gleissner and de Vreese, 2005; Statham 2006), others reflect on their abilities 
                                               
52 This category also includes possible collaboration with colleagues in other cities. 
53 Note that overall Krippendorff’s α ranges from 0.33 to 1 (see Appendix A3.5) 
 91 
to contribute to a European public sphere (e.g. Gerhards, 1993; Lecheler, 2008) and 
yet others investigate the newsmakers self-perceived identity in the light of European 
integration (Siapera 2004).While touching on previous questions such as the work 
experience on location, the main purpose of this study, however, is to understand 
why the European Parliament, its members and their actions are reported in a certain 
way. Thereby the research method falls into the category of elite interviewing whose 
function it is ‘to provide the political scientist with an insight into the mind-set of the 
actor/s who have played a role in shaping the society in which we live and an 
interviewee’s subjective analysis of a particular episode or situation’ (Richards 1996: 
200). The Brussels press corps is not only able to explain their own approach to EP 
news coverage, but at the same time they are an ‘over-informed social group which is 
aware of every single (political) fact that happens in the EU political world’ (Baisnée 
2002: 110). They see the broader picture of the on-goings in Brussels, can evaluate 
the implications of political actions and decisions; and importantly, they are capable 
of reflecting on their own role within the ‘EU political world’. The interviews are 
therefore expected to embed the results in the broader context of news making in 
Brussels and the public perceptions of the European Parliament. Their comments 
have to be interpreted with some caution however, as their expertise and opinion not 
necessarily translates into news content or tone. Their professional attitude might 
further differ from personal beliefs.   
 
3.2.2.1 Interviewee sample 
As shown in Table 3.1, 17 reporters have been interviewed in total. The interviewee 
selection accounts for some variation both in terms of the length they have been 
employed in Brussels by their newspaper at the time of the interview and by means 
of their professional occupation immediately beforehand. In fact, the work 
experience of correspondents is particularly relevant for the Brussels news beat and 
has to be controlled for in the analysis to come in terms of the years spent working as 
a journalist in the EU capital. Journalists who arrived in the 1990s or even earlier are 
said to follow a model of ‘institutional journalism’ whereby they act as experts of the 
EU. The newer ones, on the other hand, have reportedly a much more critical 
approach towards the EU and the politics going on there by pursuing roles of 
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‘investigative reporting’ and do not show a ‘reaction of protection towards the 
institution’ unlike their senior colleagues (Baisnée 2002: 122). The latter ones are not 
necessarily Eurosceptic but maybe more critical towards EU politics and the 
European Parliament in general which might be reflected in their evaluations. 
Similarly, the experience they made prior to their arrival in Brussels during their 
journalistic career regarding expertise and experience, be that in their home country 
or as a foreign correspondent elsewhere in the world, supposedly matters too. A 
journalist who has covered national parliamentary affairs beforehand, for instance, 
might take a different approach to the EP than somebody who previously reported 
about foreign affairs from South East Asia.  
Table 3.3: Interviewee details 
      
Interviewee Date of 
interview 
Interview 
language 
Interview 
length (mins) 
Duration in 
Brussels
a 
Occupation imdt. 
beforehand 
IE-1 22/06/2010 English 42 > 5 Freelancer at home 
and abroad 
IE-2 16/06/2010 English 41 < 1 Home Office 
GB-1 15/06/2010 English 38 > 3 Home Office 
GB-2 16/06/2010 English 36 > 3 Foreign 
Correspondent 
GB-3 21/06/2010 English 38 > 1 Diff. Newspaper 
FR-1 21/06/2010 English 42 > 1 Foreign 
Correspondent 
FR-2 18/06/2010 English 71 > 5 Foreign 
Correspondent in 
European country 
NL-1 23/06/2010 English 44 > 1 Home Office/ 
Foreign  
Correspondent       
NL-2 16/06/2010 English 56 > 3 Home Office 
DE-1 24/06/2010 German 32  > 5 Home 
Office/Foreign 
Affairs 
DE-2 21/06/2010 German 47 > 5 Home Office 
DE-3 23/06/2010 German 34 > 10 Home Office/ 
Foreign 
Correspondent 
(diff. newspaper) 
DE-4 15/06/2010 German 65 > 10 Freelancer in 
Brussels 
DE-5 16/06/2010 German 28 > 5 Home Office 
DE-6 14/06/2010 German 25 > 5 Home Office 
AT-1 15/06/2010 German 56 > 3 Home Office 
AT-2 24/06/2010 German 43  > 5 Other 
EP press 
official 
22/06/2010 English 30  n/a n/a 
Legend: a categories: < 1= less than one year; > 1 = more than one year; > 3 = more than three years; > 5 = 
more than 5 years; > 10 = more than 10 years 
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Table 3.3 shows that nine out of 17 correspondents of this sample have been in 
Brussels for more than five years. Two of them even arrived before 2000. The 
majority furthermore has worked for the same newspaper immediately preceding 
their arrival in Brussels, in most cases at the home office. 
The interviewee selection sought to include at least two different journalistic 
perspectives per country. One exception is the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung for 
which all members of the Brussels office have been interrogated. This is firstly due 
to practicality – all of them were pleased to provide their opinion; and secondly, 
given the large size of the office compared to other newspaper corporations on 
location, there is considerable variation among the staff which is not least due to their 
arrival date in Brussels. Moreover, these journalists all specialised in different areas. 
Thirdly, the higher number of German interviewees considered here correlates with 
the larger sample of newspaper articles referring to EU parliamentary affairs 
compared to the other countries’ number of published news items. The analysis to 
come will account for the over-selection of German correspondents to avoid any bias 
towards a German perspective.  
Most of the interviewees were men (15), and only two female. In addition, one of the 
directors at the EP Directorate-General for Communication has been asked similar 
questions in order to understand the other side of the coin. However, these latter 
findings are not crucial for the analysis, yet helpful to receive a comprehensive 
picture about the variation in EP news coverage. 
 
3.2.2.2 Interview procedure 
The interviews themselves were conducted by the author face-to-face in Brussels, 
and lasted in between 25 and 71 minutes. All interviews have been held in either 
German or English (see Table 3.3). The respondents gave their consent to the audio-
recording of each meeting and have been promised to remain anonymous in the 
analysis.
54
 In order to obtain further consent in the aftermath, all of the interviewees 
have later been provided with conference papers related to the thesis which report 
some of the findings from the interviews. 
                                               
54 For the purpose of anonymity, in the remainder of the thesis the correspondents are being 
referred to as IE-1, IE-2, GB-1, etc. The order does not result from table 3.1. 
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All interviews followed a semi-structured questionnaire to allow both for open 
answers and some form of standardisation in order to better compare the stances of 
EU correspondents.
55
 The questionnaire was slightly amended for the conversation 
with the director at the parliamentary Directorate-General for Communication. Given 
that the qualitative research was conducted after the main part of the statistical 
analysis had been completed, the interviews were guided by the researcher’s 
hypotheses. Hypotheses-directed questions serve, following Flick (2009: 157), ‘the 
purpose of making the interviewee’s implicit knowledge more explicit’. The general 
aim here was to gather explanations for the observed phenomena in the news data. 
Therefore some questions referred to broad findings in the news related to the 
particular newspaper the interviewee was working for at that time.  
All respondents were informed about the research interest in the European 
Parliament given the complexity of their work experience in Brussels and 
Strasbourg, but no hypotheses were explicitly disclosed until after the respective 
conversation.
56
 The main themes covered in the interviews comprise: background 
information related to their occupation in Brussels and previous career path; the 
relationship with the home office and the editor; access to information about the EP; 
assumptions about the readers’ interest; work relations to the EP’s seat in Strasbourg; 
the newsworthiness of the EP and its representations in the news; the relationship to 
individual MEPs and their representation in the news; the representation of political 
parties and/or party politics inside the EP; the professional opinion about the EP; 
references to other members of the Brussels press corps or other newspapers; 
experience and evaluations of the examples of SWIFT and the investiture of the 
Commission in 2009/10, and where possible in the previous years; assessment of 
future developments in the press coverage. The sequence of questions posed varied 
with each individual interview. Rather, the researcher sought to let the respondent 
develop the conversation by carefully directing the flow of information. An overview 
of the topics covered in each interview is provided in the appendix (A3.8). 
 
                                               
55 The interview guide can be found in the appendix (A3.7a and A3.7b).  
56 Although the researcher sought to follow and apply criteria of objectivity in order to avoid 
bias in the responses, in some interviews specific prompt questions can ex post be interpreted 
as leading to certain answers. These have been excluded from the empirical analysis. 
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3.2.2.3 Analysis of the interview material 
One problem, which arises from the analysis of in-depth interviews, is that ‘it is 
difficult for readers to understand how certain materials are chosen over others and 
why certain quotes take precedence over those which never appear’ (Schlesinger et 
al. 1992: 31). Thematic coding is an appropriate method for analysis, especially since 
the researcher is interested in the variation across pre-defined groups, i.e. countries 
(see Flick 2009: 323). This is in line with general standards in qualitative research: 
‘The researcher does not search for the exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories 
of the statistician but, instead, identifies the salient, grounded categories of meaning 
held by participants in the setting’ (Marshall and Rossman 2010: 215).  
Interviews were recorded and transcribed afterwards. All interview transcripts were 
coded by hand by the researcher.
57
 The interviewee statements were carefully 
categorised according to the predefined themes mentioned above (see Appendix 
A3.8). These were further classified as informational, analytical and evaluative 
comments. Informational statements comprise, for instance, descriptions of the 
relationship to the home office or the access to information. Analytical comments are 
used to explain certain phenomena such as the representations of MEPs in the press, 
while evaluative comments give insight into the newsmakers’ opinion towards the 
EP, its members and their activities.
58
 These latter comments are especially relevant 
for the case study of SWIFT and the investiture procedure dealt with in chapter 6. 
Analytical statements represent a key element of the subsequent chapters 4 and 5, 
while descriptive comments become particularly applicable in the next, introductory 
empirical chapter.   
In the analysis, the thesis reports ‘representative illustrations’ (Hansen et al. 1998b: 
281) of correspondents’ experiences and evaluations of EP press coverage. In order 
to ensure this representativeness, the author has sought to cross-reference individual 
statements accounting for cross-country and individual variation and providing a 
comprehensive analysis. In particular, the author has picked those interviewee quotes 
which consider both the majority of statements – where appropriate underlined with 
several citations – as well as opposing opinions, especially those that contradict the 
                                               
57 The interview transcripts can be obtained from the author upon request. 
58 Note that for the director at the EP Directorate-General for Communication only analytical 
comments have been selected.  
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research hypotheses. This becomes most apparent in the British sample, where one 
journalist (GB-3) had a different approach from his two colleagues to many topics 
covered in this thesis, which is reflected in the empirical chapters.   
  
3.3 Conclusions 
The present chapter has presented the research design of the thesis. It has argued, 
firstly, that the analysis of articles published in national broadsheets is appropriate. 
This is due to the fact that these provide political analysis and employ staff in 
Brussels to cover European news stories. An interest in EU parliamentary affairs can 
therefore be expected. One can be accused here that the analysis does not account for 
much variation in media content given the quality newspapers’ similarity across 
countries. Yet, the sample is sufficient enough to determine the crucial news 
selection criteria, most notably domestic relevance as well as importance and 
conflict. At the same time, variation in media systems and journalistic cultures is 
going to be controlled for by the country selection. The countries considered are 
Ireland, the UK, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria. This selection 
enables the research to determine to what extent the national political cycle, public 
opinion towards the EU and the salience of the national parliamentary tradition 
impact on the broadsheet coverage of EU parliamentary affairs given the cross-
country variation on these variables.  
Albeit a rather small sample, the amount of observations within cases is being 
increased by the selection of three time periods. The first one refers to a routine 
period covering two annual legislative cycles of the EP between October 2005 and 
September 2007; the other two serve to investigate case studies surrounding the 
investiture of the European Commission in 1999, 2004 and in 2009/10 as well as the 
SWIFT case, later called SWIFT agreement, in the period between June 2006 and 
November 2010. By this combination of time periods, the research considers both 
rather quiet times and highly salient issues. However, it would be also interesting to 
contrast two different parliaments directly, such as 6th and the 7th term and 
investigate the steady changes over time which might be affected by the new 
elections in between the two terms. Further, although the ‘Barosso crisis’ serves as 
an example of a salient pan-European event, other developments, such as the ‘Greek 
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bail-out’, or the rejection of the Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty respectively by 
referenda held in France and the Netherlands in 2005 and Ireland in 2008, might 
have shown a different media approach to EU parliamentary affairs.  
Other limitations of the research design concern the media selection due to the 
restricted amount of resources available to the researcher. A full picture of media 
coverage of EU parliamentary affairs can only be provided if we also consider 
tabloids or regional dailies as well as television programmes and content of new 
media devices. Future research should consider these, especially since citizens would 
prefer television news over other media content as a source of information about EU 
affairs. Broadsheets nevertheless provide a link between EU politics and citizens. It 
was argued above that they serve as opinion leaders in the national context with the 
potential to impact on other media coverage and content. At the same time, it is 
rather unlikely that elite journalists would publish news that utterly refutes the views 
of the general public. To say it with the words of Diez Medrano (2003: 257): elites 
would use frames that ‘would necessarily reflect cultural themes they by and large 
share with the rest of the population’. 
Further, the country selection focuses on Western Europe and established 
democracies. While this is useful given the small number of countries considered 
here and the need to limit the pool of other explanatory factors, future research might 
seek to contrast the findings of this thesis with an analysis in the newer, especially 
Central and Eastern European member states. Due to lack of resources, the research 
presented here is unable to test the research hypotheses for different countries and is 
thus subject to falsifiability. Nevertheless, the research design provides sufficient 
ground for the thesis to be able to generalise the findings for the precise case 
selection and methods applied given the account for internal and external validity as 
well as reliability of the results.  
The mixed-methods approach to the study of EP news coverage aims at triangulation 
of the results and thereby seeks to even out weaknesses of either method. While the 
quantitative content analysis of 3956 articles provides us with a description of both 
coverage and content of the particular variation across country, over time and cross-
broadsheet, we are also able to determine external effects on broadsheet coverage by 
multivariate statistical analysis in the empirical chapters to come. Indeed, while 
being a common method in political communication research the content analysis is 
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limited to quantitative methods addressing questions of how much, what and why 
with respect to the press coverage of European parliamentary affairs. Thereby it 
studies the media’s role of a messenger. A qualitative approach would have provided 
answers about how the EP, its members and their activities are being represented 
(e.g. Bijsmans, 2011) or about in what way parliamentary actors contribute to public 
discourse by claims-making analysis (see Koopmans and Statham 1999). These 
would have provided further answers to questions about the development of a 
European parliamentary public sphere, but resources of this research project are 
limited.  
Here, interviews with correspondents allow us to gain further insight into how EU 
parliamentary affairs are being evaluated by the press. However, the thesis does not 
conduct interviews with MEPs in order to understand their motivations (or lack 
thereof) to receive media coverage and/or to be portrayed by the press in a particular 
way. This at the same time would provide a more comprehensive picture of the 
supposed reciprocal relationship between newsmakers and Europe’s representatives. 
Such an investigation would exceed the scope of this research. However, the 
interview with the director from the EP Directorate-General for Communication 
serves as a control for the European Parliament’s perspective onto its press coverage.  
The interviews account for the media’s role as a commentator. In fact, the 
quantitative results will be simultaneously discussed with the findings from the 
interviews. These can not only explain internal motives of the quality press in 
reporting from the EP, but also clarify explanatory factors related to public opinion 
and the public salience of the national parliamentary culture – the two external 
effects the thesis is mostly interested in. It follows that the remainder of the thesis is 
organised in the following way: Chapter 4 examines the amount of press coverage. 
Chapter 5 investigates news content. Both chapters, alongside the content analyses, 
largely draw on the interviews in order to seek explanations for the prevailing 
variation in the press coverage. Chapter 6 uses the interviews primarily to assess 
newsmakers’ evaluations, although variation in the extent and content of press 
coverage will also be explained in part by their comments. All empirical chapters are 
structured in a similar way: the analysis firsts concentrates on broader findings, 
before it investigates occurring phenomena in more detail.  
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A last note can be provided as regards the timing of the thesis. By the date of its 
completion, the Lisbon Treaty has just been in force for two years. Thus, the current 
press coverage might be different from the previous years covered in this thesis 
considering the Parliament’s more comprehensive powers and politicisation of EU 
policies. The case study on SWIFT will provide an outlook, however, on the 
relationship of the press towards the EP in the future.  
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Chapter 4  
The European Parliament’s visibility in the press: 
Newsworthy, yet constrained  
 
Previous research in the field of EU news has underlined the ability of EU news 
coverage to impact on public awareness levels (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006a), 
electoral behaviour (see Banducci and Semetko 2003; Banducci and Semetko 2004) 
or public opinion (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006b). While it is not the purpose of 
the thesis to study the effects of media coverage about the EP on public opinion or 
awareness levels, understanding why the European Parliament receives a certain 
amount of media attention as well as under what conditions contributes to addressing 
the question of its democratic legitimacy. At least we would be able to conclude that 
if there was no coverage of the institution at all the EP is not a newsworthy 
institution and thus not important in the public eye. Similarly, given that the research 
rests on broadsheets and therewith opinion leading media, the possibility of 
stimulating political debates in other media would diminish and thus render public 
awareness of Europe’s central representative body non-existent. A regular coverage 
of EU parliamentary activities, on the other hand, allows for a thorough investigation 
of the factors responsible for variation in visibility over time, across countries (and 
newspapers) in order to understand what makes it a newsworthy institution. At the 
same time, a steady amount of news about the EP furthers the interest in the 
examination of patterns in news content.  
Hence the present chapter explores the visibility of the European Parliament in the 
European quality press by investigating patterns in coverage and volume of news 
referring to the institution, its members and their activities. Thereby it answers parts 
of the research question by asking: What explains variation across country (and over 
time) in the extent of press coverage of the European Parliament?
59
 The time of 
investigation comprises a period between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007 
within the EP’s sixth legislative term – a routine period which has not been severely 
affected by effects related to the economic crisis, pan-European scandals, European 
                                               
59 While the routine period also allows us to study changes within legislative cycles, Chapter 6 
accounts for inter-temporal variation over a longer period of time.   
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elections or referenda; yet marked with salient decisions taken by and important 
developments within the European Parliament during its sixth legislative term which 
provided the European press with many reasons to report about and from the EU 
institution.
60
  
It will be investigated here to what extent EU parliamentary affairs have been 
covered by the press – and what accounts for variation in their visibility. It has been 
argued above that there are several factors responsible for the amount of coverage the 
EP and its members receive. The precise press coverage of parliamentary affairs is 
likely to be driven by public support levels for EU membership (H3-A) and the 
interest of readers in parliamentary affairs at a general level expressed by public trust 
in the national Parliament (H4-A). Given that EU parliamentary affairs are part of 
broader political stories, it was argued that the issue involved matters. Here, common 
news selection criteria are likely to apply, most notably the domestic relevance as 
well as importance and conflict (H1-A), while H2 claims that other, here domestic, 
events have a negative effect on the amount of media attention EU parliamentary 
actors receive.  
The chapter argues that the precise coverage of parliamentary affairs at the EU level 
is actually dependent on whether the EP is sitting in plenary session or not. Thereby 
the press coverage follows the ‘normal’ parliamentary cycle of the EP distributing 
more news during the winter months than during the summer break. The steady 
amount of news produced demonstrates that the activities of the EP matter per se for 
European broadsheets, albeit dependent on several other factors as well. The chapter 
finds that public opinion is indeed a probable driver. At times and in countries where 
citizens are more in favour of EU membership, the European Parliament receives 
more press coverage – a finding which has the potential to underline the EP’s 
dependence on public evaluations of the EU political system as a whole, without 
ignoring that the causal relationship could also go into the other direction from the 
media onto public opinion. Contrary to the initial assumptions however, trust in the 
national parliament has a negative effect on the attention the European press pays to 
the European equivalent. While the reason for this phenomenon cannot be fully 
investigated here, and will be subject to the subsequent chapters, the findings provide 
room for the assumption that the European Parliament is judged against its 
                                               
60 Please refer to Chapter 3 for the justification of selecting this time period.  
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counterparts in the national context proposing some form of rivalry going on 
between the institutions in the public sphere.  
The chapter further argues that because EU parliamentary affairs are part of broader 
political stories, news selection criteria applied to the salience of the issues involved 
matter for the press coverage. Here, the relevance for the domestic context represents 
a crucial driver which also becomes apparent in the fact that more news from the EP 
is being produced in the run up to general elections in the national context. The 
importance and potential for controversy of EU parliamentary activities have an 
impact as well, although these are also subject to further circumstances related to the 
legislative process at the EU level.  
The chapter is divided into three main parts. It first provides an overview of patterns 
in the press coverage the European Parliament receives both at a pan-European level, 
across and within country, i.e. across different types of broadsheets (4.1.). Here it 
specifically asks: How much coverage do the European Parliament, its members and 
their activities receive? Next, the chapter proceeds to investigate the drivers of the 
variation in the precise press coverage of parliamentary affairs at the EU level in 
multivariate regression models (4.2). After that, a closer look is paid at what makes 
EU parliamentary affairs particularly newsworthy by analysing the issues involved in 
the news coverage (4.3). The conclusions summarise the main findings and present 
implications for the empirical chapters to follow (4.4).  
 
4.1 Patterns in the extent of press coverage  
The patterns in the press coverage can be described in several ways in order to 
provide clues for the analysis of the variation. The first interest is to examine the net 
attention EU parliamentary affairs receive during the two-year period. Then, these 
figures are distinguished by countries and type of newspapers.  
 
4.1.1 Regular coverage at a pan-European level 
Figure 4.1 describes the total distribution of articles over the two-year period of 
investigation – October 2005 to September 2007 (24 months). It shows that the 
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overall newspaper coverage of the European Parliament seems to follow what can be 
termed as a ‘normal’ parliamentary period with increasing coverage during the 
winter months since the EP is, like most national parliaments, most active and 
productive in the time after the legislative summer break. The accompanying 
descriptive statistics also reveal that slightly more articles referring to the European 
Parliament have been published for the first year than for the second year of the 
investigation with the median of the distribution being 11.28 (if it was 12, there 
would have been no difference over the years). This is possibly due to the fact that in 
the winter of 2005/06 the European Parliament was dealing with some influential 
legislative issues such as the services directive
61
, REACH
62
 and the Port Package
63
 
providing reasons for extensive political and societal battles to cover in- and outside 
the Parliament. European political affairs have often been criticized for being 
lengthy, complex or irrelevant and thus would not receive regular attention but rather 
depend on newsworthiness per se (see, for instance, de Vreese 2003; Kevin 2003). 
That is presumably also why media research most often focuses on particular events 
and issues such as elections, referenda or specific policy fields. In fact, research has 
shown that media attention is not linked ‘to regular decision-making processes in the 
EU’ (Trenz 2008: 306). Figure 4.1, however, demonstrates that there is a steady and 
predictable supply of news involving EU legislative politics which implies that EU 
parliamentary affairs are newsworthy and an essential part of EU news coverage. 
While the results might prompt surprise to some scholars who do not believe that the 
media regularly cover EU parliamentary affairs (see, for instance, Shephard 1997: 
439; Shephard and Scully 2002: 153f), they indeed provide founded reasons for 
further media research about the day-to-day political business at the EU level.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
61
 Directive on services in the internal market (Directive 2006/123/EC) 
62
 Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (Regulation (EC) No 
1907/2006) 
63 Directive of the EU Commission on market access to port services (Port Package II, COM 
(2004) 0654) 
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Figure 4.1: Total distribution of newspaper articles over time 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for Figure 4.1 
N Mean Std. Deviation Median Mode 
2155 11.28 6.81 12 5 
 
The steady amount of news distributed over the months also allows deriving that the 
access to sources and information about the EP and its activities is granted to 
newsmakers in Brussels and Strasbourg. Contrary to some allegations (e.g. Anderson 
and McLeod, 2004), correspondents stated the European Parliaments and its 
members are very accessible nowadays. In fact, ‘their communications has improved 
out of all recognition’ one Irish correspondent, who has followed the parliamentary 
business in Brussels and Strasbourg for a long time, observed (IE-1). Additionally, 
‘they [the Parliament’s administration] have improved their website a lot, and the 
press people are very responsive’ (GB-3). In line with previous research (see 
Gleissner and de Vreese 2005; Statham 2006), correspondents stated that the EP 
would be very transparent, as opposed to the meetings of the Council allowing ‘no 
transparency’, or the Commission which is ‘very technical’ in its communication 
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(FR-1). This can be exemplified by the surprise of one correspondent on his arrival in 
the sixth legislative term: 
‘In the beginning I found it rather embarrassing how easy it is to 
get access to MEPs. No other political group is so accessible [...]. 
Everyone is running around openly, and wants to discuss the issues 
duly.’ (NL-2) 
And an Irish newsmaker expressed that ‘even though rapporteurs are very busy, I 
usually get information’ (IE-1). Furthermore, parliamentary parties would employ 
certain communication strategies, which provide the journalists with comprehensive 
information and in turn leads to news coverage as one correspondent ascertained: 
‘The [German] CDU uses more resources for communication services than the social 
democrats do, and that has positive implications […] Mailing lists are worth it, 
because we sometimes take the first news that’s available.’ (DE-4). Transparency 
and access accompanied by supportive communication offices are therefore a 
positive condition for news coverage about the institution and its members. Hence, 
one would expect not much variation across country or newspaper given that the 
circumstances accompanying the availability of information in Brussels and 
Strasbourg are by and large the same for every correspondent on location.  
Yet, the EP’s seat in Strasbourg is considered a double-edged sword: On the one 
hand, journalists find it very ‘expensive and exhaustive’ (GB-3) to travel to 
Strasbourg. However, given the new technologies such as Europe by Satellite (EBS) 
and the EP’s own television coverage (EuroParlTV), a journey to Strasbourg is ‘not 
always necessary’ (DE-4). In fact, ‘the most important means of communication is 
the telephone’ (DE-6). On the other hand, some reporters appreciate the time spent 
there because they can closely follow everything that is going on there and are 
overwhelmed by the attention they receive by MEPs themselves in Strasbourg. A 
French correspondent stated in this respect: 
‘The good thing about Strasbourg is that there are all people 
together – like in the US Congress, or in the Assemblée Nationale. 
They [the MEPs] come out after the vote – you can pick and 
choose, and talk to them, feel the political heat […]’ (FR-1) 
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Another one criticises that this would only be a political show, and the ‘real thing’ 
would take place in the European capital (NL-2). But, back in Brussels the European 
Parliament would compete with all other kinds of actors, institutions and events 
going on at the same time. Thus, the European Parliament would ‘bite the dust very 
often when it is in Brussels’ (DE-4). Some of the correspondents are even obliged to 
cover themes related to the NATO or Belgian politics, with which the Parliament is 
‘competing’ (IE-2) in terms of news importance. This lends support to the 
conclusions of Baisnée (2003) who asserts that the EP in general receives far less 
attention by journalists given its limited powers, lengthy decision-making procedures 
and the lack of popularity of its members compared to the Council or the 
Commission. This would imply that, contrary to the previous assumption about 
expected similarities in the press coverage due to equal access to information, 
newsmakers evaluate the newsworthiness of EU parliamentary affairs on the grounds 
of other factors. Chapter 2 has hypothesised that these are primarily linked to news 
values and external aspects related to domestic politics, the interest in EU affairs per 
se, and the salience of the national parliamentary culture. However, before the effects 
of these factors are investigated it is useful to enquire whether we actually find 
variation across and within country.  
 
4.1.2 Variation across and within countries 
Figure 4.2 depicts the variation of newspaper articles published across countries 
within the two-year period of interest. While the same trough points of coverage as 
above can be identified for the summer months around August, the number of 
publications in each country throughout the years differs considerably. Together with 
Table 4.2, one can see that the cross-country variation is biased towards the German 
sample, in which publications referring to the EP are higher in numbers (641) than 
those distributed by the other broadsheets in this study. British (204) and Austrian 
newspapers (269) distribute the least amount of articles in this respect compared to 
the rest. Although we cannot draw a comparison to the overall amount of EU news, 
or political and business affairs in general, these figures are as such comparable. All 
but the Sunday Business Post (SBP), which only comprises 17 articles in the current 
dataset, are published on a daily basis. And, given that the communications strategies 
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of the European Parliament are aimed at most media, one would expect a similar 
amount of newspaper articles across the sheets. If we were to divide the number of 
total publications (minus the SBP ones) by 17, then we would expect about 125 news 
items per paper – that makes 250 articles for the Irish sample, and 375 for the rest. 
However, the observed figures vary considerably from the average expectation and 
provide founded reasons to investigate the drivers of this variation.   
Figure 4.2: Total distribution of newspaper articles over time and by country 
 
This variation is furthermore of another nature when looking at the overall length of 
newspaper items in Table 4.2.
64
 It turns out that once Huber and Shipan’s (2002: 
179) verbosity multiplier has been considered (see column ‘Revised Mean’), British 
(449) and Irish articles (396) are longer than their counterparts; and the Austrian ones 
are shortest (238 words on average).
65
 These particularities already imply that 
explanations for this variation in numbers and length are not necessarily clear cut: 
The contrasts in the British and Austrian cases at first glance do not yet allow us to 
                                               
64 Krippendorff’s α ranges from 0.9968 to 1 for this variable (see Appendix A3.5). 
65 The reason for the inclusion of the verbosity multiplier lies in the particularities of each 
language requiring a different amount of words to deliver the exact same message. For instance, 
Huber and Shipan (2002: 179) estimate that for every word used in the English language, 1.22 
words are used in German to express the same information.  
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infer that public opinion towards the EU is responsible for the extent of press 
coverage of the EP in these countries. While support for the EU is low in both 
member states, British news published in the respective broadsheets are much longer 
(with about 211 words on average) than their Austrian counterparts.  
Table 4.2: Mean article length by country (word count)  
         
Country N Actual 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Verbosity 
Multiplier 
Revised 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
IE 385 395.66 193.58 103 1420 1 395.66 193.58 
GB 204 449.00 209.15 102 1271 1 449.00 209.15 
FR 336 420.86 240.47 101 1930 1.13 372.45 212.80 
NL 320 381.58 200.22 102 1872 1.16 328.95 172.60 
DE 641 428.12 211.16 100 1887 1.22 350.92 173.08 
AT 269 290.28 115.06 103 734 1.22 237.93 94.31 
Total 2155 399.05 206.67 100 1930  354.19 187.78 
 
The overall article length, on the other hand, tells us little about to what extent these 
news items deal with parliamentary activities at the EU level. In fact, the European 
legislature is seldom the sole subject of these articles, but the latter refer to the 
institution and its members when reporting about a certain topic. That means, other 
institutions and actors at either level, be that domestic or European, are mentioned 
and cited as well. When considering how much of these articles actually concern the 
European Parliament, its members, functions, and actions (Table 4.3), then one can 
see that German and British articles devote far less attention to these than others with 
each about 57% of the articles covering parliamentary activities at EU level. The 
total average is 62%. Articles of the French and Austrian broadsheets, on the 
contrary, contain more about EU parliamentary affairs (68.53% and 66.99%, 
respectively).
66
 It seems like that these newspapers publish more articles which 
predominantly deal with the European Parliament, whereas their counterparts in the 
United Kingdom and Germany produce longer articles that refer more often to other 
actors and issues as well.  
 
                                               
66 The amount of attention the EP perceives within articles has been measured as a total count 
of words of all sentences that contain references to the EP, MEPs, a legislative report, a 
committee or any equivalent irrespective of whether these are treated as the grammatical 
subject or object in a given sentence. This figure is then calculated as percentage, relative to the 
overall article length. For the variable ‘EP wordcount’ Krippendorff’s α ranges from 0.87 to 0.96 
(see Appendix A3.5). 
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Table 4.3: Average share of EP news within articles by country (%)  
      
Country Mean N Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
IE 64.64 385 25.42 6.76 100.00 
GB 57.60 204 26.56 7.45 100.00 
FR 68.53 336 26.83 8.38 100.00 
NL 60.85 320 25.90 6.36 100.00 
DE 57.79 641 27.26 5.67 100.00 
AT 66.99 269 25.91 11.46 100.00 
Total 62.27 2155 26.75 5.67 100.00 
The distribution of EP news within articles looks slightly different for the type of 
newspaper publishing such items (see Table 4.4).  
Table 4.4: Average share of EP news within articles by newspaper affiliation (%) 
      
NP affiliation Mean N Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
centre-left 64.53 857 26.62 7.45 100 
centre-right 63.69 731 26.57 5.67 100 
financial/business 57.04 567 26.52 6.36 100 
Total 62.27 2155 26.75 5.67 100 
The financial newspapers have on average about six to seven percentage points less 
on EU parliamentary affairs in their news. The chapter will analyse this phenomenon 
more closely when assessing the newsworthiness of EU parliamentary affairs in 
section 4.3. For now, the chapter investigates the factors responsible for the variation 
across country and over time. However, variation by newspaper type will be 
controlled for.  
 
4.2 Explaining variation in the press coverage 
Although it is not assessed here how the EP’s press coverage relates to the coverage 
of other institutions or political actors in terms of news prominence at either level – 
be that European or domestic, we can account for the instances in which the 
European Parliament has not received any coverage. This helps us to address the 
question of the drivers of its coverage by the press. For that, the quantitative data 
sample has been extended by so-called ‘zero observations’. Precisely, for every day a 
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newspaper has not published anything on the European Parliament that would have 
been captured by the initial selection criteria, article length and the respective share 
of news dealing with EU parliamentary activities have been coded as zero.
67
 This 
increases the sample size to a total N of 10847 over the two-year period.  
The dependent variable describes the percentage of news within articles referring to 
EU parliamentary affairs as seen in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Thereby all other news 
references have been omitted from the analysis. That is to say that the multivariate 
analysis only tests effects on the precise coverage of parliamentary affairs at the EU 
level as opposed to effects on the complete stories in which these news are 
embedded. The newsworthiness of the stories will be subject to the next section 
(4.3). Methodologically, the dependent variable captures the extent of EP news 
coverage both within newspaper as well as across the 18 broadsheets included in this 
sample.
68
  
Consequently, the prospective regression analysis does not rely on Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) models but uses a Tobit model instead, which was invented by Tobin 
(1958). That way one can account for biased variation caused by the large proportion 
of zero observations in the otherwise continuous dependent variable. This model, 
however, prevents us from including country fixed-effects as robustness checks since 
the requirement of a normal distribution of the dependent variables is not met. While 
the effects are probably automatically random if we assume that the selected 
characteristics do not skew the models, the inclusion of country dummies leads to 
multicollinearity since a lot of variation can be found across country – especially 
manifest in the variable of EB support for EU (see below). Furthermore, Plümper et 
al. (2005: 330) argue that ‘the inclusion of unit dummies makes it impossible to 
estimate the effect of time invariant exogenous variables (Wooldridge 2002)’. To 
circumvent these problems the models are re-estimated separately with standard 
errors clustered by broadsheet (BS) and country. This allows us to account for the 
nested structure of the data. In addition, a jack-knife test is conducted, whereby the 
main model is run again separately by excluding each country one by one. All main 
effects should remain significant in this case; if not, a particular (outlier) country 
                                               
67 Sundays and bank holidays have been accounted for as regards the daily press. Obviously, far 
fewer ‘zero observations’ have been recorded for the SBP. At the same time, this consideration 
relativizes the weight of this particular newspaper in the analysis to come. See Appendix A4.1 
for the number of observations per country.  
68 See Appendix A4.1 for the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable.  
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sample may bias the results. The Tobit coefficients can be interpreted in a similar 
way to those of OLS models.
69
  
Before the models are being presented, the next section briefly describes the 
operationalization of the variables.  
 
4.2.1 Operationalization of the independent variables 
The thesis argues that there are two main explanatory factors which impact on the 
precise news coverage of parliamentary affairs at the EU level. It is on the one hand 
contended that, given the public unawareness of the EU political system and therein 
the role of the European Parliament and its members, public support for EU 
membership in general probably determines the extent to which the audience is 
interested in EU affairs, and parliamentary stories in particular, which eventually 
impacts on the coverage of EP activities. In short, the higher the public support, the 
greater the coverage as laid out by Hypothesis H3-A. The second part of the 
argument highlights the importance of the national parliamentary tradition. It is 
assumed that trust levels towards the national parliament predict the extent to which 
the audience is interested in reading about Parliament in general. Put differently, 
higher levels of trust in the national equivalent are associated with a greater coverage 
of EU parliamentary affairs (Hypothesis H4-A). In order to test these effects, the 
models include two variables from the Eurobarometer. For the period between 
October 2005 and September 2007, five bi-annual surveys have been considered (EB 
64 – EB 68).70 
The first independent variable measures the support levels for EU membership (EB 
support for EU). The precise Eurobarometer question asks ‘Generally speaking, do 
you think that (OUR COUNTRY’S) membership of the European Union is/would 
be…?’ and provides the following options to answer: ‘a good thing’, ‘a bad thing’, 
‘neither good nor bad’. For the analysis to come, only the percentage falling into the 
first response category has been considered. It has also been shown above that the 
                                               
69 An example for the application of a Tobit model in political science can be seen in Bouvet and 
Dall’Erba (2010).  
70 The fieldwork for EB68 started in September 2007. Thus, the respective results are applicable 
for the last month of the investigation.  
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variation of this public opinion variable is greater across country than over time, with 
the Netherlands and Ireland expressing most appreciation for EU membership, and 
citizens of Austria and the United Kingdom lowest levels of support whereas positive 
attitudes in France and Germany represent average levels of support across the 
EU25/27 member states. While limited variation over time means the variable 
conforms to a country dummy, it is one of the best measures of public evaluation 
towards the EU to date given that is has been gathered by Eurobarometer since 1973 
and hence also been widely used in public opinion research. Further, it has been 
applied in previous research, namely in the study conducted by Peter and de Vreese 
(2004) testing its effect on the amount of television coverage of EU affairs.  
In order to assess whether the alternative hypothesis about the likelihood of levels of 
party political contestation over European integration (see Schuck et al. 2011) to 
impact on the amount of attention EU parliamentary affairs holds, the models include 
the weighed party system dispersion employed by Schuck et al. (2011) who 
themselves rely on Alvarez and Nagler (2004): 
     √∑    
   
(       ̅̅ ̅)
 
 
Where VSjk is the vote share of party j in country k. Pjk is the position of party j in 
country k on the question of European integration, while   ̅̅ ̅ is the weighed mean of 
all party positions in country k. Information for party attitudes towards the EU has 
been gathered from the Chapel Hill expert survey of 2002 and 2006 (Hooghe et al. 
2010) where the overall orientation of the party leadership towards European 
integration in 2010 ranges from 1’strongly opposed’ to 7 ‘strongly in favour’. Since 
this measure is weighted by vote share, the independent variable is adapted after each 
domestic legislative election for the period under study. 
The second main variable of interest describes the public trust levels for the national 
parliament in a given country (EB trust in NP). Here, the Eurobarometer question is 
phrased: ‘I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in 
certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend 
to trust it or tend not to trust it.’ The respective measure in the models to come 
includes the percentage of people who ‘tend to trust’ their national parliament. This 
variable varies both over time and across country, as seen in the previous chapter. 
113 
 
Although taken from the same survey, the extent to which these two variables 
correlate is not too strong.
71
  
In order to test whether the news coverage of EU parliamentary affairs is affected by 
any of the other two explanatory factors – news selection criteria (H1-A) and the 
concurrence with domestic politics (H2), the Tobit models are complemented by 
further variables. While it was argued above that news covering EU parliamentary 
affairs are selected on the issue, we can test whether the EP's activities matters for 
the press coverage. The variable which responds to the newsworthiness of the 
European Parliament measures whether the EP was sitting in plenary session in 
Strasbourg (or, in rare cases, in Brussels) on or the day before the respective 
publication dates of newspaper articles and zero-observation days.
72
 It has been 
coded as a dummy variable. Although the variable does not tell us what was going on 
in Parliament at a given day in order to identify the respective news values, i.e. 
whether the plenary debates express the parliamentary actors’ importance by a 
decisive vote, or a heated discussion (conflict) over an issue relevant for the domestic 
context involving prominent actors, the likelihood that (one of) these news selection 
criteria occur is captured by this variable (EP sitting). Thereby it reflects the 
newsworthiness of EU parliamentary activities at a general level. If the institution 
and its members are considered newsworthy enough by the newsmakers for 
whichever news selection criterion, then this crude measure should have a positive 
and significant effect on the amount of coverage the former receive in the quality 
press (H1-A), controlling for the other variables.  
A similar variable, namely NP sitting, which is coded and measured in the exact 
same way as EP sitting for each national parliament, investigates the effect of the 
national political cycle. Though it does not serve as a measure of highly salient 
events, one can assume that at times the national parliament is sitting it is likely to 
take political and legislative decisions which affect politics in the domestic context. 
If we find a significant and negative effect of this variable, then we would conclude 
                                               
71 The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.2495 with an associated p-value of p < 0.000 (see 
Appendix A4.3). 
72 Note that the SBP is a special case as a Sunday newspaper. No parliamentary sessions could be 
linked to the publication dates. The effect of this independent variable is thus expected to be 
slightly weaker in the general model, although the number of observations is considerably lower 
than for the other newspapers (see Table 3.1). The particularities of the NRC as an evening 
newspaper are not affected. Note also, that all remaining date variables are coded accordingly.  
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that the salience of domestic politics bias the press coverage of EU parliamentary 
affairs similar to what has been hypothesised in H2 by assuming that domestic 
politics are deemed more newsworthy than EU parliamentary affairs. NP sitting and 
EP sitting are indeed significantly correlated with each other, but this correlation 
does not exceed 0.219 given the particularities of parliamentary activity at each 
national level.
73
  
Further, another dummy variable (EU Presidency) measures whether a respective 
country was holding the EU presidency at a time. It serves both as a controlling 
variable and as an estimate for the news value of proximity/domestic relevance. In 
fact a higher coverage can be expected in a country that holds the EU Presidency at a 
given time (cf. Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart et al. 2010), because the governmental 
actors are better recognisable for the audience and the issues supposedly more 
relevant due to the agenda-setting power of the European Council Presidency. 
Chancellor Schüssel from Austria was the Head of the Council between July and 
December 2006, directly preceded by Chancellor Merkel of Germany until 30 June 
2007. The British government was responsible for the second half of 2005, but the 
data only include articles published after 1 September that year. 
In addition, the consideration of the GDP growth rate per capita in the models to 
come serves as a control of the economic state in each country included in this 
analysis, as there might be some unexpected effects which potentially affect news 
coverage.
74
 Its measure is changing quarterly compared to the previous one.
75
  
The appendix provides the correlations for all independent variables included in the 
models.
76
 The remaining controlling variables comprise the circulation numbers in 
10000s of each broadsheet which represent an estimate for 2006 (BS circulation 
(10000s)), as well as the type of newspaper coded as a dummy of which the 
categories of left-leaning political broadsheets (Centre left BS), and business or 
                                               
73 The Person correlation coefficient is 0.219 with an associated p-value of p < 0.000 (see 
Appendix A4.3). 
74 Similarly, Boomgaarden et al. (2010: 510) in their analysis of EU news visibility include the 
exchange rate between the Dollar and the Euro in order to control for drastic changes in the 
economy able to have an effect on news coverage.  
75 Data obtained from OECD.StatExtracts, website:  
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=350 (last accessed on 5 December 2011) 
76 See Appendix A4.2 for the descriptive statistics and A4.3 for the correlations of the 
independent variables.  
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financial newspapers (Business BS) are included.
77
 The variable BS No of staff 
controls for the number of correspondents a newspaper employs in Brussels. Here, it 
is expected the staff number contributes positively to the press coverage of the EP – 
with higher numbers of staff distributing more news (see also Brüggemann and 
Kleinen von Königslöw 2007: 6-7).  
The media system is being controlled for by including two dummies (MS liberal and 
MS polarised-pluralist, reference category: MS democratic-corporatist) once in the 
general model. Time dummies have not been included in any of the models to come, 
precisely because these are responsible for multicollinearity as most of the previous 
variables are also time dependent, either measured bi-annually or daily. Instead, the 
variable EP sitting captures time effects as the variation over time follows the 
legislative cycle (see Figure 4.1).  
 
4.2.2 Findings  
Table 4.5 shows the Tobit regression models, testing whether the independent 
variables presented above have a statistically significant effect on the amount of 
news dealing with EU parliamentary affairs. Models 1A and 1B represent the basic 
model, while models 2A to 3B add additional and controlling effects. Models 4A and 
4B control for the media system. Models 5A and 5B represent a separate test of the 
interaction between EB trust in NP and EB support for EU and will be elaborated 
later. The remaining models 6A to 7B include the effect of the political contestation 
variable(s). The models in Table 4.6 include the jack-knife tests, i.e. in each model a 
different country sample has been removed from the analysis. 
First and foremost, the European Parliament itself is driving its own news coverage 
by meeting in plenary sessions. When the Parliament gathers in Strasbourg, the 
visibility of EU parliamentary activities increases by about 59.42 to 62.41%. This 
shows that plenary debates and votes by parliamentary members matter for the press 
coverage of EU parliamentary affairs – and that despite accusations of plenary 
sessions lacking heated discussions and focussing on technical details as opposed to 
political issues (see Baisnée 2003). Liebert (2007: 266) even contends that ‘EP 
                                               
77 For the sources of circulation figures and the categorisation of newspapers please refer to the 
previous chapter.  
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plenary debates are hardly ever transmitted by the national mass media’. But the 
findings here suggest the opposite to be the case. Although we are unable to say here 
what it is about the Strasbourg meetings that makes these newsworthy enough to 
report about them, we can be certain that they have a positive impact on the press 
coverage. This resonates with the findings of Boomgaarden et al. (2010), who find 
that EP plenary sessions trigger EU news coverage. While Shepard (1997: 439) 
postulates that ‘media coverage [will] tend to focus on the limited days when there is 
voting’ in the European Parliament, the next section will investigate which particular 
news selection criteria are crucial for EU parliamentary affairs to receive attention by 
the Brussels press corps. For now, the external effects of public stances towards the 
EU, trust in the national parliament, and the domestic political cycle produce very 
interesting results worth discussing. 
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Table 4.5: Tobit models, predicting variation in the volume of news referring to EU parliamentary affairs   
 
Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B Model 6A Model 6B Model7A Model 7B 
EB support for EU .93*** .93** .83*** .83** .91*** .91*** .92*** .92*** 3.21** 3.21**     
 
(.33) (.42) (.25) (.35) (.23) (.31) (.21) (.26) (1.37) (1.39)     
EB trust in NP -1.07*** -1.07*** -1.05*** -1.05*** -1.12*** -1.12*** -1.92*** -1.92*** 1.97 1.97     
 
(.38) (.38) (.35) (.17) (.34) (.10) (.42) (.33) (1.83) (1.80)     
EP sitting 62.41*** 62.41*** 61.19*** 61.19*** 60.67*** 60.67*** 59.42*** 59.42*** 60.18*** 60.18*** 59.58*** 59.58*** 59.59*** 59.59*** 
 
(3.63) (4.32) (3.21) (3.91) (2.99) (3.68) (3.15) (4.01) (3.08) (3.85) (2.98) (3.69) (3.02) (3.67) 
NP sitting 5.58 5.58 6.78* 6.78 6.36 6.36 7.94** 7.94** 8.87*** 8.87* 12.07*** 12.07*** 11.99*** 11.99*** 
 
(3.98) (5.59) (3.84) (4.86) (3.87) (5.06) (3.45) (3.73) (3.07) (4.59) (3.38) (3.50) (3.30) (3.86) 
BS No of staff 
  
11.63** 11.63** 11.29** 11.29*** 7.72** 7.72*** 12.74** 12.74*** 5.32 5.32 5.43 5.43 
   
(5.55) (4.63) (5.16) (4.25) (3.87) (2.41) (4.99) (3.96) (4.14) (3.88) (3.78) (3.66) 
Centre left BS 
  
7.06 7.06 7.3 7.3 9.4 9.4 7.41 7.41 9.47 9.47 9.42 9.42 
   
(14.65) (10.40) (13.24) (10.43) (10.82) (11.02) (10.92) (9.58) (12.78) (11.87) (12.78) (11.89) 
Business BS 
  
-17.81 -17.81 -16.61 -16.61 -16.75 -16.75 -10.42 -10.42 -21.04 -21.04 -20.98 -20.98 
   
(14.34) (17.76) (13.66) (18.04) (12.46) (17.84) (11.67) (16.31) (13.00) (17.53) (12.94) (17.25) 
BS circulation (10000s) 
  
-.00*** -.00*** -.00*** -.00*** -.00*** -.00*** -.00** -.00* -.00*** -.00*** -.00*** -.00*** 
   
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
EU Presidency 
    
25.39*** 25.39** 19.14** 19.14 20.01** 20.01 7.76 7.76 7.79 7.79 
     
(8.76) (12.23) (8.29) (13.20) (9.12) (14.64) (6.88) (6.70) (6.73) (6.53) 
GDP growth rate 
    
5.30*** 5.30*** 4.50*** 4.50*** 4.58*** 4.58*** 7.79*** 7.79*** 7.79*** 7.79*** 
     
(1.47) (1.83) (1.11) (1.54) (1.27) (1.66) (1.71) (2.33) (1.71) (2.33) 
MS liberal       -25.88*** -25.88***       
       (8.4) (8.98)       
MS polarized-pluralist       -27.95** -27.95***       
       (14.24) (7.23)       
Interaction of EB trust in         -.05* -.05*     
NP & EB support for EU         (.03) (.03)     
Political Contestation           -5.37*** -5.37*** -4.65 -4.65 
           (1.10) (.55) (6.36) (4.74) 
Squared             -.03 -.03 
Political Contestation             (.25) (.21) 
SE clustered by BS  Country BS  Country BS  Country BS  Country BS  Country BS  Country BS  Country 
Constant -102.97*** -102.97*** -98.30*** -98.30*** -106.99*** -106.99*** -52.35* -52.35* -256.48*** -256.48*** -25.79 -25.79 -30.03 -30.03* 
 
(26.71) (37.93) (28.03) (27.84) (28.18) (26.47) (27.03) (3.44) (93.79) (88.81) (27.20) (26.62) (41.97) (17.20) 
Sigma Constant 91.35*** 91.35*** 90.17*** 90.17*** 89.73*** 89.73*** 89.32*** 89.32*** 89.49*** 89.49*** 89.63*** 89.63*** 89.63*** 89.63*** 
 
(4.56) (7.33) (4.56) (7.34) (4.48) (7.15) (4.54) (7.18) (4.57) (7.28) (4.43) (7.00) (4.43) (7.00) 
N 10847 10847 10847 10847 10847 10847 10847 10847 10847 10847 10847 10847 10847 10847 
Pseudo R Squared .0253 .0253 .0297 .0297 .0314 .0314 .0334 .0334 .0324 .0324 .0322 .0322 .0322 .0322 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; adjusted standard errors in brackets; dependent variable: amount of news dealing with EU parliamentary affairs (%) 
 
 
118 
 
Table 4.6: Tobit models, predicting variation in the volume of news referring to EU parliamentary affairs (Jack-knife tests) 
 
Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B Model 6A Model 6B 
EB support for EU .76** .76 .54* .54 .83*** .83** 1.00*** 1.00*** .92*** .92*** 2.23*** 2.23*** 
 
(.38) (.52) (.28) (.35) (.25) (.36) (.27) (.35) (.21) (.11) (.36) (.23) 
EB trust in NP -.94* -.94*** -1.16*** -1.16*** -1.12*** -1.12*** -.96* -.96** -1.14*** -1.14*** -1.95*** -1.95*** 
 
(.55) (.31) (.32) (.26) (.40) (.23) (.53) (.39) (.32) (.22) (.28) (.10) 
EP sitting 60.82*** 60.82*** 59.48*** 59.48*** 60.61*** 60.61*** 58.25*** 58.25*** 63.66*** 63.66*** 58.10*** 58.10*** 
 
(3.69) (4.75) (3.19) (3.86) (3.67) (4.87) (3.19) (3.14) (2.79) (2.30) (2.92) (4.35) 
NP sitting 8.06* 8.06 10.98*** 10.98** 3.64 3.64 3.98 3.98 10.24** 10.24 10.41*** 10.41** 
 
(4.43) (6.25) (3.89) (5.05) (4.13) (5.44) (3.36) (4.44) (5.06) (6.82) (3.03) (4.47) 
BS No of staff 12.92* 12.92*** 10.38 10.38*** 13.89*** 13.89*** 12.76** 12.76*** 2.56 2.56 16.15*** 16.15*** 
 
(6.77) (4.68) (7.81) (2.75) (4.74) (4.70) (4.99) (3.96) (3.78) (2.11) (4.92) (3.93) 
Centre left BS 3.46 3.46 10.25 10.25 3.77 3.77 3.66 3.66 22.05** 22.05** 6.06 6.06 
 
(15.46) (11.38) (14.35) (12.08) (10.17) (7.68) (13.79) (10.71) (9.02) (11.13) (10.95) (10.36) 
Business BS -16.57 -16.57 -11.38 -11.38 -28.90** -28.9 -26.41* -26.41 -.19 -.19 5.57 5.57 
 
(15.67) (21.39) (10.97) (15.77) (13.52) (18.25) (15.79) (21.80) (10.05) (14.12) (12.13) (16.23) 
BS circulation (10000s) -.00** .00 .00 .00 -.00*** -.00*** -.00*** -.00*** -.00*** -.00*** .00 .00 
 
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
EU Presidency 26.91*** 26.91** 24.90** 24.90 21.54** 21.54 22.84*** 22.84 31.81*** 31.81*** 6.95 6.95 
 
(8.68) (11.65) (10.52) (15.99) (8.70) (14.11) (8.76) (14.09) (7.02) (7.85) (8.00) (10.24) 
GDP growth rate 13.22** 13.22*** 5.81*** 5.81** 4.69*** 4.69*** 4.56*** 4.56*** 4.34*** 4.34*** 3.81*** 3.81*** 
 
(5.19) (3.59) (1.72) (2.54) (.95) (1.34) (1.27) (1.18) (.71) (.78) (1.03) (1.05) 
Country exluded IE IE GB GB FR FR NL NL DE DE AT AT 
SE clustered by Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country 
Constant -121.30*** -121.30*** -87.05*** -87.05*** -96.26*** -96.26*** -107.25** -107.25** -109.66*** -109.66*** -189.17*** -189.17*** 
 
(36.79) (28.13) (31.54) (33.10) (29.47) (36.26) (43.95) (42.35) (23.99) (20.53) (34.26) (17.61) 
Sigma Constant 91.15*** 91.15*** 87.77*** 87.77*** 86.67*** 86.67*** 88.92*** 88.92*** 96.48*** 96.48*** 86.60*** 86.60*** 
 
(5.18) (9.11) (4.71) (7.58) (4.88) (7.77) (5.27) (8.56) (4.32) (4.91) (4.69) (7.51) 
N 9447 9447 8990 8990 8958 8958 8961 8961 8885 8885 8994 8994 
Pseudo R Squared .0311 .0311 .0306 .0306 .0346 .0346 .0322 .0322 .0322 .0322 .0339 .0339 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; adjusted standard errors in brackets; dependent variable: amount of news dealing with EU parliamentary affairs (%) 
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4.2.2.1. The response of the press coverage to the EU mood 
Turning to the effects of public opinion, the results show that support for EU 
membership as hypothesised above has a significant and positive relation to the 
amount of press coverage EU parliamentary activities receive. While the causal 
direction of the relationship between both variables is not entirely clear, the 
coefficient implies that every percentage point increase in support levels is associated 
with an increase of 0.83 to 3.21 per cent more news about the European Parliament. 
Compared to the previous factor of plenary debates, this effect on press coverage is 
rather small, yet remains significant and positive throughout the models. The results 
lend support to Hypothesis H3-A. Thereby, we can assume that given that citizens 
have difficulties disentangling political institutions and actors’ responsibilities at the 
EU level, the European Parliament is seen as part of the whole and evaluated 
accordingly. This builds on Gabel’s (2003) findings in that the EU citizens’ trust 
towards the EP can be explained by general public support for EU membership. 
Here, we can derive a similar relationship between the extent to which citizens 
approve of the whole, i.e. one country's EU membership, and the degree of interest 
they express in EU parliamentary affairs. The more pro-European the readership, the 
more open they are to receiving news about their EU representative body. 
Eventually, newsmakers supposedly respond to this interest by devoting greater 
attention to the role of the latter in EU politics and policy making. One correspondent 
stated in this respect: ‘our concept is that we do what is important in the public 
debate’ (DE-5). The results, however, should be interpreted with caution as 
following previous research (e.g. de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006b) EP news 
coverage could also lead to a change in public opinion towards the EU.   
These results could nevertheless also imply that at times when and in countries where 
the public mood is more open to news about the EU, editors at each home office who 
oversee their correspondent’s news production in Brussels and Strasbourg provide 
the latter with more autonomy. Previous research has underlined the central role of 
the editor at the home office in the selection of EU news (e.g. Morgan 1995; de 
Vreese 2003; Gleissner and de Vreese 2005). The interviews with the respective 
journalists reveal that especially the ones writing for the large broadsheets are 
granted a lot of space, in some cases given ‘special pages’ (NL-2) by their editor 
back home for their ‘daily coverage’ from the EU (DE-3) with ‘actually few 
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guidelines’ (DE-2). Another Dutch correspondent stated to ‘have the feeling that we 
are quite free to do what we like’ (NL-1). The French and Irish reporters of this 
sample feel similar relying on the freedom to propose and write about the issues they 
deem important, although especially the latter are reportedly sometimes restricted to 
space and importance of other news. This finding also corresponds to Lecheler’s 
analysis of the relations of EU correspondents from the new member states to their 
editors (2008: 456). An Austrian correspondent also mentioned that some stories are 
difficult to sell to the editor, for similar reasons. But headlines such as ‘Brussels 
against Austria’ would always work (AT-2). This implies a negative image of the 
EU, but can also be affiliated with the size of Austria and the corresponding impact 
in Brussels negotiations since other countries, such as France, Germany and the UK 
are considered much more influential at the EU level.  
The effect of the alternative hypothesis, party political contestation over EU 
integration, is negative in models 6A and 6B (Table 4.5). Schuck et al. (2011: 49) 
report a similar finding for the levels of party polarization on news coverage of the 
2009 EU elections. Only when they include the squared effect of dispersion in the 
model does the impact change. In particular, they find a curvilinear relationship: 
when party polarization over European integration is considerably high, visibility of 
EU news increases significantly. A squared term has been entered into the model as 
well (see Models 7A and 7B) but both the simple and squared effects remain 
negative, although the coefficients do not comply with standard thresholds of 
statistical significance. These findings do not provide sufficient support for the 
alternative hypothesis that higher party political contestation over the EU leads to 
higher news coverage of EU parliamentary affairs. While a reciprocal effect must not 
be ruled in this case either, it nonetheless demonstrates that public opinion and party 
stances have different effects onto the broadsheet coverage of the EP and its 
members. On the other hand, the absence of any positive effect is surprising as 
domestic party contestation extends towards the European level via party channels. 
One prominent example is the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) which is 
not represented in the House of Commons but in the EP while at the same time 
making a lot of noise at the domestic level. 
EU coverage is also linked to the type of media system at home. Although this 
controlling variable does not interfere with the main independent variables in Models 
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4A and 4B, its effects are statistically significant. The results demonstrate that 
articles published in the democratic-corporatist media systems of this sample, i.e. the 
Netherlands, Germany and Austria, are on average 27.95% longer than those 
produced for the French audience, and 25.88% longer than those distributed in the 
liberal media systems of Ireland and the UK. A British correspondent underlined 
why ‘differences in media culture’ are responsible for variation in EP press coverage: 
‘German and French newspapers are much more deferential 
towards national politics. They are much more dutiful. The story 
might not be very interesting, but [they say] we really feel we 
should be reporting this.’ (GB-2) 
Consequently, if we assume that a fact-oriented and neutral approach to politics 
produces less words, the differentiation between the Anglo-American and the 
Continental journalism (see Köcher 1986; Mancini 2005) would explain why news 
about EU parliamentary affairs in the Irish and British press are significantly shorter 
than the rest. 
Nevertheless, the British press corps represents the best example for the impact of 
public opinion towards the EU and news coverage. For them the editor has a more 
central role, especially since ‘the sense is that a lot of people in the UK are hostile to 
Europe, just not interested’ (GB-3) which lends evidence to allegations of Anderson 
and Weymouth (1999) and Gavin (2003) about the relationship between negative 
attitudes towards the EU and a strict media management in London. One journalist 
admitted that he would not have ‘much time for the EP’ (GB-2), while another one 
said that it would be sometimes difficult to talk the editor into a particular story 
especially when MEPs are involved: ‘you can see their eyes rolling over the phone, 
trying to convince them’ (GB-3). This finding corresponds to Morgan’s observation 
of the British press corps in Brussels stating that ‘reporters write and rewrite to suit 
changing London demands’ with only few of them able to convince their editors of 
their stories (1995: 324). In a sense, and taken together with the statements of the 
other correspondents, the extent to which editors constrain their staff in Brussels 
seems to correlate with the weight of the domestic relevance since not EU 
correspondents but home editors decide about what is being reported about the EP. 
Whether this assumption holds with regards to news content will be investigated in 
more detail in the subsequent analysis.  
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Furthermore, despite high circulation figures British newspapers employ only a small 
number of staff in Brussels which can be linked to the lack of interest in EU affairs. 
In contrast, German broadsheets in this sample are much better represented in the EU 
capitals which coincides with greater public support levels for EU membership. This 
large difference in staff numbers supposedly also explains why the positive impact of 
the number of staff is not significant anymore in Table 4.6 once the country samples 
of the UK (Model 2A) and Germany (Models 5A and 5B) are removed.
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Nevertheless, some correspondents in Brussels claimed that ‘the fewer journalists 
you have here, the less comprehensive the news reporting’ (DE-3). One has to be 
cautious however, not to link the number of staff employed in the EU capital per se 
to the interests of the home office in Brussels affairs. A French news producer 
explained why: 
‘After the NO to the constitution, at that time I feared that it was 
going to be more difficult because French readers would turn very 
Eurosceptical and so on, and also my paper. But it did not happen, 
my paper is very in favour of European integration – the interest is 
very high still. The size of the office [in Brussels] is only linked to 
the financial difficulties rather than the interest of the paper. ’ (FR-2) 
The financial crisis is therefore a problem for the press coverage of EU affairs and 
parliamentary activities therein. Table 4.5 shows that the GDP growth rate bears a 
positive and significant effect on the press coverage of the EP throughout the models. 
Put differently, in wealthier times more news about EU parliamentary affairs is being 
published. This is not necessarily linked to the public mood, but can also be 
explained by economic reasoning of newspaper corporations which supposedly 
invest more resources (staff, paper volume and/or special editions) in times of 
economic growth. When newspapers have to cut on resources however, the European 
Parliament is threatened by lower press coverage. And lower press coverage is not 
necessarily supportive for the levels of awareness of EU citizens. This shows again 
how important the Parliament’s own communications instruments are in this respect, 
as a supportive manner can work against a possible downward trend of news 
coverage – especially in times of economic crises.   
                                               
78 Note that the other controlling variables referring to the type of newspaper and respective 
circulation numbers are not statistically significant throughout the models. Given the absence of 
any effects no further elaboration is required. It simply demonstrates that cross-country 
variation is greater than cross-media variation.  
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4.2.2.2 Competing with the appreciation of the national parliament 
While the previous hypothesis H3-A (support for EU membership) has by and large 
been supported here, the effect of public trust levels towards the national parliament 
bears a peculiar finding. It has been argued above that citizens use proxies derived 
from the domestic context in order to make sense of the political ongoings at the EU 
level (see Anderson 1998, Gelleny and Anderson 2000, McLaren 2007). Given that 
public awareness of the EU and therewith the EP is rather low, it is expected that 
trust levels towards the national Parliament predict the extent to which citizens are 
interested in Parliament in general. According to H4-A it is assumed that higher trust 
levels therefore forecast a higher coverage of EU parliamentary affairs, because 
readers appreciate parliamentary democracy in the domestic context and thus should 
also express more interest in receiving news from the EP. This assumption is in line 
with Peter and de Vreese's findings (2004). According to them, greater levels of 
public satisfaction with domestic democracy are linked to a greater relevance of EU 
news in television in terms of prominence. 
The findings from the models 1A to 4B in Table 4.5 reveal, however, that here the 
contrary is the case: with every percentage point increase in the levels of trust 
towards the national representative body, the visibility of the European counterpart 
diminishes by about 1.05 to 1.92 per cent. Again the impact is small, yet significant 
even when the jack-knife tests are considered (Table 4.6). And it even holds once 
controlling for different type of media systems (Models 4A and 4B). The findings 
imply that the EP seems to be losing out on its national equivalents. In fact, in the 
public eye it might be perceived as a rival to the national parliament since 
newsmakers respond to their reader’s appreciation of the latter by distributing 
slightly fewer news about EU parliamentary affairs. Given that the legislative 
competences of the European Parliament have expanded considerably over the last 
two decades, citizens might fear that their national representative body, which is still 
somewhat closer to them, is being increasingly undermined. In fact, despite the 
formal acknowledgement of their participation in EU policy-making by the Lisbon 
Treaty, national parliaments themselves are alarmed about losing out in the process 
of further European integration (see, for instance, Maurer and Wessels 2001; Benz 
2004; Auel and Benz 2005; Raunio 2005; O’Brennan and Raunio 2007b).  And 
although ‘the EP’s role in providing democratic legitimacy has become (largely) 
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unquestioned by political elites’ (Goetze and Rittberger 2010: 50) especially as the 
EP grew stronger politically, the results hint at the circumstance that the EP and their 
members are still judged by the public and the press by means of comparisons to the 
national standard of parliamentary democracy. 
This assumption becomes especially apparent in Models 5A and 5B of Table 4.5 
where an interaction term of EB support for EU and EB trust in NP has been 
included. The beta coefficient is rather small with -0.05, yet significant. The most 
important finding is that it is negative, implying that for a given level of EU support 
an increase in trust towards the national parliament will mitigate the (positive) 
impact of EU support. That means that regardless of the public stances towards EU 
membership, the appreciation of the national equivalent shortens the press coverage 
of EU parliamentary affairs, albeit marginally only. Jack-knife tests were conducted 
for this model as well.
79
 It turns out, however, that the precise effect is not 
statistically significant anymore once the country samples of the UK, Germany and 
Austria are each omitted from the model. It means that these samples are supposedly 
driving the interaction effect and thus in these countries the allegation of a rivalry 
between the national and the European Parliament is most likely to be true. In fact, in 
the German case, the ‘Lisbon ruling’80 provided by the German Constitutional Court 
in 2009 with respect to the role of the German Bundestag in EU affairs underlines 
this enmity of competences between the legislatures. And a German journalist went 
even further to compare the democratic legitimacy of the two institutions by claiming 
that ‘[the representativeness of the EP] is not comparable to the understanding we 
have of parliamentary democracy in the Bundestag’ (DE-5). 
In the British case, Parliament is the true sovereign of the British political system. As 
such it is no surprise that, coupled with the public hostility towards the EU, the 
European Parliament is not held in high regard but seen as a threat to the role of the 
House of Commons. A quotation from a British correspondent serves to underline 
this assumption. When asked in a follow-up question about what explains the lower 
interest of the UK press in EU parliamentary affairs, he stated: 
                                               
79 See appendix A4.4 
80The so-called ‚Lisbon ruling’ underlines the privileges of the national legislature vis-à-vis the 
executive in European ratification procedures (see BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30/6/2009, Paragraph 
No. (1 - 421), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html).  
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‘It does have something to do with the esteem of the EP in the eyes 
of the newspaper. It’s not regarded – maybe this is wrong – as 
being as relevant as the British Parliament; although there is a lot 
of EU legislation and the EP is obviously part of that process…’ (GB-
1) 
Although the particular finding of the negative impact of public trust towards the 
national parliament on EP news coverage is significant throughout the jack-knife 
tests in Table 4.6, a thorough investigation of news content as well as of the 
professional opinion of the elite newsmakers towards the EP’s competences in 
legislation and scrutiny of the executive is required. Such an analysis will be subject 
to the following two chapters.  
 
4.2.2.3 Domestic politics as a driver of press coverage 
Contrary to this negative impact of the trust in the national Parliament the effects of 
the variables describing the importance of domestic politics tell a different story here. 
In fact, the legislative cycle of the national parliament is not statistically significant 
throughout the models and thus whether it is sitting or not does not severely bias the 
coverage of the EP. It seems that the press rather follows the particular legislative 
cycle of the European Parliament, regardless of the state of national parliamentary 
affairs. This is actually a good finding for EU politics, as the reporting is unlikely to 
be interrupted by the day-to-day political business at the national level. It shows that 
EU politics, and therewith EU parliamentary affairs, represent an important part on 
the news agenda of the European quality press.  
Similarly, the factor of the EU Presidency is only driven by the Austrian newspapers 
which distributed more news when the Chancellor paid regular visits to the EU 
capitals as Council President (Models 6A and 6B in Table 4.6). The results imply 
that this was not the case when the German or British government held the Council 
Presidency. However, this might be linked to the fact that British newspapers in 
general distribute less news about EU affairs due to the lower interest of the public in 
EU parliamentary affairs as discussed above, whereas their German counterparts 
publish many more news stories throughout the year. In the latter case, it might be 
difficult in practical terms to extend the coverage even further. Another implication 
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arises with the Austrian Presidency. As a matter of fact, under the precise 
Presidency, the EU multi-annual budget for 2007-13 was negotiated. Many 
arguments were exchanged among the European institutions and member states over 
the size of the budget and its spending purposes (BBC News 2005). This supposedly 
increased the coverage in the other countries as well. All told, as far as the European 
Council Presidency is concerned the findings do not yet provide sufficient evidence 
to support Hypothesis H1-A, and suggest that the news selection criterion of 
domestic relevance does not necessarily always hold. Furthermore, the findings 
contradict previous research which finds key events, such as EU summits to be a 
driver for EU news coverage (see Peter and de Vreese, 2004; Boomgaarden, 
Vliegenthart et al. 2010). Instead, and again, the results imply that the European 
Parliament with its members and their activities is able to raise media attention on 
their own.  
Although these two factors of the national parliamentary cycle and incumbent EU 
President bear a tendentious, even partially positive impact on the news coverage, the 
results are not very telling. Thus, a different test is carried out in order to measure the 
effect of national politics on the press coverage of the EP. As a reminder, Hypothesis 
H2 states that national politics are able to bias the visibility of the EP in the press by 
devoting less attention to the latter when highly salient issues are at stake. For this, 
the actual distribution of newspaper articles over time (N=2155) is plotted against the 
difference of the articles’ date to national general elections in terms of months. The 
date of each national election is either before or after the publication date of a 
newspaper article in each country.
81
 General elections in France
82
, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, and Austria fell into the period of investigation and are taken as a before-
and-after measure. For the remaining two countries, the previous election date has 
been chosen because it is closest in the German case as opposed to the next set date 
in 2009, or at the time of each article publication in the UK then unknown, since the 
Prime Minister calls for new elections which took place in 2010.  
Figure 4.3 displays the distances between the publication dates of newspaper articles 
dealing with parliamentary affairs at the EU level and the date to the closest domestic 
                                               
81 Note that, in order to calculate the difference, each publication date has been subtracted from 
the actual election date.  
82 In the case of France both dates of the respective second round of Parliamentary election 
(06/05/2007) as well as the Presidential election (17/06/2007) have been considered (see 
Appendix A4.2).  
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general election (recent or forthcoming). With the mean situated at –1.31 months and 
the mode at –2.0 months as provided by table 4.7, the graphic shows that more 
articles are generally distributed just before the next polling day in the countries 
under study. 
Figure 4.3: Distribution of newspaper articles over time according to distance to general 
elections at the national level 
 
Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics for the distance to domestic general elections  
 
N 
 
Mean Median Mode 
Std. 
Deviation  
 
Range Minimum Maximum 
Distance to 
domestic GE 
(months) 
2155 -1.35 -1.00 -2.00 11.16 49.00 -29.00 20.00 
Further, the distribution follows the normal distribution which can be interpreted as a 
sign that domestic parliamentary general elections (and presidential ones in the case 
of France) do actually play a role for the press coverage of the European Parliament 
– but not in the way as previously assumed. In fact, politics taking place inside as 
well as political consequences from the European Parliament matter for the domestic 
context. While the analysis of news selection criteria is subject of the next section, 
these findings infer that the European Parliament is a relevant institution in the 
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national media, as far as broadsheets are concerned, and therewith for domestic 
politics. This is a positive outcome for scholars studying the emergence of a 
European public sphere. In particular the results imply that national election 
campaigns experience Europeanisation effects (see de Vries 2007). In fact, EU 
parliamentary affairs matter in the run-up to general elections – a finding which 
might be welcomed by some who have previously regretted the lack of contestation 
over European issues in national elections (see Mair 2001). Supposedly, MEPs of the 
respective parties competing for votes become involved in the campaigns and are 
thus referred to and cited more often. However, it also shows that the visibility of the 
EP in the news depends on the domestic political context as more references to the 
European body are being made during national election campaigns. During non-
election times the European Parliament receives less coverage and is thus not as 
salient as in the run up to domestic general elections. This underlines the news 
selection criterion of domestic relevance – when highly salient events are coming up 
in the domestic context, such as general elections, EU parliamentary affairs are 
supposedly supportive for the broadsheets’ news agenda.    
Thus far, however, we do not know which issues are newsworthy, and especially 
whether the news value of domestic relevance holds throughout the period of 
investigation. We can be certain though that the precise coverage of parliamentary 
affairs at the EU level is driven by the plenary sessions of the EP in Strasbourg 
themselves and public support for EU membership, while the public trust in the 
national parliament has a negative impact on the amount of coverage the EP and its 
members receive. The extent to which news values apply to the selection of news 
referring among other things to EU parliamentary activities, and under which 
circumstances these are likely to hold, will be investigated in the following section.   
 
4.3 A closer look: What is newsworthy? 
The previous section has answered questions about the drivers of the precise press 
coverage of parliamentary affairs at the EU level. This section will look more 
specifically at what makes these stories newsworthy in the wider context. In 
particular, it tests whether Hypotheses H1-A holds, which proposes that news about 
the EP is primarily chosen according to domestic relevance. It has been shown above 
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that parliamentary affairs are rarely the sole subject of political stories (Tables 4.3 
and 4.4). Instead, news also refers to other political actors and institutions. Further, it 
Chapter 2 has argued that news stories are mainly selected on the issue with which 
politics are concerned at a given time. The period of investigation between 2005 and 
2007 witnesses many legislative decisions, most notably on the services directive, 
REACH, or the Port Package. This section therefore asks which topics are 
newsworthy in order for EU parliamentary affairs to receive press coverage, and 
why. Further, given the legislative process is very lengthy and complex, at what 
stage does the role of the EP in this process become valuable to report for the 
newsmakers on location? Put differently, when are the activities of the EP 
newsworthy? And on what grounds, i.e. news values, do newsmakers decide to 
report from Strasbourg? To answer these questions, the analysis here again relies on 
both the quantitative method by presenting descriptive statistics, and the qualitative 
investigation of expert interviews with correspondents. The section proceeds by 
analysing the newsworthiness of the EP’s activities followed by the investigation of 
the issue-dependence of stories reporting EU parliamentary affairs.  
 
4.3.1 The newsworthiness of the European Parliament's activities 
The European Parliament is the only directly elected institution in the EU political 
system, and being a parliament, the only institution which provides a forum for 
public debate. Although these characteristics are newsworthy enough in the eyes of 
some newsmakers – as one French correspondent put it ‘[The EP is] quite interesting 
because that is the only way we have a bit of democracy in Brussels’ (FR-2) – its 
newsworthiness is expected to be dependent on several factors internal to the news 
production process, namely common news selection criteria (according to 
Hypothesis H1-A). Here, news content serves as a retrospective measure of news 
selection criteria. Hence, at the same time, H1-B can also be addressed (it states that 
news values matter for the content of EP news). 
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Figure 4.4: Type (by article theme) of news content by country 
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Figure 4.4 depicts the type of news content in each country in terms of (non-) 
parliamentary actions reported. Krippendorff’s α, however, is rather small for this 
variable, ranging from 0.14 to 0.40 (see Appendix A3.5). Hence the results have to 
be interpreted with caution.  
The figure shows that the common news selection criteria are reflected in the 
classifications, although their application varies across country. The news value of 
importance, for instance, can be found in the categories of ‘EP decision’, 
‘EP/MEP(s) plea’, ‘EP report/resolution’, ‘EP legislation’, ‘domestic reaction to 
EP/EU’ and ‘domestic/national actor approaching the EP/MEP(s)’83 which rank 
among the most common types of EP news.  
However, there is variation across country. ‘EP legislation’ is more often worth a 
topic in the UK (8.30%) and in Austria (8.90%), whereas Irish newspapers often 
include a plea by MEPs or the whole Parliament in their news (14.80%). And 
lobbyists from the national level are more often subject in Irish (2.90%) and British 
broadsheets (4.90%) than in the rest of the newspaper sample. A report or resolution 
tabled by the EP and its members, on the other hand, is a common topic in the French 
(9.50%) and Dutch quality press (8.10%).  
As regards the news value of conflict which relates to categories of ‘EP/MEP(s) 
criticism’, ‘row/debate/comprise between EU institutions’ and ‘row in EP’, the 
French and German newspapers include more news of that type in their papers. 
Controversies between institutions, for instance, comprise 11.90% in French 
broadsheets and 12.20% of the German news about the EP, and arguments inside the 
EP 4.20% and 4.70% of their articles respectively. Yet, ‘EP/MEP(s) criticism’ 
receives 13.20% of the share in the Irish news about EU parliamentary affairs.  
Related to the news value of personification, individual MEPs are most often a 
subject of their own in Austrian broadsheets (12.30%), where prominent figures such 
as Hans-Peter-Martin, also known as a whistle-blower, and Ursula Stenzel who quit 
as an MEP to accept a renowned political post in Vienna (as Bezirksvorsteherin), 
received a lot of attention. MEPs are least often the sole interest of the German 
counterparts (4.10%). On the other hand, pure domestic issues can be found in the 
                                               
83 Note that the difference between ‘domestic’ and ‘national’ here is that ‘domestic’ refers to a 
country’s own actors and institutions, whereas the national ones are from a different national 
country than where the respective news is published.  
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British press under the umbrella of ‘domestic party politics’ (6.40%). These news 
items comprise, among other things, the debate around the Tories’ intention to leave 
the EPP. The Austrian newspapers also have more news in this category than the rest 
(3.00%), followed by the Irish press with 2.60%. It shows at the same time that some 
news stories cannot be considered as EU affairs, but technically, they belong to the 
category of national news.    
These common topics identified thus far are also reflected when considering under 
which legislative procedure the EP receives attention by the quality press (see Table 
4.8). The category of ‘other’ here primarily includes domestic issues, which 
underlines the applicability of the respective news selection criterion since it 
comprises a large amount of news items (N=490) and is significantly longer than the 
rest as the t-test reveals. The co-decision procedure, on the other hand, which entails 
both news values of conflict and importance, is subject to most articles (N= 626). 
Since the introduction of the co-decision procedure with the Maastricht Treaty in 
1993, the legislative powers of the EP have grown in a wide range of policy areas. 
Morgan (1999) though finds that in 1996 the overall media attention paid to the EP 
was still rather low in the country selection of the UK, Ireland and Belgium. 
However, this was before the Treaty of Amsterdam was introduced in 1999 and with 
it Co-decision II granting the European Parliament complete co-equal legislative 
powers shared with the Council (e.g. Tsebelis 2002: 264). Since then the EP took 
many noticeable and far-reaching decisions such as on roaming tariffs for mobile 
phone users
84
, or the labelling of food packaging
85
. Before 2007 the Treaty of Nice in 
2003 expanded the application of the co-decision procedure to more EU policy 
fields. Table 4.8 shows that the press has picked up on the growing powers of the EP 
by publishing a higher number of articles reporting about policy issues decided under 
co-decision than those steered through parliament under other legislative procedures.  
 
 
                                               
84 Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2007 
on roaming on public mobile telephone networks within the Community and amending 
Directive 2002/21/EC 
85 Regulation 1924/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on nutrition and 
health claims made on foods (amend. Directive 2000/13/EC) 
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Table 4.8: Mean differences in ‘Share of 'EP news' within article/ percentage’ across 
legislative procedures  
     
Legislative Procedure Mean N Std. 
Deviation 
t-test 
other 73.5785 490 26.91106 ‘Other' vs. the rest 
(M=58.9481): 
t= 10.93; df: 2153; p<0.000, 
95% Confidence Interval: 
12.00545/ 17.25541 
 
Co-decision vs. other 
procedures (assent, 
consultation, budget, 
initiative/resolution) 
(M=58.1999):  
t= -2.224; df: 1100; p=0.026, 
95% Confidence Interval:           
-6.25844/ -0.39156 
assent 63.4219 104 26.10893 
consultation 55.3669 91 26.15075 
co-decision 54.8749 626 23.60125 
budget 58.9404 106 24.27975 
initiative/report/resolution 56.1211 175 26.11108 
EU treaties/institutional 
reform 
65.1743 241 28.32055 
other scrutiny (Presidency, 
ECB, OLAF, MS behaviour, 
Commission) 
64.3274 273 25.73877 
administration 60.9864 11 26.93641 
opinion third country/person 56.6976 38 30.0393 
  2155   
Source: Own research 
Yet, articles dealing with this decision-making procedure are significantly shorter 
than those of the other procedures – by about 0.39 to 6.26 percentage points as 
reported by the t-test statistic of Table 4.8. Here the assent procedure, used, among 
other things, to confirm the European Commission and its President or the ECB 
President as well as for EU enlargement, receives a lot of attention too – and that 
despite the fact that the EP only had to approve two Commissioners from Bulgaria 
and Romania in December 2006, as opposed to the whole cabinet at the beginning of 
the legislative term. Overall, the findings lend support to the assumptions of Shepard 
(1997: 439) who asserts that the media ‘will also tend to focus on those policy issues 
where the Parliament has been able to exercise most muscle’ alongside the days 
when the EP is taking decisions by vote. 
A German correspondent explained what kinds of decisions are newsworthy in this 
respect: 
‘The European Parliament is important for our newspaper as a 
power factor for the investiture vote of a new Commission, and 
then for legislative activity. There, we even go into the specialised 
committees and accompany their work. If it is an important issue, 
such as REACH, then it’s worth an article. If it reaches the plenary 
stage, we even travel to Strasbourg.’ (DE-1) 
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In fact, the stage of the decision-making process is crucial when deciding to cover a 
story about EU parliamentary affairs or not. One correspondent admitted ‘I do less 
than I think I should because it’s complicated’ (NL-1); while another one evaluated 
the EU legislative process as rather lengthy and boring:  
‘The ordinary day-to-day business of legislation, of passing 
legislation, is significantly more procedural, process-oriented – 
[generating] no dramatic stories, [especially] when there is 
something else going on.’ (IE-2) 
That is also why: 
‘The media reports when something new comes up, when the 
Commission makes a proposal. The big outcry follows, and all 
report about that. After that again, when the next big steps follow. 
(AT-2) 
A British correspondent drew a direct comparison to the national legislative business:  
‘Normally we ask: What is news? [The answer is] if it’s new and has 
a direct impact on our readers. The problem is, new stuff normally 
comes out of the Commission; and the direct impact [becomes 
visible] at the very end of the process. […] I used to work in the 
British Parliament for five years, and I can see that there is a lot 
less interest in the day to day process – incremental process – here 
than there is in London or British legislation. Each subject does only 
get in the papers once or twice; maybe when it’s proposed, maybe 
when there is a big debate, maybe when it’s agreed. And so you 
don’t cover every committee or Parliament, when it changes a little, 
or when there is a new proposal – it’s too much detail! […]’ (GB-1) 
On the other hand, the European Parliament’s legislative behaviour also bears 
potential for suspense, as one correspondent described: ‘If I follow something well, 
the best moment is [just] before a plenary decision – the most interesting thing is to 
wait for a vote’ (NL-1).  
Thus far, we can see that the selection of news about the activities of the European 
Parliament, as hypothesised above (H1-A), comply with common news selection 
criteria, especially those of domestic relevance, importance, and conflict:  
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‘It’s the same like everywhere in the world. If the Parliament is 
involved in the decisions, and if that is of general interest, or if it 
makes itself visible by being particularly stupid, then it gets 
reported’ (DE-5) 
However, some of the correspondents’ statements also imply that the attention the EP 
receives is not only tied to its powers or its members’ attributes per se, but also issue-
dependent. In fact, ‘the topic is always decisive [for news reporting]’ (AT-1). 
Another correspondent even went further and explained that ‘the EP is not being 
covered because everyone thinks it’s important’ (IE-2).  
 
4.3.2 Selecting issues for a domestic audience 
The next question therefore is which issues are relevant for the press. Figure 4.5 
shows what issues were reported in the news in each country of this study. Even 
though intercoder reliability scores are not perfect with Krippendorff’s α ranging 
from 0.52 to 0.69 for this variable (topic detail) with more than 400 categories to 
choose from (see Appendix A3.5), the colourfulness demonstrates the great variety 
of issues relevant for the newsmakers. It reflects the European Parliament’s activity 
in many policy areas and its role in European politics. The category of ‘others’ here 
especially refers to specific domestic issues which hardly overlap with news content 
in other countries. More than half of the Irish news coverage (56.60%) is concerned 
with this kind of news, while only 38.00% of the British broadsheet and 32.40% of 
the French press refer to such topics. Yet, topics which appeal to all newspapers do 
not always receive the same amount of attention across countries. A major issue in 
the British newspapers, for instance, was the intention of the Tories to break apart 
from the EPP-ED (15.70%, classified under ‘EPP-ED Party politics’), which hardly 
received coverage elsewhere. This finding especially exemplifies domestic relevance 
as a news value. One correspondent explained that this topic was reported because it 
demonstrated ‘Cameron’s policies on Europe’ (GB-2).86 
 
 
                                               
86 Note: David Cameron has been leader of the British Conservative Party since the end of 2005. 
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Figure 4.5: Issues reported in the news by country 
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Broadsheets in Austria instead often referred to the EU budget (11.20%) which was 
especially debated under its EU Presidency in the second half of 2006. The 
investigation of Equitable Life which affected Irish and British citizens almost only 
received coverage in the respective countries, contributing to a share of 4.20% in the 
Irish news and 5.90% in the British press. The REACH directive, on the other hand, 
received more coverage in the remaining countries, with especially French and 
German newspapers devoting many articles to this issue (5.70% and 6.20%, 
respectively). The services directive, another issue decided under the co-decision 
procedure like REACH, was especially prominent in the French papers (13.10%), 
followed by the Austrian (10.00%) and German press (9.00%). This coincides with 
the fact that the German and French governments were initially opposed to the 
directive, which provided reasons for the respective press to report more extensively 
about it. The investigation of CIA flight and respective allegations of CIA prisons 
across Europe, on the other hand, was a hot topic in the Dutch (6.90%) and Irish 
news (8.10%).  
We could go on about the varying salience of each topic in the national context, but 
the figure speaks for itself. At the same time, the findings show that domestic 
relevance as a news selection criterion matters considerably. They demonstrate that 
news about EU parliamentary affairs is selected according to their relevance for the 
domestic audience, measured in terms of impact or consequences for the latter. In 
fact, according to one of the directors at the EP Directorate-General for 
Communication interviewed for this study, the EP would prepare targeted press 
releases which speak to ‘what is newsworthy for the national public opinion’. 
Correspondents indeed justify the importance of this news selection criterion with the 
need of a direct impact for their readers when asked ‘When do you report about the 
EP?’ An Irish journalist replied: ‘If it is a major story of particular interest from an 
Irish perspective – or a major story which is significant in an EU context’ (IE-2). 
This statement implies that domestic relevance is not always applicable. Instead, it 
provides room for the assumption related to Hypothesis H1-A that, once major 
political issues are at stake, other news values, e.g. importance and conflict, become 
more applicable. Nonetheless, the domestic relevance matters to a great deal as seen 
in the previous figure. And other correspondents support this assumption. Even the 
British correspondent who previously complained about the lengthy decision-making 
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process admitted: ‘Sometimes, such as the alternative management fundraising 
directive, when it’s more interesting to our readers to know the week to week 
process, we cover more […]’ (GB-1). 
At the same time the impact on the readership has to be sufficiently concrete in order 
for a story involving the European Parliament and its members to receive news 
coverage.  
When it becomes more perceptible, then it’s interesting [to report]. 
An example is the traffic light system [for food labels] which has 
been rejected this spring [by the EP]. This was indeed worth an 
article because it was a surprise that they took this direction […] 
Else I don’t want to bother the reader with everything’ (AT-1) 
(emphasis of the interviewee) 
The reader, on the other hand, is not only characterised by her national citizenship. 
Instead, different newspapers have different types of readers. The distinction 
becomes especially apparent when comparing the most newsworthy issues across 
newspaper type.  
Figure 4.6 shows that the business press concentrates more on policy making, such as 
on the REACH directive (7.20%), the service directive (14.50%), and roaming 
(7.20%) compared to the political newspapers, for which hardly any difference can 
be detected in terms attention paid to the various issues prominent in the press. Here, 
the business or financial press decide to cover a story if they ‘show a clear impact for 
an industry’ (GB-3). 
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Figure 4.6: Issues reported in the news by newspaper type 
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The findings demonstrate that the press indeed responds to the particular demands of 
their readership when reporting parliamentary politics from Brussels. And the press 
directorate of the EP is very aware of that too as the official interviewed for this 
research project exemplified: 
‘It works for all political institutions in the world: human touch 
works much better. The most interesting discussion of a session is 
when on Wednesday morning the heads of political groups discuss 
the next or last EU Council meeting. At the end you see they [the 
journalists] are more interested in ‘meat glue’ which is not relevant 
for the future of the EU but is perfectly relevant for everybody…. 
For the Butcher, and it’s about meat and the concern with glue…. 
Journalists choose the angle to what is interesting for the citizens.’ 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
The chapter has shown that the European Parliament and its member receive regular 
coverage, which is particularly driven by their activities in Strasbourg when 
gathering in plenary session. Although access to information and resources of media 
outlets are a crucial condition for news coverage, parliamentary affairs at the EU 
level are deemed newsworthy when the stories they are embedded in comply with 
common news selection criteria. Domestic relevance is a highly relevant criterion: 
news from Strasbourg need to have an impact on readers, both in a domestic context 
and in terms of political and business interests, in order to make it into the quality 
press. That is also why the coverage is largely issue-dependent, and reaches its peak 
during national election campaigns. Yet, other news selection criteria, especially the 
importance of the EP and its ability to generate conflict play a crucial role as well, 
albeit dependent on further circumstances such as the stage of legislative process. 
The findings have nevertheless shown that decisions under the co-decision procedure 
are worth many articles in the European broadsheets.  
In short, EU parliamentary affairs are relevant, but this relevance is weighed 
according to domestic interests. It has been argued above that domestic relevance is 
an indispensable news criterion for European affairs. However, it also responsible for 
regular coverage from the EP, which is a positive condition for raising public 
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awareness levels. The fact that EU parliamentary affairs become especially relevant 
for general election campaigns at the national level suggests furthermore that, 
contrary to initial assumptions, a form of Europeanisation of domestic politics via 
representative links with the EP has taken place. Again, this is supportive for 
developing and strengthening linkages between citizens and their representatives at 
the EU level. This has implications for the analysis in the next chapter which looks at 
news content and the way MEPs are represented in the news. Given the applicability 
of the news values domestic relevance, importance and conflict, it can therefore be 
expected that EU legislators from the country in which a newspaper is distributed are 
featured more often than other European legislators. Their salience in the news is 
furthermore expected to be conditional upon their status and potential to initiate 
controversies. The next chapter will test whether these assumptions hold, or whether 
we find variation in their representations to be due to the other two factors presented 
in this chapter.  
When considering the precise press coverage of parliamentary affairs at the European 
level, public opinion is found to be significantly correlated to the amount of news on 
the external side of the news production process. Here, high support levels for EU 
membership are associated with more coverage of EU parliamentary affairs which is 
in line with what has previously been hypothesised. That allows us to derive that 
once the EU is more appreciated, the more welcomed are news about EU 
parliamentary affairs which demonstrates that the EP’s public evaluation is probably 
dependent on attitudes towards the EU in general – although the causal direction of 
this relationship is not clear. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that awareness levels of the 
EP are high where public support for EU integration is low. This is a rather bad 
certificate for European democracy, as negative stances are unlikely to overcome by 
broadsheet coverage from the European Parliament. EP coverage must not be 
understood as propaganda, but citizenry that is better informed by the publicity the 
EP generates might reflect on their attitudes towards the EU and consequently its 
Parliament (cf. Hobolt 2005).  
The impact of public trust levels towards the national legislative body runs counter 
initial expectations, however. Here, greater public confidence in the national 
parliament impacts negatively on the press coverage of the European counterpart and 
its members. The chapter therefore has introduced the argument of a perceived 
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rivalry in the public sphere. While this rivalry has been exemplified by the German 
and British case, the chapter is not able to provide further reasons for this 
phenomenon at this stage. Chapter 6 will give answers to this question by studying 
the press evaluations of the EP’s role in two case studies over time. It tests whether 
the EP with its rising powers has become more relevant, i.e. newsworthy, for the 
press to report about it over the years. Further, the interviews with the correspondents 
provide insight as to how they assess its political role in the European Union. 
Following the findings of the present chapter, Chapter 6 investigates whether the 
press actually perceives and/or represents the European legislative body as rival to its 
national counterparts. 
This last question will also be addressed in the following chapter. It will assess to 
what extent characteristics of the national parliamentary culture are reflected in the 
news content referring to parliamentary affairs at the EU level. This provides insight 
into how the EP is perceived in public and again adds to answering questions about 
its legitimacy in the EU political system.  
 
 
 
143 
 
Chapter 5  
MEPs in the news: 
Deputies for domestic parliamentarians? 
 
The previous chapter has argued that news stories containing references to EU 
parliamentary affairs are primarily selected on the newsworthiness of the issues 
involved by applicability of domestic relevance, conflict and importance. The precise 
visibility of the EP and its members is found to be enhanced by their activities, rising 
public support levels for EU membership and proximity to general elections in the 
domestic context. It is, furthermore, particularly contented that public trust in the 
national parliament constrains the press coverage of EU parliamentary affairs to the 
extent that higher appreciation of the former leads to less attention paid to the 
activities of the European equivalent. Whether this is an expression of a perceived 
rivalry between the institutions requires further investigation.  
This chapter examines the impacts on news content of EU parliamentary affairs and 
seeks to provide answers to the following specific part of the research question: What 
explains variation across country in the content of press coverage of the European 
Parliament? It has been hypothesised earlier (Hypothesis H4-B) that news content is 
likely to reflect procedures of the national parliamentary tradition with the purpose of 
making EU parliamentary affairs better comprehensible for the national audience. In 
order to assess to what extent the salience of the national parliamentary culture 
impacts on news content, the chapter concentrates on the media representations of 
MEPs investigating how salient they are in the news, what makes them newsworthy, 
and what characteristics accompany representation at the EU level in the quality 
press. All told, it answers the question in the title of this chapter by asking whether 
MEPs are represented in the press as deputies for national parliamentarians. 
Although, technically the attention MEPs receive by European broadsheets can be 
defined in a similar way as to the amount of news coverage, the previous chapter 
revealed that the publication of most news items is issue-dependent and rarely 
selected on individual EU legislators. Thus, references to individual MEPs as well as 
the measure of their salience in terms of quotation length can be categorised into 
news content. The reason for the focus on Europe’s legislators is twofold: First, this 
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measure is comparable across newspapers since mentions of individual MEPs are a 
likely finding if we assume that journalists use ‘faces’ to sell their stories to the 
editor and the reader. Second, the presentation of MEPs offers further insight into 
how Europe’s newsmakers perceive their parliamentary roles, their constituency ties 
and their party membership. At the same time we are able to assess whether the other 
two research hypotheses related to news content also hold. It is contended that news 
selection criteria become visible in the presentation of news. Therefore, we would 
expect that the main news values identified in the previous chapter, domestic 
relevance, conflict and importance, also shape the extent to which individual MEPs 
are being referred to in the news (Hypothesis H1-B). Furthermore, and following the 
results of the previous chapter, it is argued that Eurosceptic parties and MEPs are 
likely to be granted greater consideration in the news in countries where the public is 
less supportive of the EU than in other countries (H3-B).       
The chapter essentially argues that the way newsmakers in Brussels approach 
Europe’s legislators and present them in the news is influenced by procedures of the 
respective national parliamentary tradition in terms of electoral competition and 
resulting relevance of political actors. This is not only apparent in the domestic focus 
of news content – a finding which does not hold for the French quality press though 
– but also identified by the varying patterns in references to the constituency, 
individual party membership as well as to the legislative and political role of 
individual representatives in Strasbourg. In short, Europe’s representatives are 
conceived of as deputies for their domestic colleagues. The wider conclusions of 
these findings underline the potential of the EP to be perceived as a rival to national 
parliaments. European legislators and their roles are not presented as unique or 
supranational, but as similar to those of national parliamentarians. This lends support 
to the assumption that MEPs and MPs as well their performances are directly 
compared, which provides implications for the analysis of newsmakers’ evaluations 
of the EP in the next chapter.   
Nevertheless, the chapter also finds that MEP prominence matters to some extent for 
the attention individual legislators receive by the press. Although one has to 
distinguish between status gained from either European or national-level office. Most 
newspapers rank the latter standing more prominently. And, as anticipated above, 
public attitudes towards European integration are commonly reflected in the news – 
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the French feature other European legislators more often than their own ones which 
is an indicator for their interest in the common European project. The British and 
Austrian dailies, on the other hand, also give considerable voice to some Eurosceptic 
MEPs. Other newspapers do not, even though Eurosceptic MEPs have been elected 
in their respective countries.  
The chapter is divided into two main parts. It sets out by providing multivariate 
models investigating the salience of MEPs in the quality press (5.1). The models’ 
purpose is to assess whether characteristics of national electoral systems, here 
measured by the centrality of electoral modes on either parties or individual 
candidates, matter for the attention Europe’s representatives receive by the press as 
opposed to individual characteristics deemed newsworthy by news producers. Given 
the crudeness of the results, the chapter proceeds to provide a descriptive analysis of 
news content enriched by the interview findings with the correspondents in Brussels 
(5.2). Here the interest lies firstly on answering questions about who receives media 
attention and why (5.2.1), and eventually on the characteristics that accompany the 
presentation of individual legislators at the EU level (5.2.2). The conclusions (5.3) 
underline the main findings and propose further questions to be addressed in the next 
empirical chapter. 
 
5.1 A model for explaining the salience of MEPs in the news 
Europe’s legislators are the direct link between EU citizens and politics in 
Brussels/Strasbourg. From a media perspective, they provide a face to EU legislative 
politics and thus their attitudes and activities should be especially interesting for 
newsmakers in the EU capitals to communicate to their readers. This section analyses 
firstly, to what extent they do so providing descriptive statistics. Then specific 
hypotheses are being presented able to explain cross-country variation. Thirdly, the 
factors that supposedly impact on the salience of individual representatives in the 
news are being tested in multivariate regression models.  
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5.1.1 Varying attention for MEPs  
Table 5.1 provides an overview of the percentage of articles that mention individual 
MEPs by country and newspaper.
87
 The general pattern is that broadsheets which fall 
into the category of business or financial newspapers refer less often to individual 
MEPs than their political counterparts; although in the Netherlands and Germany 
these particular figures are slightly higher compared to the centre-right press, yet still 
lower in contrast to the centre-left affiliated print media. The previous chapter has 
argued that business-oriented and financial newspapers are likely to focus more on 
policy outcome rather than on politics. Therefore, a lower number of references to 
political actors, and European legislators in particular, seems plausible. Businessmen 
and lobbyists are likely to receive more attention in these kinds of broadsheets 
instead. Given that this pattern is by and large similar across country and the fact that 
MEPs are elected on a national basis, the remainder of the analysis in this chapter 
will provide descriptive statistics as a measure of variation across country. The table 
shows in this respect that British newspapers in general least often mention Europe’s 
representatives, while the Irish press features single MEPs most often compared to 
the rest – although the Austrian and the German broadsheets follow closely.   
Table 5.1: Instances in which individual MEPs are mentioned (%), per country and 
newspaper (N = 2155) 
 
 IE GB FR NL DE AT Total 
centre-  
left 
84.35 71.70 89.24 89.72 88.48 89.83 86.71 
centre-
right 
94.20 72.34 90.00 76.77 83.44 85.42 84.56 
business/ 
financial 
82.35 69.23 62.50 79.82 84.56 81.82 75.49 
Total 
87.79 70.59 79.17 82.19 85.20 86.62 83.03 
The number of references to individual MEPs, however, provides little information 
about how much attention they receive within articles. Direct quotations instead 
serve as a measure for salience. Indeed, not all MEPs are cited directly and often 
news items simply reference an individual’s behaviour or judge what a European 
legislative actor has said. But quoting MEPs directly implies that information and 
comment was actively sought by the news producer either via news channels, press 
conferences and official press releases or actual interview with the respective 
                                               
87 Krippendorff’s α for references to MEP1 to MEP5 ranges from 0.64 to 1 (see Appendix A3.5). 
147 
 
individual. It also suggests that the author of a given story has made a decision 
whether or not to seek such information, and how much attention the individual is 
being granted in respect of other news and actors. These decisions are influenced by 
several factors which will be investigated below. Beforehand, Figure 5.1 provides an 
overview of the extent to which MEPs are cited within newspapers across country.
88 
Figure 5.1: Mean actual number of word used for direct quotations of MEPs, by country  
 
Note: Huber and Shipan’s (2002: 179) verbosity multiplier has been considered; overall N for each MEP 
provided in brackets 
The verbosity multiplier has been accounted for here in order to draw comparisons 
across country rather than within articles.
89
 The distribution shows that while less 
than half of the newspaper articles mention at least two MEPs, the first MEP cited in 
                                               
88 Appendix A5.1 provides more detailed information about the number of MEPs cited in each 
country as well as the standard deviations for each mean. Note that there are a few articles left 
which mention more than five MEPs in total. The largest number of references to individual 
MEPs was found in one article of the Irish Times, which mentioned all 14 MEPs from Ireland and 
Northern Ireland respectively. Krippendorff’s α ranges from 0.62 to 1 for MEP1ownwords to 
MEP5ownwords (disregarding one outlier – see Appendix A3.5). 
89 As a reminder, the verbosity multiplier was derived from Huber and Shipan (2002) and has 
also been used in chapter 4, Table 4.2 
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each news item receives most attention on average. Though there are considerable 
differences across country. MEPs, if mentioned first among others, in the Irish press 
are granted on average about 44 words, but only 11 in the German broadsheets. The 
figures for the respective individual quotations are close to each other in the British, 
French and Dutch sheets with about 24 to 28 words. European legislators in the 
Austrian quality press are quoted with about 17 words on average if they rank first in 
the respective news item. The rest of MEPs cited in the news in each country 
generally receives far less attention, although the second MEP quoted in British 
broadsheets still receives a decent share with about 22 words of his/her own cited in 
the respective news. The Dutch press also allow individual legislators on the second 
to fourth ranks about 17 to 19 words per article. Only German and Austrian 
newspapers quote the remaining MEPs with hardly more than 5 words.  
The next question therefore is why do we find this particular variation across 
country? At first glance, public support for EU membership is unlikely to be a 
plausible explanation. Newspapers in countries which have similar support levels do 
not pay a similar amount of attention to MEPs. The difference is strongest between 
the Irish and the Dutch press whose national audiences are very in favour of EU 
membership. It does also not explain why the British devote more attention to single 
legislators than the French, the Dutch and the German broadsheets. One might put 
forward that the size of the national delegation matters and assume that broadsheets 
of countries which have only a small number of representatives in Brussels also 
concentrate more on the individual voice. That would explain, why in Germany 
where the largest number of MEPs are elected (99), they receive only little attention 
in the press. However, Austria elected only 18 representatives to the 6
th
 European 
Parliament while the respective newspapers devote a comparably low amount of 
attention to these. All told, these assumptions, albeit plausible, are not satisfactory 
and other explanations need to be particularised.   
 
5.1.2 Factors determining the salience of MEPs in the news 
Given the variation in the attention MEPs receive in the news across countries, the 
next question is to identify factors that are responsible for this phenomenon. In 
essence, the visibility of individual MEPs in the press is a crude measure of the 
149 
 
extent of interaction between the latter and the newsmakers. Both journalists and 
politicians are mutually dependent on each other: the former receive information and 
expertise while the latter are provided with publicity (see, for instance, Neveu and 
Kuhn 2002: 6ff; Kepplinger 2007). This section first investigates the interest of 
newsmakers to pay attention to individual MEPs before the incentives of the latter 
are theorised. 
 
5.1.2.1 The newsmakers’ approach to MEPs 
Scholars of EU politics repeatedly highlight the fact that citizens are largely unaware 
of the role of the European Parliament in the EU political system (see Shepard 1997, 
Shepard and Scully 2002, Farrell and Scully 2007). Eurobarometer figures describing 
the self-perceived knowledge of EU citizens underline this assumption.
90
 The reasons 
for the widespread lack of awareness are commonly linked to the complexity of the 
EU legislative process and the number of political institutions and actors involved, to 
the fact that the EP resides in three different cities (although technically political 
deliberation, executive scrutiny and legislative decision-making is mainly located in 
the parliamentary buildings in Strasbourg and Brussels), and not least to the 
geographical distance of the EP to many of its represented. The media is furthermore 
often accused of ignoring the EP and its members. Often however, this contention 
lacks empirical proof. The previous chapter has found that the EP indeed receives 
regular press coverage. Although we are unable to say how this coverage relates to 
that of other political actors and institutions at either the national or the European 
level, we are certain that EU parliamentary affairs are visible in the European quality 
press. Further, this visibility is especially driven by the European Parliament itself 
with its gatherings in Strasbourg. Therefore, we cannot only blame the institution and 
its members themselves.  
The question here, however, is not how the media contribute to the lack of public 
awareness of EU parliamentary affairs. Rather, the research is interested in how the 
press responds to these (low) awareness levels. The previous chapter has established 
                                               
90
 According to a Special Eurobarometer published in 2008, the average for the self-perceived 
knowledge of the EP’s role in the EU was ranked by EU citizens at 3.7 on a scale between 1 (‘I 
know nothing’) and 10 (‘I know a great deal). The average figure on this scale was even lower 
concerning the self-perceived knowledge about MEPs with 3.3 (European Commission 2008c). 
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that the quality press regularly reports about EU parliamentary affairs. But how do 
they sell the stories to their audience? ‘Citizens with some comprehension of the 
operation of their own national systems are often perplexed by the very different 
arrangements that exist at the EU level’ (Shepard and Scully 2002: 155-156). The 
precise difficulty for newsmakers reporting EU parliamentary affairs then is to make 
news comprehensible for their readers. Gleissner and de Vreese (2005: 229) argue 
that in order to do so correspondents are ‘simply forced to approach a topic from the 
basics’. Thus, if we assume that practices of parliamentary democracy at the EU 
level are perceived as ‘a matter of habit’ derived from the national parliamentary 
tradition (Goetze and Rittberger 2010), we can expect that newsmakers also treat the 
European Parliament as an extension of the respective national equivalent.   
Specifically, hypothesis H4-B posits that newsmakers reflect characteristics of the 
national parliamentary culture in news content of EU parliamentary activities in 
order to make these more perceptible for the reader. With respect to the precise press 
coverage of MEPs, we can therefore expect that journalists supposedly treat MEPs 
more or less like MPs, i.e. as deputies for national members of Parliament. The 
underlining assumption is that correspondents in Brussels believe that their readers 
are more familiar with representation at the national level. They have specific 
expectations towards their national representatives which are by all accounts 
determined by the way they are elected (cf. Norton 2002b; Gallagher and Mitchell 
2008).  
A cross-country distinction of electoral politics is whether votes are given to parties 
or individual candidates (see Bowler and Farrell 1993). This difference is manifest in 
the electoral incentives of candidates. Those who seek (re-) election in a candidate-
based electoral system, i.e. where voters have the opportunity to choose between 
individual contenders of different parties or even the same parties, court constituents 
directly in order to be selected for office in Parliament. Such electoral systems 
employ either an open or an ordered ballot structure. In an open ballot structure, 
voters can choose between individual candidates of the same party, whereas ordered 
lists provide voters with pre-defined ranks to select from if they wish to. In party-
based electoral systems, the party organisation at national or regional level 
determines the ranking of candidates on the ballots. This closed ballot structure 
presents voters with the least choice – that is only to decide between parties and not 
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nominees. The consequence is that candidates have to please their party leaders first 
in order to be placed towards the top of the list, rendering close voter links less 
necessary. To phrase the relation between voters, parties and MPs in the words of 
Gallagher and Mitchell (2008: 11): ‘In ‘principal-agent’ terms, MPs are the agents; 
closed list systems seem to assume that parties are the sole principal, while open list 
systems assume that MPs have two principals, parties and voters.’  
Scholars of electoral institutions claim that citizens who choose between individual 
candidates at the polls have more direct contacts with their MPs than those who elect 
political parties as a whole (see Norton 2002b). Here, district magnitude and whether 
elections follow proportional rules as opposed to plurality modes reinforce the effects 
of the centrality of the electoral structure.
91
 The effect of electoral institutions on the 
relationship between constituents and MPs and between the latter and their parties 
can be illustrated by the country samples of this study. The electoral systems of 
Ireland, the UK, and France can be categorised as candidate-based. Irish elections 
operate under single transferable vote (STV) whereby voters can choose between 
individual candidates of the same party in multi-member districts. Consequently, 
constituency service is a strong characterisation of the role of Irish MPs, which is 
even enhanced by constitutional arrangements facilitating to carry out this particular 
role. The other side of the coin is that the Irish Parliament is rather weak given the 
preoccupation of MPs with constituency affairs (O’Halpin 2002). Elections in the 
UK and France are held under plurality and majority-plurality formulas respectively 
focussing on the individual candidate in single-member constituencies. In both 
countries, Parliament is also rather weak, although dominated by the opposition of 
two main political parties on either side of the political left-right spectrum. MPs 
compensate their lack of influence in Parliament with the devotion to constituents’ 
grievances. In Britain, ‘today, being a good constituency member is seen largely as a 
necessary condition of service for all MPs’ (Norton, 2002b: 20). French MPs are also 
known for ‘spending more time on local issues than being a national legislator’ 
(Frears, 1990: 44). Further, this constituency role is underlined by the fact that the 
majority of French MPs hold another, local office such as that of a Councillor or 
                                               
91 Carey and Shugart (1995: 431) propose a relationship, albeit non-linear, between district size 
and ballot structure decisive for electoral campaigning: the larger the district size under an open 
ballot structure, the more important the personal reputation of individual candidates competing 
for votes, while this need to distinguish themselves from electoral competitors decreases with 
the rising district magnitude in closed ballot systems. 
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Mayor – a phenomenon known as ‘cumul des mandats’ (accumulation of political 
mandates).
92
 
In the remaining countries the electoral system can be categorised as party-based. 
The Dutch can choose individual candidates on predefined party lists, but de facto 
vote for parties in proportional elections (cf. Andeweg 1997: 112). Further, ‘the 
electoral system does not result in any form of geographical representation’ 
(Andeweg 2008: 494), rendering close constituency links unnecessary. Instead, the 
electoral system produces a multi-party system with a low threshold of 0.67 per cent 
of the vote for parties to enter Parliament necessitating coalition governments. 
Germany uses a Mixed-Member-Proportional system. While half of the members are 
elected directly by plurality mode, the other half enters the Bundestag via the list-
system of their party. Nevertheless, party organisations at local and regional level 
have a strong impact on the selection of candidates. Saalfeld (2002: 55) claims that 
‘for a large number of MPs, the extra-parliamentary party organisation is still the 
most important link with their constituents’. While constituency service is not 
irrelevant in the German parliamentary tradition, ‘it has to be emphasised that the 
German system of administrative courts and other institutions serve as functional 
equivalents to the British constituency member’s role as ‘grievance chaser’’ (ibid.: 
61). One could furthermore argue that since parties only put one candidate forward in 
the first tier of the national ballot, voters de facto choose between parties, and not 
between individual contenders (see Saalfeld 2008). These characterisations of the 
German electoral system provide sufficient reasons to classify it as party-based.   
The Austrian electoral system is characterised by proportional representation which 
was reformed in 1992 (see Müller 2008). While voters ‘can indicate their party 
preference and/or one preferred candidate at the regional and the Land levels’ (ibid.: 
402)
93
, in the third tier they only have the choice between parties and not individual 
contenders of 183 seats of the Nationalrat. Similar to the German system, parties play 
a significant role in the selection of individual candidates, even at the regional and 
Land level where they ‘de facto decide on the candidate lists’ (ibid.: 408). 
Furthermore, according to Müller and Scheucher (1994: 178ff), only about a third of 
                                               
92 For the an overview of French MPs’ various mandates in the current, 13th Parliament see 
http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/visuel/2009/10/06/cumul-des-mandats-notre-classement-
des-deputes_1247998_823448.html  (last accessed on 27 October 2011) 
93 There are 43 electoral districts distributed among the nine Austrian Lander. 
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voters show their preference for individual nominees in reality – the rest make their 
cross behind parties. That is why we should rather classify the electoral system as 
party based, even though the relatively small number of regional MPs elected to 
Parliament pursue a more constituency-oriented role than their colleagues recruited 
via the Land or national tier (see Müller, Jenny et al. 2001).  
Given that the media can be understood as a watchdog by holding political 
representatives publicly accountable as ‘‘organizer’ of public opinion’ (Negrine 
1996: 110), in countries where individual candidates are elected newsmakers 
supposedly pay more attention to these, whereas political parties as a whole become 
more interesting for journalists where electoral systems are party-based. To the 
knowledge of the author, there has been no comparative research on the impact of 
electoral rules on the relationship between the media and parliamentary actors at the 
national level. Following the derivations above, the precise hypothesis here 
nevertheless suggests that MEPs from countries where the electoral system favours 
individual candidates at the national polls should receive more media attention than 
those from member states whose voting systems are based on political party 
competition – because citizens and therewith readers are more familiar with their 
MPs’ behaviour at the national level.  
Besides the facilitation of news content, the interest of newsmakers is also driven by 
newsworthiness as outlined in hypothesis H1-B. Here, the news values of 
prominence and importance come into play. The more influential an individual 
legislator within the European Parliament by political or parliamentary office, the 
supposedly more attractive she is for the media. Van Aelst et al. (2010) find that 
parliamentary experience and professional status matter for the number of personal 
contacts MPs have with the media in five European countries. Long-serving MEPs 
and those who have important posts such as the EP President, chairmen of 
committees and leaders of political groups are therefore expected to have built a 
stable and large network with the EU press corps which on the one hand ensures 
reliability of information for journalists (cf. Niven 2005) and in turn enhances the 
formers’ chances to receive coverage. Another personal auxiliary is the expertise 
certain MEPs possess in terms of committee memberships and rapporteurships. 
Especially since legislative processes at the EU level are said to be very complex, 
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parliamentary experts for various policy issues are supposedly a valued source for 
correspondents in Brussels.  
 
5.1.2.2 MEPs’ incentives to become cited in the press 
The other side of the coin is that MEPs have to provide information for newsmakers 
to publish news stories. The extent to which the European Parliament and groups of 
political actors are open to media approaches has been discussed in the previous 
chapter which has by and large concluded as providing good conditions for access to 
information. At an individual level however, the MEP’s willingness to cooperate 
with the media depends on their career goals. Europe’s legislators in general have 
become increasingly career-oriented (Scarrow 1997). Nowadays, the European 
Parliament is not necessarily a retirement domicile for domestic politicians anymore, 
but a stepping stone to many members for a longstanding career in Europe or 
elsewhere. Recent examples include Nick Clegg who served as a British Liberal 
Democrat MEP until 2004 before becoming national party leader and deputy Prime 
Minister in 2007 and 2010, respectively; or Cem Özdemir, the incumbent co-
chairman of the German Green party, who was member of the European Parliament 
between 2004 and 2009. In general, MEPs are therefore expected to actively seek 
media attention to make themselves noticeable in public assuming that their main 
goal is to become re-elected or to be considered for another office (cf. Downs 1957).  
However, the strategies they employ to become cited in the press supposedly vary 
among the members. MEPs are first and foremost elected on a national basis. Thus it 
is likely that they especially target national media outlets whereas they are less 
interested to be cited by other European media. Secondly, although European 
Parliament elections operate under Uniform Electoral Procedures laid out in 
legislation from 2002 whereby electoral rules have to be proportional in all EU 
member states, ballot structure and district size still vary across countries (Farrell and 
Scully 2005). The district size measures the number of MEPs to be elected in a 
district and is either defined by the whole country, as in the case of Germany, the 
Netherlands and Austria, where all MEPs are elected on a nation-wide basis, or by 
smaller regions within a country.  
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Previous research has shown that these two characteristics, ballot structure and 
district magnitude, are crucial when it comes to individual behaviour of Europe’s 
legislators. Hix and Hagemann (2009) argue that electoral rules impact on the 
strength of the electoral connection between voters and candidates for the EP 
exemplified by the 2004 European polls. According to them citizens were more 
likely to be contacted by candidates or parties in countries which employ an open 
ballot structure in European elections. This implies that if individual candidates 
compete for votes with colleagues from the same party, these pursue a more pro-
active electoral strategy than candidates on pre-selected party lists. Their results 
further also ‘suggest that candidates in larger districts are less likely to campaign 
directly to voters than candidates in smaller districts’. (ibid.: 37). Similarly, Farrell 
and Scully (2010) argue that electoral rules also shape the representational role 
understanding and behaviour of legislators once elected to the European Parliament 
in the sense that ‘more ‘open’ systems are associated with a greater constituency 
focus by elected representatives’ (ibid.: 51). Again, this reflects the individual 
representative’s incentives to distinguish herself from fellow MEPs in order to secure 
more votes in the next election and regain the personal seat in Parliament.  
As regards their representations in the quality press, MEPs elected in small districts 
and those chosen under an open-ballot structure are therefore also expected to pursue 
a more pro-active media strategy than their colleagues elected in larger districts or 
under closed or ordered ballots in order to receive credit in public for their 
parliamentary actions aimed at their personal re-election. And a more active 
communications approach potentially leads to more attention in the media since 
newsmakers do not have to spare many efforts when time is scarce to gain access to 
sources and information (see Niven 2005). Indeed, MEPs elected via party lists also 
seek media attention to raise their public profile. But since their strategies for re-
election are primarily addressed at party elites they supposedly rather focus on other 
tools for recognition, e.g. voting cohesion and provision of expertise (cf. Hix 2002b; 
Hix 2004).  
To sum up the hypotheses, the main research assumption posits that the way national 
MPs are elected matters for the salience of MEPs in the news in that the press of 
countries where candidate-based electoral systems prevail pay more attention to the 
latter. The alternative hypothesis suggests that electoral procedures relevant for the 
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European polls play a significant role as well. At the individual level, it is expected 
that expertise and parliamentary experience contribute considerably to the amount of 
attention single legislators in Europe receive by the quality press.   
 
5.1.3 Operationalization of the variables 
In order to explain the variation in attention individual MEPs receive by broadsheets, 
the amount of words used for MEP quotations has been recoded into a variable 
indicating the percentage of these words in relation to the overall article length.
94
 
That way, the measure accounts for the space newsmakers are granted by their 
editors for EU news. Since both country-level, time variables, and factors at the 
individual level are going to be included in the models to come, only the first MEP 
mentioned in each article has been considered.
95
 But the total number of single 
representatives mentioned in the respective articles is being controlled for (No of 
MEPs in article).
96
 N is also largest for the first MEPs with 1795 observations in 
total ensuring robust results.
97
 Appendix A5.2 provides the descriptive statistics for 
the dependent variable. Given that in 548 cases these MEPs have not been cited 
directly and thus for these the dependent variable is zero, the chapter employs Tobit 
models as before.  
The first independent variable of interest is a dummy indicating whether the 
respective national ballot system is candidate-centred as opposed to party-centred 
(GE candidate-centred). Hypothesis H4-B states that the procedures of the national 
parliamentary tradition are likely to be reflected in the news content. By measuring 
electoral structures at the national level the variable itself is a rather abstract and 
crude measure, but serves well as an indicator about how the representative function 
in the domestic parliament is performed. The underlining assumption is that national 
                                               
94 Note that Krippendorff’s α is at least 0.95 for the original variable MEP1ownwords (see 
Appendix A3.5). 
95 It is furthermore plausible that only the first MEP is being considered, since news generally 
report the most important information first. Hence, we can assume that other MEPs are 
comparatively less relevant for the newsmakers. 
96 The models have been re-run for the second and third MEP respectively. The Tobit 
regressions can be found in Appendix A5.5a and A5.5b. However, the main effect of GE 
candidate-centred is not statistically significant throughout the models given the decreasing size 
of N. Appendix A5.5c informs about the descriptive statistics of the respective dependent 
variables. 
97 Please note that some independent variables have missing values. That is why N varies across 
the models.  
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parliamentarians receive more media attention when the electoral system is 
candidate-centred. It follows that MEPs from countries in which MPs are elected via 
candidate-based ballots are likely to receive more attention by the respective quality 
press. At the same time we do not have comparable survey data that informs about 
the expectations of represented towards their representatives in the respective 
countries under studies. European-wide surveys such as Eurobarometer or the 
European Election Survey do not comprise such measures. A few surveys exist at the 
national level (e.g. Patzelt, 1996; Anker, 2000; Irwin et al. 2005; Houses of 
Oireachtas Commission, 2007; The Electoral Commission and The Hansard Society, 
2007; Ulram, 1997; Ulram & Feistritzer, 1998). But their questions and survey 
phases differ considerably which prohibits the comparability as to include the 
respective responses into the models.   
The other main independent variables are related to the electoral procedures at the 
EU level. These measure firstly whether the ballot structure is open, ordered or 
closed in a given country and are coded as dummies (EPE Ordered Ballot and EPE 
Open Ballot included in the models). Closed ballot systems can be found in France, 
Britain and Germany, whereas the Dutch and Austrians employ an ordered ballot 
structure. Irish elections use open ballots for European polls. The second measure 
(AVG district size (EPE)) refers to the electoral district size and is included as a 
continuous variable, ranging from 3.3 for Ireland to 99 for Germany where the whole 
country serves as the district (data obtained from Hix and Hagemann 2009). The 
effects of the European Parliament electoral factors are tested separately given the 
high correlations with the previous variable at the national level. According to the 
alternative hypotheses presented in this chapter, MEPs elected under an open ballot 
structure and/or in small districts are expected to be cited more extensively in the 
press. 
The variables relating to the alternative hypotheses for individual factors were 
obtained from two external datasets. One variable measures the number of reports, 
irrespective of which legislative procedure, authored by a respective MEP during the 
whole legislative term of the 6
th
 European Parliament (MEP1: No of reports) and has 
been obtained from Hurka and Kaeding (2011). Although measured for the whole 
legislative term, it serves as an indicator of expertise. It is expected that a higher 
number of rapporteurships impacts positively on the amount of attention an 
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individual MEP receives. MEP1: No of terms measures the parliamentary seniority 
of a European legislator, i.e. the length of time in office, ranging from 1 to 6 and is 
also expected to have a positive effect on the dependent variable the more experience 
a legislator has in the EP. This variable as well as the following controlling variables 
have been gathered from the same dataset by Hurka and Kaeding (2011): Attendance 
patterns (MEP1: attendance) is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1 and 
indicating the percentage of plenary sessions attended during the 6
th
 term; and 
MEP1: accession state is a dummy specifying whether the individual is from one of 
the 12 new member states. 
Information about parliamentary and political posts in the European Parliament has 
been collected from Høyland et al. (2009). Here, three dummies are included 
measuring whether the referenced MEP is the EP President (MEP1: EP President), a 
chairman of a parliamentary committee (MEP1: committee chair), or a (co-) party 
leader of a European political group (MEP1: EP party leader). These offices 
combine both seniority and expertise. Consequently, MEPs holding such a position 
during the time of investigation are expected to be especially attractive for the 
European press which in turn should boost their coverage in the news.
98
 
Another controlling variable is a dummy measuring whether an MEP’s political party 
is a major opposition party in the national government (MEP1: dom. opposition). For 
purposes of simplicity and comparability, only MEPs of the two largest European 
parties, the EPP and PES, have been considered here. In countries and at times 
where/when the Christian Democrats/Conservatives were forming a government 
(with other coalition partners), the Social Democrats were in the opposition and their 
MEPs (irrespective of their country of origin) have been coded as opposition 
members accordingly, and vice-versa if the reverse was found to be the case.
99
 The 
reason for including this variable derives from the literature: Slapin and Proksch 
(2011) discover that MEPs from national opposition parties are more likely to 
schedule parliamentary questions to the European Commission. These interpellations 
are generally known as a tool of public scrutiny aimed at media attention. Legislators 
seek to raise their own profile in public reflecting the desire of the opposition parties 
                                               
98 Note that the major overturn of parliamentary offices at the beginning of 2007 has been 
considered for all individual MEPs.  
99 Note that the governments in Austria and Netherlands changed at the beginning of 2007 
comprising both Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. The respective MEPs have thus not 
been coded as national opposition members.  
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to (re-)gain executive office after the next elections. In fact, Vliegenthart and 
Walgrave (2011) find, among other things, that in the national context opposition 
MPs ask more parliamentary questions than those supporting the government and 
especially on issues the media has already paid attention to. Thus, here a positive 
effect is expected on the dependent variables: if an MEP is member of the major 
national opposition party, she should be quoted more extensively. If we find a 
significant impact, it not only implies that the news value of domestic relevance 
applies here, but that pan-European party ideology has an effect on the domestic 
public sphere.  
The only control the analysis is unable to consider since no records are available is 
the amount of resources individual MEPs have at hand to employ public relations 
strategies. The remaining controlling variables have already been used in the 
previous chapter and require no further introduction. These comprise: EP sitting, BS 
circulation, No of correspondents, Centre-right BS, Business BS, and EU support for 
EU.
100
 As before, the dummies referring to the type of media system (MS liberal and 
MS polarised-pluralist) are included once in the general model. Time dummies have 
been included this time. The analysis will show that the results hold even when 
controlling for monthly effects. Standard errors clustered by newspaper and by 
country again serve as robustness checks (see Chapter 4). Jack-knife tests are also 
conducted this time but the findings are reported in the appendix (A5.6).   
 
5.1.4 Findings: the impact of the national electoral system 
Table 5.2 shows the Tobit regressions for the models explaining the effects on the 
attention MEPs receive by the press in terms of direct quotations. The main purpose 
of the models is to detect whether there is any effect of the national electoral system 
on the extent to which MEPs are cited in the respective broadsheets. Models 1A to 
3A show that this effect is indeed statistically significant controlling for all other 
independent variables and time effects. That is to say, in countries which employ 
candidate-centred ballot systems in national general elections, MEPs receive about 
three per cent more attention in the press through direct quotes than in countries 
                                               
100 The descriptive statistics and correlations for the independent variables can be found in 
Appendix A5.3 and A5.4 respectively.  
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where political parties dominate in elections. This effect still holds when conducting 
the jack-knife tests (Appendix A5.6). The problem with this variable is however, that 
it is a dummy dividing the country selection into two groups (Ireland, Great Britain 
and France vs. the Netherlands, Germany and Austria). In fact, we cannot be sure 
whether another system related effect is driving the results.  
Models 5A and 5B shows that if categorised by type of media system, MEPs quoted 
in newspapers which are distributed in liberal and polarised-pluralist media systems 
receive more attention than in in the democratic-corporatist systems which happen to 
be the three latter countries (by 2.98% and 3.98% respectively). So, what is it that 
divides the countries into these two groups? Although the previous chapter identified 
differences across types of media systems to impact on the variation in news 
coverage, here it is difficult to accept as an explanation since when looking at the 
relationship between politicians and newsmakers in liberal and polarised-pluralist 
systems we find severe differences (see Hallin and Mancini 2004). Journalists in the 
former are much more autonomous than their colleagues in the latter type of system 
where a strong political parallelism prevails and the news media is often subject to 
instrumentalisation by their owners. Therefore, newsmakers have a different 
approach to politicians. In the polarised-pluralist system, here exemplified by France, 
it is likely that certain politicians and reporters have a much closer relationship 
depending on their political affiliation. Although the British press is highly partisan – 
unlike the Irish print media, newsmakers are much more prone to investigative 
journalism (see also Donsbach and Patterson 2004). Further, there is reason to 
believe that we also find variation of professional role understanding in the 
democratic-corporatist type of media system. German newspaper journalists are 
known for their interpretative and opinionated role which they pursue with a decent 
degree of autonomy (see Donsbach and Patterson, 2004; Esser 1998). Evidence from 
the interviews however, suggests that Dutch newsmakers have a different approach 
to politics. One stated: ‘We are on the Anglo-Saxon side (which emphasised facts); I 
never try to show my opinion. The French have them of course, but we focus on 
news’ (NL-2).101 All told, given the severe differences between the journalistic 
                                               
101 Deuze (2002: 65ff) finds that Dutch journalists are especially motivated by delivering news 
quickly to the public. Still, analysis and interpretation as the voice of the people is another 
important criterion for newsmaking in the Netherlands. However, according to Deuze 
journalists understand themselves as advocates of public opinion more often than their German 
colleagues.   
161 
 
professions and subjective role understanding across the countries of this study, it is 
unlikely to expect that the cross-country differences in the salience of MEPs in the 
news can be explained by different characterisations of media systems.  
One could be accused here that the varying manner of direct quotations is due to 
differences in journalistic styles. However, even if that was the case, it could in turn 
be argued that such styles root in the domestic political communication systems. The 
bottom-line then is that newsmakers apply the same quotation criteria for 
parliamentarians in the domestic context. Hence, an effect of the electoral system 
employed for national parliamentary elections is much more reasonable instead – 
especially when interpreting the effects of the remaining variables (or rather lack 
thereof).  
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Table 5.2: Tobit models, predicting variation in quotation length of MEPs   
 
Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B 
GE candidate-centred 3.23*** 3.23*** 3.35*** 3.35*** 3.39*** 3.39*** 
    
 
(1.03) (.73) (.93) (.75) (.98) (.72) 
    
No of MEPs in article -1.80*** -1.80*** -1.71*** -1.71** -1.65*** -1.65** -1.66*** -1.66** -1.66*** -1.66** 
 
(.43) (.69) (.44) (.68) (.44) (.68) (.44) (.68) (.45) (.69) 
EP sitting -1.22*** -1.22*** -1.26*** -1.26*** -1.14*** -1.14*** -1.24*** -1.24*** -1.14*** -1.14*** 
 
(.44) (.38) (.39) (.36) (.41) (.34) (.42) (.36) (.41) (.34) 
BS circulation (10000s) -.00* -.00** -.00* -.00** -.00** -.00** .00 .00 -.00** -.00** 
 
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
BS No of staff -1.31*** -1.31*** -1.29*** -1.29*** -1.33*** -1.33*** -.93** -.93** -1.40*** -1.40*** 
 
(.42) (.49) (.40) (.47) (.38) (.46) (.36) (.45) (.40) (.48) 
Centre right BS -1.57 -1.57 -1.64 -1.64 -1.71 -1.71 -1.48 -1.48 -1.65 -1.65 
 
(1.20) (1.47) (1.10) (1.33) (1.12) (1.37) (.96) (1.38) (1.10) (1.40) 
Business BS -3.48*** -3.48*** -3.44*** -3.44*** -3.38*** -3.38*** -3.20*** -3.20** -3.41*** -3.41*** 
 
(1.17) (1.27) (1.12) (1.13) (1.15) (1.16) (1.20) (1.62) (1.12) (1.17) 
EB support for EU .07* .07*** .07* .07*** .07* .07*** .11** .11*** .07** .07*** 
 
(.04) (.02) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
MEP1: No of reports 
  
-.04 -.04** -.05 -.05** -.04 -.04*** -.04 -.04*** 
   
(.04) (.02) (.04) (.02) (.04) (.02) (.04) (.02) 
MEP1: attendance 
  
-5.16 -5.16 -4.73 -4.73 -3.76 -3.76 -4.8 -4.80 
   
(5.72) (8.10) (5.60) (7.66) (5.70) (8.03) (5.65) (7.68) 
MEP1: No of terms 
  
.20 .20 .31 .31 .35 .35 .30 .30 
   
(.25) (.26) (.26) (.26) (.27) (.27) (.26) (.26) 
MEP1: EP President 
  
-5.15** -5.15*** -5.25** -5.25*** -5.47** -5.47*** -5.34** -5.34*** 
   
(2.28) (1.80) (2.23) (1.84) (2.25) (1.85) (2.24) (1.86) 
MEP1: committee chair 
  
-3.04* -3.04 -3.03* -3.03 -2.74 -2.74 -3.05* -3.05 
   
(1.69) (1.90) (1.68) (1.85) (1.69) (1.86) (1.70) (1.86) 
Continued on the next page…          
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… continued Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B 
MEP1: EP party leader 
  
-2.25*** -2.25** -2.20*** -2.20** -2.27*** -2.27** -2.19*** -2.19** 
   
(.70) (.92) (.78) (1.06) (.79) (1.09) (.79) (1.07) 
MEP1: dom. opposition 
  
1.35 1.35 1.42 1.42 1.54* 1.54 1.42 1.42 
   
(1.02) (1.18) (.90) (1.05) (.89) (1.02) (.90) (1.05) 
MEP1: accession state 
  
-2.92* -2.92* -2.58 -2.58 -2.74 -2.74* -2.63 -2.63 
   
(1.75) (1.71) (1.92) (1.64) (1.87) (1.62) (1.87) (1.63) 
EPE Ordered Ballot 
      
-1.71 -1.71 
  
       
(1.44) (1.67) 
  
EPE Open Ballot 
      
-1.84 -1.84 
  
       
(2.89) (2.79) 
  
AVG district size (EPE) 
      
-.07*** -.07*** 
  
       
(.01) (.00) 
  
MS liberal 
        
2.98** 2.98*** 
         
(1.35) (1.11) 
MS polarised-pluralist 
        
3.98*** 3.98*** 
         
(.98) (.45) 
Time Dummies No  No No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country 
Constant 9.59*** 9.59*** 14.30** 14.30** 14.25*** 14.25** 13.97*** 13.97** 14.18*** 14.18** 
 
(2.43) (.60) (5.57) (7.03) (5.40) (6.87) (4.89) (5.46) (5.40) (6.88) 
Sigma Constant 12.70*** 12.70*** 12.59*** 12.59*** 12.52*** 12.52*** 12.48*** 12.48*** 12.52*** 12.52*** 
 
(1.53) (2.29) (1.50) (2.24) (1.48) (2.20) (1.48) (2.20) (1.48) (2.20) 
N 1794 1794 1765 1765 1765 1765 1765 1765 1765 1765 
Pseudo R Squared .0182 .0182 .0213 .0213 .0230 .0230 .0240 .0240 .0231 .0231 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01, adjusted standard errors in brackets; dependent variable: Percentage of cited words for the first MEP per article 
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On the other hand, when countries are categorised into different electoral procedures 
at the European level (Models 4A and 4B) the ballot structure is not a significant 
factor able to explain the differences across countries. This could potentially be due 
to the small number of countries included in the sample of which the British case 
might be an outlier as they only recently (in 1999 for the 5
th
 legislative term of the 
EP) changed their electoral system from plurality mode to proportional 
representation under a closed ballot structure. Only district magnitude serves as a 
plausible explanation for variation in the dependent variable. In fact, the larger the 
district the slightly shorter – by about 0.07% – the quotations of individual MEPs 
relative to the total article length. This partially lends support to the alternative 
hypothesis presented above deriving that MEPs in smaller districts have supposedly a 
more pro-active media approach for their purpose of re-election than MEPs elected 
in larger districts. However, the ballot structure is not decisive and the effect of 
district size only marginal. The results could therefore equally be interpreted in terms 
of country size. Given that Austria, for instance, has only one electoral district for the 
EP elections, but it only comprises 18 candidates, the fact that there are fewer MEPs 
to pay attention to by the domestic quality press than in Germany with 99 MEPs 
might here also serve as a probable reason.  
Despite the crude result, the impact of the national electoral system, by the extent to 
which it is based on the vote for parties or individual candidates, seems the most 
plausible explanation for the variation in the dependent variable. The effects become 
even more reasonable in light of the alternative hypotheses: when looking at the 
weight of individual-level variables, parliamentary expertise and seniority of 
parliamentary membership do not contribute significantly to the attention MEPs 
receive by direct quotations. In fact, these impacts are at best negative. If a respective 
MEP is the EP President or leader of a European political group, the quotations are 
significantly shorter by about 2.19 to 5.47 percentage points across all models. It 
shows that the news value of prominence is unlikely to be a decisive criterion for 
newsmakers in Brussels to cite individual MEPs, although these findings might 
simply imply that the more senior and powerful MEPs are not easily accessible for 
journalists and hence are quoted less often directly.
102
   
                                               
102 Remarkably however, Appendix A5.5b reveals that attendance rates and the number of terms 
served matter for the attention the third MEP reveices in the respective articles. The models 
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In addition, the total number of MEPs mentioned in an article impacts negatively on 
the dependent variable meaning that the more MEPs are referred to the less attention 
a single one receives – which is not a contradictory finding. The fact that European 
Parliament is meeting for plenary sessions has negative consequences for the 
visibility of MEPs in the news. On days when the EP meets in Strasbourg, its 
members are cited less comprehensively (-1.14% in Models 3A and 3B). This 
demonstrates that EP plenary sessions do not have a publicity effect by means of the 
activities and stances of individual MEPs. It shows that the press does not necessarily 
cite MEPs while actively contributing to parliamentary debates. Instead, MEPs 
receive more attention when they are in Brussels (or elsewhere). Given the advanced 
communication technologies, it is unlikely that this finding is due to the lack of 
information in case correspondents do not travel to Strasbourg. Rather, it shows that 
MEPs’ opinions are not limited to their debating roles. But their expertise and advice 
matter more in the day-to-day Brussels political affairs.  
The number of correspondents employed in Brussels by a particular newspaper also 
contributes negatively to the length of MEP quotations (-1.33% in Models 3A and 
3B). While this finding might be peculiar, there is a plausible explanation seeing that 
once the German sample is removed the effect is not statistical significant anymore 
(see Appendix A5.6 – Models 5A and 5B). German broadsheets employ the highest 
number of staff in this selection which coincides with the fact that these quote MEPs 
less comprehensively. Further, the models comply with the descriptions above: 
business or financial broadsheets provide about 3.38% (Models 3A and 3B) shorter 
direct quotations of MEPs compared to political papers. 
In most models, the controlling variable describing public support for EU 
membership also has a statistically significant effect. It is line with what has been 
identified in the previous chapter: the higher the public support, the slightly more 
comprehensive the direct quotations of MEPs in the news (0.07% in Models 3A and 
3B) – without ignoring a possible reciprocal effect. However, we do not know 
whether pro-European MEPs receive more attention in this case. In the following 
part of this chapter it will be examined whether, according to H3-B, Eurosceptic 
                                                                                                                                     
show that those MEPs who more freqently attend plenary sessions are cited more 
comprehensively. Those longer in office, on the other hand, slightly receive less attention by the 
quality press.  
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actors are more prominent in the news in countries, where support levels are rather 
low.   
Overall, the models do not provide much support for the characteristics of individual 
MEPs as a positive means for being granted a voice in the news. Electoral rules for 
European elections are not a strong predictor of variation in attention Europe’s 
legislators receive either. And the effects of media systems are not convincing in this 
respect. Nevertheless, the most significant and plausible effect we find is across 
countries, dividing Ireland, Britain and France on the one side, and the Netherlands, 
Germany and Austria on the other side. Given the crude measure, it has to be verified 
though whether this division is due to the electoral system. A large country sample 
could offer a more robust explanation. Alternatively, a thorough analysis of the 
actual content of news enriched by the comments of the correspondents delivers 
more comprehensive answers to the research question addressed in this chapter.  
 
5.2. Representations of MEPs 
The previous analysis only provided few cues about the factors responsible for the 
presence of parliamentary actors in the news while contending that electoral rules 
used for national elections supposedly impact on the amount of attention MEPs 
receive in the news. The next question therefore has to be, which MEPs are 
referenced in the news? Such an analysis also offers explanations why these 
particular legislators receive attention and not others. The question here is whether, 
according to hypothesis H1-B, the domestic perspective as a news frame followed by 
conflict and importance is an appropriate description for news content about 
MEPs.
103
 H3-B will also be tested in terms of references to Eurosceptic MEPs in 
countries less supportive of EU integration. The enquiry then moves on to investigate 
whether any of the individual-level hypotheses presented above hold when 
examining the data more closely. The next sub-section (5.2.1) will answer these 
questions. A second step (5.2.2) is to look more closely at the characteristics which 
accompany the presentation of parliamentary actors in the press. These specifically 
address references to their parliamentary roles as well as questions of party 
                                               
103 Note that the previous chapter has already addressed H1-B by a measure of prominent issues 
in the news.  
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membership and voter representation. Here, the specific interest of the chapter is to 
investigate whether characteristics of the national parliamentary culture are actually 
reflected in news content about EU parliamentary actors as hypothesised in H4-B 
which would lead to the conclusion that MEPs are perceived as deputies for MPs; or 
whether the EU parliamentary culture by means of representatives is by and large 
presented in a similar way across countries.  
 
5.2.1 Personal attributes of MEPs as a driver for news coverage 
The previous chapter has identified the news value of domestic relevance as one of 
the crucial determiners of EP press coverage. Building on Galtung and Ruge’s (1965: 
71) proposition that news selection criteria, once applicable, also shape the content of 
news in its presentation, it can be therefore expected here that domestic 
parliamentary actors are given preference in the news as opposed to other, European 
legislators.  
Table 5.3 provides a ranking of the most popular MEPs in the news of each 
country.
104
 In the British case, the number of references is lower since there were 
comparatively fewer articles published mentioning the EP, let alone MEPs as seen in 
Table 5.1. Strikingly, in all countries except France, the own domestic MEPs 
(indicated in bold letters) are mentioned most often.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
104 Note that Krippendorff’s α for references to MEP1 to MEP5 ranges from 0.64 to 1 (see 
Appendix A3.5). 
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Table 5.3: MEPs mentioned in the press across country, ranked by the number of 
references  
Ireland Great Britain France Netherlands Germany Austria 
Mairead 
McGuinness 
(54) 
Sarah Ludford 
(11) 
Hans-Gert 
Poettering (37) 
Sophia in’t Veld 
(26) 
Martin Schulz 
(75) 
Othmar Karas 
(43) 
Proinsias De 
Rossa (49) 
Chris Heaton-
Harris (8) 
Josep Borrell 
(36) 
Kathalijne 
Buitenweg & 
Dorette Corbey 
(24) 
Hans-Gert 
Pöttering (64) 
Hannes 
Swoboda (39) 
Gay Mitchell 
(45) 
Daniel Hannan 
& Hans-Gert 
Poettering (7) 
Martin Schulz 
(27) 
Hans-Gert 
Poettering & 
Joost Lagendijk 
(23) 
Elmar Brok (47) Hans-Peter 
Martin (29) 
Simon Coveney 
(44) 
Josep Borrell (6) Daniel Cohn-
Bendit (24) 
Jan Mulder, 
Camiel Eurlings 
& Jan Marinus 
Wiersma (17) 
Markus Ferber 
(44) 
Johannes 
Voggenhuber 
(27) 
Eoin Ryan (41) Martin Schulz 
(5) 
Graham 
Watson (19) 
Max van den 
Berg (16) 
Evelyne 
Gebhardt (40) 
Paul Ruebig 
(22) 
Avril Doyle (35)  Alain 
Lamassoure 
(15) 
Josep Borrell 
(13) 
Georg 
Jarzembowski 
(32) 
Maria Berger 
(18) 
Jim Higgins (29)  Bronislaw 
Geremek, 
Bruno Gollnisch 
& Malcolm 
Harbour (12) 
Jules Maaten 
(12) 
Karl-Heinz 
Florenz (29) 
Josep Borrell 
(17) 
Brian Crowley 
(26) 
 Guido Sacconi 
(11) 
Jeanine Hennis-
Plasschaert, Ria 
Oomen-
Ruijten, Joop 
Post (10) 
Hiltrud Breyer 
(27) 
Reinhard Rack 
(15) 
Kathy Sinnott 
(22) 
 Pervenche 
Beres, Benoit 
Hamon, Francis 
Wurtz (8) 
Giovanni 
Claudio Fava (9) 
Josep Borrell 
(26) 
Herbert Boesch 
(14) 
Sean O 
Neachtain (20) 
 Pierre 
Moscovici (7) 
Bert Doorn (8) Hartmut 
Nassauer (25) 
Hans-Gert 
Poettering & 
Martin Schulz 
(13) 
Josep Borrell 
(18) 
   Alexander 
Radwan, 
Werner Langen 
(24) 
Joerg 
Leichtfried (12) 
Legend: Actual number of references in brackets; MEPs elected in the respective countries are indicated in 
bold letters; the table considers all MEPs mentioned in the articles, regardless of whether they have been 
cited, or whether they have been mentioned first or last 
In fact, most correspondents affirmed that the angle of reporting would 
predominantly be national which underlines previous findings in this field as well as 
the hypothesis which states that the news value of domestic relevance matters here: 
‘When was the last time Martin Schulz105 said something of relevance for the British 
readership?’, alleged a reporter from the UK (GB-1) implying that any pan-European 
                                               
105 Note that Martin Schulz was the leader of the PES/S&D since 2004 until he got elected 
President of the European Parliament in January 2012.   
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linkage between representatives and represented is very weak. In that sense ‘all what 
happens here [in Brussels], especially in Parliament, gets distilled into the national 
[perspective]’ (DE-6).  
‘If you have an Italian Socialist against a Conservative … nobody 
cares in Germany. Who knows them anyways? It doesn’t have any 
meaning for German politics. As long as there is no European public 
sphere, nothing much will happen in that respect […]’ (DE-2) 
Most prefer their own national MEPs since ‘it’s easier to connect to Austrian 
delegates, especially regarding regional topics such as transport’ (AT-1) and, in the 
Irish case, an Irish MEP would ‘know the audience’ (IE-1) and was able to relate to 
them. Furthermore, ‘delegates complain that they not often get cited’ which is 
another reason why journalists in Brussels would talk to their own nationals first 
when required (AT-2). In fact:  
‘German press officers want to place MEPs in German newspapers. 
[Werner] Langen doesn’t get anything out of being reported in Le 
Monde.’ (DE-3) 
Yet, another one stated that domestic relevance is not always applicable:  
‘We focus more on the outcome [than on people], what the law is 
going to be. In the food labelling case it happened to be German 
rapporteur, one of the most important people to talk to. (GB-3) 
The French newspapers of this study are the only ones which prefer MEPs who hold 
important posts in the European Parliament, such as European Party leaders (Schulz, 
Pöttering until December 2006, Cohn-Bendit, Watson), and President of the 
European Parliament (Borrell, Pöttering from January 2007) regardless of their 
nationality. This reflects the regression results of the jack-knife test in Appendix 
A5.6 – Models 3A and 3B: When the French newspapers are omitted from the 
statistical analysis the effect of the origin of an individual MEP becomes statistically 
significant indicating that MEPs from newer member states receive less attention in 
the press (-4.28%) than those from the old-15 to which all countries of this sample 
belong. That is to say that the news value of domestic relevance does not necessarily 
hold for the French quality press with respect to the representations of MEPs. A 
correspondent explained why this is the case: 
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‘Sometimes it is interesting not to have contacts with your own 
nationals; because sometimes it is interesting to understand the 
point of view of different countries, different nationalities.’ (FR-2) 
A stark contrast can be found in the German broadsheets which stress German MEPs 
more than other legislators in general. However, this finding also coincides with the 
fact that these are important office-holders in the European Parliament such as party 
leaders (Schulz, Pöttering), committee chairs (Brok, Florenz) and rapporteurs (e.g. 
Gebhardt for the services directive, and Ferber for budgetary reports and amending 
Directive 97/67/EC on postal services). In fact, prominence matters here as a news 
value. ‘We don’t speak to backbenchers!’ a German journalist claimed (DE-1); and a 
French one underlined the news value of importance: 
‘I know a few MEPs, the most important ones, the most powerful 
and influential, but I am not very interested in one MEP who is not 
influential, trying to have contact with me, because he has nothing 
to say’ (FR-2) 
These findings contradict the results from the regressions to the extent that office and 
parliamentary seniority indeed matter as regards the attention different MEPs receive 
– at least in the French and German case and in terms of references to these 
individuals (and not length of quotations) as most of the high-ranked European 
legislators in these two countries also happen to be long-serving members of the EP. 
This might have something to do with the fact that both countries are major founding 
members of the European Union and their elites are in favour of European 
integration promoting European values as opposed to mere domestic interests. A 
French reporter underlined this point when asked about the French reader: 
‘Maybe, we [the French] are a bit more interested in Europe. But I 
would not say that is the main ground. We are more concerned by 
EU integration, but [in terms of being] a political project. I think it’s 
the same in Germany: it’s not only about the free market, but also 
a political project to unify Europe, with a bit of democracy which is 
interesting in this very technical construction.’ (FR-2) 
In the British press, on the contrary, European legislators are not deemed very 
important at all regardless of their parliamentary or political office: 
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‘It’s a difference when you say ‘some powerful US-Congressman 
said this yesterday’… you can tell an editor that – it resonates with 
them. Whatever he [the Congressman] says, it’s going to be 
significant. Graham Watson?106 You have to explain who he is, why 
he is important, trying to make the case…’ (GB-3) 
While this underlines once more the central role of the editor at home in deciding 
what the national audience is going to read – in this case who they are going to read 
about – others give precedence to governmental actors. Here, the opinion of MEPs is 
at times deemed less relevant than that of the heads of government as one Austrian 
correspondent explained: 
‘Sometimes [I tell MEPs]: sorry, [I am not interested in] what you 
think about the Euro regime. I just have space for Merkel and 
Sarkozy107… Other opinions are sometimes more important.’ (AT-2) 
Nevertheless, the Irish quality press is the most extreme in terms of referring to own 
MEPs only. Josep Borrell as EP President received only 18 hits as the most 
prominent European MEP on rank 11 compared to Mairead McGuiness who was 
referred to 54 times out of 385 articles.
108
 Although Irish correspondents are aware of 
other European legislative characters such as Daniel Cohn-Bendit, who is a ‘major 
international figure’ and ‘always being footed’ according to an Irish correspondent 
(IE-2), Irish MEPs receive the most attention in the respective press. According to 
the same correspondent most of them are ‘political figures who made their name in 
domestic politics beforehand’ (IE-2).  
The findings from Table 5.3 also provide insight into another phenomenon: In the 
two countries where the public is least in favour of EU membership (as seen in 
chapter 3 – Figure 3.1), namely the UK and Austria, two prominent soft-Eurosceptic 
MEPs rank third in the respective newspapers. According to Taggart and Szczerbiak 
(2002: 7) soft-Eurosceptic MEPs do not have ‘a principled objection to European 
                                               
106 Note that Graham Watson is a Briton and was serving as a party group leader of the ‘Alliance 
of Liberals and Democrats for Europe’ in the 6th legislative term of the EP.  
107 Angela Merkel has been Chancellor of Germany since 2005 and Nicolas Sarkozy President of 
France since 2007. Both have taken the lead in finding solutions to tackle the so-called Euro 
crisis.   
108 The reader might raise her concerns with regards to a possible bias in the Irish press since 
only few observations have been included here for the Sunday Business Post. Appendix A5.7 
shows, however, that this paper also prefers Irish MEPs over European legislators from other 
countries.  
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integration or EU membership but […] concerns on one (or a number) of policy 
areas [which] lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU’. This qualified 
opposition appears to be attractive material for controversial news and represents an 
indicator for the applicability of the conflict news value. Daniel Hannan is a 
prominent member of the European Tories and actually left the EPP-ED after rows 
with his fellows in 2008 and sat as a non-attached member before he was re-elected 
to the EP in 2009. He and his party are now member of the European Conservatives 
and Reformists (ECR). According to one British correspondent, many MEPs, among 
them Daniel Hannan, would ‘use the EP as a stage […] for theatrical purposes to get 
noticed’ (GB-2). Hans-Peter Martin from Austria was a non-attached MEP in the 
sixth legislative term, also known as a whistle blower demanding more transparency 
of EU politics. He got into several arguments with many of his previous party 
colleagues in the SPO and his own party list especially about MEPs’ expenses. In 
2005 he also established together with the Dutchman Paul van Buitenen and the Brit 
Ashley Mote the Platform for Transparency, a quasi-group in the EP.   
However, Paul van Buitenen, MEP between 2004 and 2009, is not among the most 
often referenced legislators in the Dutch press which might reflect the positive 
attitudes of Dutch citizens towards EU membership and the resulting lower interest 
in the former’s particular opinion. Similarly, Kathy Sinnott, an Irish independent 
MEP critical of the European Union, does not receive as much attention by the press 
in the pro-European country as many of her Irish colleagues. This implies that 
conflict and controversies furthered by negative attitudes of individual MEPs 
towards the EU and dismissive behaviour inside the European Parliament leads to 
more coverage of their respective stances – but only in the countries where the public 
is receptive enough because many citizens share such positions as was hypothesised 
in H3-B. However, ‘personalisation and scandalisation’ (DE-4) also matters in other 
countries. Remarkably though, one Dutch correspondent alleges that members of the 
Dutch Eurosceptic PVV (Partij voor de Vrijheid – Party for Freedom) would neither 
seek nor receive much media attention.
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109 Note that they got elected to the EP for the first time in 2009 and thus are not part of the 
news content investigated here. Further at the time of the interview, the PVV was not yet 
tolerating the Dutch minority government under Mark Rutte (CDA) who resumed office as 
Prime Minister on 14 October 2010.   
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‘The PPV is a strange party, very a-typical. Geert Wilders more or 
less tries to ignore me here. He hardly gives any interviews. All the 
others love to talk. I don’t know what they are doing, although I 
have been trying to follow them for a year now. They must be quite 
frustrated, the way the systems works, they don’t get anything 
done. In national politics, the parliament serves as a podium […] 
But if someone here does that, no-one notices […]’ (NL-2) 
This shows, on the other hand, that some European representatives do not see much 
of a chance in communicating their objectives responsively to their represented and 
supposedly pursue different political strategies at home and in the European arena. In 
this case, the messenger cannot be blamed as such.  
Nevertheless, the messengers, i.e. the newsmakers in Brussels, apply several rules in 
order for MEPs to be referenced in the news. We have learnt thus far that a domestic 
angle prevails in the presentation of European legislators in the press; European 
actors are only deemed newsworthy in the French press. While the importance of the 
individual legislators in terms of expertise and parliamentary seniority matter in 
some broadsheets, most notably in the French and German papers, other newspapers 
also feature some soft-Eurosceptic MEPs more prominently than the rest which is 
especially true for the British and Austrian press. They probably respond to a rather 
hostile readership given the low public support levels in these countries for EU 
membership. This lends support to hypothesis H-3B in that attitudes towards the 
European Union also matter for the presentation of news content. At the same time, 
party polarization over EU integration is considerably high in Austria and Britain 
which would lend partial support to the alternative hypothesis of political 
contestation (see Schuck et al. 2011). Yet, it reaches similar levels in France and the 
Netherlands, which do not feature prominent Eurosceptic MEPs in the press (see 
Appendix A4.2). But the findings also provide support to the verification of 
hypothesis H1-B in the sense that news values of domestic relevance, importance and 
conflict are commonly applied.  
The next section looks at what characteristics accompany the presentation of 
parliamentary activities at the EU level in order to determine whether the national 
parliamentary culture is reflected in the news or not. The question is whether 
explanations for the dominance of certain actors can be linked to the way national 
MPs and/or MEPs are elected.  
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5.2.2 Similarities in the presentation of MEPs with attributes of MPs 
The readership is central to the presentation of news. In line with previous 
expectations (see Gleissner and de Vreese 2005, Statham 2006) many correspondents 
believed that their readers do not have much knowledge about how the EU works. 
They would perceive the EU with its institutions, political processes and actors 
‘fairly often undifferentiated as one unit, as all the same’ (DE-2). In fact, as one 
reporter put it: ‘even though my newspaper has the most educated readers in the 
Netherlands, as the most serious newspaper, […] I assume they know nothing!’ (NL-
2). Thus, news from Brussels and the European Parliament in particular is not 
facilitating to communicate, especially since ‘even political editors [at the home 
office] confuse the issues’ (DE-2) – a statement which underlines once again that 
correspondents have to anticipate the editor’s taste at the home office. At the same 
time, being part of the elite in Brussels, some journalists also aim at refining their 
reader’s knowledge of the European Union, and especially the European Parliament 
one having claimed that ‘you do hope to educate your readership at least a little bit’ 
(NL-2). Nevertheless, ‘citizens don’t know very much about politics in general’ and 
therefore ‘everyone tries to bring the process much closer to the reader, the same 
holds for the correspondent in Berlin’ (DE-5). The later statement though implies 
that national politics are also not easy to follow for citizens and thus EU 
(parliamentary) politics would not be a different phenomenon. The final question to 
answer therefore addresses the actual characteristics of news content about EU 
parliamentary affairs which supposedly help the reader understand EU parliamentary 
affairs better.  
Figure 5.2 shows the number of instances in which the constituency or origin of 
individual MEPs was mentioned in the news.
110
 Indeed, some domestic MEPs do not 
have geographic constituencies in countries where nation-wide lists systems for the 
European elections prevail, which is the case for Germany, Austria and the 
Netherlands. Here, the reference to the region of origin (e.g. Bavaria) or home town 
of an MEP counts towards this particular investigation. In France, Ireland, and the 
United Kingdom, some greater regions (8, 4 and 12 respectively) define the electoral 
districts for European elections. 
                                               
110 Krippendorff’s α for references to the constituency or origin of MEP1 to MEP5 ranges from 
0.67 to 1 (see Appendix A3.5). 
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Figure 5.2: Instances in which the constituency/origin of MEPs is mentioned 
 
Remarkably, for more than a fifth of Irish MEPs the electoral constituency was 
explicitly mentioned (21.45%). Similarly, for 15.53% of MEPs refereed in the British 
press, the information of their electoral district was provided to the reader. The 
explanation can be based on the characteristics of the two electoral systems. Firstly, 
the average district size for European elections is rather small in both countries (3.3 
in Ireland and 6.8 in the UK) and thus the constituency as such is identifiable for the 
reader. Secondly, readers are probably used to knowing the regional affiliation of 
their representatives. British MPs are recruited from single-member constituencies. 
That is why one correspondent suggests that ‘MEPs should do more in their local 
areas to become better known’ (GB-1) which again resembles expectations towards 
representation in the national context since representation of citizens’ interest is 
largely focussed on the geographic constituency (Norton 2002a). Plus Ireland despite 
having multi-member constituencies is a rather small country, where members of the 
Dáil are elected in open ballots by STV with voters being left with a choice between 
individual candidates. And STV is even used in European elections, which explains 
why Irish MEPs are furthermore known to ‘also display considerable attachment to 
the idea of constituency service’ (O’Halpin 2002: 114, following Katz: 1997: 218). 
An Irish correspondent underlined that MEPs would be ‘overly accessible like Irish 
politicians’ by keeping a ‘very personal’ relationship with voters (IE-2). And another 
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one added that the own national MEPs are much better known since ‘Irish politics 
are very much personality’ (IE-1). 
However, in Britain where the electoral system only changed in 1999 from a 
majority vote similar to the one in national elections towards proportional 
representation, MEPs are reportedly hardly known. Additionally, ‘there isn’t a 
fantastic dialogue between MEPs and the media, occasionally, yes, but very few get 
in touch with the national media’ (GB-1) which might be due to the fact that after 
1999 the ballot structure changed to closed party lists. As hypothesised above, MEPs 
elected via party lists are supposedly less inclined to pursue a pro-active media 
approach but seek to reach their goals of re-election by their party political 
behaviour.  
The small country size as in Ireland is probably also a reason why the geographic 
origin of MEPs matters still considerably in the Austrian quality press (11.78% of 
instances). Although Austria – like Holland and to some extent Germany – can be 
characterised by a party-based electoral system, an Austrian journalist says that ‘half 
of them [the Austrian representatives] are certainly popular’ (AT-2): 
‘The reader knows someone like Mister Karas, is interested in the 
person as well; he elected him or not, and he is the contact person 
for the industry if they want pursue some lobbying.’ (AT-2)  
This corresponds to the findings in Table 5.3 demonstrating that Othmar Karas 
receives more attention than his Austrian colleagues in the respective press. It also 
underlines the particularities of the electoral system used in Austrian general 
elections which allows for some preferential voting. Constituency service is therefore 
not unfamiliar to Austrian citizens and provides a plausible explanation for why the 
respective press often refers to the local origins of their MEPs. However, experiences 
with the electoral system used in the domestic context are not the only explanation 
for a greater popularity of European legislators. Instead, and as shown in Table 5.2 –
Models 3A and 3B, the district size for European elections matters as well as Austria 
only elects 18 MEPs on a national basis. Therefore, both factors taken together can 
be summarised with the words of a reporter from Germany, where the EU district 
size is the largest among all European electoral systems (99) coupled with a party 
dominance during national elections, who believes that MEPs would receive ‘no 
pressure from voters’ (DE-5).  
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French and German broadsheets, however, are the odd ones out again. According to 
the hypotheses about the impact of electoral rules, relatively to the other newspapers, 
the French press should refer to the individual’s constituency much more often, given 
the relatively small district size used for European elections (9.8) and the candidate-
centred focus of national elections; the German sheets, on the other hand, are 
expected to neglect the regional affiliation more often given the party-based ballots 
at the national level. The latter phenomenon though could be related to the strong 
federalist structure of the German state – Shepard and Scully (2002: 170) argue that 
for EP elections ‘there are elements in the German electoral system which suggest a 
regional approach’. According to these authors, parties have the option to select 
candidates for EP office by Land which is most probably due to the federal structure 
of political party organisations in Germany. Further, ‘successful candidates are 
grouped by Land and national party affiliation on the German EP Information Office 
site’ (ibid.: 170). Therefore, also for the quality press it is a cultural, political and 
economic difference and thus crucial in some cases whether a politician is from 
Bremen or Munich – and given that the political newspapers have a large regional 
readership, the frequent references to the MEPs’ local origin are actually plausible. 
Similarly, German MPs maintain according to Saalfeld (2002: 55) close regional 
contacts with their voters, although the regional party organisation is still somewhat 
more important for MPs for purposes of reselection for the next election. Thus the 
above findings can still be explained with the understanding German citizens have of 
their domestic parliamentary culture.  
The findings for the French press, on the other hand, cannot necessarily be explained 
by the domestic parliamentary tradition. Despite the fact that the French Parliament’s 
public significance is undermined by the importance of presidential politics (Bell 
2004), French MPs are known for their constituency role by acting as intermediaries 
between the local people and the national level communicating their grievances to 
the central government (Frears 1990; Rizzuto 1997). The phenomenon of the ‘cumul 
des mandats’ can furthermore also be observed with MEPs. The majority of French 
MEPs also hold a local mandate, and even more often than European legislators of 
any other country (Dewoghélaëre, Berton et al. 2006). So, if not for the constituency 
role of national MPs, one would expect that references to constituencies of MEPs in 
the French press are higher in number than actually observed given their strong ties 
to their local base. Yet, the French press did not pick up on their special role. One 
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implication is however, that references to other mandates have not been coded by the 
researcher – this will have to be investigated in a follow-up study. For now, we are 
able to underline the above findings which highlight the European perspective of the 
French press. They might actually be the only broadsheets which conceive of the 
European Parliament as a unique supranational institution distinct from the French 
Assemblée Nationale. Whether this assumption is supported by evidence of 
correspondents’ evaluations of the performance by the EP and its members remains 
to be seen and will be examined in the next chapter to come.   
The origin of Dutch MEPs was only mentioned in 2.44% instances, which is in line 
with the previous hypotheses regarding nation-wide party lists at both levels. One 
correspondent explained: ‘You have the same list of candidates when you vote; we 
don’t have local candidates; everyone votes for the same people’ (NL-1). 
Similarly, as Figure 5.3 reveals, party membership is an important criterion for 
references to European representatives from Holland which employs a party-based 
system for elections.
111
 Not so for the first MEP mentioned in the quality press of 
Ireland, the UK and France where the national electoral systems are candidate-
centred. Regarding the latter, it is the first finding for the French press which lends 
evidence to Hypothesis H4-B. Although, here Austrian news are an exception which 
least often mention the political party for the first MEP. But the findings underline 
the relevance of individual personalities of Austrian MPs elaborated above which is 
put over MEPs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
111 Note that Krippendorff’s α for references to the party affiliation of MEP1 to MEP5 ranges 
from 0.72 to 1 for the first party cited (see Appendix A3.5). 
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Figure 5.3: Instances in which party membership not mentioned for an MEP 
 
The German broadsheets, on the contrary, most often provide a legislator’s political 
affiliation as Figure 5.3 demonstrates. Only in less than 8% of instances was the 
respective party membership not mentioned. And the German newsmakers in 
Brussels had plausible explanations for that:  
‘The party [reference] is an absolute must-have in Germany. I have 
been working in Germany for a long time. You always provide the 
party acronym after the name.’ (DE-3) 
Others stated that it would be ‘self-evident, basic information […] because the 
German reader understands that a Social Democrat stands for different things than a 
Christian Democrat or a Liberal, although they are rather close regarding European 
policies’ (DE-4). Again this underlines the similarities to the German parliamentary 
culture where party organisations as opposed to individual politicians dominate 
political life (see Saalfeld 2002). The newsmakers explicitly mention party 
membership because their readers are familiar with the relevance of party politics at 
the national level lending support to the major research hypothesis (H4-B).  
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Figure 5.4: Reported roles of MEPs  
 
Note: several roles possible per MEP  
Lastly, Figure 5.4 reveals which roles were reported for individual MEPs.
112
 The 
main distinction is whether they were just referenced as plain legislators, delegates, 
deputies, representatives or the like (category: MEP only), or whether they were 
actually cited with their parliamentary or political role in the news. Some news 
articles even assigned ‘shadow-rapporteurships’ or other sorts of experts, especially 
the German broadsheets (in 6.5% and 4.7% of the cases respectively). In fact, one 
                                               
112 Krippendorff’s α for references to the legislative/political role of MEP1 to MEP5 ranges from 
0.41 to 1 for the first role cited (see Appendix A3.5). 
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reporter explained that the reason for highlighting an MEP’s expertise would be that 
it ‘codifies the source for the reader’ and the latter would know ‘that it has more 
weight if [an expert] says so’ (DE-3). On the other hand, such references do not 
diminish the legislators’ party membership as one put it: 
‘If it’s not the opinion of the faction, I don’t cite them […] I only let 
people speak who are spokespersons for something, rapporteur or 
the like. When it’s clear that what he or she says is actually the 
faction’s opinion, and not their personal attitude.’ (DE-5) 
It is worthy to note here that Oberreuter (1990) finds a similar phenomenon at the 
national level. In a news evaluation of the German Bundestag he concludes that 
German parliamentarians would become less interesting for journalists as the 
Bundestag would increasingly organise itself in terms of groups and factions. Again, 
it serves as an implication for the similarity in the depiction of legislative actors at 
the EU level and expectations deriving from the national parliamentary context. 
‘German MPs are also not prominent’ a reporter stated actually comparing their 
popularity to national representatives (DE-4).  
Figure 5.5 also demonstrates again that there are considerable differences across 
countries. The Irish broadsheets most often do not highlight their office, in more than 
63% of the cases, followed by the Dutch press which in more than 60% of all 
instances did not report any specialisation of individual representatives. While for the 
Irish again, a specific role might be less appealing since the constituency service of 
MEPs matters most, the Dutch exemplify the assumptions of the impact of electoral 
procedures, most notably the party-based voting system. Contrary to the German 
case, where both party membership and expertise are complementary, if not 
indispensable for an MEP to make it into the news, a Dutch correspondent explained 
the lack of popularity of MEPs in the Dutch public eye with the parliamentary 
culture people in Holland are familiar with: 
 ‘[…] I guess it has something to do with Dutch politics where […] 
personalities aren’t that important in a sense […]. Most Dutch 
members of parliament are very anonymous, they belong to the 
party, people know the party, they know the party leaders but not 
many people would know other parliamentarians. […] Here: we 
write about them, but Dutch MEPs are not very well known. So if 
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we put a label on them, people can identify at least who they are. 
[The Party] means more than the person. (NL-1) 
Yet, another Dutch correspondent stated that the undifferentiated treatment would be 
due to the fact that each party delegation only comprises ‘two or three people’ and 
that he sometimes sees them ‘as experts, because you need someone who can explain 
the technicalities to the reader which is not always fair as they are politicians’ (NL-
2).  
British and Austrian newspapers more often than not (41% and 46% respectively) 
assign a political or parliamentary office to the referenced legislators. But MEPs in 
the French press are most often quoted together with their status – in more than 65% 
of the cases. The rapporteur is a very prominent role in the respective broadsheets 
(with 19.73%) which probably derives from the fact that it is actually a French word 
and easily comprehensible for the readers. This finding lends support to the 
assumption the also French press borrows attributes from national representatives in 
order to make EU parliamentary affairs more perceptible – a notion which has been 
by and large rendered a valid one for the other broadsheets in the remaining countries 
of this study.  
The findings from the section can be summarised with the impressions the director at 
the EP Directorate-General for Communication provided during the interview: 
‘There are countries and journalists, who are more aware of what 
happens in the EP and about the importance of the EP. Sometimes 
it’s also related to the weight of their own national parliament in the 
countries. There are countries where their own parliament is not 
very relevant when they cover politics and all the weight is in the 
government and very, very [little] in the Parliament. And there are 
countries in which you cannot explain politics without references to 
what’s happening in the Parliament. In some way this is in the mind 
of the journalists when they are in Brussels.’ 
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5.3 Conclusions 
The chapter has shown that for the most part, MEPs are perceived by the press as 
deputies for their domestic colleagues. Thereby it lends support to the allegations laid 
out in chapter 2 in that the reason for this lies in the necessity to make news about 
EU parliamentary affairs better comprehensible for the domestic audience. It shows 
that features of the national parliamentary tradition, here characterised by 
constituency focus, individual party membership as well as legislative and political 
roles, are reflected in the majority of news content across countries. 
The results in the countries of Ireland, the UK, the Netherlands, Germany and 
Austria clearly demonstrate that newsmakers draw comparisons in their 
representations between the parliamentary and representative role of MEPs and MPs. 
Put differently, the quality press hold Europe’s representatives accountable in a way 
that is comparable to public expectations towards the corresponding colleagues in 
domestic parliaments. This outcome implies that the representational relationship 
between MEPs and voters is not something with which any of the latter is unfamiliar. 
Yet, press coverage of representation at the EU level is not unitary across Europe but 
fragmented into expectations that vary across countries. Instead, the research infers 
that in countries where electoral systems favour individual candidates over party lists 
individual MEPs receive far greater attention by the quality press than in the other 
countries. Consequently, although this assumption exceeds the research scope of this 
chapter, some European citizens who as voters choose national candidates from party 
lists are supposedly less aware of their representatives, which is not necessarily 
supportive in the formation of European democracy. 
However, some results also indicate that most broadsheets draw a linkage between 
Europe’s representatives and their represented. This is demonstrated by the emphasis 
in all countries but France on nationally elected MEPs in the news which underlines 
the applicability of the news value domestic relevance. Scandalous, Eurosceptic 
MEPs are furthermore especially attractive for the press in countries where support 
for EU membership is not very high as in the UK and Austria. It is also shown that 
conflict as a news value shaping news content of EU parliamentary affairs is not 
linked to parliamentary debates, as single representatives receive more attention 
outside Strasbourg. This allows us to derive that the traditional debating role of 
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Parliament for which the British House of Commons is especially famous, is not 
something with which the Brussels press corps would describe the EP. This provides 
further implications for the next chapter which will investigate how the EP’s 
parliamentary functions are evaluated in the light of the domestic parliamentary 
tradition. The question here is to what extent the EP’s role is rendered legitimate 
compared to the national parliament. This would also answer the question of a 
perceived rivalry between the legislative institutions at European and national level. 
Taken together the findings are in line with what has been contended in chapter 2 and 
empirically supported in the previous chapter. News values, most notably domestic 
relevance, importance and conflict play a role for the presentation of news content. 
This shows that EP broadsheet coverage is not different from any other political 
news story since common news values also apply here; and that the EP is part of 
what Trenz (2004: 310) calls ‘a taken for-granted reality’. This is a positive finding 
for parliamentary democracy at the European level. And the fact that newsmakers 
respond to sceptic views in their country is not negative. But by referring to the 
respective legislators demonstrates in public that different opinions are represented in 
Parliament, which is an indicator of a functioning democracy (cf. de Wilde 2009) and 
a positive condition for an emerging European public sphere withering the elite 
consensus (Risse and van de Steeg 2003). It allows MEPs to demonstrate their 
responsiveness towards their constituents via the media even though there is no 
conformity across country. But the chapter has shown that this is a plausible finding 
given the absence of a European electoral system. As long as national rules prevail 
for European elections, the media is unlikely to change their approach to reporting 
about MEPs.  
One exception is the French press which not only stress European legislators more 
than their counterparts in the remaining countries – an indicator for the supranational 
Europeanisation of news content (see Koopmans 2007), but also reflect only few 
similarities to the role understanding of French MPs. A possible explanation can be 
related to the relative weakness of the French Parliament whose relevance is 
undermined by Presidential politics. French broadsheets might compensate this 
weakness by stressing the unique, supranational character of the European 
Parliament and its members. The next chapter will have to provide further insight 
into how EU parliamentary affairs are evaluated in the eyes of the newsmakers. A 
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potential rivalry, as suggested by the findings in the previous chapter, between the 
parliamentary institutions at the European and national level might go in favour of 
the former in that it is regarded as a somewhat better parliament concerning its 
functions of executive scrutiny and decision-making power. For the rest of the 
broadsheets, it is expected that a rivalry is likely to be interpreted in a negative light 
for the EP if they draw direct comparisons to the national parliament following the 
domestic focus in their news.  
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Chapter 6  
A SWIFT change after Lisbon? 
The press coverage of the European Parliament’s powers 
 
Chapter 4 has argued that the EP’s institutional relevance and its influence in 
enhancing political conflict in the EU political system bear the potential to raise the  
interest of the quality press during the chosen routine period. We have seen that both 
the co-decision as well as the assent procedure, known as the consent procedure after 
Lisbon, comprise a large share of news published about EU parliamentary affairs. 
This implies that, alongside the domestic relevance, news selection criteria of 
importance and conflict are applied to the news coverage of EU parliamentary 
affairs. The first purpose of the present chapter is to examine whether importance 
and conflict become relevant news criteria on their own at a pan-European level 
when highly salient issues are at stake as was put forward by hypothesis H1-A. 
Apart from expanding once more the competences of the legislature – under the 
ordinary legislative procedure (OLP), the Council of Ministers and the Parliament 
decide co-equally in most social and economic policy areas to count just the most 
important ones – the Lisbon Treaty also manifested its rights to scrutinise the 
incoming European Commission. At the same time, the EP has also been granted the 
right to give consent to international agreements, among other things. Given that 
some proposals to tackle the European democratic deficit comprise the strengthening 
of the European Parliament (Williams 1991) this increase in parliamentary power 
implies that public awareness has also risen accordingly. The media play an 
important role in raising public awareness by transmitting news and information 
from the EU (cf. de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006a); and previous research has 
observed that news coverage of EU affairs and European elections in particular has 
risen over time (e.g. de Vreese, Banducci et al. 2006; Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart et 
al. 2010, Schuck, Xezonakis et al. 2011). Here, the chapter seeks to assess whether 
the European quality press follow the actual decision-making power of the European 
Parliament over several years – by devoting more attention to the legislative body. 
Put differently, the chapter seeks to identify a ‘Lisbon effect’ in the variation of news 
coverage over time. Thereby it provides answers to the following question: What 
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explains variation over time in the extent of press coverage of the European 
Parliament?  
Furthermore, the chapter is interested in how the press presents and evaluates the 
parliamentary powers in its coverage. While their assessment of the changing powers 
over time is expected to be in line with Hypothesis H1-C, which contends that 
newsmakers evaluate the EP in terms of newsworthiness, two other factors become 
important for the cross-country variation. The previous chapters have contended that 
while public stances towards the EU have an impact, the national parliamentary 
tradition is a dominant driver of both news coverage and content. The findings of 
Chapter 4 imply a perceived rivalry between parliamentary institutions at both levels, 
whereas Chapter 5 argues that most representations of MEPs resemble those of 
national legislators. Thus, here the chapter seeks to determine how both these 
findings relate to the (new) powers of the EP. Hypothesis H4-C puts forward that the 
press compare the EP to the respective national representative bodies in their 
evaluations. Furthermore, hypothesis H3-C expects that newsmakers evaluate 
European parliamentary affairs more critically if their domestic audience is rather 
hostile towards European integration. Here, the following parts of the research 
question are being addressed: What explains variation across country in the content 
of press coverage and newsmakers’ evaluations of the European Parliament? 
In order to answer these questions, the chapter conducts a study of two most-likely 
cases, namely the SWIFT case, later called SWIFT agreement, and the parliamentary 
confirmation of the European Commission, which enable the research to hold events 
at the European level constant in order to test the main research hypotheses. In short, 
we control for the issue and concentrate on EU parliamentary affairs. 
Methodologically, the chapter relies on a quantitative content analysis of 316 
broadsheet articles published between 1 June 2006 and 30 November 2010 in six EU 
countries and the US for the SWIFT case as well as on 1320 newspaper articles 
selected for the analysis of the investiture procedure in the years 1999, 2004 and 
2009/10. 167 articles were taken of the latter sample in order to provide a closer 
analysis of the investiture of the second Barroso cabinet. Given the limited 
explanatory power of the quantitative analysis, the findings from the interviews 
provide explanations for variation over time and across countries. 
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The chapter argues that the use of its powers boosts the press coverage of the 
European Parliament. Here, the novelty of such occurrences is a positive determiner 
of news coverage exemplified by the EP’s threat to veto the incoming Barroso I 
Commission in October 2004 and the actual rejection of the SWIFT agreement in 
February 2010. However, given that news media respond to the news value of 
surprise, the chapter finds that press coverage after such climaxes is not an ever-
increasing phenomenon. Instead, the press appears to become used to the 
Parliament’s new powers by being more aware of the ongoings with the press 
coverage ‘normalising’ at a relatively high level.  
Notwithstanding the normalisation of press coverage, the second part of the chapter 
finds that the European Parliament is not yet seen as a ‘normal’ parliament. The press 
have difficulties in presenting EU parliamentary affairs in a manner that is 
understandable for their readers. The chapter argues that this is precisely because the 
EP has grown out of the national parliamentary tradition with particularly 
scrutinising powers more akin to those of the US Congress (cf. Hix 2009). Instead, 
the EP is being criticised for not yet being as competent as its national counterparts 
in terms of efficiency and scrutiny of the executive. This argument integrates the 
findings of the previous two chapters: The EP is indeed perceived as an extension of 
the national parliamentary tradition in procedural terms, but since it grew 
institutionally stronger it is seen as a rival to its national equivalents. And this holds 
especially in countries where the latter are generally considered quite influential 
legislatures in the domestic context. 
The importance of the national parliamentary tradition is also underlined by the fact 
that contrary to the initial assumptions public opinion towards the EU does not 
appear to be a decisive factor for the correspondents’ evaluations of EU parlia-
mentary affairs. Critical observations can in most cases be traced back to the 
incompatibility of EU parliamentary politics with the understanding of national 
parliamentary culture.  
The chapter proceeds by directly going into the analysis of the Parliament’s 
broadsheet coverage over time (6.1.) evaluating whether parliamentary power is an 
indicator for increasing media attention. In the second part, the chapter investigates 
the variation across country identifying the impact of the national parliamentary 
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tradition (6.2.). Within the first section, the news coverage of the SWIFT case is 
being examined before the press coverage of the investiture procedure. The then 
following section analyses both cases in the reverse order. The conclusions (6.3) 
summarise the findings and review the argument.  
 
6.1 Power as a determiner of EP press coverage  
In order to assess the response of the quality press to the rising powers of the 
European Parliament, it is necessary to return to the newsmakers’ routines when 
reporting about EU parliamentary affairs. Chapter 2 has contended that the media 
apply, among others, the news value of importance to the news selection since 
‘actions of the powerful are newsworthy’ (Shoemaker and Reese 1996: 111). Given 
the rise in EP powers in the case of the consent procedure, formerly called assent 
procedure, one would therefore also expect a ‘Lisbon effect’ in the news coverage 
over time – both in terms of extent of coverage and newsmakers’ evaluations. Power 
furthermore implies conflict which is another relevant news value of political stories. 
In the case of the SWIFT agreement and the investiture procedure of the Commission 
political battles are likely to occur at the European level between EU institutions and 
actors – in the former case even between the EU and the US. Thus, on days when 
tension is high the news coverage is likely to be further triggered by clashing 
interests. This section examines how the quality press reacts to the Parliament’s 
(new) powers in terms of attention paid to the institution by conducting each a case 
study on SWIFT and the investitures of Commissions lead by Prodi, Barroso I and 
Barroso II.  
 
6.1.1 The ‘Lisbon effect’ in the coverage of the SWIFT agreement 
SWIFT stands for the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecom-
munication which provides a worldwide financial messaging service co-ordinated 
from its headquarters in La Hulpe, just outside Brussels. After the terrorist attacks in 
2001, the United States (US) Treasury gained access to the transfer data in order to 
receive information about international money transactions as part of their Terrorist 
Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP). European data also fall under the TFTP, but 
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the data exchange only became public in June 2006. Data protectionists and the 
European Parliament immediately raised their concerns about privacy. At that time 
the EP did not even have co-decision rights in the field of Freedom, Security and 
Justice. Yet, it immediately adopted a resolution on 6 July 2006
113
 followed by a 
second one on 14 February 2007
114
 criticising both the Passenger Name Record 
(PNR)
115
 and SWIFT. In both these resolutions, the EP explicitly demanded the 
respect of data protection rights. However, its voice remained largely unheard since 
the European Union did not have a legal base to intervene or participate, although the 
EP later claimed that ‘[f]ollowing pressure by the European Parliament, guarantees 
regarding privacy were given to ensure that the data collected was used purely for 
anti-terrorist purposes’ (European Parliament 2009).   
A couple of years later, SWIFT decided to move its server from Virginia in the US to 
Switzerland in 2010 which changed the legal base for the access of data records. The 
European governments had no objection to continue the data exchange of personal 
information provided via the SWIFT system in order to combat terrorism; however 
they demanded an international agreement. That request was supported by MEPs. 
The EU and the US signed an interim accord on 30 November 2009. But the 
Parliament, having gained the right to give its consent to international agreements 
with the Lisbon Treaty a day later (Art. 188 N TFEU), insisted they were being 
considered in the decision-making. The Parliament already adopted a resolution on 
17 September 2009 which was brought forward by the three large groups in the EP – 
the Conservatives, the Socialists and the Liberals – as well as the ECR. In their 
resolution MEPs demanded public access to the text of the agreement and its 
renegotiation in order to guarantee EU citizens’ privacy rights by implementing 
appropriate measures of oversight.
116
 With the European Commission having acted 
as a mediator, the Council finally respected that the Parliament had to give its 
consent. However, since the provisional agreement was meant to take effect on 1 
                                               
113 ‘Interception of bank transfer data from the SWIFT system by the US secret services’ 
(RSP/2006/2594). Appendix A6.1 provides an overview of the resolutions related to SWIFT.  
114 ‘Resolution on SWIFT, the PNR agreement and the transatlantic dialogue on these issues’ 
(RSP/2007/2503) 
115 The PNR is closely related to the latter issue as it concerns the provision of personal data of 
airline passengers to US authorities. 
116 ‘Resolution on the envisaged international agreement to make available to the United States 
Treasury Department financial payment messaging data to prevent and combat terrorism and 
terrorist financing’ (RSP/2009/2670) 
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February for nine months, MEPs complained about the inappropriateness of a 
retrospective approval (European Parliament 2010).  
Eventually, the EP rejected the accord on 11 February 2010 on the grounds of civil 
rights and data protection by 378 votes to 196, with 31 abstentions. Informal 
negotiations between the three main institutional actors followed and led to a new 
agreement which the Parliament approved on 8 July that year. It included the EP’s 
demands for, among other things, the active oversight by Europol and the creation of 
an own European tracking system mirroring the TFTP in order to avoid that large 
bulks of data are being sent to the US in the long run.   
Given the evident use of its powers, the question now is: how did the press respond 
to the European Parliament’s persistence on securing data protections rights for 
European citizens? Figure 6.1 depicts the press coverage between 1 June 2006 and 
30 November 2010 in the six countries under study and the US.
117
 
 
                                               
117 Note that the dataset comprises all articles, including interviews and commentaries 
published by third persons, mentioning SWIFT and the EP (or any equivalent) irrespective of 
the ‘1+2’ rule previously applied (see Appendix A6.2 for an overview). These have been 
considered in order to increase N for the statistical analysis. Regarding commentaries published 
by persons not employed by a respective newspaper, the reader might question the validity of 
the argument. However, only 9 out of 286 articles of the European sheets fall into this category. 
Further, they are likely to be subject to similar selection criteria as articles from a newspaper’s 
own staff because the ultimate decision for publication rests with the editor. Taken together, all 
types of articles serve as a measure of salience.     
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Figure 6.1: The press coverage of the EP dealing with the SWIFT case  
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The figure shows that few articles were published when the EP first tried to raise 
attention with a resolution in July 2006 up to its second resolution in February 2007. 
After that, the press coverage was almost non-existent, despite the fact that the EP 
issued eight other resolutions which referred to SWIFT, though primarily dealt with 
other concerns. One of them was combined with a report on the role of the European 
Central Bank requesting the institution to act as an overseer of the data exchange 
under SWIFT on 12 July 2007.
118
 There was no coverage in 2008 at all by the 
European newspapers. As seen in the figure, the Parliament’s next major resolution 
on 17 September 2009 dedicated solely to SWIFT, did not attract much attention by 
the quality press either. In fact, it was not until the official enactment of the Lisbon 
Treaty, that the press coverage picked up on the Parliament’s claims to become 
involved in the negotiations.   
As the figure shows, in December 2009, the press started debating the stance of the 
EP in the negotiations. ‘We saw it coming late December’, stated one correspondent 
referring to the No-vote of the Parliament in February 2010, because it eventually 
had got ‘powers since the 1st of December [2009]’ (FR-1). Yet, many other 
interviewees did not regard the rejection as imminent. ‘We did write a bit [about the 
Parliament’s position on SWIFT], commented on that […] – we actually thought the 
item would go through’ (DE-3). In 2009 still, it was also not clear that the EP 
received the opportunity to vote on the issue so soon as it was due to enter into force 
on 1 February 2010. Hence, ‘it was on news value surprise’ (GB-1) and newsworthy 
because ‘the European Parliament for the very first time and deliberately overrode an 
international agreement and the European Commission’ (DE-1). That is to say, that 
the powers of the EP at this point were actually highly decisive news factors. The 
figure shows that the most significant peak in the press coverage is in February 2010.  
It was the first noteworthy decision the Parliament had taken since the expansion of 
its scrutiny rights with the Lisbon Treaty. In fact, ‘it could have been anything, but 
they [the parliamentarians] are using it to show that you have to listen to them’ (GB-
2). The correspondents interviewed here noticed that there has been a change 
affecting the decision-making of the European Parliament stating that ‘beforehand it 
was largely a talking shop’ (IE-1). But Lisbon would have been the ‘turning point’ 
(GB-3). This shows that, as far as the SWIFT issue is concerned, the news value of 
                                               
118 ‘ECB annual report for 2006’ (INI/2007/2142) 
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importance applies here lending support to hypothesis H1-A, which listed importance 
as one of the news selection criteria decisive for press coverage when highly salient 
issues are at stake. Put differently, when the Parliament did not have any powers in 
this area which combines international security concerns with data protection, the 
attention it received by broadsheets was rather meagre as exemplified in Figure 6.1. 
When the MEPs attained the competences by the Lisbon Treaty to influence the 
outcome by rejecting the interim agreement and requesting amendments to be made 
in order to approve it, the Parliament finally became relevant, i.e. newsworthy, 
enough as an institution to be reported comprehensively in the European quality 
press: ‘it matters more so it gets more coverage’ (GB-2).  
These findings are once more underlined by the fact that before the EP got the power 
to have a say on the interim agreement, the discourse on the SWIFT issue was almost 
not related at all to the EU Parliament. Figure 6.2 compares the coverage of the EP’s 
involvement in the SWIFT case in all six countries under study with the 165 articles 
published without making reference to the EP.
119
 In the years 2006 and 2007 the data 
exchange as part of the TFTP was predominantly reported as a non-EP issue. It 
appears that prior to the Lisbon Treaty EP debates and resolutions did not have any 
effect on the coverage. As figure 6.2 demonstrates, SWIFT was a highly salient issue 
at the national level right after it had become public, but before the EP issued its first 
resolution on 6 July 2006. The non-EP coverage hardly rose again after that. Instead, 
the press coverage referred to the EP more often with rising levels of media attention 
in the run-up to the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty. Scholars of Europeanisation 
would welcome these findings since they demonstrate that the EP was able to 
stimulate the public discourse across the national broadsheets after the Lisbon Treaty 
came into force.  
 
                                               
119 See Chapter 3 (and especially Table 3.1) for the selection criteria of the 165 articles selected 
on SWIFT but not referring to the EP.  
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Figure 6.2: The press coverage of the SWIFT case, by EP news coverage and domestically  
0
5
10
15
20
25
0
1
/0
6
/2
0
0
6
0
1
/0
7
/2
0
0
6
0
1
/0
8
/2
0
0
6
0
1
/0
9
/2
0
0
6
0
1
/1
0
/2
0
0
6
0
1
/1
1
/2
0
0
6
0
1
/1
2
/2
0
0
6
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
7
0
1
/0
2
/2
0
0
7
0
1
/0
3
/2
0
0
7
0
1
/0
4
/2
0
0
7
0
1
/0
5
/2
0
0
7
0
1
/0
6
/2
0
0
7
0
1
/0
7
/2
0
0
7
0
1
/0
8
/2
0
0
7
0
1
/0
9
/2
0
0
7
0
1
/1
0
/2
0
0
7
0
1
/1
1
/2
0
0
7
0
1
/1
2
/2
0
0
7
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
8
0
1
/0
2
/2
0
0
8
0
1
/0
3
/2
0
0
8
0
1
/0
4
/2
0
0
8
0
1
/0
5
/2
0
0
8
0
1
/0
6
/2
0
0
8
0
1
/0
7
/2
0
0
8
0
1
/0
8
/2
0
0
8
0
1
/0
9
/2
0
0
8
0
1
/1
0
/2
0
0
8
0
1
/1
1
/2
0
0
8
0
1
/1
2
/2
0
0
8
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
9
0
1
/0
2
/2
0
0
9
0
1
/0
3
/2
0
0
9
0
1
/0
4
/2
0
0
9
0
1
/0
5
/2
0
0
9
0
1
/0
6
/2
0
0
9
0
1
/0
7
/2
0
0
9
0
1
/0
8
/2
0
0
9
0
1
/0
9
/2
0
0
9
0
1
/1
0
/2
0
0
9
0
1
/1
1
/2
0
0
9
0
1
/1
2
/2
0
0
9
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
1
0
0
1
/0
2
/2
0
1
0
0
1
/0
3
/2
0
1
0
0
1
/0
4
/2
0
1
0
0
1
/0
5
/2
0
1
0
0
1
/0
6
/2
0
1
0
0
1
/0
7
/2
0
1
0
0
1
/0
8
/2
0
1
0
0
1
/0
9
/2
0
1
0
0
1
/1
0
/2
0
1
0
0
1
/1
1
/2
0
1
0
EP coverage in all six countries (N=286) non-EP coverage (N=165)
EP resultions 
EP elections 
EP  resolutions 
Lisbon Treaty 
EP votes 
196 
 
However, while the change after Lisbon might have been swift causing a sudden rise 
in press coverage, the attention the EP receives is not only tied to its powers per se, 
but also issue-dependent. The case of SWIFT itself is loaded with highly salient 
news values as it ‘is about privacy and direct consequences’ (NL-2). In that sense, 
the issue would be an ‘easy story to report as it relates to everybody, everybody 
understands’ (IE-1). That is where the news factor of proximity comes into play. 
The other highly relevant news factor is that of conflict. But contestation is here not 
interpreted in terms of party political battles, as a French correspondent explained: 
‘SWIFT is a civil liberty problem, but wouldn’t have been vetoed 
without the Conservatives. They felt: We are the liberal Europeans 
together with the other groups. In a normal parliament that would 
be red against blue or whatever, but on such a fundamental issue, 
they tend to stick together. It has a different dynamic, which makes 
it interesting. SWIFT was a total surprise for the Council and the 
Commission.’ (FR-1) 
That is to say that the institutional contestation gave the issue a different light when 
‘Parliament [was] flexing its new muscles’ (IE-2). As one correspondent put it: ‘Just 
the fact the EP takes a decision, doesn’t mean I write about it […] I get interested 
when the institutional balance between the Council and the EP is changing’ (NL-2). 
In the eyes of the experts in Brussels, the European Parliament with the rejection of 
the SWIFT agreement demonstrated to the Council that ‘we have arrived and you 
have to deal with us’ (IE-1). For a German correspondent it was furthermore a 
struggle ‘against the Commission and the Americans’ (DE-2). And the very fact that 
‘the EP is also getting involved in international affairs for the first time’ (GB-1) 
probably contributed to the rising attention by the press. Hence, at the time of the 
interview in June 2010, everyone was edgily looking forward to the second vote on 8 
July 2010 and not certain about how the outcome would look like. Figure 6.1 shows 
another increase in press coverage just before that date.  
In the end, the institutions reached a compromise and the EP approved the SWIFT 
agreement by 484 to 109 on 8 July 2010. Attention has faded since. The issue has 
hardly been debated in public – at least until the end of November 2010 as shown in 
Figure 6.1. Meanwhile, ‘the main problem persists, in that it has to stand up to the 
Council’ (DE-2). Yet, the case study here demonstrates that when the Parliament has 
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got the power to influence a highly salient decision at the EU level, it eventually 
receives comprehensive news coverage.  
‘SWIFT definitely got a lot of attention. It’s hard to say whether the 
EP receives more attention in general. In Strasbourg last week the 
press room was not that full. Months ago it was hard to find a place 
to sit down.’ (GB-3) 
The question is whether the EP ‘will be able to use the Lisbon Treaty to push into its 
new limits of its powers’ (GB-1).  
‘The Parliament is revelling a lot at the moment by always referring 
to Lisbon. It makes a lot of noise. It is right to do that, of course. 
But it is too early to evaluate its influence.’ (DE-6) 
The director at the EP Directorate-General for Communication explained why a 
rising media interest can be expected: ‘With Lisbon the Parliament touches areas 
which are more sensitive and which are more political; less technical, and more 
interesting for the journalists.’ The correspondents anticipated that. Other significant 
areas, such as foreign policy (the EP has sought to have a say over the budget of the 
External Action Service), the ‘supervision of economic governance’ (FR-2), or 
Common Agricultural Policy which now is decided upon co-equally by the Council 
and the EP under OLP, would be thus ‘worth to keep an eye on’ (GB-1). ‘There are 
going to be a couple of fights in the coming months’ (FR-1), which were expected to 
show in the press coverage:  
‘The EP is more powerful due to Lisbon. That will probably show in 
the news coverage because the EP has a say on important issues. 
We will report more often about the Parliament.’ (AT-2) 
It can be derived therefore that, despite being a single yet crucial case, the treaty 
revisions bear the potential to enhance the European Parliament’s visibility in the 
European quality press, having shown less interest beforehand even when major 
issues were at stake (Baisnée 2003: 96). These are positive conditions for democracy 
at the European level, as chances are that an increase in coverage generates greater 
awareness of the European Parliament among EU citizens in the long run.  
 
198 
 
6.1.2 The normalisation of the press coverage during the investiture procedure  
Although the European Parliament cannot propose any candidate, it has the formal 
right to approve the Commission and its President and can also vote it out of office 
by a majority of its members. The Maastricht Treaty (1993, Art. 158 TEU) already 
prescribed that the EP is being consulted on the choice of the Commission President, 
but the Parliament interpreted this right as a means of providing its opinion by a 
formal vote on the President and the Commission cabinet as a whole (see Hix 
2002a). Thus, the consent or confirmation procedure was already established with the 
approval of the Santer Commission in 1994 since ‘Jacques Santer made it plain that 
he would withdraw if the vote in Parliament went against him’ (Westlake 1998: 439). 
It is due to the success of this informal interpretation that the Amsterdam Treaty 
(1999, Art. 214.2 TEC) then stated that the ‘nomination [of the President of the 
Commission] shall be approved by the European Parliament’ (see Hix 2002a). 
Eventually, the Treaty of Lisbon now recognises that the EP formally elects the 
President of the Commission as the Council members shall consider their choice in 
light of majority constellations in the assembly before putting their candidate forward 
to approval by the latter (Article 17.7 TEU): 
‘Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and 
after having held the appropriate consultations, the European 
Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the 
European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission. 
This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a 
majority of its component members. […]’ 
Given that the practice existed beforehand, a possible ‘Lisbon effect’ however is 
expected to be much weaker than in the case of SWIFT. 
It is not only the candidate for Commission President who has to appear before 
Parliament in order to receive approval. But the EP has after Maastricht also 
institutionalised hearings of the individual commissioner-designates in the respective 
committees matching the candidates’ portfolios before it would vote by simple 
majority for a second time on the investiture of the whole Commission. The 
Parliament thus far has criticised the choice of nominated commissioners twice 
during its hearings which led the President-designate Jose Manuel Barroso to 
reshuffle his cabinet preference in 2004 and in 2010. In October 2004 Barroso was 
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going to go ahead with his cabinet despite explicit criticism from the PES, 
GUE/NGL, the Greens and the Liberals in the Parliament against the controversial 
views on gender equality and rights of homosexuals of Rocco Buttiglione who was 
chosen as Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security. On the day of the vote, 
facing a rejection by Parliament, Barroso withdrew and told MEPs that he would 
seek a substitute. The new Commission cabinet was then approved by the EP in 
November that year with Franco Frattini as the new Italian Commissioner for the 
portfolio in question (and two other new candidates). In January 2010, after having 
heard Rumiana Jeleva, the Bulgarian Commissioner-designate for International 
Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, the Socialists, Liberals and 
Greens again raised their voice against the former Christian-democrat MEP due to 
allegations of her husband’s connections to organised crime. She was replaced by 
Kristalina Georgieva before the EP formally approved the Commission.  
Given the increase in scrutinising powers of the EP, and the recurrent use thereof, it 
can be predicted that the press coverage of the investiture procedure has risen 
between 1994 and 2010. Table 6.1 provides an overview of the periods of 
investigation for the investiture of Prodi, Barroso I and Barroso II. Each data period 
begins with the day the Commission President was nominated by the governments 
and the presentation of the designated cabinet respectively, and ends on the 7
th
 day 
after each confirmatory vote.
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Table 6.1: Overview of events during the investiture procedures 
 
Prodi Barroso I Barroso II 
Commission President nomination 24 March 1999 30 June 2004 19 June 2009 
Commission President hearings 8 and 13 April 1999 
13, 14 and 21 July 
2004 
9, 10 and 15 
September 2009 
Commission President vote 5 May 1999 22 July 2004 16 September 2009 
Cabinet Presentation I 21 July 1999 12 August 2004 27 November 2009 
Commissioner-designates hearings I 
30 August until 7 
September 1999 
27 September until 8 
October 2004 
11-19 January 2010 
Vote planned n/a 27 October 2004 26 January 2010 
Commissioner-designates hearings II n/a 
15-16 November 
2004 
3 February 2010 
Final confirmation vote  15 September 1999 18 November 2004 9 February 2010 
 
                                               
120 Note that for the dataset on the investiture procedure the ‘1+2’ rule has been applied again 
following the same criteria as with the main dataset. 
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While the analysis to come does not include the investiture of Santer for which the 
EP made use of its elective function for the first time, we can expect that the news 
coverage of the hearings and the approval votes for Prodi and his Commission 
received a significant amount of media attention due to the relative novelty of the 
procedure manifested in the Amsterdam Treaty. Figure 6.3 showing the press 
coverage of the Prodi Commission’s investiture procedure lends support to this 
allegation.
121
 The press was particularly interested in the parliamentary approval of 
Commission President (CP) Prodi followed by the presentation of his new cabinet 
members and the final vote on the whole Commission. The hearings in between the 
two confirmatory votes received a sizeable amount of attention as well. This might 
be further due to the fact that earlier in 1999, the EP threatened to censure the Santer 
Commission before the latter resigned over allegations of fraud and financial 
mismanagement. The director at the EP Directorate-General for Communication 
claimed that the EP’s role in the resignation of the Santer Commission ‘gave us 
probably the first cover pages in the history of the EP’. With the EP having shown its 
teeth, the press was supposedly particularly interested in how the Parliament 
evaluates the incoming Commission. This can be expected since the EP made its 
approval conditional upon Prodi’s agreement to sack individual Commissioners 
should they not be trusted by Parliament anymore as a consequence of the criticism 
against the previous Commission which had focussed on Edith Cresson, the 
Commissioners for Research, Science and Technology (see Hix, 2002a). The longest 
serving Brussels correspondent interviewed for this study remembered in this 
respect: 
‘The [Parliament’s] part in the resignation of the Santer 
Commission has indirectly contributed to a change in public 
perceptions of its political and legislative role.’ (DE-4) 
 
                                               
121 No data was available for the SBP in 1999. 
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Figure 6.3:The press coverage of Prodi’s investiture 
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Figure 6.4: The press coverage of Barroso I’s investiture 
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In 2004, the press coverage is expected to have been even more comprehensive given 
the clashes between the EP and Barroso over Buttiglione. The news coverage 
reported in figure 6.4 underlines these assumptions. While Barroso’s nomination and 
the initial presentation of his team received relatively little attention in the quality 
press, the fact that Barroso was going to go ahead with his cabinet before he 
withdrew in the last minute created a theatrical suspense on the European stage. The 
hearings were reported comprehensively and the press coverage rose considerably 
before the day the vote was supposed to take place in the European Parliament. 
Eventually, the day after, on 28 October, more than 60 newspaper articles were 
published across all six countries reporting Barroso’s withdrawal and referencing the 
powers of the EP. One correspondent remembered why the procedure received a 
great deal of attention by the press, ‘because Barroso was very new – he was 
surprised by the candidate and surprised by the game of the Left in the EP’ (FR-2). 
Further the case of Buttiglione would have been a ‘morally difficult’ issue (DE-3), 
which supposedly scored on the news value of human interest (see Shoemaker and 
Reese: 111).  
Tension remained high during the second round of hearings up until the final vote 
which was reported on the day after 18 November 2004. Even after the European 
Commission was approved further criticism raised by Nigel Farage, leader of the 
Independence/Democracy group in the EP, against Jacques Barrot and Siim Kallas, 
Vice-Presidents of the Commission, over alleged criminal records, was highly visible 
in the press. Using the same scale (1-70) as in the previous figure, figure 6.3 
demonstrates that the coverage of the investiture procedure in general was much 
higher than in 1999. It started off at a comparable level, but clearly news factors of 
importance, expressed by the EP’s veto power, and conflict (between Barroso and 
the EP) are identifiable as drivers of EP news coverage. Whether this spectacle was a 
one-off event in the press coverage, or whether a similar dramaturgy was visible 
when the EP forced Barroso for the second time to reshuffle his cabinet is subject to 
the next partial analysis. The events in 2004, however, were not without consequence 
for the next investiture of Barroso II in 2009/10:  
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The Parliament revolted at the first election of the Barroso 
Commission. […] But it was unsuccessful because Barroso got 
elected in the end. He was only forced to abdicate one or two 
commissioners. This had implications for the new Commission, 
since Jeleva was replaced. (DE-1) 
Figure 6.5 shows the broadsheet coverage of Barroso II’s investiture. Contrary to the 
above findings, Barroso’s second nomination by the governments received a 
relatively high amount of coverage. After that, the press coverage rarely exceeded 
that peak in terms of publication numbers and their total number is comparable to 
1999 even though the time period in this third case is much longer (by about two 
months). Nevertheless, figure 6.5 also shows that the hearings received more regular, 
albeit less comprehensive, coverage than in the previous years. In fact, ‘we certainly 
go to Strasbourg for the hearings because they are an important moment in European 
decision-making’ (NL-1). This demonstrates that the news value of importance 
clearly applies for the EP’s investiture procedure.  
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Figure 6.5: The press coverage of Barroso II’s investiture 
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Remarkably however, despite the fact the Lisbon Treaty has just come into force on 
1 December 2009 the power factor of the Parliament did not show in the coverage. 
Thus, neither the previous experience of 2004 nor the ‘Lisbon effect’ as in the 
example of SWIFT were able to boost the coverage of the investiture procedure in 
2009/10 to higher levels than in 2004. Why is that the case? One correspondent 
compared the events of 2004 and 2010 directly:  
‘The Buttiglione case was much more seen as a signal of strength 
[by] the EP, it was a big surprise […]. Jeleva was something 
different. [There weren’t that] many stories this time when the EP 
showed its muscles. It’s not a defeat for the EP, but it was seen as 
a very strange story [in which] Barroso played his own card trying 
to instrumentalise the EP to have her out of his way. It wasn’t so 
much a [demonstration] of influence. And it was a very long 
process this time. The press was a little bit fed up by the project – 
the pressure on Jeleva and Barroso was seen with a little bit of 
fatigue. Butiglione was quick and surprising. Both cases were not 
interpreted in the same way, at least by us.’ (FR-2) 
Following this perception, the lower press coverage was due to the absence of severe 
clashes between the institutions, to strategic games and the lengthy process which did 
not produce much suspense in order for the press corps to report more news stories 
from the EP. The ‘surprise’ factor of Parliament flexing its muscles, especially 
against the same President-designate, was seemingly not applicable anymore. There 
was another peak in the press coverage when Parliament decided not to approve 
Rumiana Jeleva on 20 January 2010 and forced Barroso once more to reshuffle his 
cabinet. This time however, Barroso acted rather swiftly and had her replaced before 
the EP tabled the vote which supposedly did not create as much tension as in 2004. 
Barroso furthermore signed the inter-institutional agreement between the EP and the 
Commission, allowing the former among other things to ask the latter to introduce 
legislation on behalf of MEPs. 
Moreover, to many correspondents the investiture procedure in 2009/10 was a put-up 
affair lacking sincere politics as the tactic of the European Parliament against the 
incoming Barroso II Commission was profoundly criticised. According to them 
Parliament was out there to deliberately show its muscles by deciding beforehand to 
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get ‘a scalp’ (IE-2) after the successful withdrawal of Buttiglione in 2004 with the 
Parliament ‘showing who is the boss’ (GB-2):  
‘After Barroso’s nomination last summer, there was a [certain] 
atmosphere in the EP. They even admitted 6 months before the 
Commission [came into office] that ‘we should get at least two this 
time’. […] Sometimes they do show their power just to show that 
they have it.’ (NL-2) 
And, in the end, many correspondents complained that this power struggle of the EP 
would have been only ‘storm in a teacup’ because ‘first they cry out loud, but then 
they agree anyways’, although ‘it was good that they finally did, because it would 
have been delayed even more’ (AT-2). Some said it was a bit of a ‘dirty game’ and 
‘not very constructive’ (FR-2); another one thought of the hearings as ‘window-
dressing’ since normally ‘Commissioners work really well with the EP – they are 
always available for rapporteurs and chairs of committees’ (IE-1). Instead, it would 
just be that ‘MEPs playing politics on particular issues to attract attention to 
themselves’ (IE-2), 
To sum up, the findings not only lend support to H1-C in that the newsmakers 
evaluate the EP in terms of newsworthiness. The section has shown that power as 
such is a news trigger for the European Parliament, as long as MEPs do not 
overstretch both their self-esteem and the time to arrive at a decision. The news 
factor of surprise plays a significant part for the news selection of EU parliamentary 
affairs, but the recurrent use of powers by the EP bears the potential for tiring the 
press corps’ interest. While the press coverage of the investiture procedure remained 
high, it has not risen exponentially over time. This might be an indicator for the fact 
that parliamentary politics have normalised in the press as the latest coverage is of 
regular nature and relatively high in numbers. A British correspondent actually 
admitted that given the greater competences of the EP after Lisbon ‘we try to 
normalise it [the EP] more’ (GB-3).  
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6.2 Variation across country and the national parliamentary tradition  
The findings from the figures above do not only show variation over time, but also 
across country. The German newspapers again feature most stories regarding SWIFT 
in relation to the EP with an overall N of 137, while the US American newspapers 
have published more articles (30) than the British (17) and Irish broadsheets (11) 
together (see Table 6.2). These proportions look similar for the investiture procedure 
as Table 6.3 below reveals, although here the British newspapers devoted more 
attention than one would expect to the Prodi Commission investiture by the EP.
122
 As 
elaborated in Chapter 3, the correlations between the country samples across all 
datasets are high and statistically significant.
123
 Despite the fact that the SWIFT 
sample has been subject to more lenient selection criteria in order to increase N, one 
may derive that the interest of European broadsheets rises proportionally to their 
regular coverage when highly salient issues are at stake, but the different levels of 
interest in EU parliamentary affairs prevail. This implies that variation in EP press 
coverage is likely to be explained by the same factors identified for shaping news 
coverage and content during the routine period: most notably by the news value of 
domestic relevance, public stances towards the EU and the appreciation of the 
domestic parliamentary culture. Hence, the two case studies serve well to detect 
which of the cross-country effects prove most plausible since we are able to control 
for the events at the supranational level.  
 
                                               
122 One explanation could be that in 1999, the British press might have had a higher number of 
staff in Brussels (cf. Baisnée 2003:87f), which following the partial results in chapter 4, might 
have a positive effect on press coverage.  
123 See Appendix A3.4.  
209 
 
Table 6.2: Number of articles selected for dataset II and its sub-dataset by country and newspaper affiliation 
 
Prodi Barroso I Barroso II  Barroso II hearingse  
 
centre-
left 
centre-
right 
business/ 
financial 
centre-
left 
centre-
right 
business/ 
financial 
centre-
left 
centre-
right 
business/ 
financial Total 
centre-
left 
centre-
right 
business/ 
financial Total 
Ireland 24 7 –
d 
46 26 3 29 9 3 147 20 5 3 28 
Britain 13 20 27 21 21 47 5 4 11 169 2 1 2 5 
France 15 11 18 45 32 27 29 18 26 221 9 8 11 28 
Netherlands 13 16 19 39 40 45 21 16 22 231 8 10 9 27 
Germany 23 55 36 50 68 62 38 37 31 400 19 17 16 52 
Austria 25 8 6 38 25 3 12 27 8 152 6 16 5 27 
 
113 117 106 239 212 187 134 111 101 1320 64 57 46 167 
Legend: d data not available; e period of investigation: 27/11/2009 – 16/02/2010 
Table 6.3: Number of articles selected for dataset III by country and newspaper affiliation 
 
EP & SWIFTb  SWIFT onlyb   
 
centre- 
left 
centre-
right 
business/ 
financial Total 
centre- 
left 
centre-
right 
business/ 
financial Total Total 
Ireland 9 2 0 11 4 1 0 5 16 
Britain 5 1 11 17 1 1 8 10 27 
France 19 7 23 49 13 2 16 31 80 
Netherlands 4 10 12 26 3 4 16 23 49 
Germany 38 42 57 137 25 25 23 73 210 
Austria 22 20 4 46 14 9 0 23 69 
United States
a
 – – – 30 – – – –
c
 30 
 
97 82 107 316 60 42 63 165 481 
Legend: a International Herald Tribune: 12, New York Times: 6, The Washington Post: 6; b period of investigation:  01/06/2006 – 30/11/2010; c not considered 
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Public stances towards EU membership represent one plausible explanation for the 
variation across countries, as argued in the previous chapters. H3-C suggested that 
newsmakers’ evaluations of EU parliamentary affairs vary with the degree of public 
support for EU membership. But Baisnée also contends that ‘as the EP grows 
stronger politically, journalists have been motivated to pay more attention to it, as it 
tends to produce news stories closer to those in national politics’ (ibid. 2003: 87). 
Alongside the comparability of politics, it implies that the EP and its role is more 
facilitating to portray by the press in a way that is comprehensible for their readers, 
i.e. as a resemblance of the national parliament, as brought forward above (H4-B) 
and underlined with evidence in Chapter 5. However, Chapter 4 has raised the 
question of whether the EP is perceived as a rival to its national counterparts, since 
more stories about EU parliamentary affairs are being published when public trust in 
the latter is lower. Hence, following hypothesis H4-C, the purpose here is to examine 
how the European Parliament's improved institutional role compares to that of 
national parliaments in the eyes – and hands – of newspaper correspondents in 
Brussels. 
Many scholars studying the participation of national parliaments in European politics 
suggest that even though the Lisbon Treaty has explicitly expanded their 
participation rights specifying that ‘national parliaments contribute actively to the 
good functioning of the Union’, in reality they are not necessarily very influential 
(see Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008; Raunio 2010; Kaczyński 2011). Some argue 
though, that such influence depends, among other things, on national institutional 
provisions and national parliamentarians’ strategies to become involved leaving 
some parliaments more successful than others (see, for instance, Benz 2004; Auel 
and Benz 2005; Raunio 2005; O’Brennan and Raunio 2007b). The varying levels of 
actual policy influence and different parliamentary competences at both levels 
suggest some form of rivalry between parliamentary institutions of the national and 
European level in European affairs. Matarazzo (2011: 60) describes the relationship 
between the institutions as problematic with the Lisbon Treaty having ‘expanded the 
room for competition, in particular the power of scrutiny of sensitive topics’.  Hence, 
given that the powers of the EP have increased over time, in the public eye the EP 
might not find approval precisely because it grew into a kind of legislature which is 
distinct from its equivalents in the domestic context. Its function to control the 
executive by means of its elective function and veto power exceeds those of typical 
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working and debating parliaments (see Dann 2003). The alternative hypothesis, on 
the other hand, would propose that the EP is evaluated in a better light since it is able 
to compensate the lost powers of its national counterparts, or absence thereof. 
The next subsection draws on descriptive statistics and interview findings to explain 
the variation in media stances towards the EP’s role during the investiture procedure 
of Barroso II.
124
 The then following section deals with the SWIFT case analysing 
press evaluations by presenting multivariate regressions, descriptive statistics and 
interview findings. 
 
6.2.1 The press coverage of the Barroso II investiture  
With respect to the European Parliament’s elective function ‘the procedures for 
selecting and deselecting the Commission have become a hybrid mix of the 
parliamentary and presidential models’ (Hix and Høyland 2011: 45). Although in the 
supranational mode the Commission acts as the executive of the EU with the 
European Parliament and the Council being the legislative chambers, the Parliament 
does not have the right to choose its own preferred cabinet led by the Commission 
President. The parliamentary parties competing in European elections are up until 
now not able to put forward their own candidates. Instead, these are proposed and 
agreed on by the national heads of government in the European Council. As a 
consequence, there is no ‘inbuilt government majority in the European Parliament’ 
(Hix, Noury et al., 2007: 21). Yet, party politics play an important role which the 
Lisbon Treaty acknowledges by asking governments to consider majority 
constellations in the EP in their selection of the executive (Article 17.7 TEU). 
Nevertheless, as seen above the investiture procedure of the European Commission 
provides the EP with comprehensive powers regarding the selection of the executive.  
 
                                               
124 Here, the present chapter only relies on the descriptive quantitative analysis because unlike 
the previous datasets the sub-sample of the investiture procedure is too small in order to 
produce statistically significant correlations and regressions. A future study should cover more 
legislative and other parliamentary decisions in order to test the main argument. 
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6.2.1.1 Expected coverage: Following the national parliamentary tradition 
Chapter 5 has detected the procedures of the national parliamentary tradition as a 
central driver of EP press coverage. Thus we can hypothesise here too that variation 
in the national dealings of executive confirmation is reflected in the coverage of the 
EP investiture procedure. In the absence of indicators for the public experience of the 
investiture procedure at the national level, the procedures themselves and the actual  
legislative-executive relations serve as an indicator for the national parliamentary 
tradition. The phenomenon of confirmation hearings is unknown in all parliaments of 
the countries under study. This procedure resembles the confirmation hearings the 
US Senate conducts with the candidates for the President’s cabinet, and quite 
consciously so according to Westlake (1998: 434). Therefore, the alternative 
hypothesis would posit that cross-country variation of media presentations is not a 
likely finding.  
Yet, some traditions in national parliaments might have an influence on how the EP’s 
investiture procedure is presented by the press. The Dutch ‘investiture debate’ comes 
closest which follows the ‘governmental declaration, itself a synopsis of the coalition 
agreement’ (de Winter 1995: 134). But the Dutch Tweede Kamer has no right to vote 
on the investiture of the executive although the possibility of censure exists. The 
German Bundestag and the Dáil Éireann, on the other hand, are granted the right to 
approve the executive before it takes office. In the former an absolute majority is 
required to elect the Chancellor ‘without debate’ (German Basic Law, Art. 63), while 
a simple majority is sufficient in Ireland to approve the members of government. The 
Dáil further nominates the Taoiseach, i.e. the Prime Minister (Art. 13.1 of the Irish 
Constitution). In the semi-presidential systems of France and Austria the parliament 
has no say over the investiture of the executive. The latter is appointed by the 
directly-elected President, although the majority constellations in the legislature are 
being considered. In the UK the party with the most seats returned after a general 
election decides internally who is going to be Prime Minister who is then appointed 
by the Queen.  
Another criterion regarding legislative-executive relations varies across countries: 
that is the combination of the ministerial office and a parliamentary seat. This is 
neither allowed at the European level, nor in France and the Netherlands. Irish and 
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British members of government, on the other hand, are required to be members of 
Parliament at the same time. In these countries, it might be particularly difficult to 
explain the reader the separation of posts at the European level. In the remaining 
political systems of Austria and Germany, such a combination is allowed but not 
compulsory (see Andeweg and Nijzink 1995).  
Table 6.4 draws together the specific assumptions that can be derived with respect to 
the impacts of the national parliamentary tradition on the press coverage of the 
investiture procedure. Given that party politics matter for the inauguration of the 
executive in Ireland, Germany and the Netherlands, we can expect that these are also 
often highlighted in the press coverage of the confirmation hearings. In the UK, 
although neither a vote nor a debate takes place, the games between majority and 
opposition in Parliament are also rather likely to be reflected in the news given the 
polarization of political parties in the House of Commons. However, such news 
depictions of party political battles in the EP are rather unlikely in the remaining two 
countries’ newspapers (France and Austria), because the respective parliament has no 
influence at the national level in the appointment of the executive.  
On the contrary, in these broadsheets the separation of powers between the EP and 
the Commission are likely to be featured more often, given their semi-presidential 
systems. Although, since in Austria a combination of ministerial and parliamentary 
office is possible, the cell only predicts a ‘rather likely’. Stressing the separation of 
powers is also rather unlikely in the Dutch press, despite post separation between the 
Tweede Kamer and the government, because of the parliamentary government, 
which can be also found in the UK and Germany. Irish ministers have to members of 
parliament. Hence, a separation of powers between the EP and the Commission is 
unlikely to be visible in the Irish press.  
Table 6.4: Assumptions regarding the press coverage of the investiture procedure 
 IE GB FR NL DE AT 
Party politics of 
majority and 
opposition 
visible 
Likely Rather 
likely 
Rather 
unlikely 
Likely Likely Rather 
unlikely 
Separation of 
powers visible 
Unlikely Unlikely Likely Rather 
unlikely 
Unlikely Rather 
likely 
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The extent to which these assumptions hold when explaining cross-country variation 
in media content will be evaluated next.  
 
6.2.1.2 Actual coverage: Difficulties in representing the EP’s powers 
The hearings the EP conducted with the individual Commissioner-designates were 
treated by the press in same fashion as before: the news value domestic relevance 
prevailed in the coverage. Figure 6.6 shows that the broadsheets devoted a lot of 
attention to the candidate from their respective country.
125
 These are Geoghegan-
Quinn in Ireland, Ashton in the UK, Barnier in France, Kroes in the Netherlands, 
Oettinger in Germany and Hahn in Austria. Only Catherine Ashton, as the incoming 
High Representative, and Rumiana Jeleva received attention in all newspapers across 
countries, while the hearing of the French Commissioner-designate was also subject 
to the British press. The results are not surprising given what we have learnt thus far 
about the centrality of the domestic relevance. However, the questions of how the 
press portrayed party politics surrounding these hearings and whether they treated the 
EP as an independent institution prevail. Following Hix et al. (2007) who find that 
intra-institutional party politics have developed in recent years, in reality, the 
opposition parties, comprising the Socialists (S&D), the Liberals and the Greens, in 
the EP expressed their criticism against Rumiana Jeleva while the EPP was 
defending her until she withdrew from the post. Yet, some Conservatives raised their 
doubts with respect to the candidacy of Social-Democrats, especially Catherine 
Ashton and the Slovakian designate for inter-institutional relations and 
administration, Maroš Šefčovič.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
125 Krippendorff’s α ranges from 0.52 to 0.81 for the variable of Commission Topic (see Appendix 
A3.5). 
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Figure 6.6: Topics of the articles referring to the investiture procedure 
 
Figure 6.7 depicts how the European press reported the criticism raised towards the 
incoming executive. The interest here lies to detect whether the press portrayed the 
political battles in terms of party politics (category: EP opposition parties) or 
whether it was represented as an argument between institutions (MEPs in general 
and EP) which can be identified as a separation of powers (see Table 6.4). 
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Figure 6.7: Reported criticism towards the European Commission 
 
As expected, the Dutch press most often frames the political battles in terms of party 
politics between the majority and the opposition – in almost 60% of their news. 
However, according to Dutch correspondents such battles are not facilitating to 
describe for their readers: ‘There are political groups, but they don’t form coalitions 
to which people in the Netherlands are used too…’ (NL-1). Further,  
‘It’s a bit difficult, because if you cover stories in national politics 
you would like to say this party was in favour of a decision, this 
party was against it. But if there is a vote in the EP which is the 
same, but then you have to talk about national parties, and also 
European parties […]’ (NL-2) 
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Yet, as predicted the separation of powers between the institutions expressed by 
references to the opposition of MEPs in general is less visible in the press. Rather, it 
seems that the Dutch follow their parliamentary tradition in holding an investiture 
debate by stressing party politics in the EP. One even admitted that he saw ‘quite a 
lot of politics behind’ the hearings (NL-1). The Irish broadsheets also stress political 
conflict more often than criticism by MEPs in general (about 40%). This is in line 
with the expectations above as in the Irish context a confirmation vote by Parliament 
is necessary component of the investiture of the executive. These two findings have 
to be interpreted carefully however as Krippendorff’s α is only 0.49 for the Dutch 
case and 0.41 for the Irish newspapers (see Appendix A3.5). 
It was furthermore expected that the British papers stress party politics more often 
than anything else. This is not the case.
126
 Instead domestic (party) politics and the 
opposition of MEPs in general are more prominent in the news. One explanation is 
that Lady Ashton’s hearing was often reported, as seen in Figure 6.6, in which she 
was grilled by fellow nationals. The other explanation can be linked to the lack of 
interest of the British public as contended in Chapter 4 which coincides with the little 
coverage of the events in the EP. Nevertheless, one British interviewee claimed that 
the EP’s procedure by holding hearings would be a ‘very healthy part of the process’ 
as it ‘shows the good use of parliamentary powers’ (GB-1). 
In line with the expectations above, the French and Austrian newspapers depict the 
investiture procedure more often than not as a battle between MEPs or the EP as a 
whole against Barroso and his Commissioner-designates. For an Austrian 
correspondent the procedure itself would be ‘too complicated’ with thematic 
switches lacking debates (AT-1). According to the latter the hearings have ‘a good 
purpose, but in practice they are bad’, while another one claimed the Parliament 
would not have any power in this respect: 
‘These things [the hearings]… Sometimes you don’t know whether 
the Parliament is too fond of itself, or whether they just pretend 
before the media [that they have power] in the hope that you 
forget that they don’t have competences but you write about them.’ 
(AT-2) 
                                               
126 Krippendorff’s α is 1 for the British sample (see Appendix A3.5). 
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While these negative connotations can be linked to the rather Eurosceptic mood of 
their readership, the Austrian correspondents’ evaluations resemble experiences with 
the Nationalrat which does not have a formal say over the executive in the semi-
presidential system of Austria. Similarly, a French correspondent explained that 
‘sometimes [we are] rather interested in the EP position on a proposal’, although 
‘sometimes we look at positions inside [the EP]’ (FR-2) underlining the findings of 
Figure 6.7. Another one admitted that the political groups in the EP ‘are equivalent to 
national assemblies with their political affinities’ but some decisions would be not 
always ‘left against right’ (FR-1). Again, intercoder reliability checks reveal that 
while for the Austrian sample Krippendorff’s α produces a satisfactory score of 0.64, 
the French newspaper sample only has a score of 0.51 of agreement between coders 
(see Appendix A3.5). 
In the German newspapers, however, the separation of powers is much more visible 
in the press, although party politics are also considered in the press coverage. These 
findings, however, do not allow us to draw generalizable conclusions as 
Krippendorff’s α as a measure of intercoder reliability is not particularly high in this 
case with a score of 0.33 (see Appendix A3.5). Nevertheless, similar to the Dutch 
and other correspondents German interviewees stated that they also have difficulties 
in portraying party battles in the EP. It would not be so facilitating to present ‘like it 
would be at the national level’ (DE-2). Due to the electoral independence of the 
executive and the majority in the EP which is a common attribute of presidential 
systems, many correspondents regret that there is no clear government party within 
the parliament that is contesting an identifiable opposition and traditionally serves to 
assure stable and efficient government (cf. Bagehot 1936[1867]).     
‘I have never belonged to those who claim that the [European] 
Parliament is now a real Parliament because there is, like in 
national parliaments, also a majority and a minority; because I still 
see that you still need a broad coalition in the EP.’  (DE-4) 
Yet, this correspondent also stated that during the investiture procedure ‘one could 
feel very intensely how significant a role the political affiliation plays with the three 
institutions’ (DE-4). Nevertheless, ‘[the Parliament] does not hold a government to 
account in a classic way – honestly speaking it is much closer to the American 
Congress than to the Bundestag or British Parliament’ (DE-5) (emphasis of the 
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interviewee). In the actual press coverage, as Figure 6.8 shows, few comparisons 
were drawn to the US Congress in terms of the hearing procedure which imitates the 
Senate’s hearings (see Westlake 1998: 434).127  
Figure 6.8: Number of comparisons to the US Congress 
 
It underlines once again that the EP is presented as a parliament which follows the 
national tradition – and with which readers are familiar in the domestic context, 
rather than as an institution that operates under a distinct parliamentary practice. In 
fact, national parliaments serve as a measure of the European Parliament’s 
legitimacy for the European quality press as anticipated above (hypothesis H4-C).  
‘Perceptions of legitimacy depend on where you are coming from, 
how secure, sovereign, old and ancient your own democratic 
traditions are as opposed to the Strasbourg variety’ (GB-2) 
It is due to the distinct experience with the national parliamentary tradition that 
correspondents have difficulties in presenting the EP in a way that is understandable 
for their readers. The EP is different from its national counterparts. Correspondents 
are aware of that and do in fact draw comparisons to the national parliamentary 
culture to make it more perceptible for their readers as shown in Chapter 5. But their 
evaluations also imply, that national parliaments are somewhat better equipped to 
scrutinise the executive in the eyes of the journalists.  
 
                                               
127 Krippendorff’s α for this variable is 1 when applicable (see Appendix A3.5). 
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6.2.2 Press evaluations of the EP’s role during the SWIFT negotiations  
The Lisbon Treaty granted the EP with the right to formally approve international 
agreements. The consent procedure becomes valid since the SWIFT agreement does 
not ‘relate exclusively to the common foreign and security policy’ (Art. 188 N 
TFEU), but affects the area of Freedom, Security and Justice (the former third pillar 
of the Maastricht Treaty). However, given that the US were an active partner in the 
data sharing deal, the SWIFT accord also had implications for the EU’s foreign 
policy which, as seen above, was one reason why the press showed interest in EU 
parliamentary affairs.  
National parliaments, on the other hand, are normally also entitled to ratify 
international treaties and agreements exemplified by the national ratification 
procedures of the Lisbon Treaty. However, the difference is that the majorities of the 
lower houses of the countries included in this study (the Dáil Éireann, House of 
Commons, Assemblée Nationale, Tweede Kamer, Bundestag, and the Nationalrat) 
are intertwined with the executive, i.e. the Prime Minister/Chancellor and his or her 
cabinet. The European Parliament, as elaborated above following the elective 
function of the Commission, is independent of the executive – like the Congress is in 
the United States. That means neither the Commission nor the Council can dissolve 
the Parliament. And therewith, they do not have a tool to pressurise MEPs in order to 
approve an agreement, whereas the domestic executives, even in the semi-
presidential systems of Ireland, France and Austria, can threaten the legislature to 
call for new elections if the majority hesitates to support the government. Hence, the 
EP is in a much stronger position than its national counterparts. And even though the 
consent procedure is de jure only a veto instrument – Parliament is not allowed to 
amend any text – the de facto powers are quite comprehensive due to the lack of 
executive control over Parliament. As seen above, with the Parliament rejecting the 
interim accord on SWIFT the Commission and the Council were forced to negotiate 
a compromise with the EP in order to receive the latter’s consent. The national 
parliaments, on the other hand, did not have a say at all as the agreement fell under 
exclusive EU competences. Yet, these circumstances did not prevent most of them to 
debate the issue in plenary sessions.  
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Thus, and following the results of Chapter 4, a jealousy of national parliaments is 
likely to be expressed in the broadsheet coverage of the EP’s role. In order to test this 
hypothesis, the next sub-section demonstrates the cross-country variation of news 
content of the SWIFT issue before it conducts a regression analysis of press coverage 
complemented by the analysis of interview findings.  
 
6.2.2.1 The domestic relevance of the SWIFT issue 
Following the dominance of the domestic angle, the salience of the SWIFT case 
supposedly varies per se across countries given its divisiveness between the 
improvement of security standards to fight international terrorism and civil liberties 
in terms of ensuring data protection. For instance, after the terrorist attacks in 
London in July 2005, British citizens are expected to be more lenient towards 
improving security standards at the expense of some privacy rights. An alternative 
example is the public outrage over privacy rights in Germany in 2010 when Google 
announced to introduce its ‘Street View’ by publishing photographs of streets and 
buildings on the internet. Hence, despite the increase in EP powers, some variation in 
the coverage is a plausible finding across country.   
Table 6.5 below shows that newspapers in the countries under study pay a different 
amount of attention to the European Parliament's role in the SWIFT case.
128
 The Irish 
and German broadsheets pay the least attention to the EP, although for the latter 
publication numbers are higher, while the French devote the largest share of their 
news coverage to EU parliamentary politics.
129
  
 
 
 
 
                                               
128 Krippendorff’s α is close to 1 or 1 for both variables Article length and for Epshare wordcount 
used to calculate the percentage of words about EU parliamentary activities in each article (see 
Appendix A3.5).  
129 Note that the US newspapers have not been included in this table since no data was collected 
to control for the instances which mention SWIFT but not the EP. A comparison of this variable 
between broadsheets of the US and European countries is thus not possible.  
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Table 6.5: Percentage of words about EU parliamentary activities in the articles, by 
country 
Country Mean N Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Ireland 20.02 16 25.58 0 72.91 
Britain 28.78 27 35.80 0 100 
France 30.38 80 35.07 0 100 
Netherlands 24.42 49 28.63 0 89.70 
Germany 21.52 210 26.89 0 100 
Austria 29.30 69 31.07 0 100 
Total 24.98 451 29.94 0 100 
Thus, we can assume that journalists have different motivations for reporting from 
the European Parliament in relation to the SWIFT issue. The interviews with the 
correspondents from the European print media lend support to this assumption. For 
example, it was a ‘sensitive issue’ in both Germany and the Netherlands as regards 
data protection (NL-2). ‘Germans hold more debates [on the issue] because they are 
interested in data protection; the other countries rather perceive it as a transatlantic 
topic’ (DE-5). A British correspondent underlined this particular reason. 
Accordingly, the domestic readership was interested in the EP’s rejection of the 
international agreement because of the UK’s close ties with the US: ‘When it takes a 
decision that affects Brit-… you know … Europe’s relations with the United States – 
that’s a big deal!’ (GB-1). In the Dutch case, personification also contributed to the 
attention from the quality press given the nationality of the main rapporteur, Jeanine 
Hennis-Plasschaert:  
‘It’s always very nationalistic of course. So, for us it’s interesting 
that the liberal Dutch MEP was quite active on SWIFT […] She was 
the leader of the move by the Parliament not to accept the deal. It 
was her moment of glory.’ (NL-1) 
Figure 6.9, which depicts the attention paid to individual legislators
130
, supports this 
interest by the Dutch newspapers. Both Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert and Sophia in’t 
Veld were the most prominent MEPs in the press. The latter was the rapporteur for 
the PNR and also most prominent in the US sheets. The German broadsheets 
however, feature Manfred Weber more often than anyone else, followed by other 
German MEPs. Although not a rapporteur on any related issue such as the PNR, he 
                                               
130 Note that the category of 'others' includes references to MEPs who were only mentioned 
once across all countries. Krippendorff’s α ranges from 0.62 to 1 for references to individual 
MEPs, where applicable (see Appendix A3.5).  
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was cited as an expert on SWIFT: ‘Because you are bombarded with press releases 
throughout the day, it is easier than calling some Dutch person’ (DE-5). With the 
exception of the Austrian press, the rest of the newspapers reference European MEPs 
more prominently than their own nationals. Contrary to the findings in Chapter 4, 
where most newspapers especially feature their own MEPs, these findings show that 
when highly relevant issues are at stake, such as the SWIFT agreement, some 
national broadsheets, even the British ones, Europeanise their content in terms of 
references to individual legislators not elected in their country of news distribution. 
This finding might be interesting for scholars studying the phenomenon of 
supranational Europeanisation of news content (see Koopmans 2007) given the 
dominance of pan-European actors in this case. However, a simple explanation might 
also derive from the likelihood that the press was unable to find experts on the issue 
from their national EP delegation.  
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Figure 6.9: Number of references to individual MEPs  
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6.2.2.2 The EP’s undermined powers in the press coverage 
In order to test whether the European Parliament is perceived as a rival to the 
national counterparts, a Tobit model is being set up in a similar way as before. The 
number of articles considered comprises only the samples of the European 
newspapers, but includes both publications on SWIFT only and those referencing EU 
parliamentary politics in combination with the issue (N=451). Again, the dependent 
variable measures the amount of words per articles dealing with parliamentary affairs 
relative to the overall articles length (as seen in Table 6.5).
131
 The main independent 
variables of interest are: a dummy measuring whether the Lisbon Treaty was enacted 
on the day of publication (Lisbon Treaty); another dummy determining whether the 
European Parliament has debated the SWIFT issue or agreement on the day before or 
on the publication date of the respective articles (EP debate on SWIFT (days)); and 
finally a continuous variable quantifying the total number of parliamentary debates at 
the national level that dealt with SWIFT during the time of investigation (No of 
SWIFT debates in NP).
132
 The latter variable serves as an indicator for a national 
Parliament’s motivation to participate in the decision-making process of the SWIFT 
agreement. Indicators for the public experience with how the national parliament 
dealt with the SWIFT agreement, if at all, are not available. Here, we can only 
assume that the way the national parliament got involved is more or less 
representative of its general activities in EU affairs and hence somehow conceivable 
by the public. Although other measures such as reports and committee meetings 
could have been considered as well, plenary debates are used as a tool for generating 
publicity and can be thus understood as a specific, open type of scrutinising power 
(see de Wilde 2011: 131). Hence, if the regressions return a significant and negative 
coefficient, then one could conclude that the more active – or rather willing to act – 
national parliaments are on this issue, then the European Parliament receives less 
attention. Vice versa, it would also mean that where national parliaments do not 
express the willingness to participate in the debate, the European Parliament is 
accepted as stepping in by scrutinising the SWIFT agreement. In order to detect this 
effect, the variable EP sitting is being included again. It controls for the timing of 
                                               
131 See Appendix A6.3 for the descriptive statistics. 
132 Parliamentary archives via their websites have been scanned to identify debates on SWIFT.  
For each lower house, the following total number of debates were found: BT: 22; TK: 8; NR: 4; HoC: 
2; AN: 1; DÉ: 0 (see Appendix A6.4).  
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debates since one explanation might be that national parliaments debated the issue 
when the EP was unable to do so in the absence of a plenary session.  
The remaining controlling variables have also been considered in the models of the 
previous two chapters and require no further introduction. These are the affiliation of 
a given newspaper (the dummies Centre left BS and Business BS, reference category: 
Centre right BS) and its circulation number in 10000s (BS circulation 10000) as well 
the public opinion variables measuring support for EU membership and trust towards 
the national parliament. Regrettably, there are no time-variant data available which 
would provide insight into public opinion towards issues of national and/or European 
security or data protection. But in order to test the alternative hypothesis considered 
above regarding party polarization over European integration, models 4A and 4B 
also include the political contestation variable which was introduced in Chapter 4 
(see Appendix A4.2 for more information).   
As before, the dummies referring to the type of media system (MS liberal and MS 
polarised-pluralist) are included once in models 5A and 5B. Time is being controlled 
for by the Lisbon Treaty dummy, and the EP debate on SWIFT. Possible country 
biases are being controlled for by conducting jack-knife tests as before. Standard are 
either clustered by newspaper or by country and serve as robustness checks (see 
chapter 4).  
Table 6.6 presents the regression results from the Tobit models. Table 6.7 shows the 
jack-knife tests of the main models 3A and 3B. The results are very clear throughout 
the models in Table 6.6. Controlling for other effects, when the Lisbon Treaty was 
enacted the press paid considerably more attention to the EP by prolonging its 
articles by about 40 to 43 percentage points. This lends support to the finding of a 
‘Lisbon effect’ in the news coverage identified in the previous section. Similarly, 
when the EP held a debate on the SWIFT issue or agreement the press coverage 
increased by about 9 per cent.  
As expected, the number of debates tabled in national parliaments has a negative 
effect on the press coverage. With every more parliamentary agenda dealing with 
SWIFT, the attention EU parliamentary activities received by broadsheets was about 
0.48 to 0.93 per cent less comprehensive holding all other independent variables 
constant. Once the country samples of the Netherlands and Germany are removed 
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however (Table 6.7), the coefficient is still negative, but it does not reach the levels 
of conventional statistical significance. There is a plausible reason for that: both 
country samples are responsible for the variation in the independent variable with 
values of 8 debates in the Tweede Kamer and 22 debates in the Bundestag, 
respectively. At the same time, the quality press in these countries paid a 
considerable amount of attention to the SWIFT issue alone as seen in Table 6.3. 
Some German correspondents, in fact, ‘promoted the issue from the beginning, 
regardless of the parliament’ (DE-5). Coincidentally, the Irish press covered the 
SWIFT issue least often which correlates with the fact that national politics did not 
get involved – it did not appear on any parliamentary agenda during the time of 
investigation.  
Most controlling variables, including newspaper-related effects, do not have any 
statistically significant effect on the amount of coverage about the EP’s involvement 
in the SWIFT case. And the results hold when controlling for EPsitting throughout 
the models. The effect of national parliamentary debates, however, is not significant 
anymore albeit still negative, once the effect of political contestation is included in 
the models (4A and 4B). The latter presents a positive coefficient, implying that 
higher levels of party political polarization of the EU issue are associated with 
greater press coverage of the EP and the SWIFT case. But its effect does not comply 
with conventional levels of statistical significance. The same holds for the inclusion 
of the squared term (see Appendix A6.6) which points at the results of Schuck et al. 
(2011) who find a curvilinear relationship between contestation and EU news 
coverage, whereby coverage increases with high levels of party polarization. The 
findings suggest however, that party political contestation does not necessarily 
represent the best indicator for explaining variation in the SWIFT case. Rather, 
public or party contestation over the issue itself might have had a significantly 
positive effect onto the press coverage of EU parliamentary affairs. But we are 
unable to test this. Similarly, public support for EU membership is also not 
statistically significant in Table 6.6. Trust towards the national parliament, on the 
other hand, again has a negative and significant effect – at least in Model 3B: with 
every one per cent increase in this variable, the EP receives about 0.24 percentage 
points less attention. This underlines once more that the press respond, also in the 
SWIFT, case to the public appreciation of the national parliament by generating less 
coverage about the EP.    
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Table 6.6: Tobit models, predicting variation in the volume of news referring to EU parliamentary affairs for the SWIFT case  
 
Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B 
Lisbon Treaty 42.54*** 42.54*** 42.58*** 42.58*** 42.37*** 42.37*** 40.13*** 40.13*** 42.81*** 42.81*** 
 
(6.59) (9.05) (6.52) (8.89) (6.41) (8.35) (6.73) (9.86) (6.77) (8.45) 
EP debate on SWIFT (days) 9.18** 9.18*** 8.94** 8.94*** 9.33** 9.33*** 9.51** 9.51*** 9.43** 9.43*** 
 
(4.45) (2.98) (4.44) (3.02) (4.49) (3.21) (4.54) (3.31) (4.46) (3.05) 
No of SWIFT debates in NP -.48*** -.48*** -.58*** -.58*** -.48** -.48*** -.26 -.26 -.93** -.93** 
 
(.15) (.08) (.19) (.15) (.22) (.14) (.21) (.24) (.41) (.46) 
Centre left BS  
 
-3.84 -3.84 -3.66 -3.66 -3.94 -3.94 -3.78 -3.78 
   
(3.00) (3.89) (2.92) (3.67) (3.38) (4.10) (2.89) (3.85) 
Business BS 
  
1.08 1.08 -1.11 -1.11 3.53 3.53 1.33 1.33 
   
(2.80) (1.77) (3.62) (2.44) (3.96) (3.65) (4.14) (1.49) 
BS circulation (10000s)  
 
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
   
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
EB support for EU  
  
 .03 .03 
  
.06 .06 
    
 (.15) (.11) 
  
(.15) (.09) 
EB trust in NP  
  
 -.24 -.24** 
  
-.50 -.50 
    
 (.19) (.09) 
  
(.42) (.33) 
Political Contestation       1.18 1.18   
       (.78) (.85)   
MS liberal          -6.44 -6.44 
         (13.54) (9.80) 
MS polarised-pluralist         -15.02 -15.02 
         (12.13) (12.44) 
EP sitting 6.88** 6.88* 6.94** 6.94* 6.55* 6.55 5.94* 5.94 5.64 5.64 
 (3.10) (3.98) (3.18) (4.01) (3.49) (4.44) (3.13) (3.99) (3.74) (4.97) 
SE clustered by Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country 
Constant -6.37 -6.37 -6.79 -6.79 3.96 3.96 -27.46* -27.46* 18.73 18.73 
 
(5.35) (5.81) (5.78) (5.96) (14.61) (8.99) (16.07) (15.65) (27.18) (17.75) 
Sigma Constant 34.92*** 34.92*** 34.83*** 34.83*** 34.83*** 34.83*** 34.77*** 34.77*** 34.72*** 34.72*** 
 
(2.23) (1.85) (2.25) (1.83) (2.28) (1.84) (2.23) (1.85) (2.27) (1.76) 
N 451 451 451 451 451 451 451 451 451 451 
Pseudo R Square .0491 .0491 .0494 .0494 .0498 .0498 .0499 .0499 .0505 .0505 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; adjusted standard errors in brackets; dependent variable: amount of news dealing with EU parliamentary affairs (%) 
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Table 6.7: Tobit models, predicting variation in the volume of news referring to EU parliamentary affairs for the SWIFT case (Jack-knife tests) 
 
Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B Model 6A Model 6B 
Lisbon Treaty 42.50*** 42.50*** 42.51*** 42.51*** 38.90*** 38.90*** 40.78*** 40.78*** 54.53*** 54.53*** 40.40*** 40.40*** 
 
(6.84) (9.11) (7.05) (9.24) (6.52) (8.01) (6.78) (8.43) (4.25) (3.34) (6.95) (8.89) 
EP debate on SWIFT (days) 9.48** 9.48*** 7.19* 7.19*** 10.64** 10.64*** 9.56** 9.56** 11.80* 11.80*** 8.29* 8.29*** 
 
(4.74) (3.55) (4.10) (2.23) (5.01) (3.80) (4.56) (3.80) (6.48) (3.05) (4.64) (3.13) 
No of SWIFT debates in NP -.48** -.48*** -.41** -.41*** -.69** -.69*** -.44 -.44 .37 .37 -.40* -.40*** 
 
(.22) (.14) (.20) (.09) (.27) (.19) (.43) (.45) (2.16) (2.49) (.21) (.09) 
Centre left BS -4.43 -4.43 -3.83 -3.83 -2.01 -2.01 -5.98** -5.98** -4.07 -4.07 -2.04 -2.04 
 
(3.35) (4.10) (2.91) (4.00) (2.89) (4.44) (2.84) (2.97) (5.79) (7.93) (3.95) (4.70) 
Business BS -1.13 -1.13 -1.88 -1.88 1.45 1.45 -3.01 -3.01 -3.45 -3.45 .96 .96 
 
(5.48) (2.51) (4.02) (2.31) (3.78) (1.46) (7.22) (7.25) (5.93) (4.99) (2.67) (.70) 
BS circulation (10000s) .00 .00 .00 -.00*** .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
 
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
EB support for EU .02 .02 .16 .16*** .03 .03 .02 .02 -.07 -.07 .13 .13 
 
(.27) (.21) (.17) (.06) (.14) (.09) (.23) (.30) (.23) (.24) (.21) (.18) 
EB trust in NP -.22 -.22** -.17 -.17* -.26 -.26** -.29 -.29 -.31 -.31 -.42 -.42** 
 
(.28) (.10) (.20) (.10) (.21) (.13) (.35) (.38) (.45) (.50) (.36) (.20) 
EP sitting 6.69* 6.69 9.47*** 9.47*** 5.19 5.19 7.32* 7.32 1.97 1.97 6.02 6.02 
 (3.74) (4.82) (2.75) (2.54) (4.20) (6.14) (3.98) (4.97) (4.50) (5.39) (4.18) (5.32) 
SE clustered by Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country 
Country excluded IE IE GB GB FR FR NL NL DE DE AT AT 
Constant 3.29 3.29 -5.13 -5.13 8.09 8.09 10.12 10.12 1.38 1.38 1.83 1.83 
 
(15.51) (9.10) (16.82) (4.66) (15.84) (7.22) (28.82) (30.67) (22.52v (27.93) (12.61) (11.86) 
Sigma Constant 35.41*** 35.41*** 34.52*** 34.52*** 33.20*** 33.20*** 34.46*** 34.46*** 35.49*** 35.49*** 35.44*** 35.44*** 
 
(2.34) (1.93) (2.41) (1.99) (2.38) (1.09) (2.43) (1.96) (2.61) (2.97) (2.79) (2.23) 
N 435 435 424 424 371 371 402 402 241 241 382 382 
Pseudo R Square .0484 .0484 .0497 .0497 .0479 .0479 .0477 .0477 .0727 .0727 .0445 .0445 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; adjusted standard errors in brackets; dependent variable: amount of news dealing with EU parliamentary affairs (%) 
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Overall, the results underline the relevance of the national parliament: the more 
debates were being held in the national parliament, i.e. the greater national 
parliaments got involved in the SWIFT issue which was also the case in Austria, the 
lower the coverage of the European Parliament's activities in this regard. The results 
furthermore hold when including the crude measure of media system type in Models 
5A and 5B, which is similar to a country dummy (see discussion in Chapter 5). Thus, 
in the SWIFT case the press probably respected the national parliament's sovereignty 
more than the powers of the EP, although the former had hardly any competences to 
intervene (other than holding their own government to account and raising media 
attention). 
Here, the German and Dutch broadsheets therefore represent not an outlier but an 
example of perceived rivalry of parliamentary competences at EU and national level. 
In fact, the main rapporteur, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, left the EP in June 2010 to 
take up a seat in the Dutch Tweede Kamer, where she immediately steered through a 
motion demanding, among other things, the government to inform the chamber 
instantly and comprehensively about the new text of the SWIFT accord (Tweede 
Kamer 2010). Further, the opposition parties in the German Bundestag explicitly 
called for more influence in the negotiations of the SWIFT agreement. The social 
democrat Gerold Reichenbach claimed in plenary session that the involvement of the 
German Parliament would be ‘absolutely essential’ following the increased 
responsibility through the Lisbon Treaty and the judgement by the German 
Constitutional Court in 2009 underlining the sovereignty of the Bundestag in EU 
affairs (Deutscher Bundestag 2010)
133
. Further, many German correspondents did not 
approve of the EP’s role in the SWIFT negotiations as it would ‘paralyse the political 
culture’ (DE-2). 
‘I find that ridiculous and it has nothing to do with the voter 
mandate […] Some decisions are not necessarily better when taken 
against the will of the Council […] You and I as citizens have the 
right that decisions are being taken according to objective criteria 
and not whether the Parliament wants to prove its strength and 
feels treaded on its toes.’ (DE-5) 
                                               
133 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30/6/2009, Paragraph No. (1 - 421), 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html 
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Another German correspondent, who was in favour of the EP's proposals to improve 
the SWIFT deal, was even more concrete and compared the EP directly to the 
Bundestag, however undermining the role of the former as being not as influential 
yet as its national counterparts: 
‘It got strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty but it is not yet 
comparable to the Bundestag or the lower house in London or the 
like. It will give in in the end. Frankly, the parliamentarians always 
prance tremendously before the press. But if you look at the 
outcome at the end, there is nothing much left of it. […] Just in this 
very moment, the negotiations going on in the background aim at 
the approval [of the agreement]. There is a new proposal, which 
takes some of [the EP’s] objections into account. But the EP lets 
itself get under pressure and there will be an arrangement today or 
on Monday. (DE-1) 
One Austrian correspondent even went further and stated:  
‘I hope for every EU parliamentarian who voted against it, that 
there will never be a terrorist attack which can be traced back to 
that [decision]. Everyone wanted the data exchange, but the EP 
has delayed it.’ (AT-1)  
Put bluntly, if there was no data exchange in the future, ‘then there is no added value 
of the Parliament’ (DE-5); ‘it was also data from the Middle East, which the 
Parliament swept under the carpet’ (AT-2). Again, the Austrian newsmakers who 
write for an audience less supportive of the EU are rather negative towards the EP. 
Yet, we are unable to say whether this is actually linked to the attitudes of Austrian 
readers, or whether their opinion derives from their personal or professional 
beliefs
134
; or whether the attitudes actually derive from a sense of jealousy, given the 
inability of the Nationalrat to influence the outcome on the accord. A Dutch 
correspondent, on the other hand, was more positive towards the European 
Parliament, which is probably due to the fact that two Dutch MEPs were prominently 
involved in the negotiations on data exchange with the US: It was a ‘good thing, if it 
                                               
134 Note that their socialisation over time – as suggested by some (Baisnée 2002: 122) – is 
unlikely to have affected their opinion given the different duration as a member of the Brussels 
press corps of the two Austrian newsmakers (see Table 3.3).   
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[the Parliament] is acting like a political institution – in the past, it was more like a 
decision-making machine’ (NL-2).  
The results also reveal another phenomenon: In the countries where the national 
parliament got hardly involved in the SWIFT issue, if at all, as in the case of Ireland, 
the UK, and France, newspapers more often than not referred to MEPs who did not 
get elected in the national context, such as the two Dutch rapporteurs and other 
senior and influential members of the EP (see Figure 6.9). This demonstrates that in 
countries where the executive is a powerful agenda setter facing a rather weak 
parliament (cf. Tsebelis 2002), the European legislators were enabled by the quality 
press to step in where national politicians were not able to offer any expertise. In the 
remaining countries, where political consequences were discussed (more) frequently 
in the national legislature, own national MEPs were more prominent in the news 
underlining the issue relevance for the respective domestic context. These findings 
serve as an indicator for intra-party communication between the national and 
European level (see Miklin and Crum 2011) – or absence thereof – which explains 
why European legislators were cited as experts in the respective press. This was 
especially likely in the German case: In the EP, ‘the German CDU-CSU voted 
against [the accord]; they were not sure, and the Federal Ministry of the Interior had 
called them […]’ (DE-5)135. At the same time, these findings also suggest that 
political contestation over the SWIFT issue matters as elaborated above. However, 
the effect is supposedly negative for EP press coverage since in countries where 
political contestation was high, the debate largely remained in the domestic context 
with the EP receiving less attention by the quality press.  
Indeed, after the Lisbon Treaty came into force a French correspondents described 
the EP as a ‘real parliament, not a perfect parliament, but it´s real that it is working’ 
(FR-1). Another colleague added, that the EP's role in the SWIFT negotiations, 
among others, would have been interesting because it ‘is trying to defend the 
communitarian approach’ (FR-2). ‘Personally I think it had some points to make’ 
(IE-1) while according to this Irish interviewee others were just criticising the (mal-) 
use of powers by the EP. A British correspondent highlighted the persisting negative 
stances of the British press towards the EU when describing the role of the EP in the 
press after December 2009:  
                                               
135 Note: Thomas de Maizière of the CDU was Federal Minister of the Interior at that time.   
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'Unfortunately in the British press, it has been treated as a butt of 
jokes, [as a] kind of a laughing stock … the MEPs and the gravy 
train. [We try to show that it is a] normal, powerful and relevant 
institution, and just not like 'if you want to make fun of Brussels, 
there is the European Parliament, MEPs, expenses and perks and so 
forth'.' (GB-3) 
Yet, this particular correspondent’s perspective was rather exceptional compared to 
his other national colleagues as the increase in policy influence was not always 
appreciated: ‘It’s bad news for efficient policy making [as it] slows down and delays’ 
(GB-2) which clashes with the processes of the British majoritarian system favouring 
speedier policy decisions (cf. Lijphart 1999). Further, the EP was also not seen as 
influential as its national counterparts since it ‘doesn’t have any role in international 
affairs, not like a proper Parliament’ (GB-1) (emphasis added); although the power 
of national legislatures in this respect is questionable.
136
 Here, again, the British 
Eurosceptic mood comes through as well.  
At the same time, the results also suggest that the correspondents’ relationship to the 
editor changes at times highly salient decisions of the EP are at stake. Following the 
discussion of the findings in chapter 4, the editor at home has a central role in the 
selection of EU news, and especially in Britain and also Austria as well as in case of 
small broadsheets which are restricted by space underlining the probability of an 
‘inward orientation’ (Gleissner and de Vreese 2005) of news. However, the SWIFT 
case implies that when the EP exerts its powers, some correspondents might receive 
the chance to report more autonomously from Brussels since more news from the EP 
with more references to European actors have been produced in countries where the 
national discourse was not triggered by the national parliament and almost absent. 
However, in the absence of interviews with the respective editors, this claim only 
remains an assumption.  
Nevertheless, the findings underline once again that journalists compare parliaments 
in terms of strengths – even though they acknowledge the fact that the European 
Parliament has increased powers after the Lisbon Treaty. A French correspondent 
                                               
136 In fact, national parliaments’ competences in the area of pure foreign affairs – as opposed to 
European affairs – rarely exceed the scope of international treaty ratifications (von Beyme, 
1998). And given the electoral interdependence of the executive and the legislature elaborated 
above, parliamentary majorities are unlikely to oppose a government’s position in this respect. 
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picked up on the ‘joke’ with which his British colleagues described the European 
Parliament:  
‘For me, it is a ‘serious joke’. It is still improving, gaining powers, 
has some interesting MEPs and speakers, playing a real role, but 
sometimes not as serious as national parliaments, like the 
Bundestag, the House of Commons or Assemblée Nationale’ (FR-2) 
Here, the press again underestimate the powers of the EP which have developed 
beyond the parliamentary competences in the national tradition. The correspondents’ 
criticism is therefore an indicator for the jealousy of national parliaments, which 
cannot exert their powers like the EP does.  
To sum up the results of this section, we have learnt that the domestic media 
perspective merged with the degree of involvement by the respective national 
parliament over the debate of the SWIFT issue/agreement. In countries where the 
national legislature enhanced a domestic debate the EP’s role in the negotiations was 
seen with critical eyes (especially in Germany and Austria) – and lead to less 
comprehensive attention by broadsheets. Here, a sense of parliamentary rivalry was 
visible in some of the newsmakers’ evaluations. British correspondents, however, 
were also rather sceptical of the EP’s new powers in the ratification of international 
agreements, although the House of Commons did only little to become actively 
involved by their traditional debating function; although MPs later expressed their 
disappointment about not having been informed earlier and given time for scrutiny 
by their government (House of Commons 2010). Euroscepticism and the highly 
regarded sovereignty of Parliament supposedly contributed to this perception. 
Nevertheless, in Ireland and France a European perspective prevailed combined with 
no or very little parliamentary activity at the national level. Here, seemingly the 
European Parliament’s new role was accepted in the press as complimentary to the 
(rather few) existing competences of the respective national parliament. In the Irish 
case, the findings provide furthermore evidence to H3-C in that they evaluate the EP 
more positively which is linked to a rather Europhile readership. Yet, the French 
press also compared the EP to its national counterparts, rendering the former less 
‘serious’. Hence, we cannot rule out the rivalry hypothesis for the French. 
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6.3 Conclusions 
The chapter has shown that the press follows the European Parliament’s rising 
powers over the years. The findings are in line with what has been expected initially 
with respect to news values, and demonstrated at the collective and individual levels 
in the previous chapters. The importance of the EP’s role and its ability to stimulate 
political conflict are relevant for the print media to report from the EP once highly 
salient issues are at stake such as the investiture of the European Commission or the 
SWIFT agreement. The chapter has also shown that EU parliamentary coverage was 
able to take over public deliberation in the news, once the EP exerted its veto power 
over the SWIFT agreement. Hence, the empowerment of the EP bears the potential to 
enhance pan-European discourse of EU political affairs. However, press coverage of 
the EP does not rise exponentially but reaches a satisfaction level when MEPs have 
demonstrated their powers already once. Yet, following the increased parliamentary 
powers of the Lisbon Treaty the outlook provided by correspondents is positive in 
that they expect coverage of EU parliamentary affairs to remain at a high level. This 
finding is particularly interesting in light of research that observes a decline in media 
interest for parliamentary politics at the national level (see, for instance, Negrine 
1999). It demonstrates that the EP, bearing the potential to continue to attract media 
attention, is able to draw publicly together parliamentary power in Europe.  
As a matter of fact, the European Parliament has grown out of the parliamentary 
tradition commonly found at the national level into an institution that is, as far as its 
competences in the consent procedure are concerned, rather comparable to the US 
Congress, as a strong supranational legislature. However, the US Congress is not a 
model any of the European citizens are familiar with. It is that problem, no matter 
how powerful the EP becomes, that citizens cannot understand its role, unless it 
‘behaves’ like a type of parliament more akin to the respective national one. That is 
why the press has difficulties in representing it in a way that is perceptible for its 
readers, although similarities to the national parliamentary tradition were still drawn 
in the case of the investiture procedure of the second Barroso Commission in 
2009/10, especially by the Dutch, French and Austrian press – even though these 
findings have to be interpreted with caution as some of the intercoder reliability 
scores are not very high. We can nevertheless derive that, as initially hypothesised, 
newsmakers take the national parliament as a standard for their evaluations – but, as 
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shown above, not only to highlight similarities between the institutions in the news, 
but also to contrast their differences. 
The domestic parliamentary tradition therefore also serves as an explanation for why 
the EP is being criticised in its (new) institutional powers – because it overtakes 
parliamentary scrutiny functions at the national level (and less so because of negative 
public stances towards the EU to which newsmakers were initially expected to 
respond). Regardless of their seniority as a member of the Brussels press corps, 
correspondents claimed that the EP would not be as ‘serious’ as its national 
equivalents yet. Even the French press considers the EP somewhat less legitimate 
than the Assemblée Nationale, although the findings of the previous chapter have 
suggested that French broadsheets are more likely to evaluate the EP in positive 
terms given the relative weakness of their Parliament in the French Presidential 
system. But actually, most newsmakers ignore the fact that national parliaments are 
losing out after Lisbon: Their ability to scrutinise policy making at the EU level 
directly is rather limited (see Raunio 2010).  
Even though some news feature MEPs from other European countries more often, 
the chapter has argued that this serves as an indicator for the absence of 
parliamentary, and thus party political, expertise at the national level. This was the 
case in Ireland, Britain and France. While this is a positive finding for the emergence 
of a European public sphere, the European Parliament and its members are not per se 
deemed more capable of taking important decisions, such as on the SWIFT 
agreement.  
The problem is that the EP is not understood for its precise political role in the EU 
political system, but its legitimacy is assessed by applying standards of parliamentary 
culture and functions derived from the national context. Hence, it is not perceived as 
a common and powerful European Parliament. Yet, even if the EP developed into an 
institution that compares best to, say, the German Bundestag, the Irish, British, and 
French are least likely to make sense of its role and accept its position in the EU 
political system as a representative body since, as the chapter has shown, we find 
variation at the national level between weaker and stronger types of legislatures. 
What is left is the hope for greater awareness levels of the EP following a probable 
rise in press coverage after Lisbon. 
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Chapter 7  
Conclusions: 
Understanding broadsheet coverage of the European Parliament 
 
The objective of this thesis was to explain variation in the press coverage of EU 
parliamentary affairs. It has been contended that news values and selection criteria 
are not the only factors responsible for differences in the news coverage and content 
across country and over time. Instead, the thesis argues that national parliamentary 
traditions impact on the broadsheet coverage of the EP. Higher public trust towards 
the national parliament leads to lower coverage of EU parliamentary affairs. 
Procedural characteristics of national parliamentary traditions, on the other hand, 
shape the representations of news content. And lastly, newsmakers compare the EP 
to its national counterparts in their evaluations of the former’s role in the EU political 
system. Public opinion towards the EU plays an important role as well, although its 
effect has been found to be less influential than other factors.  
The research in this thesis has been designed to study the amount, volume and 
content of news referring to the European Parliament as well as the evaluations of 
their producers. To this end, the thesis has employed a mixed methodological 
approach. A quantitative content analysis of the quality press in six European 
countries has been conducted. Interviews with the respective correspondents in 
Brussels (17 in total) and one of the directors at the EP Directorate-General for 
Communication complement the findings by means of qualitative analysis. The 
selection of three different time phases has served to consider both routine periods 
and key events and issues.  
This chapter first draws together the findings from the thesis and then elaborates its 
contributions to the existing literature in the fields of communication research and 
European integration. After that the limitations of the study are discussed followed 
by some guidance for future research. Finally, the thesis assesses the prospects for 
public legitimacy of the European Parliament.  
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7.1 The findings  
The thesis demonstrates that the European Parliament and its members are a relevant 
subject of the ‘Brussels news beat’. This is not only due to its institutional function 
of generating publicity. The Parliament itself has taken efforts to improve its public 
relations by providing comprehensive press services as well as by pursuing direct 
communications with EU citizens through digital and social media. Contrary to some 
previous allegations in the communications literature, correspondents find MEPs 
very accessible and the EP’s internal processes more transparent than those of the 
other major political institutions in Brussels. Nevertheless, the thesis finds that 
variations in news coverage, content and professional attitudes of newsmakers in 
Brussels persist. It is argued that this variation can ultimately be explained by the 
interest of the readership in EU parliamentary affairs. The thesis shows that even 
though some correspondents believe themselves to be more autonomous in their 
relationship with the home office than others, journalists are concerned about the 
interest and awareness of their readers with regards to EU parliamentary affairs. 
Consequently, the thesis identifies three crucial factors responsible for the variation 
in press coverage: the prevailing relevance of news values, national parliamentary 
traditions and public support for EU membership. 
Chapter 2 has argued that ‘standard’ criteria of news coverage apply to European 
parliamentary affairs. Since the majority of news from the EP comprises hard, 
‘factual’ news importance and conflict are central news values. It is, however, 
contended that the EP’s prominence as well as its ability to generate political 
controversy are less likely to be decisive selection criteria in the day-to-day 
legislative business. Instead, they are likely to become decisive when major decisions 
are at stake. It follows that news referring to the EP and its members are 
predominantly selected on the issue. Hence, the dominant criterion is arguably that 
news has to be relevant for the domestic political context, given the supranational 
character of EU parliamentary activities.  
The findings from all three empirical chapters lend support to these allegations. 
Chapter 4 shows that news about the daily business of EU parliamentary affairs is 
primarily selected on the issue which has to resonate with the domestic readership. 
While cross-country differences in news coverage and volume lend further support to 
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the criterion of domestic relevance, news content serves as an indicator for the 
applied selection criteria. Domestic issues comprise the largest share of news from 
the EP. And even though business and financial newspapers feature pan-European 
issues more often, varying attention is paid across country to prominent EU affairs, 
such as the negotiations of the EU budget, the services directive, or the investigations 
of alleged CIA flights and prisons in Europe. Similarly, chapter 6 shows that even 
when highly salient issues are at stake, such as the investiture procedure and the 
international agreement on SWIFT, the press reports from a domestic lens. This has 
been exemplified by findings which suggest that the press feature ‘their’ 
Commissioner-designate’s hearings and largely rely on their own MEPs for expertise 
(where applicable) regarding SWIFT.  
The dominance of the domestic perspective is not an entirely novel contention in the 
history of EU communication research. But the findings demonstrate that the EP 
nevertheless receives regular coverage as shown in chapter 4 – the volume of news is 
found to rise significantly at times when the EP gathers in Strasbourg for plenary 
sessions. Thereby, the press follows the ‘normal’ parliamentary cycle of the EP by 
distributing more news in the winter months, and less when the Parliament is in 
recession during the summer. Put differently, the applicability of the news value of 
domestic relevance is responsible for a regular supply of news from the EP. Chapter 
5 also shows that own national MEPs receive far more attention in the news than 
legislators from other countries, with the exception of the French press however. It is 
argued here that domestic relevance is a positive condition for building links between 
representatives and represented considering the informative function of the media.  
Furthermore, the findings indicate that EU parliamentary affairs matter for domestic 
politics. In the case of SWIFT, as chapter 6 demonstrates, the EP was able to 
stimulate national public debates once it had received a veto power over the interim 
accord with the Lisbon Treaty – even though it concurred with national parliaments 
for media attention in the Netherlands, Germany and Austria. Chapter 4 finds that 
EU parliamentary affairs receive greater attention by the press in the run-up to 
national general elections. Here, salient domestic politics represent a driver of EP 
press coverage. But this finding also implies that EU parliamentary politics are able 
to fuel domestic politics. Although the research has not scanned media content in 
terms of claims made by MEPs, it is likely that European parliamentary actors are 
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sought by the media as reference points during election campaigns at the national 
level.   
The Parliament’s own importance in the EU political system and its ability to 
generate political conflict are, as expected, further drivers of press coverage. During 
the routine period, however, the findings from chapter 4 imply that these news values 
are weighed against that of domestic relevance. News about the EP is often visible 
when the co-decision (now OLP) or the then-called assent procedure applies, but 
other issues, i.e. domestic politics, receive more attention. Similarly, the findings 
suggest that European issues do not receive the same amount of attention across 
countries. Examples include the negotiations over the EU multi-annual budget for 
2007-13, which was most prominent in the Austrian press since the Austrian 
presidency took the lead in the consultations, and the REACH regulation, which 
received most coverage in the German and French print media. In short, the EP is 
relevant but the domestic impact matters more for it to get coverage in the day-to-day 
political business at the European level. This is also reflected in news content as 
shown in chapter 5. Here only the French and the German press feature senior and 
powerful MEPs as opposed to nationally prominent representatives more often than 
the rest – although in the latter case their office in the EP coincides with the German 
nationality (many prominent European legislators in the EP are actually from 
Germany).  
However, chapter 6 demonstrates that importance and controversy become 
applicable news selection criteria when major decisions are at stake at the European 
level, here the investiture procedure of the European Commission and the 
negotiations of the SWIFT agreement. The findings show that the press follow the 
European Parliament’s rising powers over the years. However, press coverage of the 
EP does not rise exponentially but reaches a satisfaction level when MEPs have 
demonstrated their powers already once, as in the case of Barroso’s withdrawal in 
2004. Yet, following the increased parliamentary powers of the Lisbon Treaty the 
outlook provided by correspondents is positive in that they expect coverage of EU 
parliamentary affairs to remain at a high level. Taken together with the regular press 
coverage during the routine period, the findings demonstrate that it has become 
rather normal for the Brussels press corps to report about EU parliamentary affairs. 
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These are positive conditions for public awareness levels of the European 
Parliament.  
Notwithstanding the normalisation of press coverage, however, the European 
Parliament is not (yet) treated as a ‘normal’ parliament by the press. The reasons for 
that lie in differing traditions of the national parliamentary culture. The thesis finds 
that its impact on the press coverage of EU parliamentary affairs is rather complex. It 
has been hypothesised in chapter 2 that trust in the national parliament is a positive 
determiner of news coverage because citizens and readers respectively are expected 
to be more interested in parliamentary affairs in general the more they appreciate 
their own representative body. However, chapter 4 finds the opposite to be the case. 
The Tobit models have returned a negative impact of public trust levels towards the 
national parliament on the volume of news dealing with the EP. This effect has 
remained significant even when controlling for type of media system, and public 
opinion towards the EU. The statistical significance of the interaction effect of the 
latter with the variable of trust in the national parliament further demonstrates that 
regardless of public stances towards EU membership, the appreciation of the national 
equivalent shortens the press coverage of EU parliamentary affairs, albeit marginally 
only.  
The findings imply that there is a perceived rivalry between parliamentary 
institutions at both levels, which has been exemplified by the German and British 
case. Both parliaments have a high esteem in the respective society. The UK 
parliament is the true sovereign in the British political system, and the German 
Bundestag is a strong defender against the erosion of parliamentary rights amid 
increasing European integration. That is also why, as chapter 6 finds, the European 
Parliament received less attention by the German press during the SWIFT 
negotiations – because the Bundestag insistently sought to become involved as well. 
Similar findings are reported for the Austrian and Dutch broadsheets following the 
results from the Tobit regression. In the latter case, the rivalry between parliaments 
was particularly triggered by the fact that the main rapporteur of the SWIFT case, 
Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, left the EP during the peak of the inter-institutional 
negotiations in order to take up a seat in the Tweede Kamer in June 2010. 
Nevertheless, in Ireland and France a European perspective prevailed combined with 
no or very little parliamentary activity at the national level. Here, seemingly the 
242 
 
European Parliament’s new role was accepted in the press as complimentary to the 
(rather few) existing competences of the respective national parliament. 
The findings nevertheless lend evidence to the assumption that the national 
parliamentary tradition is taken as a standard for the presentation of news content. It 
has been argued in chapter 2 that newsmakers use proxies derived from the domestic 
context in order to make news about the European Parliament better comprehensible 
for their readers. The results reported in chapter 5 lend support to this allegation. It is 
shown that features of the national parliamentary system, here characterised by 
constituency focus, individual party membership as well as legislative and political 
roles, are reflected in the news content referring to individual MEPs across countries 
(with some exceptions in the French case). Furthermore, results from the Tobit 
regressions illustrate that in countries where national electoral systems favour 
individual candidates over party lists individual MEPs receive far greater attention by 
broadsheets in terms of direct quotes than in the other countries. Assuming that also 
in the national context the media attention individual candidates receive is 
determined by the way they are elected, the findings underline the similarity between 
MPs and MEPs drawn by the press. Put differently, the press hold Europe’s 
representatives accountable in a way that is comparable to public expectations 
towards their corresponding colleagues in domestic parliaments by treating them as 
deputies for their domestic colleagues. This outcome implies that the representational 
relationship between MEPs and voters is not something with which any of the latter 
is unfamiliar. Yet, news coverage of representation at the EU level is not unitary 
across Europe but fragmented into expectations that vary across countries which is 
not necessarily supportive for the emergence of European democracy.  
Similarities to the procedures of the national parliamentary tradition are also found in 
the coverage of the investiture procedure of the second Barroso Commission in 
2009/10 (Chapter 6). Although the procedure does not exist in this form in the 
countries under study, the prevailing cross-country variation in news content 
indicates that practices at the national level are reflected in the coverage. While the 
British case represents an exception in this case, because the news value of domestic 
relevance appears to be more decisive, the results suggest that the Dutch and Irish 
newspapers often featured party politics between majority and opposition during the 
investiture, as they would likely do at home. Similarly, the findings suggest that in 
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the French and Austrian press political battles were rather depicted as battles 
between two independent institutions which resemble characteristics of both semi-
presidential systems. However, given that the procedure at the European level is 
distinct from what is commonly found at the national level, correspondents, 
especially the German ones, stated that they have difficulties in presenting it in an 
accurate yet perceptible way to their readers.  
Taken together, the findings demonstrate that the EP is indeed perceived as an 
extension of the national parliamentary tradition in procedural terms. But since it 
grew institutionally stronger than its national counterparts as far as the consent 
procedure is concerned, it becomes more difficult for readers and citizens alike to 
comprehend the EP’s powers. Due to the public inability to make sense of the EP’s 
role as complementing national parliaments, it is perceived as a rival to its national 
equivalents. These assumptions are underlined by the fact that it becomes 
increasingly difficult for national parliaments to influence decision-making at the EU 
level directly, despite concessions by the Lisbon Treaty. Thus, the findings lend 
support to the assumption presented in chapter 2 in that correspondents evaluate the 
EP by drawing comparisons to the respective national parliament. Since the EP is 
unable to fulfil traditional parliamentary functions in the eyes of the newsmakers, the 
EP is regarded as ‘less serious’ compared to the national counterpart. The problem 
here is that the EP is not understood for its precise political role in the EU political 
system, but its legitimacy is assessed by applying standards of parliamentary culture 
derived from the national context. Hence, it is not perceived as a common and 
therewith powerful European Parliament. 
The domestic parliamentary tradition therefore not only serves as an explanation for 
variation in the extent and content of news coverage but also for why the EP is being 
criticised in its (new) institutional powers – because it overtakes parliamentary 
scrutiny functions at the national level. This is furthermore supported by the fact that 
the research in chapter 6 has been unable to draw a clear causal relationship between 
the newsmakers’ criticism and their varying forms of socialisation in Brussels. 
Moreover, public stances towards the EU, to which newsmakers were expected to 
respond, do also not serve as a convincing explanation for the differing attitudes of 
the reporters in Brussels. The fact that some British and Austrian correspondents 
evaluated the EP in negative terms is arguably related to the incompatibility of the 
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latter’s competences with the role of Parliament in the respective domestic context. 
This is furthermore underlined by the fact that even though the French press 
expresses a rather pan-European perspective in the news, some newsmakers still 
criticise the EP for not yet being as ‘serious’ as national parliaments.     
Nevertheless, public support for EU membership is not inconsequential for EP press 
coverage. The hypothesis, put forward in Chapter 2, that lower levels of public 
support for the EU in a country lead respective newsmakers to evaluate the EP more 
negatively is not convincingly supported by evidence. But the chapter has also 
proposed a positive effect of public support levels on EP news coverage – without 
ignoring the effect of media coverage onto public opinion. The research conducted in 
chapter 4 is able to lend support to this allegation: greater levels of public support are 
associated with more comprehensive coverage of EU parliamentary affairs. This is 
arguably due to that fact that citizens are hardly able to distinguish between political 
responsibilities at the EU level and thus have an undifferentiated view onto the 
whole. Hence the more they appreciate EU membership probably the more interested 
they are in reading about the EP. The findings are furthermore relevant when 
considering that the alternative hypothesis that higher party political contestation 
over the EU leads to higher news coverage of EU parliamentary affairs can only be 
partially supported in the analysis of chapter 6 – without ignoring a reciprocal effect 
of news coverage onto party polarization. It nevertheless shows that opinion and 
party stances have different effects onto the broadsheet coverage of the EP and its 
members. However, on the downside it means that those citizens who are rather 
sceptical towards the EU are unlikely to receive a similar amount of news coverage 
as in the other countries. Consequently, we observe a kind of a vicious cycle in that 
the sceptics are unlikely to become more aware of the EP and in return unlikely to 
develop greater interest in EU parliamentary affairs.  
Newsmakers respond to the varying levels of public support for the EU also in their 
presentation of news content, as hypothesised in chapter 2. Chapter 5 demonstrates 
that the press in the UK and Austria, where the least pro-European citizens of this 
sample are at home, feature prominent soft-Eurosceptic MEPs, namely Daniel 
Hannan and Hans-Peter Martin, respectively. Although Eurosceptic MEPs are also 
elected in the other countries, none of the corresponding newspapers pays a 
considerable amount of attention to them. However, the fact that newsmakers 
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respond to sceptic views in their country is not negative, but by referring to the 
respective legislators it shows citizens that different opinions are represented in 
Parliament, which is an indicator of a functioning democracy. 
Taken together, the findings demonstrate that variation in EP press coverage cannot 
be explained by factors internal to the news production process alone. Instead the 
external factor of the national parliamentary tradition is a central diver of the 
broadsheet coverage alongside public opinion towards the EU. These factors become 
visible in the functions the media fulfil for the development of European democracy. 
In its role as a messenger the press regularly reports about the EP and transmits news 
to Europe’s citizens. As a commentator, however, the press view the Parliament with 
a rather critical eye. Put differently, the findings can be summarised by the notion of 
a ‘serious joke’ by one correspondent: the EP is relevant at the European level for it 
to receive coverage by the European quality press, but not regarded as serious as 
national parliaments (yet), in order to be represented by its unique role in the EU 
political system.  
 
7.2 Broader contribution 
The research of this thesis has several implications for the literature in the field of 
European integration and political communication. The first one is empirical. Firstly, 
in explaining broadsheet coverage of the European Parliament the thesis pursues a 
cross-country comparative approach speaking to a notion of Taggart (2006: 8) in that 
‘we can no longer understand the process of European integration in isolation from 
domestic politics’. The countries have been selected carefully in order to control for 
differences in media systems – the research considers the categorisation of Hallin 
and Mancini (2004) by which Ireland and the UK fall under the type of liberal media 
system, France is identified as pluralist-corporatist, and the Netherlands, Germany 
and Austria classified as democratic-corporatist media systems. This country 
selection allows the researcher to distinguish between effects from the national 
parliamentary culture and levels of support for EU membership. Here, citizens of 
Britain and Austria express the least support and those of Ireland and the Netherlands 
the highest, while German and French citizens are somewhere in between. Their 
parliamentary traditions, on the other hand, can be distinguished by two groups 
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which cross-cut the previous categorisations. The first one comprises Ireland, the UK 
and France which can be characterised by rather weak parliaments or legislatures and 
candidate-centred electoral systems; the second group includes the Netherlands, 
Germany and Austria which are known for their working parliaments and party-
based electoral systems. That way, the research design allows for generalisations of 
the findings.  
Secondly, the research design addresses a shortcoming in the existing literature by 
combining the study of a routine period stretching over two years with two case 
studies which investigates key events and issues over a longer period of time, namely 
the SWIFT case and the investiture of the European Commission. Thirdly, by 
employing a mixed-methods approach, the research aims at methodological 
triangulation of the results. The findings from the quantitative and qualitative 
analyses have been discussed simultaneously rather than one after another. That way 
the study has aimed at combining statistical rigor with in-depth research in order to 
explain the phenomenon of broadsheet coverage from the European Parliament. 
Fourthly, the regression analysis has been conducted by Tobit models, which is 
rather rare in political science and communication research, in order to control for 
biases against zero observations. Hence, although the research is unable to compare 
the findings with media coverage of other political actors at the EU level or in the 
domestic context – and thereby assess the EP’s prominence in the news, the 
statistical analysis is able to account for conditions under which the EP does not 
receive any press coverage. Lastly, the interviews have not only been conducted with 
the respective news producers. But the research also considers the European 
Parliament’s point of view by considering the experience of one of the directors at 
the EP Directorate-General for Communication.        
The theoretical contributions speak to several literatures. While the relevance of 
news values for EU news coverage is not an entirely novel contribution, the thesis 
demonstrates that, contrary to allegations arguing that the media’s ‘inherent 
nationalism’ (Slaatta 2006) would hinder the emergence of a European public sphere, 
the news value of domestic relevance is responsible for regular coverage of EU 
parliamentary affairs. Indeed, national differences prevail, but the research has 
shown that EU parliamentary politics are relevant for the domestic context. They 
matter for general election campaigns. Thereby, parliamentary politics at the EU 
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level are able to contribute to Europeanisation of news coverage, although it lies 
outside the scope of the thesis to answer questions about the extent to which such 
Europeanisation takes place. However, Liebert (2007) argues that the European 
Parliament’s function of representation, which is fragmented into national and 
regional constituencies, constrains the emergence of a more deliberative form of pan-
European communication. It could be argued here that given the weakness of the 
electoral link between represented and representatives a focus on nationally elected 
representatives in the news is more imperative in tackling the European democratic 
deficit for the time being. This becomes even more plausible considering the unlikely 
change of the European electoral system(s) in the near future. Hence a vertical 
Europeanisation of news content (see Koopmas 2007: 185ff), as in this case, is not 
necessarily a bad condition in the formation of European democracy. It provides 
opportunities for citizens to identify ‘their’ representatives in Europe. 
Correspondents’ speculations hinted at the likelihood for the press coverage about 
the EP to increase in the long run after Lisbon. Thus, positive conditions for public 
awareness levels are expected. That is to say, if citizens became more aware of their 
representatives, this would be beneficial for Europe’s representative democracy. 
Nevertheless, the research in this thesis also finds that cross-references to other 
European legislators not elected in the country of news distribution become more 
eminent. The French press is the best example for featuring other European MEPs. 
But the SWIFT case has demonstrated that also the British and the Irish quality press 
rely on information provided by other MEPs, most notably the respective rapporteurs 
in the EP, when their own nationals are unable to provide expertise on a given 
matter. The findings indicate that some degree of supranational Europeanisation has 
taken place as far as news content is concerned (see Koopmans 2007). The findings 
are even more telling when considering the EU as a ‘multilevel parliamentary field’ 
(Crum and Fossum 2009) whereby representation of EU citizens follows two 
channels – via the national and the European Parliament. The findings from the 
content analysis show here that the parliamentary competences are able to 
complement each other under certain circumstances. It happened that in the countries 
of Ireland, Britain and France, the national parliaments merely sought to become 
involved in the SWIFT negotiations. Parliamentary expertise was therefore absent at 
the national level and supposedly no communication of policy preferences was 
channelled via parties to the respective national representatives at the European level. 
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Here, the quality press took European parliamentary experts as surrogates in 
addressing public concerns during the debate.   
Another positive condition for the emergence of a European public sphere – or a 
‘European sphere of publics’ (Schlesinger and Kevin 2000) – is that traditional news 
values of importance and conflict are able to trigger the coverage of EU 
parliamentary affairs across country. The attention paid to the EP by the quality press 
is able to substitute public debate in the domestic context once the European 
Parliament has considerable decision making power as in the case of SWIFT, where 
it exerted its veto rights. The findings from the interviews with correspondents 
suggest that there are more instances like these to come in the future given the 
Parliament’s new powers. Hence, the EP’s ability to contribute to public debates 
might become more relevant in the future. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
predict the emergence of a European public sphere based on the EP’s role in this 
regard, especially since the literature does not agree on its definitions and empirical 
measurements. Nevertheless, De Vreese et al. (2006: 479, following Risse and van 
de Steeg 2003) contend that ‘a European public sphere should reflect national media 
reporting on the same topic using common sources’.  Hence, it can be argued that the 
minimum requirements for a transnational communicative space are met with regards 
to the European Parliament since the thesis identifies a Europeanisation in the extent 
and content of EP news coverage over time, albeit cross-country variation still exists.   
Adding to the existing literature on EU news coverage, the thesis has also shown that 
much of the domestic focus can ultimately be explained by the interest of the 
audience, which is not least channelled by the demands of the editors at the home 
offices (see, for instance, Morgan 1995; Gavin 2001; de Vreese 2003; Gleissner and 
de Vreese 2005; Lecheler 2008). Even though some correspondents are reportedly 
granted a greater degree of autonomy than others, they repeatedly have to convince 
their editors about the way they select news stories about the EP and its members and 
the manner they report EU parliamentary affairs. This moderates the chances for a 
truly European press coverage produced by direct observers on location, having 
socialised with the ‘Brussels beat’, because the home office has the final say. The 
thesis has nevertheless suggested that when the EP exerts its powers as in the case of 
SWIFT, some correspondents supposedly receive the chance to report more 
autonomously from Brussels since more news from the EP with more references to 
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European actors have been produced in countries where the national discourse was 
not triggered by the national parliament and almost absent – although the motives of 
the editors have not investigated in this case.  
While little has been done in media research to explain variation in media coverage 
of EU affairs more generally, the thesis has sought to identify external effects on the 
press coverage of the EP that go beyond mere country variables. The broadsheet 
coverage turns out to be significantly different across types of media system 
following the classifications of Hallin and Mancini (2004) as far as the extent and 
content are concerned during the routine period. However, the thesis argues that 
variation in media system dynamics as such is not a sufficient explanation. This is 
not only due to the fact that their effect is not statistically significant for the amount 
of attention the EP received during the SWIFT negotiations. The thesis does not seek 
to challenge their typology. Rather, the thesis proposes for the precise coverage of 
EU parliamentary affairs that definitions of media systems are extended to including 
somewhat broader descriptions of political communication systems (cf. Esser and 
Pfetsch 2004). Hallin and Mancini (2004) classify media systems according to the 
degree of state intervention in regulating the media, the degree of media partisanship, 
the historical development of media markets and the extent of journalistic profession 
within countries. Nonetheless, the thesis shows that the national parliamentary 
tradition proves to be a crucial determiner of broadsheet coverage about the 
European Parliament alongside public opinion towards the EU in general. Indeed, the 
variation is greatest across country, but the research also finds inter-temporal effects 
of these factors – especially since trust levels towards the national parliament 
fluctuate considerably within country over time. Hence, a typology of political 
communication systems might want to take political factors and political system 
dynamics into account in addition to media system characteristics when studying 
variation in EU news coverage.  
The thesis has argued that the prevalence of national parliamentary traditions in the 
news coverage is due to high levels of public unawareness about how the EU 
political system works. Hence, the national tradition serves as a proxy for 
understanding and appreciating parliamentary democracy at the European level (see 
Schmidt 2006, Diez Medrano 2003). While according to Goetze and Rittberger 
(2010) the European Parliament has evolved out of a ‘matter of habit’ at the national 
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level, the thesis amends their notion that policy makers would regard the EP as a 
‘normal’ parliament. This is not the case with the press elites. The thesis has shown 
that publicly the EP is considered a rival to national parliaments precisely because 
the EP has grown out of that habit with comprehensive powers not comparable 
anymore to those of national parliaments in the European decision-making process.  
Thereby, the thesis adds to existing research on the interplay of national parliaments 
and the European representative body by means of their ‘dual legitimacy’ (Benz 
2004) in the EU polity. Little has been done on the question of whether national 
parliaments and their European counterpart compete in terms of influence in EU 
policy-making. Yet, some research on cross-level inter-parliamentary cooperation 
suggests that parliamentary actors have different incentives for co-ordinating their 
interests (see Costa and Latek 2001; Neunreither 2005). The thesis is not able to 
identify the motivations of parliamentarians in the EU for seeking media attention. 
Yet, the findings suggest that given the media’s role as a messenger, parliamentary 
communications tools can be used as a strategic means for increasing public 
legitimacy. The findings from the interview with one of the directors at the EP 
Directorate-General for Communication underline this assumption in that the EP 
provides the Brussels press corps with carefully selected information. The media, 
however, are arguably not a silent recipient of information which they communicate 
plainly. Instead, as a commentator they are able to fuel any perceived rivalry of 
parliamentary competences in the EU. Hence, as research on the relations between 
the EP and national parliaments becomes more imminent after Lisbon, the thesis 
advises not to overlook the media’s role in this regard.  
The conclusions of the perceived rivalry between parliamentary institutions, 
however, are that the EP is not yet a fully legitimate institution in the public eye 
because it is not regarded as ‘serious’ yet as its national equivalents. Consequently, 
the thesis also adds to the literature on the role of national parliaments in the EU 
political system. Some argue that EU media coverage provides national parliaments 
and especially domestic opposition parties with a ‘weapon of the weak’ vis-à-vis 
their governments in EU policy-making (de Wilde 2011). This thesis further points 
out that even if they are threatened to loose parliamentary oversight in EU politics 
(see Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008; Raunio 2010; Kaczyński 2011), the public eye 
holds them still in high regard compared to the European Parliament.  
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Ultimately, the thesis seeks to provide a bridge between communication research and 
the literature on EU integration by arguing that we are unable to understand the 
phenomenon of EP press coverage without considering parliamentary traditions at 
the national level.   
 
7.3 Limitations of the study 
Despite the merits of the empirical contribution by this study, there are several 
limitations due to the lack of resources and scarcity of time. These especially concern 
the objectives for generalizability and falsifiability. While the mixed-methods 
approach was taken to increase the internal validity of the results, not all variation 
could be explained by the national parliamentary tradition. This is especially true for 
the French press which reflects only few characteristics of the domestic 
representative democracy in their presentation of news content. Nevertheless, the 
findings from the multivariate analyses do not expose France as an outlier. And, in 
the end, French newsmakers also draw comparison to the national legislature in their 
evaluations. 
Further, the research, despite being cross-national, only comprises six countries from 
Western Europe. While this is useful given the small number of countries considered 
here and the need to limit the pool of other explanatory factors, future research might 
seek to contrast the findings of this thesis with an analysis in the newer, especially 
Central and Eastern European member states. Here, we might, for instance, find a 
different approach to the EP – maybe one that treats it as a rather unique institution 
given that many of the respective parliamentary cultures have unfolded only after the 
Iron Curtain came down. Nonetheless, one might still find an impact of the national 
parliamentary tradition, perhaps alongside more numerous other explanatory factors. 
The Polish Sejm, for instance, still had an important role in society under the 
Communist regime. Due to lack of resources, the research presented here is unable to 
answer such questions and is thus subject to falsifiability. Hence, the external 
validity of the findings is rather limited to the countries under study and those which 
possess similar characteristics in the main independent variables.  
252 
 
The research design nevertheless has sought to tackle this problem by increasing the 
number of observations both over time and within country. The high and statistically 
significant correlations between the datasets demonstrate that the internal validity of 
the results holds. This means that the results are relatively consistent across the three 
datasets.   
Another problem concerns the type of media chosen for analysis. Broadsheets do by 
no means represent the comprehensive media landscape in a country. Thus the 
generalizability of the findings is limited. Trenz (2004) argues that quality 
newspapers do not per se represent a national perspective. Instead they provide elite 
views onto politics and also address specific target groups only. This is underlined in 
the present research as well. While the political sheets are found to be rather similar 
in their coverage and content patterns, the business and financial broadsheets slightly 
differ. However, differences in media type have been controlled for in all models 
without producing statistically significant effects throughout the thesis.  
A full picture of media coverage of EU parliamentary affairs can, nonetheless, only 
be provided if we also consider tabloids or regional dailies, online news content as 
well as television programmes, especially since European citizens would prefer 
television news over other media content as a source of information about EU affairs. 
Due to lack of resources the research has been unable to investigate other media 
content. Nevertheless, it has been argued above that broadsheets serve as sufficient 
media type for explaining cross-country and inter-temporal variation in EP news 
coverage since broadsheets provide a link between EU politics and citizens. They 
serve as opinion leaders in the national context and are likely to impact on other 
media coverage and content (cf. Trenz 2004; d’Haenens 2005; Bijmans and Altides 
2007) – even though this does not necessarily imply that news producers of 
television programmes, other print media or online news outlets have a similar 
approach to EP news coverage.  
And while the thesis assumes that they are more likely to report about EU 
parliamentary affairs than other media, some findings show that correspondents of 
the quality press are constrained by the editor’s interest in European parliamentary 
affairs, and ultimately that of the reader – as would likely be case with any other 
journalist in Brussels. The interviews furthermore reveal that even though their 
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readership is said to be somewhat better educated and politically more aware than the 
average media consumer, journalists nevertheless experience difficulties in 
presenting news content in a comprehensible manner. It can therefore be expected 
that some of the research hypotheses regarding news content, and especially the 
argument about the importance of features borrowed from the national parliamentary 
culture, are even more likely to hold with other media, despite the fact that the EP 
may be less visible in the news following previous research (cf. Kevin 2003). Future 
research should address these assumptions.  
The research interest itself bears several limitations. Indeed, while being a common 
method in political communication research the content analysis is limited to 
quantitative methods addressing questions of how much, what and why with respect 
to news coverage of European parliamentary affairs. An analysis of the tone used in 
the content of news about European parliamentary affairs, for instance, would have 
provided more comprehensive answers to whether public opinion towards the EU in 
general is reflected in the news. However, due to lack of resources such questions 
could not be addressed. Future research might want to investigate the tone for a 
routine period of EP news coverage. Similarly, although the thesis identifies a 
relevant role of the European Parliament for domestic politics, the research is unable 
to assess how exactly news about the EP impact on domestic politics. A discourse 
analysis would have provided further insight.  
The focus of the research is on news stories referring to the EP only investigating its 
visibility. Hence, we are unable to draw comparisons to the EU coverage in general, 
to media representations of other European actors or to the media attention national 
parliaments receive. While the regression analysis by use of Tobit models and 
consideration of the so-called zero observations has sought to circumvent these 
problems, we are unable to assess the relative attention the EP and its members 
receive compared to other actors. This would have provided clues about the 
prominence of EU parliamentary affairs in the news. Future research might want to 
compare the coverage of the EP to the actual coverage of other political stories and 
actors within media. 
Given the timing of the thesis, the research is only able to provide an outlook for the 
broadsheet coverage post-Lisbon. Future research might find different patterns in 
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coverage and content of EU parliamentary affairs especially at times of the Euro 
crisis.  
 
7.4 Avenues for future research 
Following the limitations of the research, the thesis proposes possible avenues for 
future research. The first one concerns the extension of the research hypotheses not 
only to different countries, as discussed above, but also to different types of media. 
Apart from testing whether the research hypotheses presented in this thesis hold with 
other media coverage, an interesting question here would ask about the ‘pictures’ 
television programmes deliver from the parliamentary debates in Strasbourg. Would 
we find similarities to the angles from which national parliamentary debates are 
reported? Further, tabloids would provide an interesting case for the study of tone 
towards European representatives – are news really about MEP expenses and 
scandals only, or do we find more substantive news as well, bearing in mind the 
ability of the media to affect public opinion? Regional or local newspapers are 
expected to take a different perspective too. One question here would be whether 
they inform readers better about the linkage function of the European Parliament by 
featuring locally elected MEPs.  
Considering the linkage function, future research might want to investigate the 
communication strategies of MEPs, possibly by means of a survey. The thesis has 
suggested that they are not mere objects of media representations, but they are active 
players in the Brussels news beat as well which was underlined by correspondents’ 
experiences with press officers of MEPs and political parties. Although the effect of 
the ballot structure is not statistically significant in the respective models, the MEPs 
might still have different communications strategies according to the way they are 
elected. Whether the press picks up on their activities, is a different question and has 
been addressed in this thesis. Bennett et al. (2007) show, for instance, that US 
politicians have taken the lead in the tango with journalists in recent years. Following 
the assumptions of the thesis, MEPs should have different communication strategies 
according to the way they are elected. Although all electoral systems across Europe 
comply with the rules of proportional representation, previous research finds that the 
ballot structure and the size of the electoral district have an impact on the campaigns 
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of individual candidates and political parties (Hix and Hagemann 2009). Similarly, 
Farrell and Scully (2010) argue that MEPs elected under more open electoral rules 
tend to focus more on their constituency. Hence, one would expect that MEPs elected 
in an open ballot structure and in smaller districts employ more pro-active 
communications strategies than their colleagues who enter the EP via country-wide 
party lists. One question could then also ask about the extent to which MEPs respond 
publicly to the concerns of their constituents.  
Further, the experience of one Dutch correspondent with representatives of the PVV 
(they reportedly try to avoid the media in Brussels) implies that political parties 
employ different strategies dependent on the parliamentary arena. Future research 
might want to compare public relations of Eurosceptic parties in the domestic context 
with media strategies pursued at the EU level. One hypothesis could be that despite 
the fact that fringe Eurosceptic parties tend to gain more seats at the EU level and 
Euroscepticism is central to their ideology, thus have increased incentives to address 
their communication strategies towards journalists working in Brussels, they prefer 
communication strategies in the domestic arena. Such a study would not only add to 
our knowledge of Europeanisation effects, but also answer questions about 
representation and responsiveness at the EU level – especially since we are able to 
control for the same national audience. 
The thesis has not addressed questions about the visibility and representations of 
political parties at the EU level. In modern democracies political parties provide a 
linkage between government and citizens. And even though this linkage is allegedly 
weaker in the EU political system which is thereby characterized by a democratic 
deficit, research suggests that political parties matter for EU parliamentary politics 
(e.g. Hix, Noury et al. 2007). Hence, a future study should investigate the salience of 
national parties and European party groups of the European Parliament in the news 
and explain varying representations across countries. Following the findings of the 
thesis, variation is likely to occur. Accordingly, such research is likely to draw 
similar conclusions as in this thesis: Given the prevalence of the domestic angle in 
the national media, national party politics are expected to be a crucial driver of media 
coverage. However, domestic politics are unlikely to be the only explanatory factor 
for variation. Representations might again also depend on the dynamics of national 
party systems.  
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Following some findings of this thesis which imply that European parliamentary 
politics matter in the run up to national general elections, a claims-making analysis 
could provide answers as to how European parliamentary actors contribute to the 
electoral campaigns in the media. Such a study would answer questions about the 
extent to which national election campaigns become Europeanised by linkage to 
European party politics.   
Another research idea would be to study the effect of news coverage and content 
about EU parliamentary affairs onto public awareness and public opinion of 
European citizens. At the end of the routine period chosen for this research, a Special 
Eurobarometer was conducted on the European Parliament (European Commission 
2008c). It tested the knowledge of EU citizens, and asked about their self-assessed 
awareness and opinion about the EP. Interestingly, for instance, on average only 35% 
knew that MEPs sit according to their political party affiliation, and not with their 
national delegation. This implies that awareness levels are still quite low despite 
regular coverage of EU parliamentary affairs. In fact, only 48% were able to recall 
that they had heard anything from the EP in the media in recent times. Remarkably 
these figures are below average for citizens of France, the UK, and Ireland; and 
above average for the remaining three countries of this research sample. This implies 
that the research hypotheses are likely to resonate with media effects of EU 
parliamentary affairs: In countries where the national parliament is rather strong, 
citizens are more likely to have heard or read about the EP in the media – perhaps 
another indicator for the perceived rivalry of parliamentary competences in the 
public sphere.   
The allegation of a perceived rivalry between parliaments also deserves further 
attention in future research. In order to investigate a publicised competition of 
parliamentary competences in the EU, one study should compare the media coverage 
of parliaments across levels. A different study of the SWIFT case could, for instance, 
answer questions about which parliament receives what kind of attention. A claims-
making or discourse analysis might even find a public battle between parliaments of 
different levels. It is, furthermore, likely that parliaments receive a different amount 
of attention depending on the issue, and ultimately on their competences. The 
SWIFT case has shown that news featured the EP more often than not. However, 
other issues might involve national parliaments more prominently in the news, such 
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as those related to the principle of subsidiarity. Recent examples here include the 
seasonal workers directive
137
, or the new Schengen agreement
138
. Comparing media 
coverage of parliaments across different levels would also assess the ability of 
legislatures to generate publicity – one of the core parliamentary functions – which 
has implications for public awareness levels. Another cross-level analysis could 
address questions about the prominence of individual parliamentary actors in the 
news, and their claims with regards to parliamentary competences post-Lisbon. A 
qualitative content analysis of tone could also study possible criticism towards 
European parliaments in the news.  
All told, the thesis offers a wide range of further research questions. While future 
research should continue studying the European Parliament’s representations in the 
media after Lisbon and extend the research to different legislative terms, the research 
hypotheses also provide cornerstones for other media research of European politics. 
Given the recent calls for a direct election of the Commission President or the 
President of the European Council (see, for instance, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
2011), one might, for example, want to investigate by a study of the media whether 
the legitimacy of other political actors at the European level also depends on 
preconceptions of political power and competences derived from the national 
context. 
 
7.5 Towards a ‘serious’ European Parliament? 
The research in this thesis demonstrates that the European Parliament is relevant for 
it to receive coverage by the quality press, especially given its increased powers after 
Lisbon. However, the press, as correspondents elaborated, do not regard it (yet) as a 
‘serious’ parliament comparable to those at the national level. Its role and powers are 
compared to the national standard and deemed ‘less’ democratic, as far as the 
representation of interests in the scrutiny function as well as the interplay of 
opposition and majority parties are concerned; and less efficient by the press. This 
                                               
137 Title: Seasonal employment: conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals 
(2010/0210(COD)) 
138 Title: External and internal borders: rules on movement of persons across borders (Schengen 
Borders Code) (amend. Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 and Convention implementing the 
Schengen Agreement) (2011/0051(COD)) 
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thesis nevertheless defends the relevant role of the European Parliament in the 
European decision-making process. Hence, what we have learnt from this research 
can be expressed by the words of Trenz (2008: 292): ‘media call for more democracy 
in Europe but media also restrain democratic procedures and practice’. The question 
therefore is whether any change of this perception is likely in the future and what 
conditions have to be met for it to be the case.  
The answer is twofold. Given the current situation with the Euro crisis, the European 
Union is subject to severe criticism by European citizens, especially in the old and 
large member states. Further integration is viewed with a sceptical public eye and 
decisions over greater funds for debtors fought by fierce intergovernmental battles. 
Following some findings of the thesis showing that support for the EU is a driver of 
news coverage from the European Parliament, the odds for the media to pay 
increasing attention to it, or even maintaining its current levels of coverage, are 
rather questionable. The second implication is that national parliaments seek a say 
over the size of the bail-out as recently demonstrated by the German Bundestag and 
the Slovak Parliament. In the debate about further integration The Economist 
claimed that ‘the European Parliament is a poor substitute for national legislatures’ 
(2011). Consequently, the public rivalry between parliamentary competences at the 
national and European level is likely to continue, if not to rise, in the future.    
Such a scenario is unfavourable for the EP’s legitimacy in public. However, much 
attention is paid to the European level these days. Therefore, the European 
Parliament is likely to receive media coverage too, especially since journalists 
contended that it would be more interesting given its new powers after Lisbon. 
Nevertheless, the media should stop comparing the EP to its national predecessors. 
Rather, they should clearly distinguish between parliamentary competences at either 
level. Further integration would then be a chance for the EP to demonstrate that its 
powers are complementary in that it is able to step in where national parliaments 
have lost competences. If the media understood it for the unique institution it is, the 
European Parliament’s legitimacy is likely to increase.  
Nevertheless, press coverage will continue to be provided through a domestic lens. 
This is hard to overcome for two reasons. One derives from the way European 
elections are organised. Up until now, national candidates and parties compete for 
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legislative office at the EU level. Indeed, there are propositions to enhance political 
contestation by means of European parties putting forward a candidate for the office 
of the Commission President in 2014 (see Party of European Socialists 2011). And 
more contestation would arguably lead to a greater interest of the media (see also 
Schmitt 2005). But until the scattered electoral system does not allow for cross-
country campaigning of political parties, a pan-European understanding of the 
European Parliament is unlikely to emerge in the media coverage. The second reason 
for the domestic perspective onto parliamentary politics at the European level is the 
dominance of national publics. In the absence of a European media system and a 
shared language, national public spheres are likely to prevail. What is left is the hope 
for rising awareness levels of the European Parliament in the public eye bearing a 
positive condition for the emergence of European democracy.  
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Appendices  
Appendix – Chapter 3 
A3.1: Descriptive statistics for the type of article 
 
N Percent Valid Percent Cum. Percent 
News  2212 83.85 83.92 83.77 
Comment  351 13.30 13.30 97.15 
Other  comment  11 0.42 0.42 97.57 
Interview  6 0.23 0.23 97.80 
Portrait  58 2.20 2.20 100 
Total 2638 100 
  
Note: N comprises N=2155 of dataset I, N=167 of dataset II and N=316 of dataset III 
 
 
A3.2: Keywords used for the collection of articles 
Language Dataset I Dataset II Dataset III 
English *EU AND Parliament 
*EU AND Legislature 
*Euro-Parliament 
*European AND 
Parliament 
*Brussels AND Parliament 
*Strasbourg AND 
Parliament 
*European AND 
*Parliamentarian  
*EU AND Parliamentarian 
*Euro-MP 
*MEP 
Same as in dataset I, plus: 
*European Commission 
*Commissioner 
*Hearing 
*Ashton OR Geoghegan-
Quinn 
*Barroso 
*Prodi 
 
Same as in dataset I, plus: 
*SWIFT 
*SWIFT (on its own) AND 
financial AND data OR 
Belgian 
* Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial 
Telecommunications 
 
French
a
 *Europarlement 
*Parlement AND Européen 
*Parlement AND Bruxelles 
*Parlement AND 
Strasbourg 
*Deputé AND européen 
*Eurodeputé 
*Europarlementaire 
*Parlementaire AND 
Européen 
 
 
Same as in dataset I, plus: 
*Commission Européenne 
*Commissaire 
*Audition 
*Barnier 
*Barroso 
*Prodi 
 
Same as in dataset I, plus: 
*SWIFT 
*SWIFT on its own 
 
280 
 
Language Dataset I Dataset II Dataset III 
Dutch
a
 *EU-Parlement 
*Europarlement 
*Europees AND Parlement 
*Brussel AND Parlement 
*Straatsburg AND 
Parlement 
*Europarlementarier 
*Europese Parlementarier 
*EP-leden 
*EU-Parlementarier 
*Europese AND 
afgevaardigde 
Same as in dataset I, plus: 
*Europese Commissie 
*Commissaris 
*Eurocommissaris 
*Hoorzitting 
*Kroes 
*Barroso 
*Prodi 
Same as in dataset I, plus: 
*SWIFT 
*SWIFT on its own 
 
German
a
 *Europäisches Parlament 
*EU-Parlament 
*Brüssel AND Parlament 
*Straßburg AND 
Parlament  
*Euro-Parlament 
*Europaparlamentarier 
*Europaabgeordnete 
*Europäische AND 
Abgeordnete 
*Europäische AND 
Parlamentarier 
*Europäische AND 
Mandatare (Austrian 
German only) 
Same as in dataset I, plus: 
*Europäische Kommission 
*Kommissar 
*Anhörung  
*Oettinger OR Hahn 
*Barroso 
*Prodi 
Same as in dataset I, plus: 
*SWIFT 
*SWIFT on its own 
 
Legend: a Grammar changes, plural and female versions have been accounted for.  
A3.3: Intercoder reliability (Krippendorff’s α) for the selection of articles 
 Coder A Coder B 
 FR GB AT DE IE NL US 
Dataset I N=148 N=93 N=59 N=184 N=104 N=80  
 .8699 .8612 .9230 .8699 .8657 .8261 - 
Dataset II
a
 N=36 N=7 N=37
b
 N=60 N=33 N=31  
 .6475 1 .9452 .8570 .7994 1  
Dataset III N=265 N=445 N=136 N=234 N=138
cd
 N=106 N=118
d
 
 .9034 .9239 .8083 .8902 .9638 .9381 .9381 
Legend: a only a pre-selection has been provided for the check; b selection excludes DER STANDARD;  
c selection excludes Sunday Business Post; d selection does not comprise articles referring to SWIFT only. 
Note: All calculations are based on the SPSS instructions by Hayes (2005) by calculating with two dummy 
variables (1-selected, 0-not selected). 
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A3.4: Bivariate correlations between datasets 
 Correlations across country (N=6) Correlations across newspaper (N=18)
a 
 
Dataset I Dataset II Dataset III Dataset I Dataset II Dataset III 
Dataset I 1 .870** .855** 1 .854*** .625*** 
Dataset II .870** 1 .918** .854*** 1 .803*** 
Dataset III .855** .918** 1 .625*** .803*** 1 
Legend: Pearson coefficients; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; a the Irish Independent and Irish Examiner have been 
merged.  
 
A3.5: Inter-coder reliability (Krippendorff’s α) for individual variables 
Variable Name Coder I Coder II Coder III 
Newspaper sample NL DE AT IE GB FR US 
Dataset I N=33 N=66 N=28 N=38 N=22 N=34  
Date 1 1 1 1 1 1  
NPaffil 1 1 1 1 1 1  
NPname 1 1 1 1 1 1  
Country -* -* -* -* -* -*  
Location .8972 .9287 .9395 .7148 .8530 .8738  
Articletype .5285 .3093 .4712 .2331 .3385 .1651  
length 1 .9998 .9987 .9968 1 1  
EPsharewc .9323 .8749 .9144 .9620 .9385 .9419  
Theme .2907 .2534 .3968 .1389 .2777 .1972  
Topicdetail .6858 .5325 .5603 .5179 .6269 .5434  
MEP1 1 1 .9190 .9709 1 1  
MEP1role .7322 .8954 .8324 .7871 .6643 .8200  
MEP1role2 1 .6957 .0000° -* .6560 -*  
MEP1nat_a .9377 .5670 .8205 .7304 .8784 .6560  
MEP1nat_b .9451 .6812 .9403 .9497 .8297 .8731  
MEP1partyinEP .8146 .7410 .8092 .8358 1 .8483  
MEP1partyinEP2 -* 1 .0000° 1 -* .7873  
MEP1ownwords .9953 .9878 .9626 .9609 .9839 .9491  
MEP1const .8277 .6857 .8068 .8190 .9052 .6697  
MEP2 1 1 .7731 1 .6393 1  
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MEP2role 1 .9180 .6318 .7339 .5000 1  
MEP2role2 -* .2308 -* .6606 -* -*  
MEP2nat_a .8503 .8501 .8831 .4669 .4634 .8619  
MEP2nat_b .8588 .8750 .8643 .7979 .7027 1  
MEP2partyinEP .8276 .7526 .6776 .8466 1 .9117  
MEP2partyinEP2 -* 1 -* -* -* .0000°  
MEP2ownwords .9896 .9958 .9481 .9353 .6196 .9972  
MEP2const 1 .7529 .8421 .7661 1 1  
MEP3 1 .9277 .6452 1 -* 1  
MEP3role 1 .8708 .4054 1 -* .8496  
MEP3role2 -* -* -* -* -* -*  
MEP3nat_a 1 1 .7317 .5313 -* .5750  
MEP3nat_b 1 .9024 .7317 .7619 -* 1  
MEP3partyinEP 1 .9231 .8197 1 -* 1  
MEP3partyinEP2 -* -* -* -* -* .0000  
MEP3ownwords 1 .8504 .9952 .9398 -* .6286  
MEP3const 1 .8688 .7317 .8000 -* 1  
MEP4 -* .8471 .7568 1 - 1  
MEP4role -* 1 .6667 -* - .6140  
MEP4role2 -* -* -* -* - -*  
MEP4nat_a -* 1 .6897 -.1667 - 1  
MEP4nat_b -* .8116 .7273 1 - 1  
MEP4partyinEP -* 1 .7568 1 - .8136  
MEP4partyinEP2 -* -* .0000° -* - -*  
MEP4ownwords -* .8630 1 .9912 - .8058  
MEP4const -* 1 1 1 - 1  
MEP5 - .7200 1 1 - -  
MEP5role - 1 1 -* - -  
MEP5role2 - -* -* -* - -  
MEP5nat_a - .6316 1 .0000° - -  
MEP5nat_b - .6667 1 -* - -  
MEP5partyinEP - 1 .7200 1 - -  
MEP5partyinEP2 - -* 0° -* - -  
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MEP5ownwords - 1 0° 1 - -  
MEP5const - 1 .8593 -* - -  
Dataset II  N=6 N=12 N=7 N=6 N=3 N=7  
Date 1 1 1 1 1 1  
NPaffil 1 1 1 1 1 1  
NPname 1 1 1 1 1 1  
Country -* -* -* -* -* -*  
Location 1 .7579 1 -* 1 .4583  
Articletype .5926 1 1 -* 1 1  
length 1 .9902 1 1 1 1  
EPsharewc .6461 .9460 .9273 .9345 .9726 .9395  
CommissionTopic .8070 .6052  .6667 .7027 1 .5244  
CriticismByX .4884 .3268 .6389 .4054 1  .5094  
ComparisonUS -* -* -* -* 1 1  
Dataset III N=6 N=29 N=10 N=3 N=5 N=11 N=8 
Date 1 .9647
+
 1 1 1 .9050
+
 .8673
+
 
NPaffil 1 1 1 1 1 1 n/a 
NPname 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Country -* -* -* -* -* -* -* 
Location 1 1 1 -* .3333 1 .8148 
Articletype 1 .8707 1 -* 1 .7529 .7541 
length 1 .9971 1 1 1 1 1 
EPsharewc .9949 .9677 .9373 .9758 .9909 .9393 .9908 
MEP1 1 .9091 1 1 1 1 1 
MEP2 1 1 1 1 -* -* - 
MEP3 .6207 1 -* - - - - 
MEP4 - 1 - - - - - 
MEP5 - 1 - - - - - 
Legend: * SPSS cannot calculate Krippendorff’s α when the variables exhibit no variation. In essence, 
however, the inter-coder agreement is perfect. ° Only one disagreement with only one case entered. + All 
dates were double-checked again for this dataset and corrected afterwards for the analysis. 
Note: N is decreasing for MEPs and their characteristics. Most articles mention one MEP, but few mention 
more than one and beyond. Hence, Krippendorff’s α is more sensitive in these cases. All calculations are 
based on the SPSS instructions by Hayes (2005).  
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A3.6: Coding Scheme for the quantitative content analysis 
Variable Name Description Variable type Coding categories 
All datasets    
ArticleName Name of the article  String  Own codification 
Date Publication date Date  Continuous 
NPaffil Political affiliation of newspaper Categorical 1=centre-left 2=centre-
right 
3=business/financial 
NPname Name of the newspaper Categorical By newspaper name 
Country Country of newspaper Categorical  By country name 
Location Location where the article was 
written 
Categorical  By city/cities 
Articletype Type of article Categorical 1=news; 2=comment; 
3=other comment; 
4=interview; 5=portrait 
length Total length of article body Numerical Continuous 
EPsharewc Total amount of words of all 
sentences that mention the EP or 
any equivalent 
Numerical Continuous  
EPsharepc Share of EP within article/ 
percentage (calculated by the 
previous two variables)  
Numerical 0.00 to 100.00 
MEP1
a
 Name of the first MEP mentioned 
in the article 
Categorical By name (0=no name 
given; 999=n/a) 
MEP1role Role cited for MEP1 (e.g. 
rapporteur) 
Categorical By assigned role 
MEP1role2 Second role cited for MEP1 (if 
applicable) 
Categorical By assigned role 
MEP1nat_a Nationality mentioned of MEP1 Categorical 1=not mentioned 2=not 
explicitly mentioned but 
clear from the article 
3=explicitly mentioned; 
99=n/a 
MEP1nat_b Nationality of MEP1 Categorical By Nationality 
MEP1partyinEP First party mentioned for MEP1 Categorical By party name (either 
European or national 
party group) 0=name 
not given 
MEP1partyinEP2 Second party mentioned for MEP1 
(if applicable) 
Categorical By party name (either 
European or national 
party group) 99=n/a 
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Variable Name Description Variable type Coding categories 
All datasets    
MEP1ownwords Number of words cited for MEP1 Numerical Continuous  
MEP1const Constituency or origin mentioned 
for MEP1 
Categorical 1=not mentioned; 
2=mentioned; 3=n/a (if 
from different country 
than newspaper origin) 
Dataset I only    
Theme Structural theme of the article (e.g. 
domestic party politics, speech in 
EP; ECJ ruling) 
Categorical By theme 
Topicdetail Policy issue or more detailed topic 
of the article (e.g. services 
directive, Turkey accession, Oeger: 
kidnapping case) 
Categorical By topic 
Dataset II only    
CommissionTopic Topic of the article (e.g. Barnier 
Commissioner hearing) 
Categorical By topic 
CriticismByX Who expressed criticism towards 
the Commission? (e.g. author, 
other domestic, MEPs in general) 
Categorical By subject 
ComparisonUS Comparison drawn to the US 
Congress regarding the hearing 
procedure 
Categorical 0=no; 1=yes 
Legend: a all MEP1 variables were replicated for MEP2 - MEP14 where appropriate 
Note: Many more variables were coded, such as the author’s name, page numbers, newspaper categories, 
whether the EP was mentioned in the headline, whether vote results were reported, which parties and 
committees were mentioned etc. These are not of interest in this thesis but information about them can be 
obtained from the author, if needed.   
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A3.7a: Interview guide for correspondents
 
1. Personal information 
- How long have you been in Brussels? 
- What did you do beforehand? 
- What is your specialization (if several correspondents)? 
- How many correspondents are employed here by your newspaper? 
- What are your career prospects? Why have you come to Brussels? 
 
2. Reporting about the EP 
- Why are you not in Strasbourg? /Have you been to Strasbourg last week? 
- Editors 
o Do they have specific ideas about EP coverage?  
o What are they interested in?  
o What is the procedure? Do editors tell you what they want or do you 
approach them? What happens then? 
o What are the technical constraints (deadlines etc.?)? 
o What is newsworthy? At what time is there more coverage ( 
examples)? 
o Editorial line? Politicized Newspaper? In favor of certain actors?  
- Readers 
o Do you think they are interested? 
o How much does the readership know? 
o Distance?/Relevance? 
o Is it difficult to cover the EP?  
o Which stories are easier to cover? 
o What is newsworthy? What do you think is of interest to them?  
o How do you cover the EP? What do you explain when drawing 
references? 
- Access 
o Who are your sources/contacts with respect to the EP? 
o Press conferences, press releases, MEPs, assistants? How useful?  
o Special relations?  
o Working modus of Parliament – constraining? 
o Other institutional constraints (decision making process, plenary 
votes & debates, committee work etc.) 
o other topical constraints/events 
o Some better access to EP than others? 
- Examples 
o SWIFT 
o Power towards EU Commission, esp. investiture procedure 
 
3. Opinion 
- What do you think about the EP? 
o How important is the EP? Criticism with it? 
o How do you see the powers? 
o Change of coverage over time? Prospects for the future, i.e. after 
Lisbon? 
o What is better/ worse? 
o Which institution is most visible? Why? 
o How do others cover the EP? Can you see differences? Is there a 
competition? 
- Personal role? 
o How do you see your role? As a ‘foreign’ correspondent? 
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A3.7b: Interview guide for the director at the EP Directorate-General for Communication
 
Note: These questions were not disclosed to the interviewees. They served as a guide for the interviewer, 
and were not posed in the way presented here in order to avoid leading the interviewee to certain 
answers.
- The EP Press office 
o How is it organized?  
o What is the communication strategy of the EP? Does the information       
you distribute vary across media type and/or country?  
o What is the information/news routine? 
- The press corps 
o What is your impression of the press corps? 
o What is newsworthy? Have you adapted your strategy? 
o How do they cover the EP? Can you see differences? Is there a 
competition? 
o Who is interested? 
o Some better access to EP than others? 
o Special relations to some MEPs? 
o Who do correspondents approach? 
o Why do you think are some more interested than others? 
- The EP’s picture in the media? 
o What are the weaknesses of the EP? 
o How do you see the powers? 
o Change of coverage over time? Prospects for the future, i.e. after 
Lisbon? 
o What is better/ worse? 
- Examples 
o SWIFT 
o Power towards EU Commission, esp. investiture procedure 
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A3.8:  Themes covered in each interview 
 IE-1 IE-2 GB-1 GB-2 GB-3 FR-1 FR-2 NL-1 NL-2 DE-1 DE-2 DE-3 DE-4 DE-5 DE-6 AT-1 AT-2 
Career related information x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Newspaper particularities     x  x x  x  x x     
Relationship to the 
editor/home office 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x 
Assumptions about the reader x x x x x  x x x x x x x x  x x 
EP access to information x x x  x x x x x   x x  x   
Relationship to Strasbourg seat 
of EP 
x x x x x x  x x  x  x   x x 
Newsworthiness of EP x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Representation of EP in the 
news 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x 
Relationship to MEPs x x x x x x x x x x  x x  x x x 
Representation of MEPs in the 
news 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Representation of parties/ 
party politics 
x  x  x x x x x x x x x x x   
Press coverage of European 
elections 
   x     x       x x 
Professional opinion towards 
EP 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Comparison to colleagues/ 
other newspapers 
x x  x x x x x x x x x x   x  
Coverage of SWIFT x x x x x x x x x x x x  x  x x 
Coverage of the Barroso 
Commission 
x x x x x  x x x x  x x   x x 
Coverage of previous 
investitures 
x    x  x  x x  x x    x 
Future EP press coverage  x x x x x x  x x x x x  x x x x 
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Appendix – Chapter 4 
A4.1: Descriptive Statistics for the dependent variable ‘Share of EP within article 
/percentage’ 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
EPsharepc 10847 0 100 12.37 27.56 
Valid N (listwise) 10847     
 
Number of observations in each country 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum.Percent 
Ireland 1400 12.9 12.9 12.9 
Netherlands 1857 17.1 17.1 30 
France 1889 17.4 17.4 47.4 
Germany 1886 17.4 17.4 64.8 
Austria 1962 18.1 18.1 82.9 
UK 1853 17.1 17.1 100 
Total 10847 100 100 
 
 
A4.2: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables  
 
Plenary dates for parliaments 
 EP sitting NP sitting 
Sitting Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
no 7957 73.4 73.4 6292 58 58 
yes 2890 26.6 100 4555 42 100 
Total 10847 100 
 
10847 100 
 
 
Dates for general elections considered for the data analysis 
Ireland 24 May 2007 
United Kingdom 5 May 2005 
France 
22 April & 6 May 2007 (presidential elections)  
10 & 17 June 2007 (parliamentary elections) 
Netherlands 22 November 2006 
Germany 18 September 2005 
Austria 1 October 2006 
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Political contestation over the EU by country and election 
Country Election dates 
Ireland 17 May 2002 24 May 2007  
 14.01 13.33  
United Kingdom  5 May 2005* 6 May 2010 
  15.81 16.44 
France 9 & 16 June 2002 10 & 17 June 2007  
 8.95 14.84  
Netherlands 22 January 2003 22 November 2006 9 June 2010 
 11.94 14.65 16.40 
Germany 18 September 2005 27 September 2009  
 6.81 9.96  
Austria 24 November 2002 1 October 2006 28 September 2008 
 13.16 18.84 19.50 
Calculations based on Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey 2002 
Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey 2006 
Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey 2010 
Legend: * includes the BNP and UKIP and hence data from the 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey were used 
for the calculations 
Sources: Own calculations based on Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 2002, 2006, 2010 
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EB Support for EU membership (% EU membership is a good thing) 
 
2005.2 2006.1 2006.2 2007.1 2007.2 2008.1 2008.2 2009.1 2009.2 2009.3 2010.1 2010.2 
Ireland 73.00 77.00 78.00 76.00 74.00 73.00 67.00 68.00 69.00 72.00 66.00 69.00 
Netherlands 70.00 74.00 72.00 77.00 79.00 75.00 80.00 78.00 72.00 74.00 69.00 67.00 
France 46.00 49.00 50.00 52.00 60.00 48.00 49.00 52.00 50.00 49.00 44.00 46.00 
Germany 53.00 57.00 58.00 65.00 67.00 60.00 64.00 60.00 61.00 60.00 50.00 49.00 
Austria 32.00 34.00 36.00 36.00 38.00 36.00 39.00 41.00 41.00 42.00 36.00 43.00 
UK 34.00 42.00 34.00 39.00 34.00 30.00 32.00 29.00 28.00 30.00 29.00 27.00 
 
EB Trust in the national parliament (% tend to trust) 
 
2005.2 2006.1 2006.2 2007.1 2007.2 2008.1 2008.2 2009.1 2009.2 2009.3 2010.1 2010.2 
Ireland 40.00 44.00 36.00 43.00 33.00 42.00 36.00 31.00 23.00 19.00 22.00 12.00 
UK 37.00 36.00 29.00 41.00 34.00 27.00 30.00 28.00 17.00 19.00 24.00 27.00 
France 28.00 31.00 27.00 44.00 40.00 35.00 36.00 31.00 33.00 28.00 36.00 28.00 
Netherlands 50.00 55.00 53.00 77.00 54.00 56.00 64.00 70.00 56.00 52.00 54.00 55.00 
Germany 36.00 40.00 31.00 51.00 41.00 41.00 41.00 46.00 46.00 45.00 39.00 40.00 
Austria 49.00 56.00 52.00 57.00 54.00 46.00 54.00 61.00 58.00 55.00 52.00 49.00 
Sources: Eurobarometer 
Party contestation over EU integration  
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Party Contestation 10847 6.81 18.84 12.45 3.71 
Valid N (listwise) 10847 
    
Sources: Own calculations based on Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 2002, 2006, 2010 
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A4.3: Bivariate correlations of the independent variables 
 
EB support 
for EU 
EB trust in 
NP EP sitting NP sitting 
BS No of 
staff 
Centre left 
BS 
Business 
BS 
BS 
circulation 
(1000s) 
EU 
Presidency 
GDP 
growth 
rate MS liberal 
MS 
polarized-
pluralist Interaction 
Political 
Contestati
on 
Squared 
Political 
Contestati
on 
EB support for 
EU  
1               
EB trust in NP .2495*** 1              
EP sitting  -.0016 -.034*** 1             
NP sitting -.0037 -.2148*** .219*** 1            
BS No of staff -.0239** -.296*** .0168* .1594*** 1           
Centre left BS .0502*** -.0097 .0155 .0056 .0549*** 1          
Business BS -.0984*** .0188* -.0164* -.0036 .0307*** -.4801*** 1         
NP circulation 
(10000s) 
-.1019*** -.3546*** .0072 .2091*** .3327*** .1656*** -.4077*** 1        
EU Presidency -.2058*** .0631*** .0196** -.0046 .0501*** -.0105 .0212** -.0056 1       
GDP growth 
rate 
.1295*** .0034 .014 .041*** -.0883*** .0181* -.0344*** -.0778*** -.0962*** 1      
MS liberal 
-.01 -.3259*** -.0104 .1582*** -.1513*** .0565*** -.1056*** .185*** -.0773*** .0708*** 1     
MS polarized-
pluralist 
-.1255*** -.4315*** -.0007 .0344*** .1111*** -.0098 .0359*** .0753*** -.1608*** -.1102*** -.3008*** 1    
Interaction of 
EB trust in NP 
& EB support 
for EU 
.8106*** .7465*** -.0213** -.0911*** -.1339*** .0209** -.0415*** -.2062*** -.1228*** .0726*** -.1819*** -.3099*** 1   
Political 
Contestation 
-.2656*** .3636*** -.018* -.0455*** -.4963*** .0166* -.0214** -.2112*** -.1224*** .0609*** .4485*** -.3228*** .0335*** 1  
Squared 
Political 
Contestation  
-.3145*** .3532*** -.0172* -.055*** -.459*** .011 -.0134 -.1998*** -.1189*** .0553*** .4094*** -.3405*** -.0096 .9894*** 1 
Legend: Pearson coefficients, N=10847, * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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A4.4: Tobit models, predicting variation in the volume of news referring to EU parliamentary affairs (interaction effect and jack-knife tests) 
 
Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B Model 6A Model 6B 
EB support for EU 3.17** 3.17* 1.49 1.49 3.55*** 3.55** 5.08*** 5.08*** 1.06 1.06 2.98*** 2.98*** 
 
(1.38) (1.74) (1.75) (1.60) (1.26) (1.49) (1.44) (1.88) (1.42) (1.76) (1.04) (.89) 
EB trust in NP 2.06 2.06 .08 .08 2.71* 2.71 3.73* 3.73 -.95 -.95 -.46 -.46 
 
(1.85) (1.85) (2.27) (2.15) (1.63) (2.02) (1.92) (2.42) (1.90) (2.33) (1.36) (1.12) 
EP sitting 60.24*** 60.24*** 59.32*** 59.32*** 59.96*** 59.96*** 57.54*** 57.54*** 63.64*** 63.64*** 58.16*** 58.16*** 
 
(3.79) (4.94) (3.28) (3.99) (3.70) (4.88) (3.30) (3.57) (2.79) (2.28) (2.90) (4.31) 
NP sitting 10.88*** 10. 88** 11.76*** 11.76** 6.47* 6.47 5.32* 5.32 10.36** 10.36 10.73*** 10.73** 
 
(3.06) (4.76) (3.39) (4.94) (3.37) (5.10) (3.15) (4.27) (4.57) (6.47) (2.95) (4.33) 
BS No of staff 13.49** 13.49*** 10.9 10.90*** 16.47*** 16.47*** 13.62*** 13.62*** 2.78 2.78 15.93*** 15.93*** 
 
(6.31) (4.40) (7.93) (2.84) (3.53) (3.11) (4.76) (3.97) (4.55) (2.50) (4.79) (3.72) 
Centre left BS 3.69 3.69 9.97 9.97 4.62 4.62 4.85 4.85 21.97** 21.97* 6.20 6.20 
 
(12.76) (10.76) (13.44) (11.97) (7.23) (6.79) (12.01) (9.97) (9.06) (11.37) (10.65) (10.36) 
Business BS -11.65 -11.65 -9.46 -9.46 -22.36** -22.36 -17.58 -17.58 .16 .16 5.59 5.59 
 
(13.39) (18.75) (11.30) (16.56) (10.69) (15.13) (14.90) (21.91) (10.77) (15.97) (11.98) (16.47) 
BS circulation (10000s) .00 .00 .00 .00 -.00* .00 -.00*** -.00* -.00*** -.00** .00 .00 
 
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
EU Presidency 21.81** 21.81 22.73** 22.73 16.23* 16.23 20.27** 20.27 31.60*** 31.60*** 5.78 5.78 
 
(9.20) (14.65) (10.8) (17.96) (8.84) (14.94) (8.98) (14.80) (8.10) (10.21) (7.52) (9.50) 
GDP growth rate 12.18** 12.18*** 5.44*** 5.44** 4.29*** 4. 29*** 3.32*** 3.32*** 4.31*** 4.31*** 3.68*** 3.68*** 
 
(4.80) (3.15) (1.52) (2.38) (1.00) (1.54) (1.15) (1.21) (.68) (.88) (.98) (1.10) 
Interaction of EB trust in -.05* -.05 -.02 -.02 -.06** -.06** -.10*** -.10** .00 .00 -.02 -.02 
NP & EB support for EU (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.02) (.02) 
SE clustered by Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country 
Country excluded IE IE GB GB FR FR NL NL DE DE AT AT 
Constant -267.36*** -267.36*** -148.59 -148.59 -284.91*** -284.91** -321.87*** -321.87*** -119.54 -119.54 -239.76*** -239.76*** 
 
(94.71) (90.09) (121.48) (108.35) (85.97) (111.30) (99.59) (118.89) (96.79) (124.18) (73.36) (50.69) 
Sigma Constant 90.88*** 90.88*** 87.75*** 87.75*** 86.29*** 86. 29*** 88.55*** 88.55*** 96.48*** 96.48*** 86.60*** 86.60*** 
 
(5.27) (9.23) (4.73) (7.63) (4.89) (7.76) (5.36) (8.70) (4.32) (4.92) (4.69) (7.50) 
N 9447 9447 8990 8990 8958 8958 8961 8961 8885 8885 8994 8994 
Pseudo R Squared .0322 .0322 .0307 .0307 .0361 .0361 .0335 .0335 .0322 .0322 .034 .034 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; adjusted standard errors in brackets; dependent variable: amount of news dealing with EU parliamentary affairs (%)
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Appendix – Chapter 5 
A5.1: Means of quotation length and N for each MEP cited across countries 
Country 
 
MEP1 MEP2 MEP3 MEP4 MEP3 MEP6 MEP7 MEP8 MEP9 MEP10 MEP11 MEP12 MEP13 MEP14 
IE M 44.1982 16.3972 13.6164 12.6098 5.6364 17.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
N 338 141 73 41 22 12 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
SD 57.7046 24.75505 19.05375 20.33701 10.92636 38.146 0 . . . . . . . 
GB M 28.5548 22.4407 9.4444 2.1818 14 34 10.5 29 
      
 
N 146 59 18 11 4 3 2 1 
      
 
SD 35.72887 22.52759 20.53755 7.23627 18.11077 56.294 14.84924 . 
      FR M 27.6045 15.2941 17.8636 9.4545 9.5455 41.09 15 25.4444 4 23 27.6 68.5
  
 
N 268 153 88 55 33 22 15 9 5 5 5 2 
  
 
SD 39.66716 16.81356 27.23975 13.66235 14.42673 49.317 26.52223 43.78102 8.94427 36.64696 39.3103 96.87363 
  NL M 29.365 22.6573 20.7419 21.8621 14.1333 17.33 0 2 49 
     
 
N 263 143 62 29 15 6 2 1 1 
     
 
SD 40.03143 28.1022 27.12203 26.42878 18.68486 40.008 0 . . 
     DE M 13.5009 7.4157 6.6415 6.2533 2.8649 10.52 3.6429 3 10.1667 1.6667 0 10 11
 
 
N 547 332 159 75 37 21 14 10 6 3 2 2 1 
 
 
SD 22.26977 10.37523 9.6261 8.21846 5.67236 29.417 6.46419 4.54606 11.44407 2.88675 0 14.14214 . 
 AT M 21.6266 7.8037 3.6053 1.9444 2.4667 33.78 3 0 
      
 
N 233 107 38 18 15 9 4 1 
      
 
SD 34.31111 12.20071 7.36515 4.65861 5.86596 48.918 3.55903 . 
      Total M 25.9905 13.3829 11.9064 9.6026 6.746 25.25 7.9231 12.6087 10 13.3333 17.25 31.4 5.5 0
 
N 1795 935 438 229 126 73 39 23 13 9 8 5 2 1 
 
SD 40.18912 19.52001 19.994 16.12789 12.2722 42.486 17.78436 29.09661 15.20965 28.37693 32.97077 59.66406 7.77817 . 
Legend: M= mean; SD= standard deviation; verbosity multiplier not considered 
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A5.2: Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable ‘MEP1 words/pc’ 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MEP1 words/pc  1795 0 88.86 7.2898 10.70142 
Valid N (listwise) 1795     
 
A5.3: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables  
Ballot structure and district size in the 2004 EU elections in each country 
Country Ballot structure 
Average 
district size 
Ireland Open 3.3 
UK Closed 6.8 
France Closed 9.8 
Netherlands Ordered 27 
Germany Closed 99 
Austria Ordered 18 
Source: Hix and Hagemann (2009)  
 
Individual characteristics of MEP1, MEP2 and MEP3  
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MEP1: No of reports
a 
1767 0 51 4.5 6.834 
MEP1: attendance
a 
1767 0.52 1 0.8858 0.083 
MEP1: No of terms
a 
1767 1 6 2.42 1.426 
MEP2: No of reports
a 
913 0 51 3.61 5.742 
MEP2: attendance
a 
913 0.09 1 0.8891 0.084 
MEP2: No of terms
a 
913 1 6 2.4 1.376 
MEP3: No of reports
a 
425 0 51 3.22 5.575 
MEP3: attendance
a 
425 0.47 1 0.8708 0.102 
MEP3: No of terms
a 
425 1 6 2.49 1.442 
Continued on the next page… 
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MEP1: EP President
b 
MEP1: committee chair
b 
MEP1: EP party leader
b 
MEP1: accession state
a 
MEP1: dom. opposition
c 
 
N Valid % Cum. % N Valid % Cum. % N Valid % Cum. % N Valid % Cum. % N Valid % Cum. % 
No 1695 94.4 94.4 1615 90 90 1675 93.3 93.3 1713 96.9 96.9 1181 66.84 66.84 
Yes 100 5.6 100 180 10 100 120 6.7 100 54 3.1 100 586 33.16 100 
Total 1795 100 
 
1795 100 
 
1795 100 
 
1767 100 
 
1767 100 
 
 
 
MEP2: EP President
b 
MEP2: committee chair
b 
MEP2: EP party leader
b 
MEP2: accession state
a 
MEP2: dom. opposition
c 
 
N Valid % Cum. % N Valid % Cum. % N Valid % Cum. % N Valid % Cum. % N Valid % Cum. % 
No 897 95.9 95.9 896 95.8 95.8 830 88.8 88.8 871 95.4 95.4 623 68.2 68.2 
Yes 38 4.1 100 39 4.2 100 105 11.2 100 42 4.6 100 290 31.8 100 
Total 935 100  935 100  935 100  913 100  913 100  
 
 
MEP3: EP President
b 
MEP3: committee chair
b 
MEP3: EP party leader
b 
MEP3: accession state
a 
MEP3: dom. opposition
c 
 
N Valid % Cum. % N Valid % Cum. % N Valid % Cum. % N Valid % Cum. % N Valid % Cum. % 
No 427 97.3 97.3 419 95.4 95.4 373 85 85 410 96.5 96.5 291 68.5 68.5 
Yes 12 2.7 100 20 4.6 100 66 15 100 15 3.5 100 134 31.5 100 
Total 439 100  439 100  439 100  425 100  425 100  
 
Sources: a Hurka and Kaeding (2011), b Høyland, Sircar et al. (2009), c own calculations. 
Note: The descriptive statistics for ‘EP sitting’ and ‘EB support for EU’ have already been provided in A4.2. 
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A5.4: Bivariate correlations of the independent variables  
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19 V20 V21 
V1 1                     
V2 -0.03 1                    
V3 -0.03 0.01* 1                   
V4 -0.11*** 0.08*** 0.01 1                  
V5 -0.23*** 0.09*** 0.02* 0.33*** 1                 
V6 -0.16*** -0.03 0.00 0.22*** -0.08*** 1                
V7 0.01 -0.10*** -0.02* -0.41*** 0.03*** -0.48*** 1               
V8 0.04* 0.04 0.00 -0.10*** -0.02** 0.04*** -0.10*** 1              
V9 -0.07*** -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05** 0.04 0.01 -0.10*** 1             
V10 -0.05** 0.05** 0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.07** -0.16*** 0.10*** 1            
V11 -0.22*** 0.15*** 0.05** 0.11*** 0.20*** -0.01 0.06** -0.16*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 1           
V12 0.05* 0.07*** 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.14*** 0.15*** 0.09*** 1          
V13 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.43*** -0.01 0.11*** -0.08*** 1         
V14 -0.01 0.10*** 0.02 0.09*** 0.11*** -0.05** -0.01 -0.05* -0.15*** 0.09*** 0.33*** -0.07** -0.07*** 1        
V15 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.13*** -0.01 0.03** -0.01 -0.03*** 0.06*** -0.10*** 0.02 -0.09*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.03 1       
V16 0.05* 0.07*** -0.03 0.03 0.05* -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.06** -0.01 -0.18*** -0.04* 0.05** -0.05** -0.08*** 1      
V17 -0.69*** 0.07 0.01 0.19 0.52 -0.01 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.03 0.25 -0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04 -0.02 1     
V18 -0.53*** -0.03 0.00 -0.43*** -0.38*** -0.03** 0.05*** 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.10*** -0.06** -0.07*** -0.04 -0.14*** 1    
V19 0.54*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.26*** -0.40*** 0.08*** -0.19*** 0.53*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.26*** -0.01 0.04* -0.07** 0.10*** -0.01 -0.29*** -0.28*** 1   
V20 0.71*** -0.08*** -0.01 0.19*** -0.15*** 0.04*** -0.11*** -0.01 -0.05** -0.09*** -0.24*** -0.03 0.01 -0.04* 0.02** 0.00 -0.46*** -0.48*** 0.59*** 1  
V21 0.50*** 0.05** 0.00 0.08*** 0.11*** -0.02** 0.04*** -0.13*** -0.03 0.04* 0.00*** 0.10*** 0.02 0.04* 0.01 0.07*** -0.26*** -0.33*** -0.18*** -0.30*** 1 
Legend: Pearson coefficients; N=1795 max; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; variable codes on the next page 
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Variable codes for A5.4 
V1: GE candidate-centred 
V2: No of MEPs in article 
V3: EP sitting 
V4: BS circulation (10000s) 
V5: BS No of staff 
V6: Centre right BS 
V7: Business BS 
V8: EB support for EU  
V9: MEP1: No of reports 
V10: MEP1: attendance 
V11: MEP1: No of terms 
V12: MEP1: EP President 
V13: MEP1: committee chair 
V14: MEP1: EP party leader 
V15: MEP1: domestic opposition 
V16: MEP1: accession state 
V17: EPE Ordered Ballot 
V18: EPE Open Ballot 
V19: AVG district size 
V20: MS liberal 
V21: MS polarised-pluralist 
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A5.5a: Tobit models, predicting variation in quotation length of MEPs (MEP2) 
               
 
Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B Model 6A Model 6B Model 7A Model7B 
GE candidate-centred 1.36 1.36 4.42*** 4.42*** .42 .42 .31 .31 3.18*** 3.18*** -1.56* -1.56** -.18 -.18 
 
(.97) (1.56) (.67) (1.08) (1.18) (2.00) (1.70) (2.55) (.24) (.23) (.85) (.66) (2.05) (2.63) 
No of MEPs in article -.86*** -.86*** -.69*** -.69*** -.79*** -.79*** -.95*** -.95*** -.87*** -.87*** -.84*** -.84*** -.88*** -.88*** 
 
(.19) (.17) (.18) . (12) (.18) (.18) (.21) (.26) (.21) (.18) (.25) (.26) (.20) (.18) 
EP sitting .82 .82 .47 .47 .51 .51 .85 .85 .63 .63 1.34** 1.34* 1.00* 1.00 
 
(.53) (.64) (.43) (.60) (.49) (.53) (.66) (.76) (.65) (.68) (.67) (.72) (.57) (.73) 
BS circulation  .00 .00** .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00*** .00*** .00*** .00*** .00*** .00 .00 
(10000s) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
BS No of staff -.62 -.62** -1.29*** -1.29*** -.42 -.42 -.92 -.92* -.47*** -.47*** .46 .46 -1.18* -1.18** 
 
(.39) (.30) (.37) (.21) (.66) (.37) (.68)  (.48) (.11) (.11) (.42) (.53) (.65) (.54) 
Centre right BS -1.74 -1.74*** -1.17* -1.17*** -2.20* -2.20*** -1.51 -1.51*** -1.62*** -1.62*** -.71 -.71 -2.01 -2.01*** 
 
(1.27) (.39) (.60) (.35) (1.23) (.39) (1.36) (.44) (.34) (.42) (1.13) (.93) (1.36) (.52) 
Business BS -.25 -.25 -1.82** -1.82* -1.32 -1.32 .03 .03 .15 .15 .25 .25 -1.87 -1.87 
 
(.96) (.90) (.83) (1.10) (1.29) (1.04) (1.03) (1.00) (.31) (.36) (1.15) (1.55) (2.11) (1.37) 
EB support for EU .01 .01 .13*** .13*** .04 .04 .03 .03 -.05*** -.05*** .05** .05*** -.08 -.08* 
 
(.03) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.05) (.03) (.05) (.01) (.00) (.02) (.01) (.08) (.04) 
MEP2: No of reports .03 .03 -.01 -.01 .03 .03 .02 .02 .06 .06 .10 .10 .05 .05 
 
(.07) (.07) (.05) (.05) (.08) (.07) (.09) (.08) (.07) (.07) (.08) (.06) (.08) (.07) 
MEP2: attendance 2.97 2.97 3.27 3.27* 2.15 2.15 2.87 2.87 5.68** 5.68** 2.47 2.47 4.91* 4.91*** 
 
(2.77) (2.24) (2.65) (1.80) (2.86) (1.99) (3.48) (2.94) (2.40) (2.65) (3.07) (2.27) (2.62) (1.80) 
MEP2: No of terms .03 .03 .05 .05 .03 .03 -.05 -.05 .15 .15 -.07 -.07 .02 .02 
 
(.21) (.18) (.20) (.16) (.23) (.21) (.26) (.24) (.19) (.08) (.29) (.32) (.23) (.22) 
MEP2: EP President -4.89*** -4.89*** -5.30*** -5.30*** -4.43*** -4.43*** -5.13*** -5.13* -3.52*** -3.52*** -6.20*** -6.20** -5.48*** -5.48*** 
 
(1.22) (1.74) (1.36) (1.98) (1.15) (1.62) (1.67) (2.64) (.78) (.71) (1.88) (2.72) (1.33) (1.90) 
MEP2: committee  -1.81 -1.81 -.22 -.22 -3.52** -3.52* -.95 -.95 -.87 -.87 -1.49 -1.49 -1.98 -1.98 
chair (1.75) (1.96) (1.79) (1.91) (1.75) (1.89) (1.69) (1.81) (1.64) (1.60) (2.46) (3.11) (1.94) (2.18) 
Continued on the next page…          
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… continued Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B Model 6A Model 6B Model 7A Model7B 
MEP2: EP party  -.25 -.25 -.91 -.91** -.06 -.06 -.44 -.44 -.08 -.08 1.12 1.12 -.55 -.55 
leader (.80) (.91) (.62) (.46) (.87) (1.07) (.83) (1.00) (.86) (.98) (1.62) (1.22) (.77) (.86) 
MEP2: dom.  .26 .26 .53 .53 .21 .21 -.39 -.39 .93 .93 1.06 1.06 .29 .29 
opposition (.73) (.74) (.70) (.64) (.76) (.67) (.85) (.49) (.70) (.72) (.71) (.68) (.78) (.78) 
MEP2: accession  -.79 -.79 -1.73 -1.73 -.68 -.68 -2.06 -2.06* -.11 -.11 .66 .66 -.99 -.99 
state (1.64) (1.51) (1.64) (1.47) (1.71) (1.67) (1.77) (1.05) (1.66) (1.93) (2.18) (2.37) (1.65) (1.64) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country 
Country excluded None None IE IE GB GB FR FR NL NL DE DE AT AT 
Constant 1.15 1.15 -2.61 -2.61* 1.13 1.13 1.00 1.00 .15 .15 -.35 -.35 9.96 9.96 
 
(2.67) (1.32) (3.13) (1.44) (2.58) (1.39) (3.27) (1.92) (3.05) (3.09) (4.15) (2.29) (9.88) (7.84) 
Sigma Constant 7.05*** 7.05*** 6.33*** 6.33*** 6.94*** 6.94*** 7.14*** 7.14*** 6.52*** 6.52*** 7.68*** 7.68*** 7.05*** 7.05*** 
 
(.65) (.92) (.57) (.72) (.69) (1.00) (.77) (1.14) (.72) (1.00) (.56) (.67) (.68) (1.01) 
N 913 913 772 772 860 860 765 765 772 772 587 587 809 809 
Pseudo R Squared .0259 .0259 .0369 .0369 .0278 .0278 .0271 .0271 .0363 .0363 .0355 .0355 .0282 .0282 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01, adjusted standard errors in brackets; dependent variable: Percentage of cited words for the second MEP per article 
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A5.5b: Tobit models, predicting variation in quotation length of MEPs (MEP3) 
               
 
Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B Model 6A Model 6B Model 7A Model7B 
GE candidate-centred 1.29 1.29 3.23*** 3.23*** 1.09 1.09 -1.59 -1.59 2.57*** 2.57*** -.75 -.75 .16 .16 
 
(.87) (1.02) (.89) (.48) (.82) (1.09) (1.06) (1.51) (.72) (.36) (.52) (.61) (1.42) (1.47) 
No of MEPs in article -.73*** -.73*** -.75*** -.75*** -.74*** -.74*** -.67*** -.67*** -.66*** -.66*** -.93*** -.93*** -.74*** -.74*** 
 
(.20) (.16) (.22) (.22) (.20) (.19) (.25) (.16) (.21) (.16) (.22) (.12) (.22) (.19) 
EP sitting .28 .28 .28 .28 .13 .13 .06 .06 .44 .44 -.09 -.09 .30 .30 
 
(.58) (.31) (.64) (.36) (.58) (.31) (.69) (.55) (.53) (.36) (.62) (.29) (.62) (.33) 
BS circulation  .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 (.00 .00 .00 .00*** .00*** .00 .00 
(10000s) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
BS No of staff .21 .21 -.26 -.26 .87* .87** -1.12** -1.12** .06 .06 .46 .46 -.25 -.25 
 
(.42) (.49) (.43) (.52) (.45) (.36) (.48) (.51) (.32) (.40) (.38) (.48) (.64) (.70) 
Centre right BS -2.19* -2.19*** -2.33*** -2.33*** -2.48** -2.48*** -1.22 -1.22* -1.61** -1.61*** -1.50* -1.50** -2.32* -2.32*** 
 
(1.15) (.48) (.80) (.46) (1.16) (.89) (.96) (.70) (.64) (.35) (.81) (.61) (1.34) (.80) 
Business BS -.58 -.58 -2.30** -2.30** -.64 -.64 1.00 1.00 -.15 -.15 -1.82** -1.82** -1.94 -1.94 
 
(.90) (1.04) (.99) (.95) (.89) (1.01) (1.17) (1.65) (1.21) (1.39) (.76) (.77) (1.74) (1.23) 
EB support for EU .05 .05 .14*** .14*** .06* .06 .10*** .10** .00 .00 .06** .06*** -.03 -.03 
 
(.03) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.07) (.03) 
MEP3: No of reports .04 .04 .04 .04 .05 .05* .04 .04 .07* .07*** .02 .02 .05 .05* 
 
(.05) (.03) (.05) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.07) (.05) (.04) (.02) (.08) (.09) (.05) (.03) 
MEP3: attendance 10.92*** 10.92** 10.07*** 10.07* 10.75*** 10.75** 11.30** 11.30* 7.16*** 7.16** 15.88** 15.88*** 10.46*** 10.46** 
 
(3.67) (4.66) (3.48) (5.26) (3.77) (4.52) (4.78) (5.89) (2.73) (2.79) (6.82) (5.82) (4.02) (5.02) 
MEP3: No of terms -.66** -.66*** -.76** -.76*** -.59** -.59*** -.60 -.60** -.68** -.68*** -.88** -.88** -.59** -.59*** 
 
(.27) (.20) (.30) (.25) (.26) (.18) (.36) (.24) (.27) (.25) (.42) (.42) (.30) (.19) 
MEP3: EP President -9.06*** -9.06*** -9.10*** -9.10*** -9.11*** -9.11*** -35.57 -35.57 -7.69*** -7.69*** -8.26** -8.26*** -8.43** -8.43*** 
 
(3.22) (2.03) (2.99) (2.26) (3.26) (1.92) (.00) (.00) (2.96) (1.70) (3.70) (2.89) (3.57) (2.06) 
MEP3: committee  .50 .50 .72 .72 .13 .13 1.14 1.14 1.38 1.38* -.99 -.99 .36 .36 
chair (2.11) (1.38) (2.23) (1.74) (2.16) (1.34) (2.72) (1.07) (1.92) (.83) (3.81) (2.46) (2.22) (1.45) 
Continued on the next page…          
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… continued Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B Model 6A Model 6B Model 7A Model7B 
MEP3: EP party  -.17 -.17 -.22 -.22 .00 .00 .21 .21 .41 .41 -1.26 -1.26 -.07 -.07 
leader (1.06) (.97) (1.11) (.98) (1.04) (.96) (1.46) (1.35) (.96) (.64) (1.17) (.88) (1.12) (1.04) 
MEP3: dom.  -.18 -.18 .2 .20 .01 .01 -.93 -.93 -.21 -.21 -.79 -.79 -.18 -.18 
opposition (.74) (.72) (.68) (.41) (.75) (.72) (.96) (.97) (.64) (.72) (1.00) (1.14) (.78) (.76) 
MEP3: accession  -2.07 -2.07 -2.55 -2.55 -2.05 -2.05 -5.92** -5.92** .03 .03 -3.03 -3.03 -1.92 -1.92 
state (2.07) (3.00) (2.46) (3.53) (2.01) (2.98) (2.29) (2.87) (1.31) (1.68) (3.04) (4.09) (2.13) (3.11) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country 
Country excluded None None IE IE GB GB FR FR NL NL DE DE AT AT 
Constant -8.35** -8.35* -9.51*** -9.51** -1.88** -1.88** -9.13* -9.13* -3.74 -3.74** -13.31** -13.31*** .51 .51 
 
(3.88) (4.41) (3.25) (4.10) (4.41) (4.71) (4.71) (4.89) (3.00) (1.56) (5.94) (4.85) (7.94) (5.80) 
Sigma Constant 5.63*** 5.63*** 5.15*** 5.15*** 5.53*** 5.53*** 5.57*** 5.57*** 5.00*** 5.00*** 5.99*** 5.99*** 5.70*** 5.70*** 
 
(.55) (.73) (.52) (.68) (.57) (.78) (.68) (.90) (.62) (.72) (.41) (.56) (.57) (.78) 
N 424 424 351 351 409 409 339 339 364 364 269 269 388 388 
Pseudo R Squared .0475 .0475 .0687 .0687 .0504 .0504 .0594 .0594 .0553 .0553 .0679 .0679 .0404 .0404 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01, adjusted standard errors in brackets; dependent variable: Percentage of cited words for the third MEP per article 
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A5.5c: Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables ‘MEP2 words/pc’ and ‘MEP3 
words/pc’ 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MEP2 words/pc  935 .00 30.04 3.4243 5.06794 
MEP3 words/pc 438 .00 30.50 2.6323 4.13353 
 
 
304 
 
 
Table 5.6: Tobit models, predicting variation in quotation length of MEPs (MEP1) (Jack-knife tests) 
 
            
 
Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B Model 6A Model 6B 
GE candidate-centred 4.85*** 4.85*** 3.11*** 3.11*** 2.71* 2.71** 4.19*** 4.19*** 1.98** 1.98*** 3.56** 3.56* 
 
(1.00) (1.01) (1.10) (.98) (1.43) (1.26) (.81) (.28) (.87) (.23) (1.77) (2.01) 
No of MEPs in article -1.17*** -1.17*** -1.63*** -1.63** -1.81*** -1.81* -1.62*** -1.62** -2.34*** -2.34*** -1.54*** -1.54** 
 
(.25) (.37) (.47) (.73) (.62) (.97) (.51) (.79) (.53) (.78) (.47) (.73) 
EP sitting -1.25*** -1.25*** -1.28*** -1.28*** -1.04** -1.04** -.98** -.98*** -1.03 -1.03* -1.34*** -1.34*** 
 
(.43) (.35) (.45) (.34) (.45) (.42) (.42) (.37) (.63) (.55) (.45) (.36) 
BS circulation (10000s) -.00*** -.00*** .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 -.00* -.00* -.00*** .00 .00 
 
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
BS No of staff -1.47*** -1.47*** -1.65*** -1.65** -1.85*** -1.85*** -1.38*** -1.38*** -.27 -.27 -1.25** -1.25* 
 
(.34) (.17) (.62) (.72) (.56) (.68) (.29) (.37) (.34) (.32) (.56) (.70) 
Centre right BS -3.06*** -3.06*** -1.67 -1.67 -1.20 -1.20 -1.78* -1.78 -.31 -.31 -.94 -.94 
 
(.67) (.87) (1.28) (1.63) (1.21) (1.55) (1.04) (1.51) (1.34) (1.99) (1.18) (1.31) 
Business BS -5.17*** -5.17*** -3.54*** -3.54** -2.21 -2.21 -3.11** -3.11*** -3.01*** -3.01*** -3.41* -3.41 
 
(1.02) (1.01) (1.35) (1.55) (1.36) (1.54) (1.21) (1.08) (.93) (1.07) (1.92) (2.34) 
EB support for EU .12*** .12*** .07* .07* .08** .08*** .03 .03*** .09*** .09*** .07 .07 
 
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.01) . (03) (.01) (.07) (.06) 
MEP1: No of reports -.03 -.03 -.06 -.06*** -.05 -.05*** -.04 -.04* -.06 -.06* -.04 -.04** 
 
(.05) (.03) (.04) (.01) (.03) (.01) (.04) (.02) . (06) (.03) (.04) (.02) 
MEP1: attendance -1.00 -1.00 -3.36 -3.36 -.66 -.66 -11.49*** -11.49** -4.51 -4.51 -4.85 -4.85 
 
(6.28 (9.34) (6.37) (8.58) (5.86) (7.89) (4.35) (5.52) (7.41) (10.05) (6.41) (8.92) 
MEP1: No of terms .45 .45* .35 .35 .14 .14 .42 .42 .55 .55 .15 .15 
 
(.28) (.25) (.28) (.29) (.29) (.24) (.29) (.27) (.39) (.36) (.20) (.26) 
MEP1: EP President -5.81*** -5.81*** -5.38** -5.38*** -4.52* -4.52* -4.28* -4.28** -7.06*** -7.06*** -4.61** -4.61** 
 
(2.11) (2.05) (2.36) (1.98) (2.68) (2.39) (2.41) (1.79) (2.58) (1.22) (2.31) (2.07) 
MEP1: committee chair -2.33 -2.33 -3.02* -3.02 -1.83 -1.83 -2.73 -2.73 -4.34* -4.34 -4.06** -4.06* 
 
(1.79) (2.00) (1.83) (2.16) (1.69) (1.66) (1.72) (1.84) (2.35) (2.65) (1.84) (2.09) 
Continued on the next page…          
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… continued Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B Model 6A Model 6B 
MEP1: EP party leader -2.09*** -2.09** -2.79*** -2.79** -1.40* -1.40* -1.89** -1.89 -3.20*** -3.20** -2.06** -2.06* 
 
(.73) (1.04) (.95) (1.27) (.79) (.81) (.83) (1.17) (.94) (1.26) (.85) (1.16) 
MEP1: dom. opposition .68 .68 1.41 1.41 1.17 1.17 1.73* 1.73 2.38** 2.38*** 1.46 1.46 
 
(.93) (.88) (.92) (1.20) (1.02) (1.34) (.95) (1.18) (1.00) (.74) (.99) (1.19) 
MEP1: accession state -2.38 -2.38 -2.00 -2 -4.28** -4.28*** -3.26 -3.26* -1.8 -1.8 -2.25 -2.25 
 
(1.73) (1.61) (1.94) (1.68) (2.10) (1.55) (2.11) (1.93) (2.46) (2.28) (2.05) (1.60) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE clustered by Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country Newspaper  Country 
Country excluded IE IE GB GB FR FR NL NL DE DE AT AT 
Constant 9.13 9.13 13.14** 13.14 11.08* 11.08 21.08*** 21.08*** 10.55 10.55 14.11** 14.11*** 
 
(6.08) (8.82) (6.24) (8.13) (5.82) (7.32) (4.41) (4.18) (6.44) (7.95) (6.97) (3.21) 
Sigma Constant 10.41*** 10.41*** 12.74*** 12.74*** 12.52*** 12.52*** 12.52*** 12.52*** 14.14*** 14.14*** 12.40*** 12.40*** 
 
(1.01) (1.53) (1.58) (2.40) (1.73) (2.63) (1.74) (2.66) (1.37) (1.75) (1.71) (2.60) 
N 1431 1431 1626 1626 1503 1503 1507 1507 1223 1223 1535 1535 
Pseudo R Squared .0222 .0222 .0239 .0239 .0245 .0245 .0255 .0255 .0190 .0190 .0256 .0256 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01, adjusted standard errors in brackets; dependent variable: Percentage of cited words for the first MEP per article 
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A5.7: MEPs mentioned in the SBP, ranked by the number of references 
 
MEP No. of references 
Eoin Ryan 8 
Proinsias De Rossa 3 
Simon Coveney 2 
Sean O Neachtain 1 
Mairead McGuinness 1 
Jim Higgins 1 
Gay Mitchell 1 
Marian Harkin 1 
Liam Aylward 1 
Kartika Tamara Liotard 1 
Pervenche Beres 1 
 
Legend: Total number of articles = 17; Irish MEPs are indicated in bold letters; the table considers all MEPs 
mentioned in the articles, regardless of whether they have been cited, or whether they have been 
mentioned first or last  
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Appendix – Chapter 6 
A6.1: EP resolutions linked to SWIFT 
Date Title of the resolution Procedure Document 
06/07/2006 Resolution on interception of bank transfer data 
from the SWIFT system by the US secret services 
2006/2594(RSP) T6-0317/2006 
14/02/2007 Resolution on SWIFT, the PNR agreement and the 
transatlantic dialogue on these issues 
2007/2503(RSP) T6-0039/2007 
14/02/2007 Resolution on the alleged use of European 
countries by the CIA for the transportation and 
illegal detention of prisoners 
2006/2200(INI) 
 
T6-0032/2007 
15/03/2007 Report on compliance with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in the Commission's 
legislative proposals: methodology for systematic 
and rigorous monitoring 
2005/2169(INI) 
 
T6-0078/2007 
24/04/2007 Resolution on the proposal for a directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on 
payment services in the internal market and 
amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2000/12/EC and 
2002/65/EC  
2005/0245(COD) T6-0128/2007 
25/04/2007 Resolution on transatlantic relations 2007/2530(RSP) T6-0155/2007 
21/06/2007 Resolution on an area of freedom, security and 
justice: Strategy on the external dimension, 
Action Plan implementing the Hague programme 
2006/2111(INI) T6-0284/2007 
11/07/2007 Resolution on Financial services policy (2005 - 
2010) - White Paper 
2006/2270(INI) T6-0338/2007 
12/07/2007 Resolution on the ECB annual report for 2006 2007/2142(INI) T6-0349/2007 
05/06/2008 Resolution on the forthcoming EU-United States 
summit (Ljubljana, 9-10 June 2008) 
2008/2530(RSP) T6-0256/2008 
04/09/2008 Evaluation of EU sanctions as part of the EU's 
actions and policies in the area of human rights 
2008/2031(INI) T6-0405/2008 
17/09/2009 Resolution on the envisaged international 
agreement to make available to the United 
States Treasury Department financial payment 
messaging data to prevent and combat terrorism 
and terrorist financing 
2009/2670(RSP) T7-0016/2009 
22/10/2009 Resolution on the upcoming EU-US Summit and 
the Transatlantic Economic Council Meeting 
2009/2697(RSP) 
 
T7-0058/2009 
25/11/2009 Resolution on the Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council - An area of freedom, security and justice 
serving the citizen - Stockholm programme 
2009/2534(RSP) 
 
T7-0090/2009 
05/05/2010 Resolution on the Recommendation from the 
Commission to the Council to authorise the 
opening of negotiations for an agreement 
between the European Union and the United 
States of America to make available to the United 
States Treasury Department financial messaging 
data to prevent and combat terrorism and 
terrorist financing 
2010/2649(RSP) 
 
T7-0143/2010 
05/05/2010 Resolution on the launch of negotiations for 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) agreements with 
the United States, Australia and Canada 
2010/2657(RSP) T7-0144/2010 
Source: Legislative Observatory of the European Parliament 
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A6.2: Article type by country 
 
News Comment 
other 
comment
a 
Interview
b 
 
Total 
Ireland 10 1 0 0  11 
UK 12 0 5 0  17 
France  44 4 0 1  49 
Netherlands 19 2 2 3  26 
Germany 110 25 1 1  137 
Austria  39 5 1 1  46 
US 27 1 2 0  30 
 261 38 11 6  316 
Legend:  
a UK: FT = 3, Guardian= 1, Times =1; NL: Trouw =1, NRC =1; DE: SZ =1; AT: Standard = 1; US: Washington 
Post = 2;  
b FR: Les Echos = 1; NL: VK = 2, NRC = 1; DE: FAZ =1; AT: SN =1 
 
A6.3: Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable ‘Share of EP within article 
/percentage’ (SWIFT case) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
EPsharepc 451 0 100 24.9802 29.9404 
Valid N (listwise) 451     
 
A6.4: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables  
 
Lisbon Treaty
 
EP debate on SWIFT (days)
 
No of SWIFT debates in NP
 
 
N Valid % Cum. % N Valid % Cum. % N Valid % Cum. % 
No 212 47 47 354 78.5 78.5 415 92 92 
Yes 239 53 100 97 21.5 100 36 8 100 
Total 451 100  451 100  451 100  
Note: Descriptive statistics for ‘EB trust in NP’ , ‘EB support for EU’ and ‘Political Contestation’ have 
already been provided in A4.2.  
 
Party contestation over EU integration  
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Party Contestation 451 6.81 19.50 12.36 4.05 
Valid N (listwise) 451 
    
Sources: Own calculations based on Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 2002, 2006, 2010 (see also A4.2) 
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Dates of parliamentary debates on SWIFT 
DÉ HoC AN TK BT NR EP 
 12/02/2009 
04/02/2010 
27/04/2010 27/07/2006 
13/03/2007 
23/05/2007 
04/07/2007 
15/10/2009 
01/12/2009 
08/12/2009 
17/12/2009 
28/09/2006 
22/03/2007 
29/03/2007 
28/05/2009 
11/11/2009 
25/11/2009 
02/12/2009 
03/12/2009 
17/12/2009 
19/01/2010 
24/02/2010 
03/03/2010 
04/03/2010 
18/03/2010 
26/03/2010 
22/04/2010 
06/05/2010 
01/07/2010 
08/07/2010 
16/09/2010 
28/10/2010 
16/12/2010 
03/05/2007 
03/09/2009 
20/10/2010 
05/11/2010 
03/07/2006 
05/07/2006 
06/07/2006 
07/09/2006 
11/10/2006 
14/11/2006 
13/12/2006 
31/01/2007 
13/02/2007 
14/02/2007 
14/03/2007 
23/04/2007 
24/04/2007 
25/04/2007 
20/06/2007 
05/09/2007 
13/01/2009 
24/03/2009 
16/09/2009 
17/09/2009 
21/10/2009 
11/11/2009 
23/11/2009 
24/11/2009 
25/11/2009 
15/12/2009 
16/12/2009 
19/01/2010 
20/01/2010 
08/02/2010 
09/02/2010 
10/02/2010 
11/02/2010 
24/02/2010 
09/03/2010 
10/03/2010 
19/04/2010 
20/04/2010 
21/04/2010 
05/05/2010 
18/05/2010 
15/06/2010 
06/07/2010 
07/07/2010 
08/07/2010 
 
 
0 debates 2 debates 1 debate 8 debates 22 debates 4 debates 45 debates 
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A6.5: Bivariate Pearson correlations of the independent variables 
 
Lisbon 
Treaty 
EP debate 
on SWIFT 
(days) 
No of SWIFT 
debates in 
NP 
Centre left 
BS Business BS 
BS 
circulation 
(10000s) 
EB support 
for EU 
EB trust in 
NP MS liberal 
MS 
polarised-
pluralist 
Political 
Contestation 
Squared 
Political 
Contestation EP sitting 
Lisbon Treaty 1          
   
EP debate on SWIFT 
(days) 
.2938*** 1 
        
   
No of SWIFT debates in 
NP 
.0652 .0521 1 
       
   
Centre left BS .02 -.0577 -.1259*** 1       
   
Business BS -.1532*** -.0215 .016 -.5469*** 1      
   
BS circulation (10000s) .1098** .0025 .4532*** .3573*** -.4753*** 1     
   
EB support for EU -.1405*** -.0088 .3633*** -.0919* .0958** .1732*** 1    
   
EB trust in NP -.0563 .0194 .1114** -.0008 -.1221*** -.2106*** .2339*** 1   
   
MS liberal -.1617*** -.0246 -.3671*** .1421*** -.0265 -.1267*** -.1284*** -.3929*** 1  
   
MS polarised-pluralist .0556 -.0758 -.5376*** .0211 .1095*** -.0113 -.2256*** -.4961*** -.1978*** 1    
Political Contestation .2251*** .0687 -.7782*** .0626 -.1275*** -.4762*** -.441*** .2675*** .1674*** .1306*** 1   
Squared Political 
Contestation  
.1891*** .0576 -.7444*** .0558 -.1356*** -.4999*** -.4744*** .3031*** .1217*** .0846** .9892*** 1  
EP sitting .1399*** .6779*** .0236 -.0417 .0239 -.0363 -.0674 -.0371 .0353 -.0884* .0941** .0895* 1 
Legend: Pearson coefficients; N=451; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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A6.6: Tobit models, predicting variation in the in the volume of news referring to EU 
parliamentary affairs for the SWIFT case (including Squared Political Contestation) 
 
 
Model 1A Model 1B 
Lisbon Treaty 41.93*** 41.93*** 
 
(6.58) (1.07) 
EP debate on SWIFT (days) 9.56** 9.56*** 
 
(4.40) (3.27) 
No of SWIFT debates in NP -.45 -.45 
 
(.29) (.38) 
Centre left BS -4.35 -4.35 
 
(3.75) (4.27) 
Business BS 5.30 5.3 
 
(4.34) (5.18) 
BS circulation (10000s) .00 .00 
 
(.00) (.00) 
EB support for EU   
 
  
EB trust in NP   
 
  
Political Contestation -3.60 -3.60 
 (5.03) (4.81) 
Squared Political .17 .17 
Contestation (.17) (.17) 
EP sitting 6.15** 6.15 
 (3.10) (3.95) 
SE clustered by Newspaper  Country 
Constant 34.69*** 34.69*** 
 
(34.25) (26.42) 
Sigma Constant 34.69 34.69 
 
(2.29) (1.84) 
N 451 451 
Pseudo R Square .0504 .0504 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; adjusted standard errors in brackets; dependent variable: amount of news 
dealing with EU parliamentary affairs (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
